People v. Dominguez

No. 3--05-0668
Filed August 9, 2006
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
A.D., 2006
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
ILLINOIS, ) of the 12th Judicial Circuit,
) Will County, Illinois
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
)
v. ) No. 05--DT--743
)
ARMANDO DOMINGUEZ, ) Honorable
) Richard C. Schoenstedt,
Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, Presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE SCHMIDT delivered the opinion of the court:
On May 13, 2005, the defendant, Armando Dominguez, was
issued three traffic tickets, including one for driving while
under the influence of alcohol, other drug or drugs, intoxicating
compound or compounds, or any combination thereof, in violation
of section 11--501(a)(6) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (the Code).
625 ILCS 5/11--501(a)(6) (West 2004). Subsequently, defendant
received notice that his driving privileges were to be summarily
suspended pursuant to section 11--501.1 of the Code. Defendant
filed a petition to strike and rescind his statutory summary
suspension, which was granted by the circuit court of Will
County. The State appeals from the circuit court's order
granting defendant's petition.
BACKGROUND
On the day defendant was issued the three traffic tickets,
he agreed to provide a sample of blood and urine to determine
whether he had ingested any illegal drugs. Several weeks later,
the police officer who issued the tickets received a lab report
which indicated that defendant had, in fact, ingested illegal
drugs. The police officer prepared a supplemental sworn report.
Copies of this report were mailed to the defendant and the
Secretary of State. The Secretary of State then sent a
confirmation of defendant's statutory summary suspension to the
defendant. No sworn report was mailed to the circuit court of
Will County.
Prior to the date upon which his statutory suspension was to
become effective, defendant filed a petition to strike and
rescind the suspension. This petition was based upon the fact
that the officer failed to forward his sworn report to the
circuit court of Will County in compliance with section 11--
501.1(f) of the Code. 625 ILCS 5/11--501.1(f) (West 2004). The
circuit court granted defendant's petition. The State appeals.
ANALYSIS
The sole issue on appeal is whether the circuit court
properly granted defendant's petition. To resolve this issue, we
must interpret section 11--501.1(f) of the Code. 625 ILCS 5/11--
501.1(f) (West 2004). Statutory construction is a matter of law
2
and, therefore, our standard of review is de novo. People v.
Phelps, 211 Ill. 2d 1, 809 N.E.2d 1214 (2004).
Section 11--501.1 states, in pertinent part, as follows:
"(a) Any person who drives or is in actual
physical control of a motor vehicle upon the
public highways of this State shall be deemed
to have given consent, subject to the provisions
of Section 11-501.2, to a chemical test or tests
of blood, breath, or urine for the purpose of
determining the content of alcohol, other drug or
drugs, or intoxicating compound or compounds or
any combination thereof in the person's blood if
arrested, as evidenced by the issuance of a
Uniform Traffic Ticket, for any offense as defined
in Section 11-501 or a similar provision of a
local ordinance. The test or tests shall be
administered at the direction of the arresting
officer. ***
***
(d) If the person refuses testing or submits
to a test that discloses an alcohol concentration
of 0.08 or more, or any amount of a drug, substance,
or intoxicating compound in the person's breath,
blood, or urine resulting from the unlawful use
or consumption of cannabis listed in the Cannabis
3
Control Act, a controlled substance listed in the
Illinois Controlled Substances Act, or an intoxicating
compound listed in the Use of Intoxicating Compounds
Act, the law enforcement officer shall immediately
submit a sworn report to the circuit court of venue
and the Secretary of State, certifying that the
test or tests was or were requested under paragraph
(a) and the person refused to submit to a test, or
tests, or submitted to testing that disclosed an
alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more.
***
(f) *** In cases where *** any amount of a
drug, substance, or compound resulting from the
unlawful use or consumption of cannabis as covered
by the Cannabis Control Act, a controlled substance
listed in the Illinois Controlled Substances Act,
or an intoxicating compound listed in the Use of
Intoxicating Compounds Act is established by a
subsequent analysis of blood or urine collected at
the time of arrest, the arresting officer or
arresting agency shall give notice as provided in
this Section or by deposit in the United States
mail of the notice in an envelope with postage
prepaid and addressed to the person at his address
as shown on the Uniform Traffic Ticket and the
4
statutory summary suspension shall begin as provided
in paragraph (g). *** The officer shall immediately
forward the driver's license or permit to the
circuit court of venue along with the sworn report
provided for in paragraph (d)." 625 ILCS 5/11--
501.1 (West 2004).
The trial court's order states that it granted defendant's
petition "due to the failure to file the sworn report with the
clerk of the court." Defendant maintains that the trial court
acted properly in that section 11--501.1(f) of the Code
unequivocally and clearly directs the officer to forward to the
circuit court the sworn report once it has been completed. 625
ILCS 5/11--501.1(f) (West 2004). Therefore, defendant continues,
after the court took notice that the sworn report was not filed
with the court, its only option was to strike and rescind
defendant's statutory summary suspension.
The State disagrees. The State admits that the officer
failed to send a copy of the sworn report to the circuit court as
directed by the statute. However, the State notes that the
statute is silent as to the proper remedy available in such an
instance. The State suggests that failing to send a copy of the
sworn report to the circuit court can be cured by later tendering
a copy of the report to the court. The State suggests that
allowing a defendant to escape the statutory summary suspension
called for in the Code as a result of a clerical error belies the
5
purpose and subverts the intent of the statute. We agree and
hold that the trial court erred in granting defendant's petition
to strike and rescind his statutory summary suspension.
Neither party cites authority which directly addresses this
issue. However, the State draws our attention to People v.
Badoud, in which the Illinois Supreme Court held that an
officer's failure to fulfill every technical requirement of
section 11--501.1 did not mandate the rescission of a defendant's
statutory summary suspension. People v. Badoud, 122 Ill. 2d 50,
521 N.E.2d 884 (1988). The Badoud court dealt with a provision
contained in section 11--501.1(d) of the Code which states that
the arresting officer "shall immediately submit a sworn report"
to the Secretary of State and circuit court after the arrested
driver refuses or fails an appropriate sobriety test. Badoud,
122 Ill. 2d at 53, citing Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 952, par.
11-501.1(d). The officer in Badoud failed to properly swear to
the report filed so there was technically no "sworn report" filed
with the Secretary of State. Badoud, 122 Ill. 2d at 56. Some of
the consolidated defendants in the Badoud case argued that the
officer's technical violation of failing to properly swear to the
report "ends the matter and necessitates dismissing the charges."
Badoud, 122 Ill. 2d at 57. In answering these arguments, the
supreme court stated:
"[W]e conclude that the General Assembly
6
intended an officer's good-faith failure to
initially swear to the report to be curable.
This interpretation fosters the accomplishment
of the legislation's obvious objective of pro-
tecting individuals using the roads in this
State.
We next consider whether an initial failure
to swear to the report must be corrected before
the Secretary of State can enter the suspension.
We conclude that this is not essential. ***
[W]e believe that the summary suspension
provision should be liberally construed to
accomplish the General Assembly's obvious purpose
of fostering highway safety, and we believe that
the legislative objective would be thwarted by
holding void suspensions such as those occurring
in the instant cases. The most reasonable
interpretation of the statutory scheme is that,
while it permits a defendant to insist on having
an unsworn report corrected, it does not permit
him to escape responsibility for drunk driving by
pointing to this technical deficiency in the
completion of the officer's report." (Emphasis
in original.) Badoud, 122 Ill. 2d at 59-60.
We find Badoud instructive on this issue and similarly
7
believe that the most reasonable interpretation of the statutory
scheme is that failure of an officer to forward a copy of the
sworn report to the circuit court is a technical deficiency which
can be cured. The record is clear that both the defendant and
the Secretary of State were provided a copy of the sworn report.
The State is correct that the statute does not specifically
identify a remedy available to a defendant when the officer fails
to provide the circuit court the sworn report. To use our
supreme court's words from Badoud, this statute simply does not
permit a defendant to escape responsibility for driving under the
influence of alcohol or drugs by pointing to a technical
deficiency in the completion of an officer's duties. Badoud, 122
Ill. 2d at 60. Any other holding would thwart the General
Assembly's obvious purpose of fostering highway safety. Having
received a copy of the report himself, this defendant was not
prejudiced in any way by the officer's failure to forward a copy
to the court. The supreme court stated in Badoud that the
statute gives defendant the right to have an unsworn report
properly attested to, but, to paraphrase, does not allow a
defendant to engage in a game of technical "gotcha" to avoid the
statutory summary suspension. Badoud, 122 Ill. 2d at 60.
Similarly, we hold in this instance that the statute permits a
defendant to have a copy of the sworn report forwarded to the
circuit court, but an officer's initial failure to do so does not
mandate rescission of the statutory summary suspension.
8
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the circuit court
erred in granting defendant's petition to strike and rescind his
statutory summary suspension. Therefore, the judgment of the
circuit court of Will County is reversed and this case remanded.
Reversed and remanded.
BARRY and McDADE, JJ., concur.
9