DocketNumber： 5-95-0474WC
Filed Date： 10/4/1996
Status： Precedential
Modified Date： 4/17/2021
No. 5-95-0474WC
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION DIVISION
_________________________________________________________________
RALPH GILES, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Appellee, ) Williamson County.
)
v. ) No. 94-MR-95
)
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. ) Honorable
(Freeman United Coal Mining Co., ) Ronald Eckiss,
Appellant). ) Judge, presiding.
_________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE COLWELL delivered the opinion of the court:
Employer, Freeman United Coal Mining Co. (Freeman), appeals
the circuit court's reversal of the Industrial Commission's
determination that the claimant, Ralph Giles, is permanently
partially disabled to the extent of five percent of the man-as-a-
whole due to coal worker's pneumoconiosis (CWP). Originally, on
the claimant's appeal, the circuit court remanded to the Commission
for reconsideration of the claimant's diminished earning capacity
in light of Zeigler Coal Co. and Monterey Coal Co. Zeigler Coal Co.
v. Industrial Comm'n, 237 Ill. App. 3d 213 (1992); Monterey Coal
Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 241 Ill. App. 3d 386 (1992). On remand,
the Commission reaffirmed its decision, with one commissioner dis-
senting. The dissenting commissioner concluded that the claimant
was 100% permanently and totally disabled. The circuit court
reversed the Commission and adopted the dissenting commissioner's
interpretation, finding the claimant 100% permanently and totally
disabled.
Freeman brings two contentions on appeal: (1) the circuit
court erred in remanding to the Commission because it failed to
find that the original decision was against the manifest weight of
the evidence (and Freeman contends that even if this court
concludes such a finding was implied in the circuit court's remand
order, it was erroneous); and (2) the circuit court "exceeded its
authority" in reversing the Commission's reaffirmation of the five-
percent figure and in finding that the claimant is 100% permanently
and totally disabled.
Before we begin our analysis of the issues on appeal, however,
we first must resolve Freeman's motion to dismiss filed during the
pendency of this appeal. The motion was made upon proof that the
claimant died in August 1995. Freeman contends that no one
qualifies under the terms of section 8(h) of the Workers' Compensa-
tion Act to be substituted as a party. 820 ILCS 305/8(h) (West
1992). We granted leave for the claimant's estate to respond to
the motion to dismiss and ordered the estate's motion to substitute
the decedent's administrator (his daughter, Jo Lynn Carter) taken
with the case.
As the employer points out, the claimant leaves only two known
heirs, Carter and a son, Michael Giles. Both are above the age of
majority, and no suggestion is made that either was in any manner
dependent on the claimant at the time of his death. Consequently,
the question is presented as to whether section 8(h), when read in
conjunction with section 7(g) (820 ILCS 305/7(g) (West 1992)),
allows only dependent children to succeed to the claimant's
benefits. Thus, we are asked to determine what portion, if any, of
the award is owed to the decedent's estate.
As the administrator notes in her response to the employer's
motion to dismiss, our supreme court found that benefits accrued
prior to a claimant's death are assets of the estate, as any other
debt. Republic Steel Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 26 Ill. 2d 32
(1962). However, subsequent to that case, the legislature amended
the Workers' Compensation Act to provide that both accrued and
unaccrued benefits are to be paid in accordance with the provisions
of section 7(g) of the Act. 820 ILCS 305/8(h), 7(g) (West 1992).
Section 8(h) provides:
"In case death occurs from any cause before the total
compensation to which the employee would have been
entitled has been paid, then in case the employee leaves
any widow, widower, child, parent (or any grandchild,
grandparent or other lineal heir or any collateral heir
dependent at the time of the [injury] upon the earnings
of the employee to the extent of 50% or more of total
dependency) such compensation shall be paid to the
beneficiaries of the deceased employee and distributed as
provided in paragraph (g) of Section 7." 820 ILCS
305/8(h) (West 1992).
Section 7(g) provides for payment to be made in installments.
The claimant's administrator argues that section 8(h) is
inapplicable because all of the amount awarded had accrued and
therefore was "vested" before the claimant's death. However, we
note that by its plain language, section 8(h) is applicable any
time that a portion of the award remains to be paid. Thus we turn
to the second part of the claimant's argument, that because the
legislature does not define the term "child" in section 8(h) as a
minor or dependent, we should find that even adult children, such
as the administrator and her brother, are entitled to collect the
awarded benefits. The employer argues that we should construe the
term child in section 8(h) as it is defined in section 7, which
states that only dependent children are entitled to collect
deceased claimants' awards. 820 ILCS 305/7, 8(h) (West 1992).
The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain
and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Kraft, Inc. v.
Edgar, 138 Ill. 2d 178, 189 (1990). Although the language that the
legislature actually used is our starting point in divining this
intent, the words must receive a sensible construction "even though
such construction qualifies the universality of its language." In
re Illinois Bell Switching Station Litigation, 161 Ill. 2d 233, 246
(1994). The statute should be evaluated as a whole, with each
provision being construed in connection with every other section.
Bonaguro v. County Officers Electoral Board, 158 Ill. 2d 391, 397
(1994). A court should avoid a construction which renders part of
the statute superfluous or meaningless. Bonaguro, 158 Ill. 2d at
397. Specific language controls over more general language (People
v. Singleton, 103 Ill. 2d 339, 345 (1984)), and the enumeration of
one thing in a statute implies the exclusion of all others. Baker
v. Miller, 159 Ill. 2d 249, 260 (1994). In ascertaining the intent
of the legislature, a court may consider the reason and necessity
of the law, the evils to be remedied, and the objects to be
obtained. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Yapejian, 152 Ill. 2d
533, 541 (1992). All portions of the Workers' Compensation Act
must be read as a whole and in such a manner as to give them the
practical and liberal interpretation intended by the legislature.
Vaught v. Industrial Comm'n, 52 Ill. 2d 158, 165 (1972).
Applying these principles to this case, we find that the
legislature did in fact require in section 7 that a person
qualified to succeed to a deceased claimant's benefits in the
capacity of "child" be a dependent. As section 8(h) expressly
requires that it be construed according to the provisions of
section 7, and because we are required to read the statute as a
whole, we must find that the legislature intended that dependent
children succeed to both accrued and unaccrued benefits, but awards
to claimants leaving no dependents are abated at the claimant's
death. Thus, we find that the legislature in effect overruled
Republic Steel to the extent that it provides that accrued benefits
are de facto a part of the deceased claimant's estate. In fact, in
Republic Steel, the administrator was allowed to succeed to the
benefits expressly for the benefit of the decedent's dependents.
Republic Steel is silent as to whether the accrued benefits would
have been considered a part of the decedent's estate if he had left
no dependents. Republic Steel, 26 Ill. 2d 32.
This is in accord with the remaining provisions of section 7,
which provide death benefits only to dependents. We find that it
would be illogical for the legislature to have provided that only
dependents of employees who die as a result of a work-related
accident may make a claim for death benefits, but that nondependent
heirs of employees who die of unrelated causes may collect an
accrued award. Thus, we find that the legislature intended that
only dependents may collect awarded benefits upon the death of the
claimant. Awards made to claimants who die without dependents are
abated.
Thus, we need not address the merits of the instant appeal, as
we have determined that no party is entitled to be substituted as
a party in this case.
For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is dismissed as moot.
Appellee's motion to substitute denied; appellant's motion to
dismiss appeal granted; appeal dismissed.
McCULLOUGH, P.J., and RAKOWSKI and HOLDRIDGE, JJ., concur.
JUSTICE RARICK, dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the majority's attempt to amend
the Workers' Compensation Act to correct a perceived oversight by
our legislature. After applying various rules of statutory
construction, the majority concludes that nondependent children,
and presumably parents, cannot succeed to a claimant's benefits
under section 8(h). The majority bases this conclusion on the fact
that "section 8(h) expressly requires that it be construed
according to the provisions of section 7 ***" and that it would be
"illogical" for the legislature to have provided that only
dependents of employees who die as a result of a work-related
accident may make a claim for death benefits, but that nondependent
heirs of an employee who dies of unrelated causes may collect an
accrued award.
As the majority notes, the cardinal rule of statutory
construction, to which all other rules are subordinate, is to
ascertain and give effect to the true intent and meaning of the
legislature. Kraft, Inc. v. Edgar, 138 Ill. 2d 178, 189, 561
N.E.2d 656, 661 (1990). Legislative intent is best evidenced by
the language used by the legislature, and where the language is
clear and unambiguous, a court is not at liberty to depart from the
plain language and meaning of the statute by reading into it
exceptions, limitations, or conditions that the legislature did not
express. People v. Goins, 119 Ill. 2d 259, 265, 518 N.E.2d 1014,
1016 (1988). Where the language is clear, the court should give
effect to it and not look to extrinsic aids for construction.
Bogseth v. Emanuel, 166 Ill. 2d 507, 655 N.E.2d 888 (1995).
Section 8(h) provides:
"In case death occurs from any cause before the total
compensation to which the employee would have been
entitled has been paid, then in case the employee leaves
any widow, widower, child, parent (or any grandchild,
grandparent or other lineal heir or any collateral heir
dependent at the time of the [injury] upon the earnings
of the employee to the extent of 50% or more of total
dependency) such compensation shall be paid to the
beneficiaries of the deceased employee and distributed as
provided in paragraph (g) of Section 7." 820 ILCS
305/8(h) (West 1992).
Section 7(g) provides for the manner of payment. Contrary to the
majority's assertion, section 8(h) does not require that it be
construed according to section 7 as a whole, it merely adopts the
manner of payment provided for in section 7(g), nothing more.
The language of section 8(h) is clear and unambiguous. There
is no language precluding an adult nondependent child from
receiving the compensation to which the employee would have been
entitled. I would deny the employer's motion to dismiss and allow
decedent's administrator to be substituted.
ATTACH A FRONT SHEET TO EACH CASE
___________________________________________________________________________
NO. 5-95-0474WC
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION DIVISION
___________________________________________________________________________
RALPH GILES, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Appellee, ) Williamson County.
)
v. ) No. 94-MR-95
)
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. ) Honorable
(Freeman United Coal Mining Co., ) Ronald Eckiss,
Appellant). ) Judge, presiding.
___________________________________________________________________________
Opinion Filed: October 4, 1996
___________________________________________________________________________
Justices: Honorable Michael J. Colwell, J.
Honorable John T. McCullough, P.J.,
Honorable Thomas R. Rakowski, J., and
Honorable William E. Holdridge, J.,
Concur
Honorable Philip J. Rarick, J.,
Dissents
___________________________________________________________________________
Attorney Kenneth F. Werts, Craig & Craig, 227½ South 9th Street, P.O.
for Box 1545, Mt. Vernon, IL 62864
Appellant
___________________________________________________________________________
Attorney Harold B. Culley, Jr., Culley & Wissore, Raleigh Road, P.O.
for Box 217, Raleigh, IL 62977
Appellee
___________________________________________________________________________