eCases

; Grady,

85 N.J. 235

426 A.2d 467

; In re Guardianship of Hayes,

93 Wash. 2d 228

, 234,

608 P.2d 635

, 640 (1980).
“[I]n making the decision of whether to authorize sterilization, a court should consider
only the best interest of the incompetent person, not the interests or convenience of the
individual’s parents, the guardian, or of society.” Terwilliger,

304 Pa. Super. at 564

, citing Grady,

85 N.J. 235

426 A.2d 467

. Furthermore, it cannot be assumed that the
interests of a parent or guardian seeking sterilization are identical to those of the mental
incompetent. Hayes,

93 Wash. 2d at 234

608 P.2d at 640

 (1980).
In order to prevail, the petitioner must prove that sterilization is in the best interests of the
-19-
Nos. 1-06-2263 & 1-06-3077 & 1-07-0618 cons.
incompetent by clear and convincing evidence. Terwilliger,

304 Pa. Super. at 564

; see also Hayes,

93 Wash. 2d at 237

608 P.2d at 640

. This high standard of proof is
necessary because of the fundamental rights at stake in sterilization cases, and our “overriding
concern to prevent any abuse of judicial authority.” Terwilliger,

304 Pa. Super. at 565

.
Procedurally, the Terwilliger court required the following safeguards to be implemented:
First, the court must appoint a guardian ad litem to represent and defend the ward’s interests, if
the ward does not already have one. Second, there must be a full judicial hearing, at which both
the petitioner and the guardian ad litem have the opportunity to present evidence and cross-
examine witnesses. Third, the court has a duty to ensure that the ward undergoes a full medical
and psychological evaluation, with particular attention paid to the ward’s decisionmaking capacity
with respect to the proposed sterilization. Terwilliger,

304 Pa. Super. at 565-66

450 A.2d at 1383

. The judge should also meet personally with the ward in order to observe firsthand her
condition and gauge her level of mental functioning.
Based upon this evaluation and upon the evidence presented during the hearing, the judge
must explicitly make the finding that the ward lacks the capacity to make a decision regarding
sterilization and that the ward is unlikely to regain such capacity. This finding is needed because
even if the individual has been adjudicated a mental incompetent, it does not necessarily follow
that he or she is incapable of making a choice regarding sterilization.
Only if these procedural safeguards are met would the court move on to substantive
analysis of the petition. The Terwilliger court found that in order for sterilization to be in a
-20-
Nos. 1-06-2263 & 1-06-3077 & 1-07-0618 cons.
ward’s best interests, it must be shown by clear and convincing evidence that the sterilization
procedure being petitioned for “is the least significant intrusion necessary to protect the interests
of the individual”; that is, less drastic contraceptive means are impractical and unworkable under
the circumstances. Terwilliger,

304 Pa. Super. at 566

450 A.2d at 1383

; see also Hayes,

93 Wash. 2d at 237

608 P.2d at 641

. Pursuant to the foregoing considerations, the court set forth
the following six factors to be considered in discerning the ward’s best interests:
“(2) The possibility that the incompetent person will experience trauma or
psychological damage if she becomes pregnant or gives birth, and, conversely, the
possibility of trauma or psychological damage from the sterilization operation.
(3) The likelihood that the individual will voluntarily engage in sexual activity or
be exposed to situations where sexual intercourse is imposed upon her.
(4) The inability of the incompetent person to understand reproduction or
contraception and the likely permanence of that inability.
***
(7) The ability of the incompetent person to care for a child, or the possibility that
the incompetent may at some future date be able to marry and, with a spouse, care for a
child.
(8) Evidence that scientific or medical advances may occur within the foreseeable
future which will make possible either improvement of the individual’s condition or
alternative and less drastic sterilization procedures.
(9) A demonstration that the proponents of sterilization are seeking it in good faith
-21-
Nos. 1-06-2263 & 1-06-3077 & 1-07-0618 cons.
and that their primary concern is for the best interests of the incompetent person rather
than their own or the public’s convenience.’ ” Terwilliger,

304 Pa. Super. at 567

450 A.2d at 1383

, quoting Grady,

85 N.J. at 264

426 A.2d at 483

.
See also Hayes,

93 Wash. 2d at 239

608 P.2d at 641

(articulation of a similar standard). These
are not intended as rigid elements, nor are they intended to be an exhaustive list; rather, they are
to guide the court as it seeks to decide whether sterilization by the petitioned-for method is truly
the best way to serve the interests of the ward.
We find that the multifaceted concerns regarding the best interests of the mental
incompetent are fully reflected in the standards under Terwilliger. We therefore adopt the
Terwilliger standards as outlined in the foregoing six-factor test, subject to the requirements of
the Probate Act.
While Illinois has no statute that specifically governs sterilization of mentally handicapped
individuals, cases such as the present one are governed by the Probate Act (755 ILCS 5/1-1 et
seq. (West 2006)). The Probate Act defines the duties of guardians for disabled adults as follows:
“To the extent ordered by the court and under the direction of the court, the
guardian of the person shall have custody of the ward and the ward’s minor and adult
dependent children; shall procure for them and shall make provision for their support,
care, comfort, health, education and maintenance, and professional services as are
appropriate ***. The guardian shall assist the ward in the development of maximum
self-reliance and independence.” 755 ILCS 5/11a-17(a) (West 2006).
The Probate Act goes on to set standards for decisions that are to be made on behalf of disabled
-22-
Nos. 1-06-2263 & 1-06-3077 & 1-07-0618 cons.
adults.
“Decisions made by a guardian on behalf of a ward may be made by conforming as closely
as possible to what the ward, if competent, would have done or intended under the
circumstances, taking into account evidence that includes, but is not limited to, the ward’s
personal, philosophical, religious and moral beliefs, and ethical values relative to the
decision to be made by the guardian. Where possible, the guardian shall determine how
the ward would have made a decision based on the ward’s previously expressed
preferences, and make decisions in accordance with the preferences of the ward. If the
ward’s wishes are unknown and remain unknown after reasonable efforts to discern them,
the decision shall be made on the basis of the ward’s best interests as determined by the
guardian. In determining the ward’s best interests, the guardian shall weigh the reason for
and nature of the proposed action, the benefit or necessity of the action, the possible risks
and other consequences of the proposed action, and any available alternatives and their
risks, consequences and benefits, and shall take into account any other information,
including the views of family and friends, that the guardian believes the ward would have
considered if able to act for herself or himself.” 755 ILCS 5/11a-17(e) (West 2006).
Thus, the law sets up a dual standard to be applied in situations where guardians of disabled
adults must make decisions for their wards, such as the decision currently before us. First,
guardians are to apply a substituted judgment standard, where they attempt to discern what the
ward would have wished if she were competent, and then substitute that judgment for their own.
See, e.g., In re Estate of Greenspan,

137 Ill. 2d 1

558 N.E.2d 1194

 (1990) (guardian had
-23-
Nos. 1-06-2263 & 1-06-3077 & 1-07-0618 cons.
standing to seek removal of artificial life support for ward in a permanent vegetative state, when
testimony established that the ward would likely have refused such treatment if competent). If
there is clear and convincing evidence to demonstrate the course of action that the ward would
have taken if competent, then those wishes take precedence over any best interests analysis.
Greenspan,

137 Ill. 2d at 18

558 N.E.2d at 1202

. However, if the guardian is unable to
determine such wishes “after reasonable efforts to discern them,” then the guardian should instead
act to further the ward’s best interests. 755 ILCS 5/11a-17(e) (West 2006).
Hence, we adopt the following substantive standards in determining whether sterilization
of a mental incompetent is appropriate. In accordance with the mandate of the Probate Act as
discussed above, we begin with a substituted judgment standard; then, if that fails to produce
clear results, we instead move to consider the best interests of the ward. See 755 ILCS 5/11a-
17(e) (West 2006). We also note that while the instant case concerns a female ward, the
standards would remain the same in a case involving a male ward.
First, the party seeking sterilization may demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence
that the ward, if competent, would have wished to be sterilized and would not have objected to
the chosen method of sterilization. If the party seeking sterilization can meet this burden after all
procedures have been followed and all relevant evidence has been taken into account, then the
court may issue an order authorizing sterilization of the ward.
The party opposing sterilization can attempt to produce clear and convincing evidence
that if the ward were competent, she either (1) would not have wished to be sterilized if she could
have foreseen her current situation, or (2) would not have consented to the chosen method of
-24-
Nos. 1-06-2263 & 1-06-3077 & 1-07-0618 cons.
sterilization. If either of these things can be demonstrated, then following the substituted
judgment standard provided for in the Probate Act, the ward’s wishes prevail and the court
should deny the petition for sterilization. No analysis of the ward’s best interests is necessary
under either of these scenarios.
However, if the ward’s substituted judgment cannot be proved by clear and convincing
evidence either way, then the Probate Act instructs us to proceed to a best interests analysis,
following the six Terwilliger factors outlined above. As discussed, the petition for sterilization
should be granted if and only if the proponent of the petition can prove it is in the ward’s best
interests by clear and convincing evidence, when compared to other, less intrusive alternatives
currently available to the ward, as well as potential future alternatives that may become available
due to scientific or medical advances.
If the court concludes, after analysis of all the above factors, that sterilization by the
petitioned-for method is proven to be in the ward’s best interests by clear and convincing
evidence, then a petition authorizing the procedure may issue. Otherwise, the petition must be
denied.
3. Application to the Instant Case
We now turn to reviewing the lower court’s decision based on the standard we have
articulated above.
The general rule is that when a trial court makes rulings after a bench trial that are fact-
dependent, we will not reverse those rulings unless they are against the manifest weight of the
evidence; however, to the extent that the rulings are purely legal, we review them de novo.
-25-
Nos. 1-06-2263 & 1-06-3077 & 1-07-0618 cons.
Dargis v. Paradise Park, Inc.,

354 Ill. App. 3d 171

, 177,

819 N.E.2d 1220

, 1227 (2004).
Proper procedural safeguards were followed by the court below. K.E.J. was represented
even before the filing of the petition by Raleigh, her long-standing guardian ad litem. K.E.J. was
also represented by independent counsel who vigorously opposed the petition. The court held a
bench trial during which both petitioner V.H. and the independent counsel were allowed to call
witnesses to testify to K.E.J.’s mental and psychological condition, and Raleigh was given ample
opportunity to cross-examine these witnesses and to speak before the court on K.E.J.’s behalf.
Moreover, the judge conducted a private interview with K.E.J., which he used in tandem with her
testimony and the testimony of expert witnesses to make a finding that she completely lacked
capacity to make a decision regarding whether to undergo a tubal ligation.
Furthermore, under the facts of this case, the trial court did not err in using the best
interests standard. Because K.E.J. sustained the head injury leading to her current lack of
competence when she was eight years old, far before the age when she had the legal capacity to
make decisions regarding pregnancy and childbirth, there is no way to determine what she would
choose for herself now if she were competent. Any attempt to use the substituted judgment
standard would be little more than wild speculation. Thus, we follow the mandate of the Probate
Act by moving on to consider what course of action would be in K.E.J.’s best interests.
K.E.J.’s counsel suggests that the present judgment of a ward should be controlling, at
least in a case like the present one, where fundamental constitutional rights are at stake. In
support of this contention, counsel cites the language in the statute which says that decisions are
to be made “in accordance with the preferences of the ward.” 755 ILCS 5/11a-17(e) (West
-26-
Nos. 1-06-2263 & 1-06-3077 & 1-07-0618 cons.
2006). We disagree with this interpretation. When read in context, the quoted language is
referring to the preferences of the ward that were “previously expressed” – i.e., before the ward
became incompetent. Thus, the statutory concern about the ward’s preferences is part of the
substituted judgment standard, rather than the establishment of a new actual judgment standard.
K.E.J.’s current desire to have children, even if it were clearly and consistently expressed over the
course of the proceedings below (which the evidence shows it was not), would not automatically
trump all other considerations in determining whether a tubal ligation is appropriate. Moreover,
the record reflects that K.E.J.’s present will was ambivalent and that on multiple occasions, her
statements regarding tubal ligation seemed to reflect not her present will, but merely a desire to
accommodate the anticipated preference of the person to whom she was speaking. In that regard,
the court below made a finding that K.E.J. “doesn’t have the ability to make up her will,” so the
evidentiary value of her statements at trial is dubious at best.
The case law cited by K.E.J.’s counsel in support of their interpretation is inapposite. In
re Estate of Brooks,

32 Ill. 2d 361

205 N.E.2d 435

 (1965), dealt with an adult woman who had
steadfastly refused blood transfusions for religious reasons while competent; the court ruled that it
violated her constitutional rights for her to be judicially compelled to accept a transfusion while
incompetent. This case is readily distinguishable from the case at hand, since the woman’s
statements while competent provided a clear basis for conducting a substituted judgment analysis.
With respect to K.E.J., we have no such statements, and we cannot presume that any statements
she makes in her current mentally handicapped state are in line with what she would wish for
herself if she were competent. Moreover, the case of In re Gardner,

121 Ill. App. 3d 7

, 459
-27-
Nos. 1-06-2263 & 1-06-3077 & 1-07-0618 cons.
N.E.2d 17 (1984), is irrelevant, as it deals with a statutory scheme for involuntary commitment of
the mentally ill that is not applicable here.
Hence, we proceed to an analysis of K.E.J.’s best interests under the six factors outlined
earlier. Regarding the possibility of psychological trauma or damage from either childbirth or
sterilization, we find the testimony of K.E.J.’s father regarding the likely effect of a tubal ligation
to be persuasive: because K.E.J. dreams of having children someday, he stated that a tubal
ligation would be likely to induce severe depression in her, as she understands the permanence of
the procedure. While other methods of contraception also have the effect of preventing
pregnancy, they are much less intrusive in that she does not object to their use, as they allow her
to maintain her hope for the future. However, this must be weighed against the testimony that if
she were to have a child and it were taken away, it would be a highly traumatic event for her.
The ward’s level of sexual activity weighs in favor of a permanent or at least long-lasting
means of contraception: Uncontroverted testimony from multiple witnesses, including K.E.J.
herself, indicated that K.E.J. was sexually active and had no plans of stopping her sexual activities
in the near future.
The ward’s understanding of reproduction and contraception weighs somewhat against a
tubal ligation. K.E.J.’s testimony, corroborated by the testimony of counselor Pollard, shows that
she does understand that intercourse leads to pregnancy and that pregnancy may be stopped
through contraception. Nevertheless, under the circumstances of this case, this is not a strong
factor, as Pollard also indicated that due to K.E.J.’s poor impulse control, she could be persuaded
into having unprotected sex (and K.E.J. admitted that she had done this on multiple occasions).
-28-
Nos. 1-06-2263 & 1-06-3077 & 1-07-0618 cons.
Furthermore, neuropsychologist Larson testified that K.E.J.’s cognitive condition is unlikely to
improve due to the nature of her head injury.
The evidence regarding the ability of the ward to take care of a child is not persuasive
either for or against a tubal ligation. To be sure, there was a good deal of testimony supporting
the proposition that K.E.J. could not take care of a child alone, particularly considering that she
lacks the independent decisional capacity even to take care of herself alone. The court also made
a specific finding to this effect. However, K.E.J.’s father testified that he would be willing to take
care of any children she might have (though V.H. disputed this contention); in addition, it is
plausible that K.E.J. might eventually be married to someone with the ability to help her raise the
child, a possibility which she raised in her testimony.
Finally, the good faith of the petitioner weighs in favor of the guardian V.H.: The trial
court made a specific finding that V.H. was acting in good faith, and we are reluctant to disturb
that finding on appeal, since we do not have the opportunity the trial court had to observe V.H.
and hear her testimony firsthand.
Considering these factors as a whole, we find that the trial court did not err in concluding
that K.E.J. would have a constant need for contraception due to her inability to raise a child and
the emotional pain she would suffer were a child of hers to be taken away by the state.
Nevertheless, that need not justify a tubal ligation. We affirm the court’s ruling to deny the
petition for tubal ligation based on the presence of less intrusive and less psychologically harmful
alternatives to a tubal ligation.
There are a number of potential alternatives which could serve K.E.J.’s needs better than
-29-
Nos. 1-06-2263 & 1-06-3077 & 1-07-0618 cons.
sterilization. One of those contraceptive methods is birth control pills, which K.E.J. is currently
using. They are not physically invasive, and there was no evidence offered that K.E.J. objects to
their use, thus preserving the right of personal inviolability. See Botsford,

141 U.S. at 251

35 L. Ed. at 737

11 S. Ct. at 1001

. Furthermore, there has been no indication that they might be
ineffective, and indeed they were recommended for use by her at her gynecological appointment
with Dr. Axelrod. Moreover, although this was disputed, there was expert testimony from Dr.
Hammond that favored consideration of an IUD as a more long-term contraceptive device for
K.E.J.
Another contraceptive solution that might be suitable for K.E.J. is the drug Implanon, if
and when it is approved for use by the FDA. As Implanon may be removed, this solution is
unlikely to cause the psychological trauma associated with a more permanent solution such as a
tubal ligation. Furthermore, contrary to the implications in V.H.’s brief, the fact that Implanon
was not then FDA-approved as of the time of trial would arguably not bar us from considering the
likelihood of its emergence as a new, less intrusive alternative. This is particularly true since Dr.
Hammond testified that he expected Implanon to be FDA-approved due to its use in Europe.
Due to the presence of the foregoing alternative methods, we cannot say that V.H. has
met her burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that a tubal ligation is in K.E.J.’s best
interests when compared to other methods of contraception. Hence, the trial court did not err in
denying V.H.’s petition for a tubal ligation.
B. Award of Fees from the Ward’s Estate
We next turn to consider whether the trial court was correct in granting V.H.’s petition
-30-
Nos. 1-06-2263 & 1-06-3077 & 1-07-0618 cons.
for attorney fees at the trial level to be paid out of K.E.J.’s estate, but in denying her petition for
appellate attorney fees.
V.H. contends that we lack jurisdiction to consider whether the trial court erred in
granting reimbursement for the attorney fees she incurred in the trial proceedings, because she
claims that K.E.J.’s counsel failed to file their notice of appeal in a timely fashion.
Failure to file a timely notice of appeal deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction over the
appeal. Lowenthal v. McDonald,

367 Ill. App. 3d 919

, 925,

856 N.E.2d 1118

, 1124 (2006).
Accordingly, we lack the authority to excuse an appellant who has failed to comply with the filing
requirements. Clark v. Han,

272 Ill. App. 3d 981

, 984,

651 N.E.2d 549

, 551 (1995). Under
Supreme Court Rule 303(a), any notice of appeal must be filed “within 30 days after the entry of
the final judgment appealed from, or, if a timely post-trial motion directed against the judgment is
filed, *** within 30 days after the entry of the order disposing of the last pending post-trial
motion” directed against that judgment or order. 134 Ill. 2d R. 303(a)(1).
The issue here is whether K.E.J.’s postjudgment motion dated August 14, 2006, counts as
a motion “directed against” the court’s July 13, 2006, order denying V.H.’s petition for tubal
ligation. If so, then K.E.J.’s counsel had until 30 days after the resolution of that motion to file its
notice of appeal, so its appeal is timely. 134 Ill. 2d R. 303(a)(1). However, if the motion does
not fall within the requirements of Rule 303(a), then it does not extend the time allowed for the
filing of an appeal and, thus, K.E.J.’s appeal must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. This is
V.H.’s argument: She says that the August 14, 2006, postjudgment motion was not “directed
against” the final ruling on the petition for tubal ligation, because the sole purpose of the motion
-31-
Nos. 1-06-2263 & 1-06-3077 & 1-07-0618 cons.
was to challenge the court’s earlier grant of attorney fees dated September 22, 2005.
We disagree with V.H.’s contention. The postjudgment motion brought by K.E.J.’s
counsel was made pursuant to section 2-1203, which states: “In all cases tried without a jury, any
party may, within 30 days after the entry of the judgment or within any further time the court may
allow within the 30 days or any extensions thereof, file a motion for a rehearing, or a retrial, or
modification of the judgment or to vacate the judgment or for other relief.” 735 ILCS 5/2-
1203(a) (West 2006). In their motion, K.E.J.’s counsel requested that the court order all trial
fees that had been paid to V.H.’s counsel to be returned to the estate; that is, they were seeking a
modification of the July 13, 2006, judgment to include monetary relief. We find that this is
sufficient to constitute a motion “directed against” the judgment (134 Ill. 2d R. 303(a)(1)),
because they argued that its terms should be materially changed, even though the order itself did
not mention the fees at issue. Therefore, the postjudgment motion satisfies the terms of Rule
303(a), K.E.J.’s appeal was timely, and we have jurisdiction to decide the appeal on the merits.
134 Ill. 2d R. 303(a)(1).
Moving on to substantive analysis of the fee petitions, both at the trial and the appellate
levels: The general rule is that an award of attorney fees is within the discretion of the trial court,
and we will not overturn a fee award absent an abuse of discretion. Weidner v. Szostek,

245 Ill. App. 3d 487

, 493,

614 N.E.2d 879

, 883 (1993). Under the Probate Act, guardians such as V.H.
may obtain compensation for services they pay for on the ward’s behalf: “The guardian of the
person may petition the court for an order directing the guardian of the estate to pay an amount
periodically for the provision of the services specified by the court order.” 755 ILCS 5/11a-17(a)
-32-
Nos. 1-06-2263 & 1-06-3077 & 1-07-0618 cons.
(West 2006). Nevertheless, this must be balanced against the guardian’s obligation to responsibly
manage the estate on the ward’s behalf. As a fiduciary of the ward, the guardian is held to the
“highest standard of fair dealing and diligence” in all matters relating to the ward’s estate. In re
Estate of Berger,

166 Ill. App. 3d 1045

, 1056,

520 N.E.2d 690

, 697 (1987). The trial court has a
concomitant duty to closely scrutinize the guardian’s actions and direct the guardian’s
management of the estate. Berger,

; In re Estate of
Mank,

298 Ill. App. 3d 821

699 N.E.2d 1103

 (1998), citing Wellman,

174 Ill. 2d at 348

673 N.E.2d at 278

 (guardian is “subject to the court’s direction” in spending estate resources on the
ward’s behalf). Indeed, the trial court must protect the incompetent as its own ward, “vigilantly
guarding his property and viewing him as a favored person in the eyes of the law.” Berger,

166 Ill. App. 3d at 1055

; see also Mank,

298 Ill. App. 3d at 826

699 N.E.2d at 1107

; Miller v. Myer,

46 Ill. App. 2d 106

, 113-14,

196 N.E.2d 370

, 374 (1964).
Counsel for K.E.J. contend that because K.E.J. said that she was unwilling to undergo a
tubal ligation, it was clear that a tubal ligation was not in her best interests, so any award of fees
was improper. We disagree. A ward’s perception of her best interests is not necessarily in line
with her actual best interests. This is true of anyone who has been adjudicated mentally
incompetent, and it is particularly true in the instant case, where the trial court found based on
testimony from multiple sources that K.E.J. did not have the capacity to make such personal
decisions for herself. Hence, K.E.J.’s statements regarding the tubal ligation are not dispositive of
the fee issue. Rather, we defer to the trial court’s finding that V.H. was acting in good faith to
pursue what she saw as K.E.J.’s best interests when she brought the petition.
-33-
Nos. 1-06-2263 & 1-06-3077 & 1-07-0618 cons.
However, V.H.’s good faith does not mean that she ought to be given carte blanche to
spend whatever she might wish for the purported benefit of her ward. “Good faith does not
create authority for improper acts.” Berger,

166 Ill. App. 3d at 1059

520 N.E.2d at 699

, citing
Nonnast v. Northern Trust Co.,

374 Ill. 248

29 N.E.2d 251

 (1940). Rather, a balance must be
struck between the benefit to be gained from a successful petition and the detriment to be done to
K.E.J.’s estate. As Raleigh stated before the court, the estate is limited and K.E.J. is young;
depleting the estate in pursuit of obtaining authorization for a tubal ligation, even if such an
operation were found to be in K.E.J.’s best interest, is not necessarily a wise use of limited
resources. A cost-benefit analysis must be undertaken to determine whether the expected gain
from bringing the case to court outweighs the expected cost – and as a case drags on, and more
and more fees are incurred, the chances become less of that expected gain being high enough to
justify mounting legal expenses. Failure to conduct such an analysis is a failure of the fiduciary
duty owed by the guardian to the ward, for it is not a responsible use of the ward’s limited estate
to continue spending resources past the point where it is profitable to do so. Berger,

. We wish to stress that when conducting such a cost-benefit
analysis, the court should not see it as an all-or-nothing affair; rather, an effort must be made to
gauge the point at which further expenditures are excessive, and the payment of funds from the
estate stopped at that point.
We note in passing that, although the trial court eventually denied V.H.’s petition for
K.E.J. to undergo tubal ligation, our analysis here does not hinge upon that fact. Even if the
operation could be proven to be in K.E.J.’s best interests by clear and convincing evidence, that
-34-
Nos. 1-06-2263 & 1-06-3077 & 1-07-0618 cons.
would not justify any expenditures above and beyond the benefit that could be derived from the
operation when compared to other contraceptive measures.
Nevertheless, we express severe doubts that the payment of such an exorbitant sum, given
the size of the estate and the relatively young age of K.E.J., could withstand scrutiny under the
kind of cost-benefit analysis described above.2 Not only is $111,000 in attorney fees a high figure
in absolute terms, but payment of those fees reduced the estate to only $114,000 in liquid funds.
For V.H. to deplete the estate in this manner in pursuit of a tubal ligation for K.E.J., when other
contraceptive methods existed, may well have fallen short of the due diligence required of a
guardian. Furthermore, we cannot say that the court undertook a careful cost-benefit analysis to
determine the point at which V.H.’s continued pursuit of her petition became detrimental to the
future financial security of the ward. Lack of such an analysis is an abuse of the court’s
discretion, as it falls short of the vigilance required in ensuring that a ward’s estate is responsibly
spent. See Berger,

; Myer, 46 Ill. App. 2d at 113-14,
196 N.E.2d at 374. Hence, we remand for the court below to conduct such an analysis.
Furthermore, we find that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying V.H.’s petition
for appellate fees to be paid from the estate. As discussed earlier, the amount of attorney fees
that the court had already granted to V.H.’s counsel was extremely high in light of the financial
condition of the estate at the time; it was not at all unreasonable for the court to find that any
further expenditure of resources in pursuit of a tubal ligation would be an unwise use of the
2
We note that V.H. makes no argument in her brief regarding the propriety of trial fees,
choosing instead to rest solely on her jurisdictional argument with respect to K.E.J.’s appeal.
-35-
Nos. 1-06-2263 & 1-06-3077 & 1-07-0618 cons.
estate’s limited resources, and thus conclude that granting V.H.’s motion would be a violation of
the court’s duty to safeguard the ward’s estate. See Berger,