Adames v. Sheahan

FOURTH DIVISION
November 29, 2007
No. 1-05-3911
HECTOR ADAMES, JR., and ROSALIA DIAZ, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
as Co-Special Administrators of the Estate of) of Cook County.
Joshua Adames, Deceased, )
)
Plaintiffs-Appellants, )
) No. 01 L 05894
v. )
)
MICHAEL F. SHEAHAN, in his Official Capacity ) Honorable Carol Pearce McCarthy,
as Cook County Sheriff, BERETTA U.S.A. ) Judge Presiding.
CORPORATION, and FABBRICA D’ARMI )
PIETRO BERETTA S.P.A., )
)
Defendants-Appellees. )
MODIFIED UPON DENIAL OF REHEARING
JUSTICE MURPHY delivered the opinion of the court:
On May 5, 2001, Joshua Adames (Josh) was shot in the abdomen while playing with
William Swan (Billy). Billy’s father, David Swan (David), was employed by the Cook County
sheriff’s department at the time. Billy, age 13, had found David’s service weapon in his parents’
bedroom closet and was playing with it when Josh came over. While playing, Billy accidentally
shot Josh in the stomach and he died as a result of the abdominal wound.
Plaintiffs, Hector Adames, Jr., and Rosalia Diaz, co-special administrators of the estate of
Joshua Adames, brought suit against various defendants. At issue on appeal are plaintiffs’ claims
against defendant Cook County Sheriff Michael F. Sheahan (Sheahan) and defendant Beretta
U.S.A. Corp. (Beretta). Following the conclusion of discovery, the trial court granted
1-05-3911
defendants’ separate motions for summary judgment. Plaintiffs now appeal the trial court’s orders
granting defendants’ motions for summary judgment. For the following reasons, we affirm in part
and reverse in part the findings of the trial court and remand this matter for a new trial.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Billy Swan
On the morning of Sunday, May 5, 2001, Billy was home alone while his mother was at
work and David and his brother went out. Billy called Josh and invited him over to play. Billy
went into his parents’ bedroom to watch through their window for Josh’s arrival. Billy knew that
inviting Josh over and going into his parents’ bedroom were both against the rules.
Billy noticed that his parents’ closet door was open and he saw a box on a shelf. Billy
retrieved the box, which was unlocked and contained three guns belonging to David, including a
Beretta 92 Series handgun (handgun) with a full magazine clip of bullets. Billy never saw his
father carry or clean a gun in the house, but thought that his father might have a gun.
Billy had never handled a gun before, but he picked up the handgun and pushed a button
that released the magazine holding the bullets. Billy replaced the clip and removed it several
times. He also moved the slide mechanism at the top of the handgun and a bullet popped out.
Billy repeatedly removed and replaced the bullets and magazine from the handgun. Billy stated
that he understood the handgun to be loaded when the magazine was in place. However, he
thought that bullets came out of the top of the magazine when the handgun was fired, not from
within the chamber of the handgun. Billy also thought that removing the magazine fully unloaded
the handgun.
After a few minutes, Billy saw his friend, Michael, riding his bicycle outside. Billy took
-2-
1-05-3911
the three guns, put them in his pockets and went downstairs to see Michael. Billy showed
Michael the guns and how they worked. Josh arrived and Michael went to another room in
Billy’s house.
Billy and Josh began wrestling and playing around. Billy showed Josh the handgun,
ejecting the magazine and bullets as described above. Billy removed the magazine and the bullet
using the slide on the handgun, placing the bullets and magazine in his pocket. Billy first
pretended to fire the handgun six or seven times at Josh before he actually pulled the trigger.
Billy knew the handgun was dangerous and it could hurt or kill somebody, but he thought that the
magazine had to be loaded in the handgun to fire a bullet. Tragically, the handgun discharged a
chambered bullet that hit Josh in the abdomen.
Billy ran upstairs and put the guns back in his parents’ closet. Billy then ran back
downstairs and realized that he had shot Josh. He called 911 and told the dispatcher that he found
a gun and accidentally shot his friend while playing. Billy also stated that he did not know there
were any bullets in the handgun.
Billy was subsequently found delinquent in juvenile court proceedings relating to the
shooting. The delinquency holding was based on a finding that Billy committed involuntary
manslaughter and reckless discharge of a firearm. Billy was placed on probation. This court
affirmed the delinquency finding of the juvenile court. In re W.S., No. 1-02-1170 (2003)
(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).
B. David Swan
David testified that he graduated from the police academy in 1988, was deputized with the
Cook County sheriff around January 1988, and promoted to lieutenant in 1997 or 1998. David
carried a gun with him to work as an officer. When David started with the sheriff’s office, his
-3-
1-05-3911
service revolver was a Smith & Wesson .38 Special. Eventually, he became certified in automatic
weaponry and the handgun became his service handgun. David was promoted to supervisor and
no longer needed his handgun on the job and, therefore, rarely brought it to work. David
continued as a supervisor after the incident, even though all of his firearms were confiscated by
the police investigators.
David testified that he owned three guns: the handgun, the .38 Special, and a .25
automatic. All three guns were stored in the same locking case, along with ammunition. David
stored the case, and additional ammunition, on the top shelf in his closet. He maintained one key
to the case on his key ring and an additional key in the junk drawer of his dresser. Approximately
a year before the shooting, David completed his annual firearm qualification. David disagreed
with Billy’s testimony and stated that he locked up all three guns in the lockbox, returned them to
the top shelf in his closet and did not touch the guns after that date. For the purposes of
defendants’ summary judgment motions and these proceedings, the presumption is that the
lockbox was unlocked.
David understood that the sheriff’s office required deputies to secure and store their
weapons in either a locking box, like he used, or with a trigger lock. David testified that,
pursuant to department requirements, he stored the ammunition separately from the handgun and
that the handgun was stored without a bullet in its chamber. David knew how to check if a bullet
was in the chamber and how to clear the weapon. David also knew about trigger locks, but did
not have one and did not look into purchasing one for his handgun. However, David was not
aware that the handgun would fire a bullet with the magazine removed. David also was unaware
of a settlement by Beretta in a different case that included an agreement to include either
magazine disconnect safeties in all guns sold after January 1, 2001, or a warning label that the
-4-
1-05-3911
firearm is capable of firing when the magazine is not engaged.
David stated that his house rules included a prohibition on any child in the parents’
bedroom at any time and no one outside the family was allowed in the house when he or his wife
was not home. David testified that he reminded Billy of this rule on May 5, 2001, and Billy told
him that he was going to go to the park. David speculated that Billy found the lockbox and the
key and gained access to the gun. However, from the moment he returned to the house after the
shooting to the day of his deposition, Billy had never openly discussed the shooting. David
admitted that he never informed his children that he maintained guns in the household and that he
never taught them gun safety.
In response to the shooting, Sheahan filed a complaint against David before the Merit
Board claiming that David failed to properly secure and store his handgun. David’s guns were
taken from him by the police in their investigation and never returned to him. Following a bench
trial, David was found not guilty of criminal charges based on the proscription under section 24-9
of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/24-9 (West 2004)) against improper storage of a
firearm in a premise in which a minor under 14 is likely to gain access to the firearm.
C. Sheriff’s Office Rules and Policies
Sheahan’s general counsel, executive director, and weapons training officers testified to
the department’s rules and procedures and training programs. At the time of the incident,
Sheahan had a general order in place that mirrored or exceeded the requirements of section 24-9
of the Criminal Code of 1961. 720 ILCS 5/24-9 (West 2004). The purpose of the general order
is to promote safe gun usage, citing 1,134 Americans were killed in 1997 from accidental
shootings and that, annually, about 300 children are killed in accidental shootings. The general
order requires officers to secure duty weapons in a secured lock box container or other location
-5-
1-05-3911
that would prohibit access by unauthorized persons to avoid accidents. In addition, officers are
required to store any keys to such locking devices in a secure location separate from the weapon.
Officers were taught to expect children to look everywhere in their homes. Therefore, weapons
must always be inaccessible to children and properly stored to avoid accidents with children.
Sheahan’s training program also included materials on educating family members,
particularly children. Education of children was detailed as an additional responsibility beyond
proper storage. Specifically included in the materials is the recommendation to openly discuss
firearm safety with children and avoid ignoring the issue.
Officers are informed that their responsibility for their firearm includes unintentional
discharge because of improper storage, education, or disarming of the firearm. Officers were re-
certified in their firearms annually, which included a program on home firearm safety. Although
David did not need a weapon to perform his duties as a supervisor, he completed this program
annually.
D. The Handgun
Extensive testimony and documentation was presented regarding the handgun itself and
various safety measures available in the industry. The handgun is a semiautomatic pistol designed
for law enforcement and military use. The handgun is loaded by filling the magazine with bullets
and inserting the filled magazine into the magazine well. The handgun is prepared for discharge
by chambering the first round, pulling the slide to the rear of the handgun, and releasing it. When
the safety is off, the handgun may be fired by its double-action trigger pull. After the chambered
round is fired, the slide recoils to the rear, the spent cartridge is ejected, and the next live round is
chambered upon the return of the slide.
-6-
1-05-3911
This process will continue each time the trigger is pulled until the magazine is empty, at
which time the slide remains locked open until the slide catch lever is released. Therefore, the
user knows when firing the handgun that the magazine and chamber have been emptied. A user
may also check if a round has been chambered by manually pulling the slide back and visually
determining if a round has been loaded. Additionally, the handgun has a chamber loaded indicator
– a small extractor head painted red – that protrudes from the side of the slide when the chamber
is loaded. Other safety devices on the weapon include: an ambidextrous safety-decocking lever; a
hammer drop catch; a flared and serrated trigger guard; an automatic firing pin catch; a two-piece
inertial firing pin unit; a reversible magazine release button; and a slide overtravel stop. Beretta
did not include a magazine disconnect safety on this model.
Each handgun sold by Beretta was packaged with an instruction manual that included
specific warnings and safety instructions. Like the training provided by Sheahan, the instruction
manual contains repeated warnings of the dangers of firearms and the importance of proper
handling and storage to avoid accidental injury or death. In particular, it contains advice to
owners to store guns in locked storage units out of reach of children with ammunition stored
separately.
Further, the manual contains advice to owners to make sure the cartridge chamber is
empty when storing the handgun. Explicit step-by-step instructions on how to safely and
completely unload the handgun are provided. The manual also includes instructions on how to
fully engage the safety, release the magazine, fully retract the slide to extract and eject the
chambered cartridge, and, finally, visually inspect the open slide and magazine well to ensure all
cartridges have been completely ejected. This information is repeated several times in the manual.
-7-
1-05-3911
E. Expert Testimony
Plaintiffs presented witnesses who opined that the gun as designed was unreasonably
dangerous. Plaintiffs’ expert, Stanton Berg, a firearms consultant, admitted that an accident-
proof handgun is impossible, but claimed that repetitive accidents may be designed out by gun
manufacturers. Berg opined that if the handgun had a magazine disconnect safety, a device that
stops the firearm from firing when the magazine is not fully inserted, the shooting in this case
would not have occurred. Berg noted that this safety device was invented in 1910 and had even
been used by Beretta on 92 Series handguns utilized by some police departments. Berg listed
over 300 models of handguns that utilize a magazine disconnect safety and concluded that a
handgun without such a safety is defective.
Berg continued to opine that the chamber loaded indicator located on the side of the slide
was insufficient. He claimed the indicator was too small to provide an effective warning that a
bullet was chambered. Berg also testified that the handgun should contain a warning on the
firearm itself that it could be fired with the magazine removed. Berg admitted on cross-
examination that the nature and function of a firearm is to discharge a projectile at a high rate of
speed. Berg stated that the majority of law enforcement agencies in the country utilized firearms
without a magazine disconnect safety. Berg also admitted that it was a valid concern of these
agencies to assure that they utilize firearms without anything that threatened to be an impingement
on the firing of the gun.
Wallace Collins, a firearms and ammunition design and safety expert, testified to his study
of safety assists suitable for handguns. Collins determined that the following safety characteristics
were available at the time the handgun was manufactured, but were not included: a magazine
-8-
1-05-3911
disconnect safety; a warning that the gun will fire when the magazine is released; a better-located
chamber-loaded indicator with clear directions; and a key lock. Therefore, Collins concluded that
the handgun was unnecessarily dangerous.
Collins testified that these safety features were readily available, inexpensive, and
commercially feasible. Collins opined that the key safety component that was missing was the
magazine disconnect safety. Collins concluded that countless accidents like the shooting in this
case could be avoided by the implementation of the devices.
Stephen Teret, a professor of epidemiology for the School of Public Health at Johns
Hopkins University, also was deposed as a witness for plaintiffs. Teret prepared a report on the
shooting and testified that he concluded that the absence of a magazine disconnect safety caused
the shooting in this case. Teret included data in his report from a survey designed by the Johns
Hopkins Center for Gun Policy and Research, performed by the National Opinion Research
Center and reported in the Journal of Public Health Policy. The survey asked respondents
whether they thought that a pistol can still be shot when its magazine is removed. Of the 1,200
respondents: 65% answered the pistol could still be fired; 20.3% answered the pistol could not be
fired; 14.5% did not know; and .2% refused to answer. Of the 34.8% who responded that the
pistol could not fire when the magazine is removed or that they did not know, 28% lived in a gun-
owning household. Teret also testified that he felt the chamber loaded warning was not effective
and could not possibly warn people who have no knowledge about guns.
Witnesses for Beretta testified that they understood that children gain access to guns and
accidental shootings have occurred both with and without the magazine inserted in the gun. It
was agreed that this incident would not have occurred with a magazine disconnect safety installed
-9-
1-05-3911
on the handgun. It was further admitted that Beretta was capable of manufacturing guns with
such a feature at a cost of up to $10 per gun. However, Beretta did not include a magazine
disconnect because there was no market demand for that feature. Beretta also admitted to other
manufacturers’ use of the aforementioned safety devices on their handguns.
Beretta introduced evidence that the Beretta FS is utilized by police departments
throughout the country. Testimony was presented that the handgun, as manufactured, met or
exceeded industry standards. Further testimony on behalf of Beretta claimed that for the past 20
years, the vast majority of law enforcement agencies have consistently expressed a preference for
no magazine disconnect safety or internal locking devices. Law enforcement officers and agencies
do not want weaponry that may become inoperable by an inadvertent release of the magazine, that
could possibly jeopardize the safety of officers and the public.
F. Motions for Summary Judgment
Both defendants filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motions
in separate orders dated August 23, 2005. With respect to Sheahan, the trial court found that
questions of material fact remained to preclude summary judgment on plaintiffs’ arguments
regarding the propriety of weapon storage and scope of employment. However, summary
judgment was granted based on the trial court’s finding that Sheahan did not have a duty to
protect the victim from the criminal acts of Billy Swan. The trial court also noted that, had a duty
existed, the cause of the harm was not reasonably foreseeable.
Beretta argued in its motion for summary judgment that its product was not unreasonably
dangerous, it had no duty to warn due to the obvious danger, and that Billy Swan’s actions were
an intervening cause. Beretta’s motion was granted in its entirety. Plaintiffs timely filed their
-10-
1-05-3911
appeal of these two rulings.
II. ANALYSIS
Summary judgment may be granted when “the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on
file, [and] affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2004).
The sole function of the trial court is to determine if material issues of fact exist; it is not to try the
issues. Kim v. Citigroup, Inc., 368 Ill. App. 3d 298, 305 (2006). We review an order granting
summary judgment de novo. Ragan v. Columbia Mutual Insurance Co., 183 Ill. 2d 342, 349
(1998). While we also review the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmovant, we cannot
ignore evidence unfavorable to the nonmovant and may sustain the trial court on any basis called
for in the record. Ruane v. Amore, 287 Ill. App. 3d 465, 474 (1997).
Plaintiffs assert five issues on appeal. With respect to Sheahan, plaintiffs argue that the
trial court erred in finding that Sheahan had no duty to Josh and that Billy Swan’s conduct was
criminal and an independent intervening cause. As to the claims against Beretta, plaintiffs argue
that the trial court erred in: failing to find that the handgun was unreasonably dangerous from
failure to include a magazine disconnect or a sufficient chamber loaded indicator; failing to find
that the handgun was unreasonably dangerous for failing to adequately warn the user; and, as with
Sheahan, finding that Billy Swan’s conduct was an independent intervening cause superceding
Beretta’s legal responsibility. However, Beretta asserts in its response and sur-reply that the
United States Congress’s enactment of the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act
(PLCAA) (Pub. L. 109--12, 119 Stat. 2095 (2005)) (adding 15 U.S.C. § 7901 through 7903)
provides gun manufacturers immunity from claims such as those advanced by plaintiffs.
-11-
1-05-3911
A. Scope of Sheahan’s Duty to Third Parties
Plaintiffs first argue that the trial court erroneously determined that Sheahan had no duty
to protect Josh from a criminal attack. While the question of duty is a question of law to be
determined by the trial court, plaintiffs maintain that because of the trial court’s reliance on the
criminal attack, it failed to examine the proper factors to determine whether a party owes a duty
to another. Plaintiffs argue that they established the factors relevant to the establishment of a
duty, namely: reasonable foreseeability of the injury; the likelihood of injury; the magnitude of the
burden to guard against such an injury; and the consequences of placing that burden on the
defendant. Ward v. K mart Corp., 136 Ill. 2d 132, 140-41 (1990). Therefore, plaintiffs argue
that the finding of the trial court must be reversed.
Plaintiffs argue that Sheahan owed a duty to Josh. Plaintiffs cite the rules and training
materials created by the sheriff’s department requiring safe and secure storage of handguns by
officers. In addition, plaintiffs argue that under common law and section 24-9 of the Criminal
Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/24-9 (West 2004)), Sheahan has a duty to assure his deputies safely
secure their service firearms away from children. Furthermore, plaintiffs note that in Gaffney v.
City of Chicago, 302 Ill. App. 3d 41 (1998), which is taught to deputies during weapons training,
this court found the defendant city liable for one of its police officer’s failure to properly store his
firearm.
In Gaffney, a police officer for the City of Chicago stored his unloaded service revolver
and bullets together in an unlocked metal cabinet in his home. The officer’s minor son took the
unsecured revolver and bullets to a party and shot and killed a boy. The minor shooter was
subsequently adjudicated delinquent for the shooting. Gaffney, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 44. This court
-12-
1-05-3911
reversed the trial court’s grant of judgment notwithstanding the verdict to the City and found that
the officer was acting within the scope of his employment at the time he stored his revolver.
Gaffney, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 43-44. Although the police department had no rules, general orders,
or directives requiring officers to lock up guns at home, this court found that the officer was
acting within the scope of his employment when storing his revolver at home. This court
specifically cited to the police department’s training and disciplining officers for off-duty weapon
storage issues, testimony that the officer was required to perform authorized tasks whenever the
need arose, and the officer’s testimony that he stored the revolver unlocked to assure he could
carry out his duties on a moments notice. This evidence supported the conclusion that a triable
issue of fact remained that he was acting within the scope of employment in storing his revolver.
Gaffney, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 48-49. Plaintiffs highlight testimony of Sheahan’s range master that
Gaffney is taught because it establishes liability against an officer and the department if an
unauthorized person gains access to an improperly stored handgun.
Plaintiffs also assert that the trial court erred in finding that a criminal attack even
occurred. Plaintiffs note that Billy testified that the shooting was an accident and that defendants’
experts agreed as much. Therefore, plaintiffs claim that since the shooting was unintentional, it
was not a criminal attack and did not support the trial court’s judgment. Plaintiffs argue that this
case involved an accident by someone who clearly did not actively intend the outcome. Plaintiffs
assert that even if one is found guilty of reckless or negligent conduct, he may still seek
contribution from a negligent third party if he has not committed an intentional tort. Therefore,
they conclude that they should not be barred from seeking compensation for Billy’s negligence.
See Ziarko v. Soo Line R.R. Co., 161 Ill. 2d 267 (1994).
-13-
1-05-3911
Furthermore, plaintiffs argue that the trial court relied upon an unpublished order entered
pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 23. Plaintiffs note that the trial court’s only reference to
evidence of the juvenile proceeding against Billy was to the Rule 23 order and no other evidence
is of record. Plaintiffs assert that the Rule 23 order has no precedential value and cannot be
utilized for this purpose. Price v. Hickory Point Bank & Trust, 362 Ill. App. 3d 1211, 1221
(2006). Therefore, plaintiffs claim the trial court had no support for its finding.
Sheahan responds that a party does not have a duty to protect another from criminal
attack absent a special relationship unless it voluntarily undertakes actions to protect that person.
Rowe v. State Bank of Lombard, 125 Ill. 2d 203, 215-16 (1988). Special relationships that have
been found to create a duty are: common carrier and passenger; innkeeper and guest; business
inviter and invitee; and voluntary custodian and protectee. Hernandez v. Rapid Bus Co., 267 Ill.
App. 3d 519, 524 (1994). Sheahan concludes that no special relationship existed with Josh and
that he did not perform any voluntary undertaking to create a duty to protect Josh. Sheahan
argues that the recent trend in cases has identified a fear of the expansion of liability and the
special relationship rule. See City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 213 Ill. 2d 351 (2004);
Young v. Bryco Arms, 213 Ill. 2d 433 (2004); Charleston v. Larson, 297 Ill. App. 3d 540 (1998).
Sheahan notes that, though the Rule 23 order affirming the delinquency adjudication was
not included in the record, the trial court cited to the order. Sheahan adds that this court may
take judicial notice of its own opinions and attached the order to his brief for that purpose.
Dawdy v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 207 Ill. 2d 167, 177 (2003). Contrary to plaintiffs’ assertion,
Sheahan argues that the Rule 23 order has a preclusive effect to the extent that it affirmed Billy’s
adjudication and that it was not utilized as precedent based on its legal analysis. Furthermore,
-14-
1-05-3911
Sheahan argues that the information is of record as David testified to the findings of the juvenile
court against Billy. As to the actual crime committed, Sheahan points out that specific intent is
not required for involuntary manslaughter and Billy’s reckless behavior does not remove the
criminality of that conduct.
Sheahan continues that a duty may not be established by internal rules and policies.
Rhodes v. Illinois Central Gulf R.R., 172 Ill. 2d 213, 238 (1996). Sheahan argues that the
training and general orders with respect to gun safety may establish a standard of care applicable
to his officers, but do not establish a duty. Jones v. Chicago HMO Ltd. of Illinois, 191 Ill. 2d
278, 295 (2000). Sheahan distinguishes Gaffney on this subject, asserting that the Gaffney court
did not examine the question of duty. Sheahan notes that the issue in Gaffney was whether the
defendant police officer was acting within the scope of his employment when he stored his gun at
home. Gaffney, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 48-49. In addition, Sheahan asserts that there was no criminal
conviction of the child who accessed the gun in that case.
Sheahan concludes that, most importantly, the shooting was not foreseeable and,
therefore, no duty could exist. Sheahan maintains that David could not reasonably foresee that
Billy would: break his rules against children in the bedroom; find the gun box; unload the gun box;
load and unload the gun; and finally shoot Josh. Sheahan argues that this lack of foreseeability
takes this case out of the firearms storage statute and no duty existed as a matter of law.
As noted above, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss on the scope of employment
issue because an issue of fact remained, but granted the motion on the duty issue. Therefore,
Sheahan maintains that this is not a scope of employment case. However, plaintiff sought
damages against Sheahan based on the principle of respondeat superior. A discussion of the
-15-
1-05-3911
relevant principles of respondeat superior should illuminate and resolve this issue.
“The general rule is that a person injured by the negligence of another must
seek his or her remedy from the person who caused the injury. The relation of
employer and employee is an exception to this general rule. Darner v. Colby, 375
Ill. 558, 560 (1941); Metzler v. Layton, 373 Ill. 88, 91 (1939). Under the theory
of respondeat superior, an employer can be liable for the torts of an employee, but
only for those torts that are committed within the scope of the employment.
Wright v. City of Danville, 174 Ill. 2d 391, 405 (1996); Pyne v. Witmer, 129 Ill. 2d
351, 359 (1989). Indeed, the employer’s vicarious liability extends to the
negligent, willful, malicious, or even criminal acts of its employees when such acts
are committed within the scope of the employment. See Mitchell v. Norman
James Construction Co., 291 Ill. App. 3d 927, 932 (1997); Randi F. v. High
Ridge YMCA, 170 Ill. App. 3d 962, 964 (1988); Webb v. Jewel Cos., 137 Ill. App.
3d 1004, 1006 (1985).
The term ‘scope of employment,’ used interchangeably with ‘in the course
of the employment,’ refers to a ‘bare formula,’ whose ‘very vagueness has been of
value in permiting a desirable degree of flexibility in decisions.’ W. Keeton,
Prosser & Keeton on Torts §70, at 502 (5th ed. 1984). The Second Restatement
of Agency has identified three general criteria in determining whether an
employee’s acts are within the scope of employment.
‘(1) Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment
if, but only if:
-16-
1-05-3911
(a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform;
(b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time
and space limits;
(c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to
serve the master ***[.]
***
(2) Conduct of a servant is not within the scope of
employment if it is different in kind from that authorized, far
beyond the authorized time or space limits, or too little actuated by
a purpose to serve the master. (Restatement (Second) of Agency
§228 (1958).) Pyne, 129 Ill. 2d at 360.’ ” Bagent v. Blessing Care
Corp., 224 Ill. 2d 154, 163-64 (2007).
“Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a principal may be held liable for the tortious
actions of an agent which cause a plaintiff’s injury, even if the principal does not himself engage in
any conduct in relation to the plaintiff.” Woods v. Cole, 181 Ill. 2d 512, 517 (1998). This is so
even though “[o]nly the agent is at fault in fact for the plaintiff’s injuries.” American National
Bank & Trust Co. v. Columbus-Cuneo-Cabrini Medical Center, 154 Ill. 2d 347, 354 (1992).
Both before the trial court and this court, Sheahan strenuously argues that David violated
sheriff’s department regulations and numerous directives of staff members of the sheriff’s
department when he failed to put the handgun in a secure locked box. However, it is a well-
settled legal principle that where an agent does an act in the course of his employment, although
the principle did not authorize or participate in, or know of the conduct, or even if he forbade the
-17-
1-05-3911
acts or disapproved of them, the rule of respondeat superior applies. Lynch v. Board of
Education of Colinsville Community Unit District No. 10, 82 Ill. 2d 415, 424-25 (1980).
Our supreme court most recently addressed the rule of respondeat superior in Bagent.
There, the court held that “all three criteria of section 228 of the Second Restatement of Agency
must be met to conclude that an employee was acting within the scope of employment.” Bagent,
224 Ill. 2d at 165. The court further held that whether an employee was acting within the scope
of employment depends on “the employment contract and the nature of the relationship, which
must exist at the time of and in respect to the particular facts out of which the injury arose.”
Bagent, 224 Ill. 2d at 165. Section 229 sets out a nonexhaustive list of several factual matters to
consider in determining whether the complained-of act is so similar or incidental to employer-
authorized conduct:
“Pertinent matters include: whether the act is one commonly done by such
employees; the time, place, and purpose of the act; the previous relations between
the employer and the employee; whether the act is outside the enterprise of the
employer or, if within the enterprise, has not been entrusted to any employee;
whether the employer has reason to expect that such an act will be done; the
similarity in quality of the act done to the act authorized; whether the employer
furnished to the employee the instrumentality by which the harm is done; and the
extent of departure from the normal method of accomplishing an authorized
result.” Bagent, 224 Ill. 2d at 166-67, citing Restatement (Second) of Agency
§229(2) (1958).
An employer’s warning to an employee to act with care does not remove an employer
-18-
1-05-3911
from vicarious liability. Although an express prohibition may argue against an act being within
the scope of employment, it is only a factor in determining the issue. Bagent, 224 Ill. 2d at 167-
68. It is the plaintiff’s burden to show the contemporaneous relationship between the tortious act
and the scope of employment. Bagent, 224 Ill. 2d at 165. However, for purposes of summary
judgment, it must be shown that no reasonable person could conclude from the evidence that an
employee was acting within the scope of employment. Bagent, 224 Ill. 2d at 165.
We find that the facts of this case are similar to those presented in Gaffney and that case is
controlling. The Gaffney court considered the aforementioned factors from sections 228 and 229
of the Restatement. Gaffney, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 51-52. As in this case, Sheahan would be hard-
pressed to say that officers did not store their weapons at home; in fact, like in Gaffney, the
specific training and materials on proper storage supports a finding that the act is incidental to an
act David was hired to perform. While David did not carry his weapon to work daily like the
defendant police officer in Gaffney, and he did not testify that he stored his gun unlocked to
respond to any emergency in his presence, he did testify that he owned the firearm because of his
job and annually was certified to use the firearm as required by Sheahan. David’s continued
storage of the gun was not outside the enterprise of his employer and David maintainted the
firearm for the purpose of serving as a deputy sheriff. As in Gaffney, the evidence that Sheahan
further disciplined officers for improper storage supports the conclusion that such storage is
incidental to employment. This also argues to the factor that the improper storage was not an act
that the servant was unlikely to do.
These facts also support a finding that David was acting within the authorized time and
space limits of his employment. In addition to the above, testimony was presented that there were
-19-
1-05-3911
insufficient storage options at the department and home storage was expected. While David
testified that he did not carry his firearm to work for his daily duties, the fact remains that he did
at one time, he owned the firearm for work purposes, he would be required to use it in an
emergency, he was certified annually to use the firearm, and he ultimately was disciplined by
Sheahan for his improper storage. While the facts of this case do not present the same explicit
testimony from Gaffney about an officer’s being “on duty” 24 hours a day, these facts argue in
favor of finding David was acting within the scope of employment and Sheahan is liable for
David’s alleged tortious actions.
Accordingly, we must determine whether the trial court erred in finding Billy’s actions
foreclosed a duty to the victim. First, we note that neither side discussed the importance of the
fact that Billy’s adjudication of delinquency was conducted, naturally, pursuant to the Juvenile
Court Act of 1987. 705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. (West 2004). Although both the trial court and
Sheahan repeatedly raise the import of Billy’s “conviction” for criminal acts, our supreme court
recently rejected this categorization. People v. Taylor, 221 Ill. 2d 157, 163-71 (2006). The
Taylor court highlighted the Juvenile Court Act procedures both before and after its major
amendments in 1999 and found that a juvenile adjudication has never been a “conviction” as
defined under the Criminal Code of 1961. 720 ILCS 5/2-5 (West 2004).
Under the Criminal Code, a conviction requires either a plea of guilty or a verdict entered
by a jury or court of competent jurisdiction authorized to try the case without a jury. 720 ILCS
5/2-5 (West 2004). Although a juvenile may plead guilty under section 5-605 of the amended
Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/5-605 (West 1998)), minors do not have a right to a jury trial
under that act within the meaning of the sixth amendment. Taylor, 221 Ill. 2d at 168. In fact,
-20-
1-05-3911
delinquency proceedings are not criminal, but civil in nature, intended to correct and rehabilitate,
not punish. In re R.G., 283 Ill. App. 3d 183, 186 (1996). Further, under the Juvenile Court Act,
the State may move to permit prosecution of the juvenile under the criminal laws if the alleged
offense is of such a serious nature. 705 ILCS 405/5-805(3) (West 2004). Therefore, a juvenile
adjudication is not tantamount to a criminal conviction. Taylor, 221 Ill. 2d at 170.
We also note that in civil cases, Illinois courts have similarly differentiated between
criminal behavior by an adult and a minor in discussing public policy. In the context of an
insurance coverage dispute and application of the inferred-intent standard, this court affirmed that
public policy in Illinois favors affording compensation to victims. Country Mutual Insurance Co.
v. Hagan, 298 Ill. App. 3d 495 (1998). The Hagan court likened exclusionary provisions in
insurance policies to negligence cases where specific intent to injure requires an ability to foresee
the consequences of an act. The court refused to infer that a 14-year-old minor insured had the
capacity to form the intent to sexually abuse a 6-year-old was a question for the trier of fact.
Hagan, 298 Ill. App. 3d at 505. The court concluded that holding perpetrators responsible for
actions they intend but of which they have little understanding of the ramifications, would have
little deterrent effect and would be far outweighed by the policy in favor of compensating victims.
Hagan, 298 Ill. App. 3d at 505.
Accordingly, Billy was not convicted of a crime. Sheahan correctly notes that Gaffney did
not involve a criminal conviction of the minor that accessed his father’s gun. Indeed, similar to
this case, Gaffney involved a juvenile court delinquency adjudication of the minor. Although
Gaffney did not include an analysis of the import of the minor’s adjudication, it is not
distinguishable on this point as Sheahan maintains.
-21-
1-05-3911
The question that remains is whether Taylor impacts the trial court’s, and Sheahan’s,
reliance on the adjudication to foreclose a duty. Although plaintiffs’ argument that Billy’s lack of
intent eliminates the criminality required to overcome duty is misguided, the element of intent
does take on more importance when viewed in light of Taylor. Plaintiffs argue that Billy did not
intend to hurt Josh; therefore, there was no criminal attack, but merely an accident. As such,
plaintiffs conclude that there was no intervening criminal attack to foreclose a duty to the victim.
This reasoning is in line with that of the Hagan court.
The determination of duty is a question of law, that question may only be answered upon
review of the factual circumstances of the particular case. Hernandez, 267 Ill. App. 3d at 522.
Taking a view of plaintiffs’ presentation of facts under a favorable view, we find that this incident
was reasonably foreseeable. Whether Billy’s actions were accidental or reckless is a question of
material fact that remains for the trier of fact to determine.
Plaintiffs assert that they did not cite to Sheahan’s rules and orders to establish a duty, but
to show that an incident like the instant situation was eminently foreseeable. Plaintiffs argue that
Sheahan’s repeated warnings to lock firearms and store ammunition separately and citing to
Gaffney to underscore the importance of doing so in a place away from children clearly indicate
this case was foreseeable. Under plaintiffs’ theory, David stored the handgun next to ammunition
in an unlocked storage case in an unlocked closet where a 13-year-old boy could easily access
such an item of natural “magnetic” intrigue. These particular facts, coupled with the evidence of
an acute awareness by Sheahan of these types of incidents, section 24-9 of the Criminal Code,
titled “Firearms; Child Protection” (720 ILCS 5/24-9 (West 2004)), and data that this exact
scenario plays out across the country every year, indicate the accident was foreseeable for the
-22-
1-05-3911
purposes of summary judgment.
As noted above, the trial court found that no duty existed because of the lack of
foreseeability of a criminal attack and the lack of special relationship. Aside from a citation to
City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 213 Ill. 2d 351 (2004) and our supreme court’s specific
reluctance to expand duty where it would impose potentially limitless liability for the acts of
another, the trial court did not discuss the additional duty factors of the likelihood of injury, the
magnitude of the burden to guard against the injury or the consequences of imposing that burden.
While under Ruane this court may affirm the trial court on any basis in the record, the record in
this case does not support an argument that such a duty would be so onerous.
Sheahan argues that even if this shooting was foreseeable, the other factors required to
establish duty have not been met. Most importantly, Sheahan asserts that the magnitude and
burden of guarding against this type of injury is too high to create a duty. Sheahan maintains that
rigorous training is undertaken in teaching gun safety and proper gun storage and to require more
of the department would be tantamount to “tucking them in bed” and be unduly burdensome. In
conclusion, he argues that establishing a duty in this scenario would open the door to ruinous
liability claims against the county anytime an officer’s gun is misappropriated and used for harm.
We reject Sheahan’s argument that no duty exists based on these additional factors. First,
as noted above, Sheahan is vicariously liable under the principle of respondeat superior for the
torts of his employees when committed within the scope of employment. Second, the likelihood
of injury follows the foreseeability discussion above. The record is replete with testimony and
evidence that this type of accident is all too common and foreseeable. Our legislature has seen fit
to protect children by codifying safe gun storage practices in a statute section entitled “Firearms;
-23-
1-05-3911
Child Protection.” 720 ILCS 5/24-9 (West 2004). Sheahan notes that Gaffney involved a scope
of employment issue and not a consideration of duty. While Gaffney did not include a duty
analysis, it ostensibly involved a finding that the defendant city had a duty to protect children from
the negligent actions of its police officers. This situation is distinguishable from a resultant crime
spree with a stolen gun; it is exactly the scenario the legislature and law enforcement have
foreseen and tried to limit. The public interest in protecting children from this harm simply
outweighs the burden of assuring police officers properly store their weapons. David’s storage of
his firearm was incidental to his conduct authorized by Sheahan and summary judgment was
improper on this issue.
B. Proximate Cause and Independent Intervening Cause
Plaintiffs next argue that Billy’s actions were not an independent intervening cause that
superseded Sheahan’s negligence or Beretta’s legal responsibility. Plaintiffs assert that they
satisfied the foreseeability criterion, both cause in fact and legal cause, to establish a duty and
determine proximate cause. Based on the argument above, plaintiffs claim that Billy’s actions
were foreseeable and summary judgment was improper.
To establish proximate cause, a party must first show that the defendant’s negligence was
the actual cause of the injury. Bourgonje v. Machev, 362 Ill. App. 3d 984, 1007 (2005).
Plaintiffs assert that if the handgun was properly stored and secured as required by statute and
Sheahan’s general order, the shooting would not have occurred. Therefore, they argue that they
established cause in fact, the first prong of proximate cause.
The second prong, legal cause, is met if it can be shown that the defendant’s conduct was
so closely tied to the injury that he may be found legally responsible. Bourgonje, 362 Ill. App. 3d
-24-
1-05-3911
at 1007. Plaintiffs note that the exact harm involved need not be foreseeable, but only that some
harm might result. Brannon v. Southern Illinois Hospital Corp., 69 Ill. App. 3d 1, 10 (1978).
Plaintiffs argue that the facts in this case present a strong argument for legal cause because the
injury suffered is the exact type of harm the handgun storage statute and Sheahan’s rules were
enacted to prevent.
Because of this, plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in finding Billy’s actions an
independent intervening cause. In order to escape liability as an intervening cause, an event must
be unforeseeable as a matter of law. Mack v. Ford Motor Co., 283 Ill. App. 3d 52, 57 (1996).
Plaintiffs highlight as error the trial court’s characterization that Billy loaded and unloaded the
handgun before firing it at Josh. Plaintiffs claim that the court erred in making this
characterization and then finding that Billy engaged in a criminal act. Plaintiffs contend that, even
if some element of Billy’s conduct was criminal, such criminal activity is no longer an independent
intervening act per se under Bourgonje. Bourgonje, 362 Ill. App. 3d at 1008. As noted above,
plaintiffs focus on the fact that Billy did not intend to shoot Josh. Therefore, Billy’s actions were
foreseeable and did not supersede Sheahan’s liability. Plaintiffs assert that if the trial court’s
ruling is allowed to stand, it would effectively eliminate any cause of action for negligent storage
of a weapon. Plaintiffs claim that the act of pulling the trigger ultimately required would always
operate to cut off liability.
With respect to Beretta, plaintiffs argue that Beretta’s experts conceded that children gain
access to guns and that accidental shootings occur, specifically, accidents exactly like the instant
scenario. In fact, plaintiffs note that Beretta’s expert stated that this type of scenario was the
impetus for the creation of the magazine disconnect safety in 1910. Furthermore, plaintiffs note
-25-
1-05-3911
that Beretta manufactured other firearms with additional safeguards. Therefore, plaintiffs
conclude that Billy’s actions were not an independent intervening cause to absolve Beretta of
liability for this tragedy.
Sheahan responds that David’s storage of the handgun was a condition and not a cause of
the shooting. Where the action of a defendant does not cause the injury, but a third party acting
independently causes the injury, the creation of the condition is not a proximate cause. Young,
213 Ill. 2d at 449. Under Young, the key consideration in a case such as this is whether the
intervening cause is such that a reasonable person would find it a likely result of the complained-
of conduct. Young, 213 Ill. 2d at 449, quoting First Springfield Bank & Trust v. Galman, 188 Ill.
2d 252, 258 (1999). Sheahan argues that the aforementioned actions of Billy, both criminal and in
violation of David’s house rules, were not foreseeable to a reasonable person and, therefore,
David’s actions were not a proximate cause.
Beretta also relies on Young to argue that Billy’s criminal actions were an unforeseeable
intervening cause relieving it of liability as a matter of law. Beretta argues that the adjudication of
Billy as delinquent based on his commission of involuntary manslaughter and reckless discharge of
a firearm and Billy’s testimony affirm that he recklessly pulled the trigger and committed the
crime. Beretta also cites to two federal cases that are factually similar to this case for support.
Eichstedt v. Lakefield Arms Ltd., 849 F. Supp. 1287, 1291-92 (E.D. Wis. 1994) (17-year-old
boy’s pointing rifle at friend and pulling trigger was reckless by any reasonable person, especially
an “experienced handler of guns” like the shooter and summary judgment for gun manufacturer
was proper); Raines v. Colt Industries, Inc., 757 F. Supp. 819, 822-26 (E.D. Mich. 1991)
(summary judgment was proper where the handgun is a simple tool, danger is open and obvious,
-26-
1-05-3911
and shooter had played with gun for two days with prior experience manipulating the gun). Not
only are these cases based on Wisconsin and Michigan laws and, as such, are merely persuasive
authority, but they are distinguishable on the facts as well. Both cases involved gun users that
were both older and more experienced than Billy. Furthermore, as noted below, the exception for
the open and obvious danger of a simple product has been rejected in Illinois as a per se rule
against liability. Calles v. Scripto-Tokai Corp., 224 Ill. 2d 247, 262-63 (2007).
Proximate cause may not be proven based upon speculation or surmise, but must be
proven to a reasonable certainty. Bourgonje, 362 Ill. App. 3d at 1007. As addressed above,
viewing plaintiffs’ complaint and evidence favorably, cause in fact was shown because the
shooting would not have occurred if the handgun had been properly stored. Second, it was
reasonably foreseeable that this type of harm would occur if the handgun was not properly stored
based on the testimony of several experts and the specific rules and laws implemented for this
exact concern.
The trial court opined that finding proximate cause in this case would create liability for
Sheahan for any harm created if a weapon was stolen from an officer. However, plaintiffs do not
argue for this extensive a finding. Rather, they point to Billy’s testimony that the gun and
ammunition were negligently stored in an unlocked case in violation of Illinois law and Sheahan’s
training and rules. This case is distinguishable from a stolen weapon scenario.
Under plaintiffs’ theory, Billy in no way “stole” the handgun, as he never intended to
deprive David of possession of the handgun and the underlying negligent storage is the cause of
the harm. Whether or not that is the case, the scenario in this case in fact is exactly what the gun
storage statute and Sheahan’s own departmental rules and training programs sought to avoid. In
-27-
1-05-3911
this case, a child found an improperly stored gun and played with it. While playing, the gun was
accidentally discharged.
With respect to the intervening cause, Billy was adjudicated a delinquent, not convicted of
a crime. While this court affirmed the findings of the juvenile court, the proceedings before that
court are not of record. Whether Billy’s actions were criminal and unforeseeable is an open
question considering the fact that he is not a convicted criminal and the evidence presented by
plaintiffs. Plaintiffs continue to assert that there was no intervening intentional attack to break the
causal chain. In any event, under Bourgonje, whether Billy’s actions were criminal or tortious in
nature under the common law is not necessarily outcome determinative. Furthermore, as noted
above, under Hagan, public policy dictates a differentiated approach to considering behavior by a
child intentional and criminal as compared to that of an adult. We have concluded above that this
accident was foreseeable and, therefore, it is a question for the jury.
C. Plaintiffs’ Claim the Handgun Was Unreasonably Dangerous
Plaintiffs next argue that the trial court erred in failing to find the handgun unreasonably
dangerous under their strict product liability claim. Plaintiffs dispute Beretta’s claim that the sole
function of the handgun is to fire a projectile with each pull of the trigger. Plaintiffs argue that the
function of the gun changed when Billy removed the magazine because he believed it to be
unloaded, as if the safety were engaged, and, essentially, it became a toy gun. Additionally, they
assert that the existence of a manual safety indicates that the handgun did not serve only one
purpose, but had shifting functions. Plaintiffs assert that they demonstrated that the handgun was
unreasonably dangerous and defectively designed under both the consumer expectation test and
risk-utility test for product liability claims as detailed in Hansen v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 198
-28-
1-05-3911
Ill. 2d 420, 433 (2002).
1. Consumer Expectation Test
Under the consumer expectation test, a plaintiff may prove a product defective “ ‘by
introducing evidence that the product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would
expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner.’ ” Hansen, 198 Ill. 2d at 433,
quoting Lamkin v. Towner, 138 Ill. 2d 510, 529 (1990). Beretta properly notes that the
reasonable consumer for this review is not necessarily the user at the time of the incident, but the
“typical user and purchaser” of the product, in this case, a licensed firearm owner. Calles v.
Scripto-Tokai Corp., 224 Ill. 2d 247, 257 (2007).
Plaintiffs cite to the Johns Hopkins study noted above, several cases from foreign
jurisdictions, and testimony regarding the long-established patents for magazine disconnect
safeties to establish the existence and knowledge of this device. Plaintiffs argue that this evidence
demonstrates that it is reasonable an intended user would expect that the removal of the magazine
would render the handgun harmless. Plaintiffs note David Swan’s testimony that he did not know
the handgun would fire without the magazine engaged. At a minimum, plaintiffs argue that this
establishes a question of fact for the jury to determine and not simply take what Beretta says
about its product over what the consumer believes.
Beretta argues that application of the consumer expectation test must lead to a finding that
the handgun was not unreasonably dangerous. Beretta highlights that it is important to consider
the nature and function of the product in addition to determining the ordinary consumer and how
the product performed under this test. Taylor v. Gerry’s Ridgewood, Inc., 141 Ill. App. 3d 780,
784 (1986). Beretta first argues that the ordinary consumer of the handgun is not, as plaintiffs
-29-
1-05-3911
assert, a 13-year-old child, but an adult who can better understand the dangers and consequences
of handling a firearm.
Beretta asserts that a firearm has been considered an “instrument of death” by the courts
and its basic function is purely to discharge a projectile when the trigger is pulled. Taylor, 141 Ill.
App. 3d at 785. Experts for both parties testified that the function of a handgun is not to be a toy,
but simply to fire bullets. Accordingly, Beretta concludes that plaintiffs’ argument that the
presence of a safety on a firearm does not alter its function.
With respect to the third consideration in the consumer expectation test, Beretta argues
that Taylor is on point and controlling. In Taylor, the adult gun owner and friends had been
drinking for hours and playing Russian roulette with his newly purchased revolver while it was
unloaded. When preparing to leave, the owner reloaded the revolver and placed it on the table
telling everyone it was loaded. One friend apparently did not hear this warning, picked up the gun
and shot and killed another friend. Taylor, 141 Ill. App. 3d at 781-82.
The estate of the friend who was killed filed a strict liability claim against the manufacturer
of the revolver, alleging that the double-action trigger was unreasonably dangerous and that it
should have had a manual or automatic safety. The Taylor court affirmed the trial court’s
summary judgment order. The court noted that a manufacturer is not under a duty to design a
product that is incapable of preventing injury or include safety features to foreclose any harm to
its user. The court found that the plaintiff failed to prove the revolver was defective and that the
revolver performed as designed. Taylor, 141 Ill. App. 3d at 784-85.
Beretta asserts that as in Taylor, and similar cases following Taylor, the handgun
performed as expected given its nature and function. As in these cases, Billy was playing with the
-30-
1-05-3911
handgun and it did what it was supposed to, discharging a bullet. Beretta repeatedly highlights
the language in Taylor that “[o]nly a defective person would fail to realize the obvious dangers
associated with these actions.” Taylor, 141 Ill. App. 3d at 785.
Plaintiffs respond that the Taylor court made those comments in the context of a situation
where grown men had been drinking heavily and playing with a firearm, not a 13-year-old boy
simply playing with a gun. We agree with plaintiffs that the instant scenario is distinguishable.
We would be remiss if we did not further note our belief that utilizing this language is
inflammatory and inappropriate in this case. The duty of zealous advocacy does not require
counsel to ignore common decency. This case is clearly distinguishable from Taylor and involves
the tragic loss of a young boy and obvious damage to Josh’s family and friends, as well as to Billy,
David, and the Swan family. Testimony was received on the disruptive force this has been to all
those involved and repeatedly labeling a 13-year-old boy as defective is not only unnecessary, but
sad. We note, however, even if we were to accept Beretta’s assessment of Billy as defective, it
would strengthen the argument in favor of application of the Hagan case and allowing the case to
go forward as a matter of public policy.
Furthermore, this language is entirely unnecessary considering Beretta’s final argument
that the handgun was purchased by David and used for law enforcement purposes. This particular
model was designed and marketed by Beretta for military and police use. Beretta notes that
testimony indicated that the handgun operated properly every time David used it and there had
not been any reports of widespread defects of this handgun model. The Cook County
Department of Corrections found it to be a safe and reliable firearm suitable for use as a duty
pistol. Therefore, the record supports Beretta’s conclusion that the handgun performed as
-31-
1-05-3911
expected and was not unreasonably dangerous and summary judgment was proper under the
consumer expectation test.
2. Risk-Utility Test
Under the risk-utility test, a plaintiff may establish a defective-design claim “ ‘by
introducing evidence that the product’s design proximately caused his injury and the defendant
fails to prove that on balance the benefits of the challenged design outweigh the risk of danger
inherent in such designs.’ ” Hansen, 198 Ill. 2d at 433, quoting Lamkin, 138 Ill. 2d at 529.
Under Calles, accepted factors to be considered when engaging in a risk-utility analysis are:
“ ‘(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product - its utility to the user
and to the public as a whole.
(2) The safety aspects of the product - the likelihood that it will cause
injury, and the probable seriousness of the injury.
(3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet the same
need and not be as unsafe.
(4) The manufacturer’s ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the
product without impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain its
utility.
(5) The user’s ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use of
the product.
(6) The user’s anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product
and their avoidability, because of general public knowledge of the obvious
condition of the product, or of the existence of suitable warnings or instructions.
-32-
1-05-3911
(7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the loss by
setting the price of the product or carrying liability insurance.’ ” Calles, 224 Ill. 2d
at 264-65, quoting J. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products,
44 Miss. L. J. 825, 837-38 (1973).
The Calles court also provided four factors to be considered with respect to the utility of a
product. These factors are: the appearance and aesthetic attractiveness of the product; the utility
for multiple uses; the convenience and extent of use without harm resulting from the product; and
the collateral safety of a feature other than the one causing harm to the plaintiff. Calles, 224 Ill.
2d at 265-66, citing American Law of Products Liability 3d §28:19, at 28-30 through 28-31
(1997).
Plaintiffs argue that they not only showed that a safer alternative design existed, but that
Beretta had manufactured such firearms at an admittedly marginal increased cost. Furthermore,
Beretta’s expert stated that there was no documentation available that the magazine disconnect
safety would make the handgun more dangerous. Therefore, plaintiffs conclude that Beretta
could have easily and cost-effectively equipped the handgun in a safer manner, but did not and as
a result it was unreasonably dangerous.
Beretta claims that Calles upheld the “general rule” that manufacturers will not be held
liable for harm resulting from a danger that is open and obvious to the typical user. Calles, 224
Ill. 2d at 262-63. However, the Calles court specifically rejected this general rule, citing to
Illinois and foreign cases rejecting such a rule and the policy reasons supporting these findings.
Calles, 224 Ill. 2d at 263. The Calles court continued to state that the open and obvious nature
of the danger involved is an important factor in the risk-utility analysis, but “[a] per se rule would
-33-
1-05-3911
also frustrate the policy of preventing future harm which is at the heart of strict liability law.”
Calles, 224 Ill. 2d at 263.
In any event, Beretta argues that under the risk-utility test, the product still could not be
found unreasonably dangerous. While not per se rules, the open and obvious danger of firearms
and the intended user, military and police personnel, are both important factors in the calculus
under Calles. Experts for all parties agreed that most police officers specifically refuse to utilize a
magazine disconnect safety for fear of not being able to utilize their firearm when needed the
most. Beretta argues that the testimony of several experts indicated that plaintiffs’ proposed
magazine disconnect safety would undermine the utility of the handgun as a law enforcement
weapon. Beretta highlights witness testimony that over 20 years of requests for firearms from law
enforcement agencies have overwhelmingly included specific requests that a magazine disconnect
not be incorporated.
Beretta argues that the testimony of several experts indicated that plaintiffs’ proposed
magazine disconnect safety would undermine the utility of the handgun as a law enforcement
weapon. In addition, Beretta points out the additional safety features that were included on the
handgun. Further, with proper storage and handling of the handgun and adequate training, the
handgun is not unreasonably dangerous. While, as discussed below, it is arguable that a suitable
warning was not provided regarding the dangers involved in handling the handgun, that factor
does not outweigh the other factors under Calles and the particular needs of police officers and
the military. Accordingly, summary judgment was proper on this count under the risk-utility test.
D. Plaintiffs’ Failure to Warn Claim
Plaintiffs also argue that the trial court erred by finding that Beretta did not have a duty to
-34-
1-05-3911
warn because of the open and obvious danger presented by the handgun. Plaintiffs again assert
that it was reasonable for Billy to believe that the handgun was unloaded and inoperable when he
removed the magazine. Plaintiffs assert that an ordinary person would believe the same and that
Beretta had a duty to warn based on the level of awareness of an ordinary person. Sollami v.
Eaton, 201 Ill. 2d 1, 7 (2002).
Plaintiffs argue that this reasonable belief also removes the risk of the handgun as an open
and obvious danger. Miller v. Rinker Boat Co., 352 Ill. App. 3d 648, 666 (2004). A
manufacturer must provide a warning for a product with dangerous propensities when the seller
has greater knowledge of the risk of harm from the product and knows that harm will occur to the
buyer absent a warning. Bates v. Richland Sales Corp., 346 Ill. App. 3d 223, 232-33 (2004).
Plaintiffs argue that the warnings provided by Beretta were insufficient. Plaintiffs cite to
testimony that the chamber loaded indicator was hard to see and tothe lack of any warning on the
handgun that the chamber may be loaded without the magazine engaged. Plaintiffs argue again
that foreseeability is the key consideration, without citation to authority for this issue, and that it
was clearly proven by the facts of this case.
Beretta responds that summary judgment is appropriate on a failure to warn claim where
the party failed to read product warnings. Kane v. R.D. Werner Co., 275 Ill. App. 3d 1035, 1037
(1995). Beretta argues that Billy testified that he did not read any of the repeated and explicit
warnings provided in the owner’s manual. Secondly, it argues that no duty to warn exists where
the danger involved is open and obvious. Sollami v. Eaton, 201 Ill. 2d 1, 7 (2002). As noted
above, the danger of pulling the trigger of a firearm has been found to be open and obvious.
Beretta again cites to Taylor, which also involved a failure to warn claim. The Taylor
-35-
1-05-3911
court found that the potential danger of pulling a trigger on a firearm is open and obvious.
Taylor, 141 Ill. App. 3d at 785. Beretta also cites to Billy’s testimony that he knew he was
handling a firearm with the potential to hurt or kill a human being. Therefore, Beretta concludes
that the danger was open and obvious, and despite its extensive warnings contained in the owner’s
manual, Billy recklessly pulled the trigger on the handgun.
Kane does stand for the proposition Beretta claims, however. Its finding was qualified by
the court’s noting that, if the “ ‘nature of the alleged inadequacy is such that it prevents [the
party] from reading [the warning],’ ” a failure to warn claim may stand. Kane, 275 Ill. App. 3d at
1037, quoting E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Cox, 477 So. 2d 963, 971 (Ala. 1985). Plaintiffs
provide several ways that Beretta failed to warn of the danger the handgun would fire without the
magazine engaged. Plaintiffs claim the chamber loaded indicator should have been larger, the
manual should have provided better warnings, and additional warnings could have been written on
the handgun itself.
Interestingly, plaintiffs argue that Taylor was “of course not a warning issue case.”
However, the Taylor court specifically upheld the dismissal of a count sounding in negligence and
alleging the revolver lacked adequate safeguards and warnings. Taylor, 141 Ill. App. 3d at 785.
The Taylor court found that the manufacturer’s warning to read the instruction manual before use
and the warnings provided in the manual were extensive and adequate. Both parties also fail to
note that the Taylor court specifically stated that rollmarked into the steel barrel of the revolver at
question was a warning to read the instruction manual before use. Taylor, 141 Ill. App. 3d at
785. Because of this, the Taylor court concluded that the warning was communicated and the
manual contained specific details that, if followed, the shooting would not have occurred.
-36-
1-05-3911
In this case, the first line of the manual reads in bold and enlarged font “Caution: Read this
manual carefully before handling and loading the pistol.” As noted above, the manual repeatedly
warns the user to make sure the cartridge chamber is empty when storing the firearm and provides
step-by-step instructions on how to accomplish this. The manual clearly reads that removing the
magazine does not clear a loaded chamber. However, the manual does not contain any notation
or warning whether or not a handgun may fire the chambered bullet when the magazine is
removed. Thus, the holding in Kane is not helpful to Beretta because even if Billy had read the
entire manual, he would not have been warned that removing the magazine does not mean the
handgun will not discharge a bullet.
Beretta clearly has greater knowledge of the danger of the handgun than the typical user.
The nature of the inadequacy in this case was that a user was not pointed to a warning in any
event. Plaintiffs provided evidence that over a third of adults questioned in the Johns Hopkins
study either believed that a gun would not fire with its magazine removed or did not know either
way. In fact, an experienced user such as David, a trained police officer, did not know that the
firearm may fire a bullet with the magazine removed. Therefore, plaintiffs’ failure to warn claim
presented a question of fact and should have survived summary judgment to determine if Beretta’s
warnings were sufficient.
E. Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act
Finally, Beretta asserts that this cause of action must be immediately dismissed pursuant to
the PLCAA. Beretta argues that the PLCAA, enacted on October 26, 2005, two months after the
trial court granted summary judgment for Beretta, prohibits civil suits against manufacturers,
importers, distributors, and dealers of firearms for harms caused by criminal or unlawful third
-37-
1-05-3911
party misuse of firearms that function properly as designed and intended. Pub. L. 109--12, 119
Stat. 2095 (2005) (adding 15 U.S.C. §§7901(a)(3), (b)(1)). Beretta argues that the PLCAA
retroactively prohibits civil suits such as plaintiffs’ under section 7902(b) (Pub. L. 109--12, 119
Stat. 2095, 2096 (2005)) (adding 15 U.S.C. §7902(b)) and that this court must apply the law as it
exists at appeal unless doing so would interfere with a vested right (Caveney v. Bower, 207 Ill. 2d
82, 85 (2003)).
With the PLCAA, Congress sought to protect the gun industry from ruin due to lawsuits
under “theories without foundation in hundreds of years of the common law and jurisprudence of
the United States and do not represent a bone fide expansion of the common law” to be possibly
sustained by a “maverick judicial officer or petit jury.” Pub. L. 109--12, 119 Stat. 2095 (2005)
(adding 15 U.S.C. §7901(a)(7)). Congress also found that these “qualified civil liability actions”
threatened the important principles of federalism, state sovereignty and the separation of powers
doctrine. Pub. L. 109--12, 119 Stat. 2095 (2005) (adding 15 U.S.C. §7901(a)(8)). Section
7903(5)(A) defines a “qualified civil liability action” as “a civil action or proceeding or an
administrative proceeding brought by any person against a manufacturer or seller of a qualified
product, or a trade association, for damages, punitive damages *** resulting from the criminal or
unlawful misuse of a qualified product by the person or a third party.” Pub. L. 109--12, 119 Stat.
2095, 2097 (2005) (adding 15 U.S.C. §7903(5)(A)). “Unlawful misuse” is defined as “conduct
that violates a statute, ordinance, or regulation as it relates to the use of a qualified product.”
Pub. L. 109--12, 119 Stat. 2095, 2097 (2005) (adding 15 U.S.C. §7903(9)).
Beretta states that it is unchallenged that it is a manufacturer of guns under sections
7903(2) & (5)(A) of the PLCAA. Pub. L. 109--12, 119 Stat. 2095, 2097 (2005) (adding 15
-38-
1-05-3911
U.S.C. §§7903(2) & (5)(A)). The handgun is a “firearm” and a “qualified product” under the
PLCAA. Pub. L. 109--12, 119 Stat. 2095, 2097 (2005) (adding 15 U.S.C. §7903(4)). Therefore,
Beretta concludes that because Billy was adjudicated a delinquent for involuntary manslaughter
and reckless discharge of a firearm, he unlawfully misused the handgun and the action must be
dismissed under section 7902(b).
Plaintiffs argue that the PLCAA does not apply to this case. Plaintiffs assert that the
target of the PLCAA was actions brought by states, municipalities, interest groups and others
attempting to force the gun industry to pay for the crimes of third parties under novel theories.
Pub. L. 109--12, 119 Stat. 2095 (2005) (adding 15 U.S.C. §§7901(a)(3), (a)(7), (a)(8)).
Therefore, an accidental shooting like Billy’s that, plaintiffs argue, could have been avoided with
additional safety features and proper warnings was not Congress’s intended target. Furthermore,
plaintiffs argue that their cause of action fits within the exceptions to qualified civil liability actions
provided by the PLCAA. The relevant exceptions to the PLCAA are as follows:
“(ii) an action brought against a seller for negligent entrustment or
negligence per se;
***
(iv) an action for breach of contract or warranty in connection with the
purchase of the product;
(v) an action for death, physical injuries or property damage resulting
directly from a defect in design or manufacture of the product, when used as
intended or in a reasonably foreseeable manner, except that where the discharge of
the product was caused by a volitional act that constituted a criminal offense, then
-39-
1-05-3911
such act shall be considered the sole proximate cause of any resulting death,
personal injuries or property damage.” Pub. L. 109--12, 119 Stat. 2095, 2097
(2005) (adding 15 U.S.C. §§7903(5)(A)(ii), (5)(A)(iv), (5)(A)(v)).
Plaintiffs assert that their claims meet the exceptions for negligence and breach of
warranty under sections 7903(5)(A)(ii) and 7903(5)(A)(iv) and the exception for actions based on
defect or design under section 7903(5)(A)(v). Plaintiffs argue that they overcame the limitations
on exception 5(A)(v) for volitional acts that constitute criminal offenses because Billy did not
intend to shoot and kill Josh. Plaintiffs argue that Congress’s use of “criminal offense” intended
the limitation to criminal actions with accompanying mens rea and not reckless actions like
Billy’s. Plaintiffs argue that this court’s Rule 23 order affirming the adjudication of delinquency
was improperly utilized to establish the criminality of Billy’s behavior and that the evidence
establishing this is incomplete and not of record. Plaintiffs also assert that their claims against
Beretta resulted from the product’s condition. Therefore, plaintiffs conclude that Billy’s actions
were not the sole cause of harm and not covered by the PLCAA.
Plaintiffs finally assert that the PLCAA is unconstitutional because it violates the tenth
amendment. Plaintiffs argue that the United States Supreme Court has clearly stated that the
United States Constitution does not grant Congress authority to direct the action of state
governments. Rather, Congress may only enact generally applicable laws requiring or prohibiting
certain acts and may not command the states to require or prohibit those acts. New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 165-66, 178-79, 120 L. Ed. 2d 120, 143-44, 152-53, 112 S. Ct.
2408, 2422-23, 2429-30 (1992). Plaintiffs claim that Congress’s command to state courts to
immediately dismiss qualified civil actions violates the tenth amendment.
-40-
1-05-3911
Beretta responds that this appeal only involves plaintiffs’ claims sounding in strict liability;
thus, the negligence and warranty exceptions are irrelevant. Beretta also contends that plaintiffs
failed to show that the handgun was used as intended or in a reasonably foreseeable manner and
not in a manner that would constitute a criminal offense as required by the exception under
section 7903(5)(A)(v). Beretta argues that it was proven that Billy’s act in purposefully pulling
the trigger was a volitional act that solely caused the harm and was properly found to be a
criminal act. Beretta asserts that plaintiffs have tried to avoid this conclusion with meaningless
semantics.
Beretta states that Congress repeatedly made clear its intent that the gun industry not be
liable for harm caused by criminal and unlawful misuse of its products. Pub. L. 109--12, 119 Stat.
2095 through 2097 (2005) (adding 15 U.S.C. §§7901(a)(3) through (a)(5), (a)(7), (a)(8),
7903(5)(A)). Beretta argues that plaintiffs incorrectly claim that the PLCAA does not apply
because Billy’s conduct was not the “sole cause” of the harm under section 7901(b)(1). Beretta
argues that the language of section 7903(5)(A)(v) is conclusive that if the act in question is found
criminal, “such act shall be considered the sole proximate cause of any resulting death, personal
injuries, or property damage.” Pub. L. 109--12, 119 Stat. 2095, 2097 (2005) (adding 15 U.S.C.
§7903(5)(A)(v)).
First, we agree with Beretta that plaintiffs have confused Congress’s direct regulation and
preemption of state law with commandeering state functions. Congress, Beretta correctly asserts,
simply established a new federal standard that governs claims against the gun industry, preempting
conflicting state tort law, a common action. See BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S.
559, 571, 134 L. Ed. 2d 809, 823-24, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1596-97 (1996). The PLCAA has been
-41-
1-05-3911
examined by the United States District Courts for the Eastern District of New York and the
Central District of California in the context of nuisance claims against gun manufacturers. City of
New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 401 F. Supp. 2d 244, 266-67 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); Ileto v. Glock,
Inc., 421 F. Supp. 2d 1274 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
While both of these courts are federal district courts in foreign jurisdictions, their
reasoning is sound and we follow these decisions on the constitutional issues. Both of these
decisions included detailed examinations of the constitutionality of the PLCAA, including
thorough reviews of the legislative history of the statute. In both cases, the courts found that,
though there are differing opinions supporting the reasons to protect the gun industry, Congress
cited proper support to utilize the commerce clause and the PLCAA was constitutional. City of
New York, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 271-97; Ileto, 421 F. Supp. 2d at 1298-1304.
Both courts examined whether the PLCAA violated the due process or equal protection
clause and whether it was a bill of attainder. Both courts found no violation in these areas,
principally from the fact that one does not have a vested right in a lawsuit until a final,
unreviewable judgment has been reached. City of New York, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 271-97; Ileto,
421 F. Supp. 2d at 1298-1304. With respect to the tenth amendment, the City of New York court
simply stated there was no violation because Congress is not commandeering the states by means
of the Act. City of New York, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 294. Beretta properly notes that the PLCAA
does not compel states to regulate anything or enact any law. The PLCAA simply establishes a
federal standard for claims against the gun industry.
It is clear from the PLCAA and legislative history that plaintiffs correctly assert that
Congress was primarily concerned with novel nuisance cases like Ileto and City of Chicago v.
-42-
1-05-3911
Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 213 Ill. 2d 351 (2004). However, based on the plain language of the
statute, plaintiffs must show they fall within the exceptions to avoid the provisions of the Act.
Plaintiffs failed to support their claim that exceptions under section 7903(5)(A)(ii) for negligent
entrustment or negligence per se and section 7903(5)(A)(iv) for breach of contract or warranty in
this case. Therefore, the exception under section 7903(5)(A)(v), which allows for a claim alleging
a defect in design or manufacturing, absent a volitional criminal act, is the only applicable
exception to this case.
Beretta argues that Billy’s testimony and the delinquency adjudication prove that the gun
was discharged by a volitional act that constituted a criminal offense. However, as we have held
above, plaintiffs have provided evidence that Billy’s actions were not unlawful. While we look at
the delinquency adjudication deferentially, it is not the law of this case and not the result of
proceedings subject to the protections of the sixth amendment. Whether Billy’s act was volitional
or whether he understood the ramifications of his conduct to support summary judgment or
affording compensation to victims as Hagan argues for, is a question for the trier of fact.
We do not have the record of those proceedings before us and do not know the evidence
that was presented. We do have the evidence plaintiff has presented in this case supporting a
finding that Billy’s actions were accidental. Whether Billy’s actions were criminal or unlawful is a
question of fact for the finder of fact based on all the evidence. If Billy’s actions were criminal,
the PLCAA would foreclose plaintiffs’ claims against Beretta. However, if Billy’s actions were
found to be purely accidental and not unlawful or criminal, the exception under section
7903(5)(A)(v) would apply and the PLCAA would not preclude plaintiffs’ claims against Beretta.
III. CONCLUSION
-43-
1-05-3911
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse in part and affirm in part the decision of the trial
court and remand the matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We note that
Sheahan raised sections 2-109, 2-204, 2-201 and 2-202 of the Local Governmental and
Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act as affirmative defenses to the complaint. 745 ILCS
10/2-109, 2-201, 2-202, 2-204 (West 2004). The trial court did not address this issue and our
finding that Sheahan is liable under the principle of respondeat superior does not end the analysis.
The existence of a duty and the existence of an immunity are distinct issues that must be analyzed
separately. Village of Bloomingdale v. CDG Enterprises, Inc., 196 Ill. 2d 484, 490 (2001), citing
Barnett v. Zion Park District, 171 Ill. 2d 378, 388 (1996).
Affirmed in part and reversed in part, remanded for a new trial.
Presiding Justice Quinn, and Justice Campbell, concur.
-44-