People v. Robinson

FIRST DIVISION
JUNE 29, 2007
No. 1-04-2437
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County.
)
v. ) No. 01 CR 12422
)
WILLIAM ROBINSON, ) The Honorable
) Preston L. Bowie,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE GARCIA delivered the opinion of the court.
On May 17, 2001, the State charged the defendant, William
Robinson, with first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West
2000)) and unlawful use of a weapon (720 ILCS 5/24-1(a)(7)(ii)
(West 2000)). The trial court found the defendant guilty of
involuntary manslaughter and unlawful use of a weapon. At
sentencing, the court found that because the defendant and victim
were in a dating relationship, the victim was a "household
member" as defined by section 112A-3(3) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/112A-3(3) (West 2000)). The
"household member" finding elevated the offense from a Class 3 to
No. 1-04-2437
a Class 2. The court sentenced the defendant to a 12-year prison
term for involuntary manslaughter and a concurrent 5-year term
for unlawful use of a weapon. The court later denied the
defendant's motions to reconsider his sentence and for a new
trial, and his motion in arrest of judgment. The defendant
appeals, arguing: (1) his due process rights were violated when
he was convicted of the uncharged offense of involuntary
manslaughter of a household member; (2) the State failed to
comply with section 111-3(c-5) of the Code because it did not
give the defendant notice that it would seek an enhanced sentence
for involuntary manslaughter; (3) section 9-3(f) of the Criminal
Code of 1961 (Criminal Code) (720 ILCS 5/9-3(f) (West 2000)),
which provides for the sentence enhancement, is unconstitutional;
and (4) the compulsory extraction of his blood and storage of his
DNA violated his right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
In May 2001, the defendant was charged by indictment with
six counts of first degree murder for the murder of Joi Jefferson
and one count of felony unlawful use of a weapon. None of the
first degree murder counts alleged that Jefferson was the
defendant's girlfriend or that she was a member of the
defendant's household. Before trial, the State nol-prossed five
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of the first degree murder counts and proceeded on one count of
first degree murder and felony unlawful use of a weapon. The
defendant's trial began as a jury trial, but prior to closing
arguments, the defendant waived his right to a jury trial and the
case was decided by the trial court.
The evidence at trial showed that on April 13, 2001, the
victim, Joi Jefferson, called the defendant and asked him to
accompany her home from work because she cashed a check and did
not want to ride the bus home alone. The defendant testified
that Jefferson was his girlfriend and that they had dated off and
on for three years. After he picked her up from work, they went
to his apartment, where they engaged in sexual intercourse. They
were interrupted by two phone calls, the first from the
defendant's mother. The second from Angel Jordan, a woman the
defendant was also dating.
While the defendant spoke with Jordan, Jefferson became
upset. After the defendant brushed Jefferson off and told her to
go home, she took a sawed-off shotgun from the defendant's
counter and pointed it at him. The defendant testified that the
gun was loaded and sitting on the counter. He indicated that he
placed it on the counter two days earlier after he was threatened
by his sister's boyfriend.
Jefferson took the gun into the bathroom and closed the
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No. 1-04-2437
door. When the defendant finished his conversation with Jordan,
he went to the bathroom to see what Jefferson was doing. The
defendant knocked on the bathroom door and Jefferson told him to
leave her alone. The defendant continued to antagonize Jefferson
because he knew it would bother her.
After a few minutes, the defendant forced the bathroom door
open. Jefferson was sitting on the toilet with the gun across
her lap and pointed away from the defendant. The defendant asked
Jefferson what was wrong with her and told her to give him the
gun. He tried to grab the gun, but she moved it out of his
reach. He reached for the gun again. This time he grabbed it,
stepped back, and fired the gun.
The defendant shot Jefferson in the face. After she was
shot, she fell between the toilet and the bathtub. The defendant
tried to move her back onto the toilet and admitted positioning
her arm so that it was in contact with the gun. The defendant
testified that he was in shock. He called his mother and told
her that a friend had been shot; he then called 911. When the
paramedics arrived, Jefferson was pronounced dead. At the scene,
the defendant told police officers that Jefferson shot herself.
The defendant was taken to Area 2 police station for
questioning. After being confronted with evidence that Jefferson
could not have shot herself, the defendant told Assistant State's
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No. 1-04-2437
Attorney Megan Goldish that when he went into the bathroom, he
and Jefferson struggled over the gun and the gun went off. This
conversation was not memorialized. In a videotaped interview
played for the jury, the defendant indicated that Jefferson was
his girlfriend and that they had been dating on and off for three
years. He stated that after Jefferson took the gun, he got angry
and antagonized her by banging on the bathroom door. He then
forced the door open and took the gun from her lap. He called
her a bitch, pointed the gun, and pulled the trigger. The
defendant testified that he shot the gun, but he did not remember
squeezing the trigger and he did not intend to do so.
After the parties rested, the defendant executed a jury
waiver and the trial court decided the case. During closing
argument, both the State and the defendant's attorney referred to
Jefferson as the defendant's girlfriend. The defendant also
asked the court to find him guilty of involuntary manslaughter
rather than first degree murder. The court found the defendant
guilty of involuntary manslaughter.
At sentencing, the State asked the trial court to make a
finding that the defendant and Jefferson were in a dating
relationship and that she was a "household member" for purposes
of a sentence enhancement under section 9-3(f) of the Criminal
Code. The State then urged the court to sentence the defendant
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No. 1-04-2437
to the maximum prison term of 14 years. The defendant argued
that Jefferson was not a household member based on her and the
defendant's on-and-off-again relationship.
The trial court found that Jefferson was a "household
member" and that the defendant was eligible to be sentenced under
the section 9-3(f) enhancement. The court sentenced the
defendant to a term of 12 years for involuntary manslaughter and
a concurrent term of 5 years for felony unlawful use of a weapon.
The defendant filed a motion to reconsider his sentence,
arguing that his sentence violated his due process and equal
protection rights because the victim's status was not included in
the indictment and involuntary manslaughter of a household member
was not a lesser-included offense of first degree murder. The
court denied the motion, finding that the State was not obligated
to include the nature of the relationship between the defendant
and Jefferson in the charge of first degree murder, and that the
evidence was overwhelming that Jefferson was a "household
member." The defendant filed a motion for new trial and a motion
in arrest of judgment, which alleged the charging instrument was
insufficient because it failed to allege the fact that Jefferson
was a household member. The court denied the motions. This
appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
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No. 1-04-2437
As his principal argument, the defendant maintains that he
was wrongly convicted of the uncharged offense of involuntary
manslaughter of a household member. He maintains that this
offense is a separate and distinct offense from "simple"
involuntary manslaughter. And, because it requires proof of an
"element" that the offense of first degree murder does not --
that the victim was a household member -- it is not a lesser-
included offense of first degree murder. Thus, the issue at the
heart of this appeal is whether the victim's status as a
household member is an "element," as that term is used in
included-offense analysis, of the offense of involuntary
manslaughter of which the defendant was convicted and sentenced,
or whether it is merely a factor that enhances a defendant's
sentence that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
I. Lesser-Included Offense
An included offense "means an offense which *** [i]s
established by proof of the same or less than all of the facts or
a less culpable mental state (or both), than that which is
required to establish the commission of the offense charged[.]"
720 ILCS 5/2-9(a) (West 2000). There is no doubt that "simple"
involuntary manslaughter is a lesser-included offense of first
degree murder based on a less culpable mental state (People v.
Givens, 364 Ill. App. 3d 37, 44, 846 N.E.2d 951 (2005)), and the
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No. 1-04-2437
defendant does not claim otherwise. The defendant maintains,
however, that because the involuntary manslaughter charge upon
which he was sentenced contains the added "element" of the status
of the victim as a household member, it is a distinct offense
from "simple" involuntary manslaughter. In other words, because
involuntary manslaughter involving a household member requires
proof of more facts than that which is required to establish the
commission of first degree murder, the offense with which the
defendant was charged, it is not an included offense.
Generally, involuntary manslaughter is a Class 3 felony.
However, when the victim is a household member, the offense is
classified a Class 2 felony. Section 9-3(f) of the Criminal Code
provides:
"In cases involving involuntary
manslaughter in which the victim was a family
or household member as defined in paragraph
(3) of Section 112A-3 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure of 1963 [725 ILCS 5/112A-3(3) (West
2000)], the penalty shall be a Class 2
felony, for which a person if sentenced to a
term of imprisonment, shall be sentenced to a
term of not less than 3 years and not more
than 14 years." 720 ILCS 5/9-3(f) (West
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No. 1-04-2437
2000).
A family or household member includes: "persons who have or
have had a dating or engagement relationship." 725 ILCS 5/112A-
3(3) (West 2000). Illinois courts have interpreted a dating
relationship as a serious courtship in that it is "'a
relationship that [is] more serious and intimate than casual.'"
People v. Young, 362 Ill. App. 3d 843, 851, 840 N.E.2d 825
(2005), quoting Alison C. v. Westcott, 343 Ill. App. 3d 648, 653,
798 N.E.2d 813 (2003). "[A]t a minimum, [it must be] an
established relationship with a significant romantic focus."
Young, 362 Ill. App. 3d at 851.
We acknowledge and agree with the defendant that section 9-
3(f) requires proof of a factor that first degree murder does not
-- that the victim is a household member. This factor does not,
however, create a distinct offense of involuntary manslaughter of
a household member. Instead, it is a factor that enhances the
range of penalties for the offense of involuntary manslaughter.
The supreme court recently explained that even if an offense
has different classifications based on the status of a victim,
the offense is and remains a "single offense." People v. Green,
No. 102751, slip op. at 6 (May 24, 2007). In Green, the
defendant was charged in a one-count indictment with robbery of
"a person 60 years of age or over, *** in violation of 720 ILCS
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No. 1-04-2437
5/18-1(a)(Class 1 Felony)." Green, No. 102751, slip op. at 1.
The issue addressed by the supreme court was whether there was a
conflict between the elements instruction that contained the
proposition that the victim was 60 years of age or over and the
verdict form that simply found the defendant guilty of robbery,
with no mention of the age of the victim. Based on this
perceived "conflict" between the elements instruction and the
verdict form, the appellate court reduced the defendant's
conviction from Class 1 to Class 2 robbery, citing as authority
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S.
Ct. 2348 (2000). Green, No. 102751, slip op. at 5. The supreme
court rejected the appellate court's analysis, finding no
conflict existed between the elements instruction and the signed
verdict form. Green, No. 102751, slip op. at 7. The Court
rejected the appellate court's pronouncement that "'robbery' and
'robbery of a person 60 years of age or over'" are distinct
crimes. Green, No. 102751, slip op. at 6.
"'[R]obbery' and 'robbery of a person 60
years of age or over' are not distinct
crimes, a fact that even a cursory
examination of the robbery statute reveals.
Rather, Illinois has a single offense called
'robbery' that is either a Class 1 or a Class
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No. 1-04-2437
2 felony, depending upon the nature of the
victim:
'(a) A person commits robbery
when he or she takes property ***
from the person or presence of
another by the use of force or by
threatening the imminent use of
force.
(b) Sentence.
Robbery is a Class 2 felony.
However, if the victim is 60 years
of age or over *** robbery is a
Class 1 felony.' (Emphasis added.)
720 ILCS 5/18-1 (West 2004).
Thus, under the statute's plain language,
even when charged as a Class 1 felony because
of the victim's age, the name of the offense
committed remains 'robbery.'" Green, No.
102751, slip op. at 6.
The rationale expressed by Chief Justice Thomas in Green for
the unanimous court applies equally here. Like the robbery
statute, the involuntary manslaughter statute establishes a
single offense of involuntary manslaughter, which is either a
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No. 1-04-2437
Class 3 or a Class 2 felony, depending on the status of the
victim. 720 ILCS 5/9-3 (West 2000). The status of the victim as
a household or family member acts only as a factor to enhance the
defendant's sentence; the offense committed remains involuntary
manslaughter.
The statutory elements of involuntary manslaughter are set
out in section 9-3(a). Upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of
each of the statutory elements, the offense of involuntary
manslaughter is established. Only upon establishing the
commission of the offense do we look to the sentencing
classification. Under section 9-3(d) involuntary manslaughter is
a Class 3 felony unless there is proof beyond a reasonable doubt
that the victim was a household member, then under section 9-3(f)
it is a Class 2 felony. Whether a Class 2 or Class 3 felony, the
offense committed remains involuntary manslaughter. See Green,
No. 102751, slip op. at 6; 720 ILCS 5/2-12 (West 2000) (defining
"offense" as a violation of any Illinois penal statute). It is
the offense of involuntary manslaughter set out in section 9-3
that is a lesser-included offense of first degree murder. See
Givens, 364 Ill. App. 3d at 44. To hold otherwise would render
the term "offense" as used in section 2-9(a) of the Criminal Code
at odds with the supreme court's holding in Green.
Thus, we hold the status of the victim is not an "element"
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No. 1-04-2437
of the offense of involuntary manslaughter for purposes of
included-offense analysis.1 That the statutory elements of
involuntary manslaughter are set out in section 9-3(a) is further
supported by section 111-3(c-5) of the Code. This section
recognizes that there are sentence-enhancing factors that must be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt but are not elements of the
charged offense:
"[I]f an alleged fact (other than the fact of
a prior conviction) is not an element of an
offense but is sought to be used to increase
the range of penalties for the offense beyond
the statutory maximum that could otherwise be
imposed for the offense, the alleged fact
must be included in the charging instrument
or otherwise provided to the defendant
through a written notification before trial,
submitted to a trier of fact as an
1
The term "elements" has a slightly broader meaning in the
"elements instruction" to a jury; it describes the "propositions"
that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, which may
include a sentence enhancing factor. See Green, No. 102751, slip
op. at 6-7, citing Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal,
(2000), No. 14.04.
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No. 1-04-2437
aggravating factor, and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt." (Emphasis added.) 725
ILCS 5/111-3(c-5) (West 2000).
We, therefore, reject the defendant's assertion that
involuntary manslaughter of a household member is a distinct
offense from "simple" involuntary manslaughter. In doing so, we
choose not to follow the holding in People v. DeBord, 344 Ill.
App. 3d 321, 328, 800 N.E.2d 809 (2003), where the court found
involuntary manslaughter of a family member was not a lesser-
included offense of first degree murder. We note our supreme
court cast doubt on this holding in Davis: "To the extent that
DeBord is inconsistent with this opinion, it is overruled."
People v. Davis, 217 Ill. 2d 472, 480, 841 N.E.2d 884 (2005).
Our supreme court's holding in Green that proof of a sentence
enhancing factor to elevate the classification does not create a
distinct offense, leads to but one conclusion: there is but one
offense of involuntary manslaughter and that offense is a lesser-
included offense of first degree murder.
II. Notice
In the first of three alternative arguments, the defendant
maintains that his sentence is void because the State failed to
provide him with sufficient notice that it was seeking an
enhanced sentence for involuntary manslaughter in violation of
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No. 1-04-2437
section 111-3(c-5) of the Code. Section 111-3(c-5) provides:
"Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, *** if an alleged fact (other than the
fact of a prior conviction) is not an element
of an offense but is sought to be used to
increase the range of penalties for the
offense beyond the statutory maximum that
could otherwise be imposed for the offense,
the alleged fact must be included in the
charging instrument or otherwise provided to
the defendant through a written notification
before trial, submitted to a trier of fact as
an aggravating factor, and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt. Failure to prove the fact
beyond a reasonable doubt is not a bar to a
conviction for commission of the offense, but
is a bar to increasing, based on that fact,
the range of penalties for the offense beyond
the statutory maximum that could otherwise be
imposed for that offense." (Emphasis added.)
725 ILCS 5/111-3(c-5) (West 2000).
The defendant cites People v. Champ, 329 Ill. App. 3d 127,
768 N.E.2d 237 (2002), to support his argument that when a
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No. 1-04-2437
sentence is not imposed pursuant to statutory requirements, the
sentence is void. In Champ, the defendant, a minor, was charged
with first degree murder. A jury found him guilty of involuntary
manslaughter and a trial court sentenced him as an adult to five
years in prison. On appeal, the defendant argued that he should
have been sentenced as a juvenile, not an adult, because the
State failed to request a hearing pursuant to section 5-
4(6)(c)(ii) of the Juvenile Court Act. Champ, 329 Ill. App. 3d
at 128-29. Section 5-4(6)(c)(ii) mandated that before a juvenile
could be sentenced as an adult for any crime not specifically
listed in section 5-4(6)(a), the State was required to request a
hearing within 10 days of "'the entry of a finding or the return
of a verdict.'" Champ, 329 Ill. App. 3d at 130, quoting 705 ILCS
405/5-4(6)(c)(ii) (West 1996) (now, as amended, 705 ILCS 405/5-
130(1)(c)(ii) (West 2000)). First degree murder was an offense
listed in section 5-4(6)(a); involuntary manslaughter was not.
Champ, 329 Ill. App. 3d at 130.
The Champ court vacated the defendant's sentence. It held
that because the language of section 5-4(6)(c)(ii) was
unambiguous and the defendant was convicted of an offense that
was not covered by section 5-4(6)(a), the State was required to
request a hearing to determine whether the defendant should be
sentenced as an adult. Champ, 329 Ill. App. 3d at 133. Because
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No. 1-04-2437
the State failed to request such a hearing, the defendant's adult
sentence was void. Champ, 329 Ill. App. 3d at 135-36. While not
cited by Champ, the court could just as well have quoted our
supreme court: "A sentence which does not conform to a statutory
requirement is void." People v. Arna, 168 Ill. 2d 107, 113, 658
N.E.2d 445 (1995).
Section 111-3(c-5) is not analogous to the section at issue
in Champ. There is no statutory requirement here that was unmet
by the State. By its plain language, section 111-3(c-5) applies
to the offense charged, not to any lesser-included offense. The
section requires notice "before trial," and indicates that the
alleged fact is one that increases the penalty of an offense set
out in the charging instrument, but not a statutory element of
the offense. 725 ILCS 5/111-3(c-5) (West 2000). We also note,
it was the defendant that asked the trier of fact, the trial
judge, to find him guilty of the lesser-included offense of
involuntary manslaughter.2 Involuntary manslaughter, elevated to
a Class 2 offense based on the status of the victim as a
2
See People v. Schickel, 347 Ill. App. 3d 889, 897, 807
N.E.2d 1195 (2004), quoting People v. Carter, 208 Ill. 2d 309,
319, 802 N.E.2d 1185 (2003) ("'Action taken at defendant's
request precludes defendant from raising such course of conduct
as error on appeal'").
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No. 1-04-2437
household member, was set out in our Criminal Code "and therefore
defendant was on notice that his conduct might fall within its
scope." People v. Harvey, 366 Ill. App. 3d 119, 133, 851 N.E.2d
182 (2006).
We reject any claim by the defendant that, when confronted
by the defendant's request that he be found guilty of a lesser-
included offense that provides for a sentence enhancing factor,
the State must give the defendant notice of the elevated range of
sentences at the risk of injecting error if it fails to do so.
Under the circumstances present in this case, the State did not
violate section 111-3(c-5). The Class 2 sentence imposed was not
void based on lack of notice.
III. Due Process
In his next alternative claim, the defendant frames his
argument as a deficient-charging-instrument claim, alleging that
his due process rights were violated when he was convicted of an
offense that was not a lesser-included offense of first degree
murder. Because we have found that involuntary manslaughter
involving a household member is a lesser-included offense of
first degree murder, much of his charging-instrument argument has
no application.
In fact, based on the dilemmas posed by each party, we
question whether a case involving a sentence enhancement presents
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No. 1-04-2437
a deficient-instrument type of claim at all. But compare Davis,
217 Ill. 2d at 478 (the defendant's argument that he was
improperly convicted of involuntary manslaughter of a family
member based on an indictment charging first degree murder was
analyzed as a deficient-instrument type of claim, requiring a
showing of prejudice when first raised on appeal). The State, in
response to this argument, points out that the defendant's
deficient-charging-instrument argument requires the State to
become "clairvoyant" or add the superfluous fact of the victim's
status to every murder indictment where the victim is a household
member to provide notice prior to trial in the event the accused
should be convicted of involuntary manslaughter so as to face a
Class 2 sentencing range rather than a Class 3. In reply to the
State's claim that this issue was not preserved because the
defendant did not object prior to trial, the defendant points out
he could not have been expected to object to the charging
instrument based on a "speculative prediction" that he might
later be convicted of an uncharged offense. The predicaments
envisioned by each party suggest that the anticipatory actions
set out by each side are not required under established law.
In general, a defendant's due process rights are violated
where he is convicted of an offense that was never charged.
People v. Baldwin, 199 Ill. 2d 1, 6, 764 N.E.2d 1126 (2002).
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No. 1-04-2437
Illinois courts, however, have held that there is no violation
if: (1) the uncharged offense is identified by the charging
instrument as a lesser offense of the one charged; and (2) the
evidence adduced at trial rationally supports the conviction on
the lesser-included offense. Baldwin, 199 Ill. 2d at 6.
As made clear, involuntary manslaughter is a lesser-included
offense of first degree murder. Givens, 364 Ill. App. 3d at 44.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim is a household
member elevates the involuntary manslaughter charge from Class 3
to Class 2. 720 ILCS 5/9-3 (West 2000). The status of the
victim, however, is not a statutory element of the offense of
involuntary manslaughter. In the instant case, that offense is
clearly identified in the charging instrument and there was
sufficient evidence to support the charge. Because involuntary
manslaughter involving a household member is a lesser-included
offense of first degree murder, the State was not required to
include the non-element fact of the victim's status as a
household member in the first degree murder charging instrument
in order to provide notice to the defendant that if convicted of
involuntary manslaughter he might face a Class 2 sentencing
range; nor do we believe was the defendant required to object to
the charging instrument prior to trial in anticipation of being
found guilty of involuntary manslaughter of a household member in
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No. 1-04-2437
order to preserve a claim that the charging instrument did not
charge the lesser offense. See People v. Kolton, 219 Ill. 2d
353, 367, 848 N.E.2d 950 (2006) (if elements of a lesser offense
are explicit or can be reasonably inferred from the factual
description of the charged offense, it is "included" in the
charged offense). In any event, because involuntary manslaughter
of a household member is a lesser-included offense of first
degree murder, the defendant's due process rights were not
violated upon being convicted of that included offense.
Assuming merit in the defendant's claim of a due process
violation based on a deficient charging instrument, we would find
no prejudice. See People v. Benitez, 169 Ill. 2d 245, 257-58,
661 N.E.2d 344 (1996) (explaining that where an indictment is
challenged for the first time in a posttrial motion in arrest of
judgment or on appeal, it is subject to the prejudice standard of
review). The indictment apprised him of the precise offense
charged with sufficient specificity to prepare his defense and to
bar future prosecution arising out of the same conduct. See
Davis, 217 Ill. 2d at 479. The first degree murder charge named
Jefferson as the victim and the defendant was certainly aware of
his relationship with her.
The defendant, in his videotaped statement, when he talked
to police, and in his trial testimony, identified Jefferson as
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No. 1-04-2437
his "girlfriend." He does not point to any evidence that would
put in controversy the nature of their relationship. See Davis,
217 Ill. 2d at 479-80. Although the defendant's trial attorney
argued that she would not have requested consideration of an
involuntary manslaughter conviction had she known the defendant
would be sentenced for a Class 2 rather than a Class 3 felony,
she failed to specifically state what she would have done during
the course of the trial to refute the testimony regarding the
relationship between the defendant and the victim. If the
defendant were convicted of first degree murder, he faced a
minimum sentence of 20 years. His implicit argument post trial
that he wanted only to face a maximum of 5 years for a Class 3
felony rather than 14 years for a Class 2 felony, else he would
have chosen to proceed on the first degree murder charges, is
unpersuasive at best.3
In any event, something more than trial counsel's bald
assertion that the defendant would not have sought consideration
3
See Schickel, 347 Ill. App. 3d at 902 (Quinn, P.J.,
concurring) ("Had the trial court not done as the defendant
requested, the only alternatives for the trial court would have
been to find defendant either guilty or not guilty of [first
degree] murder. While the State was willing to take this risk,
the defendant was not").
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No. 1-04-2437
of a lesser-included offense had he known the full range of
sentences that he faced is required to establish prejudice on his
due process claim. This is so because both trial counsel and the
defendant were on notice as to the range of sentences by the very
provision of the Criminal Code the defendant requested be applied
to him. See 720 ILCS 5/9-3 (West 2000) (under section 9-3(d)
involuntary manslaughter is a Class 3 felony; under section 9-
3(f) it is a Class 2 felony); People v. Molnar, 222 Ill. 2d 495,
514, 857 N.E.2d 209 (2006) (no due process violation where
Registration Act itself provides notice that failure to comply
will result in a 10-year extension of registration period).
Although the defendant now objects to being sentenced by the
trial court under the enhancement, it was within the court's
power to do so. No prejudice ensued to the defendant based on
the trial court's finding that Jefferson was a household member
mandating a Class 2 sentence.
IV. Constitutionality
In his final alternative argument, the defendant challenges
the constitutionality of section 9-3(f) of the Criminal Code,
arguing that the purpose for the enhancement, to fight and deter
domestic violence, is not rationally related to the enhanced
penalty.
Statutes are presumed to be constitutional, and the party
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No. 1-04-2437
challenging a statute has the burden of demonstrating its
invalidity. People v. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d 413, 418, 739 N.E.2d
433 (2000). We will "construe a statute in a manner that upholds
its validity and constitutionality if it can be reasonably done.
We review de novo whether a statute is constitutional." Malchow,
193 Ill. 2d at 418.
The First District recently found that section 9-3(f) is
constitutional. People v. Adams, 363 Ill. App. 3d 34, 39, 842
N.E.2d 1187 (2006). In Adams, the defendant argued that section
9-3(f) was unconstitutional and violated his right to due process
because the statute bore no rational relationship to the
legislature's stated purpose of fighting and deterring domestic
violence. Adams, 363 Ill. App. 3d at 36.
The Adams court considered the numerous cases that found
that involuntary manslaughter cannot be deterred by an enhanced
penalty, which are also cited by the defendant in this appeal.
Adams, 363 Ill. App. 3d at 37, citing People v. Martin, 119 Ill.
2d 453, 519 N.E.2d 884 (1988); People v. Fernetti, 104 Ill. 2d
19, 470 N.E.2d 501 (1984); People v. Alejos, 97 Ill. 2d 502, 455
N.E.2d 48 (1983); People v. Land, 169 Ill. App. 3d 342, 523
N.E.2d 711 (1988). The court distinguished those cases as
focusing on statutory construction, not due process, and held
that none of them suggested that a defendant's due process rights
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No. 1-04-2437
would be violated by statutorily increasing the class level of an
involuntary manslaughter offense under certain specific
circumstances. Adams, 363 Ill. App. 3d at 38.
The court looked to the legislative history of section 9-
3(f), but found it "vague at best, not helpful." Adams, 363 Ill.
App. 3d at 38. It instead focused on the plain language of the
statute: "The plain language of section 9-3(f), however, makes it
clear the legislature intended the penalty for involuntary
manslaughter to be more severe under certain circumstances."
Adams, 363 Ill. App. 3d at 38. Because the legislature has wide
discretion when establishing penalties for criminal offenses, the
court found that section 9-3(f) was reasonably tailored to
accomplish the legislature's goals. Adams, 363 Ill. App. 3d at
39. The defendant presents no argument that requires us to
revisit this issue.
V. DNA Extraction
The defendant's final argument is that the compulsory
extraction of his blood and the perpetual storage of his DNA
profile violated his fourth amendments right to be free from
unreasonable search and seizure.
This argument was rejected by the supreme court in People v.
Garvin, 219 Ill. 2d 104, 125, 847 N.E.2d 82 (2006).
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No. 1-04-2437
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the trial
court.
Affirmed.
McBRIDE, P.J., and R. GORDON, J., concur.
26