People v. Jenkins

2023 IL App (4th) 220173-UNOTICE FILED
This Order was filed under
NO. 4-22-0173 March 3, 2023
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
not precedent except in the Carla Bender
limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate
IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL
under Rule 23(e)(1).
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) McLean County
DERRICK JENKINS, ) No. 16CM1656
Defendant-Appellant. )
) Honorable
) William A. Yoder,
) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE CAVANAGH delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Turner and Doherty concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The evidence was insufficient to support defendant’s conviction for obstructing a
peace officer.
¶2 Defendant, Derrick Jenkins, appeals his conviction for obstructing a peace officer.
Defendant contends the evidence at trial was insufficient to prove him guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. We agree and reverse defendant’s conviction for obstructing a peace officer.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 In October 2016, defendant received a citation and complaint for driving under
the influence (DUI) (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2) (West 2016)) in McLean County case No.
16-DT-702 and improper lane usage in McLean County case No. 16-TR-19088. The State
further charged defendant by information with obstructing a peace officer (720 ILCS 5/31-1(a)
(West 2016)) in the present case, McLean County case No. 16-CM-1656, alleging he knowingly
obstructed the performance of Bloomington police officer Brandt Parsley of an authorized act
within his official capacity, being the custodial transportation of defendant, in that defendant
physically refused to enter a police vehicle for his transportation after being directed to do so by
Parsley, and he knew Parsley was a peace officer.
¶5 At defendant’s March 2017 jury trial, Bloomington police officer Bryce Janssen
testified he and Officer Parsley were on foot for an unrelated investigation at approximately
10:20 p.m. on October 10, 2016, when they “heard a loud crash.” As they walked toward the
crash scene, Janssen observed a Chevrolet Malibu that had struck a parked blue van. Defendant
was standing near the vehicles. Defendant declined an ambulance and told Janssen he was the
driver and only occupant of the vehicle. Parsley arrested defendant for DUI and transported him
to the police department for processing.
¶6 Janssen explained defendant was acting “belligerent almost” during processing.
Janssen stayed in the processing room with Parsley based on defendant’s actions. After
defendant was processed, the officers attempted to place defendant in Parsley’s car for transport
to the county jail. Parsley’s car did not have a divider to separate the rear passenger area from the
front of the vehicle, so the officers attempted to place defendant in the front seat. Janssen
described defendant’s refusal:
“Officer Parsley asked him to get in the car and he said he wasn’t getting
in the car. And at one point in time, he even leaned his body outside of the
vehicle. I’m not 100 percent positive, I believe he had his foot in the vehicle and
he refused to get his other foot in the vehicle. And based off of his unwillingness
to get in the vehicle, I told Officer Parsley we should put him in my vehicle.”
Janssen’s car did have a partition separating the rear passenger area.
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¶7 Parsley testified he conducted field sobriety tests. During the tests, Parsley noted
defendant was “just unable to follow instructions” and refused to complete some tests. Parsley
arrested defendant and transported defendant to the police department in his squad car. During
the DUI processing, defendant was erratic. Parsley stated defendant “would go from being very
nice and cordial to just absolutely irate.” Due to defendant’s “hostile behavior,” Janssen stayed
with Parsley during DUI processing. Parsley described the attempt to place defendant in his car:
“We attempted to place him in the car. He refused. At that time we decided that
we would place him in Officer Janssen’s car which was directly behind mine. The
reason for that is that it had a Plexiglass divider where we put [defendant] away
from—away from me, basically.
***
He just leaned up against [the vehicle] like (indicating). I don’t really
know how to explain it. But he would put his back against the top portion of the
car. Making it to where we couldn’t push him into the car and have him sit
down.”
¶8 The State played a video of defendant refusing to get in Parsley’s vehicle for the
jury. Parsley testified the video was from Janssen’s squad car and caught the “initial attempt” to
put defendant in his car. The video begins with defendant partially in the front passenger side of
the car with an officer behind him. Within a few seconds, the officers removed defendant and
took him to Janssen’s car.
¶9 Defendant testified in his own defense. Defendant claimed Ladika Tolise was
driving the vehicle when a strut broke on the car. Defendant was on the phone with roadside
assistance and Tolise “walked off” because “[h]e was in a bit of a rush.” Officers arrived and had
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defendant perform field sobriety tests. Defendant informed one of the officers he needed to use
the restroom and believed it affected his ability to perform the tests. Defendant also claimed to
be taking prescription pain medication at the time. Defendant stated he was giving random
answers to the officers’ questions because he did not want to talk to the officers at all.
¶ 10 The jury found defendant guilty of DUI in case No. 16-DT-702, improper lane
usage in case No. 16-TR-19088, and obstruction of a peace officer in case No. 16-CM-1656. The
trial court sentenced defendant to 150 days in jail for obstruction and DUI.
¶ 11 Defendant appealed his convictions for DUI and obstruction in consolidated
appeals. (We note defendant did not appeal his conviction for improper lane usage in case No.
16-TR-19088.) After a series of remands related to Krankel hearings (People v. Krankel, 102 Ill.
2d 181 (1984)), the trial court held a final Krankel hearing on February 28, 2022. See People v.
Jenkins, 2019 IL App (4th) 170319-U; People v. Jenkins, 2020 IL App (4th) 190878-U; People
v. Jenkins, No. 4-21-0134 (Ill. Mar. 17, 2022) (appeal dismissed) (dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction on defendant’s motion).
¶ 12 On March 4, 2022, defendant filed a timely separate notice of appeal in case No.
16-DT-702 (docketed as No. 4-22-0187) and case No. 16-CM-1656, the present case. This court
granted the Office of the State Appellate Defender’s motion to withdraw as counsel on appeal
and affirmed defendant’s conviction for DUI. See People v. Jenkins, No. 4-22-0187 (Dec. 6,
2022) (unpublished summary order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(c)). This appeal
pertains only to case No. 16-CM-1656, defendant’s conviction for obstruction of a peace officer.
¶ 13 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 14 A reviewing court will not set aside a criminal conviction unless the evidence is
so improbable or unsatisfactory that it creates a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt. People
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v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261 (1985). On a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, “ ‘the
relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Id. (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307, 319 (1979)).
¶ 15 The trier of fact has the responsibility to assess the credibility of witnesses, weigh
their testimony, and draw reasonable inferences from the evidence. People v. Heard, 187 Ill. 2d
36, 84 (1999). A reviewing court will not reverse a conviction simply because the evidence is
contradictory. People v. Berland, 74 Ill. 2d 286, 306 (1978). We will not substitute our judgment
for that of the trier of fact. People v. Cooper, 194 Ill. 2d 419, 431 (2000); People v. Kotlarz, 193
Ill. 2d 272, 298 (2000).
¶ 16 Section 31-1(a) of the Criminal Code of 2012 provides, “[a] person who
knowingly resists or obstructs the performance by one known to the person to be a peace officer
*** of any authorized act within his or her official capacity commits a Class A misdemeanor.”
720 ILCS 5/31-1(a) (West 2016). Defendant does not dispute he knew Officer Parsley was a
peace officer performing an authorized act within his official capacity.
¶ 17 Defendant argues the State “failed to present any evidence that [defendant’s]
conduct materially obstructed Officer Parsley for more than a de minimis period of time.”
Defendant argues his case is analogous to People v. Gotschall, 2022 IL App (4th) 210256.
¶ 18 In Gotschall, the defendant was arrested and placed in the back seat of an
officer’s squad car. Id. ¶ 5. The defendant’s foot was still on the pavement, so the officer was
unable to close the door. The officer repeatedly asked the defendant to place his foot in the car,
and the defendant did not comply. Id. The officer attempted to physically put the defendant’s
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foot in the car, and the defendant resisted by pushing his foot back down to the pavement. The
officer threatened to spray the defendant with pepper spray, and the defendant complied. Id.Thirty seconds elapsed from the time the officer first told the defendant to get in the car and the
point when the officer shut the car door. Id. ¶ 6. The defendant was charged with obstruction of a
peace officer. Id. ¶ 3.
¶ 19 This court held “the offense of obstructing a peace officer *** includes a material
impediment requirement.” Id. ¶ 26. In reversing the defendant’s conviction, we found the
“defendant’s brief refusal to place his foot inside the squad car did not materially impede [the
officer] from performing the authorized act of transporting defendant to the county jail.” Id. ¶ 29.
The defendant’s refusal lasted less than 30 seconds and did not “threaten [the officer’s] safety
nor did it delay his transport by any appreciable period of time.” Id. We noted, however, “a
defendant’s conduct may be found to materially impede an authorized act of a peace officer,
even if it causes only a brief delay, if it threatens officer safety.” Id. ¶ 30.
¶ 20 Defendant argues this case is substantially similar to Gotschall. Defendant’s
refusal to get into Parsley’s squad car was brief. The recording of the incident lasted only four
seconds, and Parsley testified it showed the “initial attempt” to place defendant in his car. Even
the most generous definition of “initial attempt” would still mean a very brief period elapsed
before the officers decided to place defendant in Janssen’s squad car. Defendant’s refusal to sit in
Parsley’s car, therefore, did not delay his transport by any appreciable time period.
¶ 21 The State concedes there are factual similarities between this case and Gotschall,
including that the length of defendant’s refusal was brief, but argues this case is distinguishable
because defendant’s conduct placed officers in fear for their safety. The State compares
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defendant’s case to People v. Mehta, 2020 IL App (3d) 180020, and People v. Synnott, 349 Ill.
App. 3d 223 (2004).
¶ 22 In Mehta, the defendant was convicted of obstructing a peace officer. Mehta,
2020 IL App (3d) 180020, ¶ 3. Officers pulled over a vehicle in which the defendant was a
passenger after receiving a report that two men had been chasing a victim with a gun. Id. ¶¶ 4, 9.
The defendant exited the vehicle, and officers ordered him to turn around multiple times. Id. ¶ 6.
The defendant did not turn around, but he eventually walked towards the officers, who took him
into custody. Id. The incident lasted three minutes or less. Id. ¶¶ 8, 11. Officers described the
stop as a “ ‘very high stress situation,’ ” and the defendant’s refusal to turn around put officers at
risk and impeded the officers’ ability to investigate any other occupants of the vehicle or whether
there was a gun in the vicinity. Id. ¶ 11. The appellate court ultimately affirmed the defendant’s
conviction, finding, although the defendant’s conduct caused only a brief delay in the traffic
stop, the nature of the obstructive act and the nature of the act being obstructed were relevant
considerations. Id. ¶¶ 32-35. The court noted the conduct occurred in a “high-tension situation,”
as officers stopped the defendant’s vehicle on suspicion the occupants possessed a firearm in an
area known for gang-related violence. Id. ¶ 35. The court found, “ ‘[A]ny behavior that actually
threatens an officer’s safety or even places an officer in fear for his or her safety is a significant
impediment to the officer’s performance of his or her duties.’ ” Id. (quoting Synnott, 349 Ill.
App. 3d at 228).
¶ 23 In Synnott, an officer stopped the defendant’s vehicle for speeding 20 miles per
hour over the posted speed limit. Synnott, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 224. After observing signs the
defendant was intoxicated, the officer asked the defendant to turn off the engine and step out of
the car. Id. The trial court explained the situation as follows:
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“ ‘[T]he officer four times told the defendant to exit the vehicle, the defendant
repeatedly refused to do so. He grasped the steering wheel firmly at one point in
an obvious indication he was refusing to leave the vehicle and after four occasions
did not remove himself, and then momentarily did not comply with the officer
pulling his arm; although he then immediately did comply.’ ” Id. at 224-25.
The defendant was found guilty of obstructing a peace officer. In affirming the defendant’s
conviction, the appellate court found, “It seems clear that any behavior that actually threatens an
officer’s safety or even places an officer in fear for his or her safety is a significant impediment
to the officer’s performance of his or her duties.” Id. at 228.
¶ 24 We fail to see how defendant’s actions in this case placed the officers’ safety at
risk. Mehta and Synnott involve officers conducting traffic stops on unfamiliar subjects. In both
cases, the defendants refused to comply with direct orders from officers, heightening existing
concerns for officer safety. In this case, defendant was already in custody in a police parking
garage. Defendant had been in custody for over an hour by this point, and he had already safely
been transported in Parsley’s squad car. Even after defendant’s “erratic” behavior in the DUI
processing room, Parsley was still willing to transport defendant in his squad car prior to
defendant’s refusal. That the officers decided it would be safer to transport defendant in
Janssen’s vehicle after defendant’s refusal does not demonstrate the officers felt actually
threatened by defendant’s actions or feared for their safety.
¶ 25 We conclude, even considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the
State, defendant’s brief refusal to get into Parsley’s squad car did not materially impede the
officers from transporting defendant to the county jail. The partial recording of the incident
reflects defendant only briefly refused to sit in Parsley’s car before officers decided to place him
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in Officer Janssen’s squad car. Defendant’s brief refusal to sit in Parsley’s car while handcuffed
in a police parking garage did not threaten the safety of the officers.
¶ 26 Because we find the trial evidence was insufficient to prove defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt of obstructing a peace officer, we reverse defendant’s conviction.
¶ 27 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 28 For the reasons stated, we reverse the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 29 Reversed.
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