People v. C.L.

No. 3--06--0495
_________________________________________________________________
Filed April 27, 2007.
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
A.D., 2007
In re S.B., ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
) of the 10th Judicial Circuit,
a Minor ) Peoria County, Illinois,
)
(The People of the State of )
Illinois, )
)
Petitioner-Appellee, ) No. 04--JA--275
)
v. )
)
C.L., ) Honorable
David J.) Dubicki,
Respondent-Appellant). ) Judge, Presiding.
_________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE O’BRIEN delivered the opinion of the court:
_________________________________________________________________
C.L. was the guardian of the minor, S.B. The trial court
adjudged that S.B. was neglected because of an injurious
environment while in C.L.'s care. In its dispositional order, the
trial court, among other things, ordered C.L. to undertake certain
tasks, and named the Department of Children and Family Services
(DCFS) as the child's guardian.
In the trial court's second permanency review order after the
dispositional order, the trial court changed the permanency goal
and granted the State's motion to dismiss C.L. from the case for
failure to make reasonable efforts toward the previous permanency
goal(705 ILCS 405/2--28(2)(B--1) (West 2004)). On appeal, C.L.
argues that the trial court erred by (1) changing the permanency
goal and (2) dismissing her from the case. The State contends
that we lack jurisdiction to consider the trial court's change of
the permanency goal because a permanency review order is not a
final order. We (1) rule that we lack jurisdiction over the trial
court's change of the permanency goal; and (2) affirm the trial
court's dismissal of C.L. from the case.
BACKGROUND
S.B. is male and was born on January 20, 2000. S.B.'s mother
is deceased, and his father is serving a 20-year prison sentence.
C.L. is S.B.'s paternal aunt. The record does not reveal how or
when C.L. became S.B.'s guardian.
On November 23, 2004, the State filed a juvenile petition
alleging that S.B. was neglected because of an injurious
environment while in C.L.'s care. In its petition, the State
named C.L. as a respondent because C.L. was the child's guardian.
The State alleged that (1) C.L. had left S.B. unattended during
November 19 and 20, 2004; and (2) C.L.'s whereabouts were unknown
from November 17 to 22, 2004. Initially, S.B. was taken into
shelter care. Later, the trial court adjudged the child to be
neglected.
On July 5, 2005, the court issued a dispositional order in
which it (1) found C.L. to be unfit to care for S.B.; (2) made the
minor a ward of the court; and (3) named DCFS as S.B.'s guardian.
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In the dispositional order, the court found that while C.L. left
S.B. unattended, she had gotten drunk and used crack cocaine. The
court said that C.L. had failed to visit S.B. since he was taken
into shelter care. The court ordered C.L. to undertake the
following tasks: (1) execute all authorizations for releases
requested by DCFS; (2) cooperate with DCFS; (3) obtain a drug and
alcohol assessment; (4) successfully complete any course of
treatment recommended as a result of the drug and alcohol
assessment; (5) perform two random urine tests for drugs per
month; and (6) submit to a psychological examination. In the
dispositional order, the court denied the State's request to
dismiss C.L. from the case. In C.L.'s appeal from the
dispositional order, this court ruled that the trial court did not
err in finding S.B. to be neglected. In re S.B., No. 3--05--0529
(2006) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).
The trial court issued its first permanency review order on
December 13, 2005. In this order, the court stated that the
previous permanency goal of returning S.B. to C.L.'s home within
one year (705 ILCS 405/2--28(2)(B) (West 2004)) had not been
achieved. The record does not show how or when the previous
permanency goal had been set. The court found that C.L. had
failed to make reasonable efforts toward the permanency goal
because she had "not done counseling or any tests, [and had] not
followed recommendations of [the] psychological evaluation." The
court established a new permanency goal of returning S.B. to
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C.L.'s home pending a status hearing (705 ILCS 405/2--28(2)(B--1)
(West 2004)). In this permanency review order, the court again
denied the State's request to dismiss C.L. from the case.
On June 6, 2006, the court issued its second permanency
review order. In this order, the court found that the prior
permanency goal of returning S.B. to C.L.'s home pending a status
hearing had not been achieved. The court stated that C.L. had
failed to make reasonable efforts toward the most recent
permanency goal because she had "miss[ed] drug tests, counseling
[and] visits, [and had] refused [a] psychiatric evaluation as
recommended by [the] psychologist" (See 705 ILCS 405/2--28(2)(B--
1) (West 2004)). The court changed the permanency goal to
substitute care pending the court's decision (705 ILCS 405/2--
28(2)(C) (West 2004)). In this order, the court granted the
State's request to dismiss C.L. from the case because of her
failure to make reasonable efforts toward the permanency goals.
C.L. appealed.
ANALYSIS
I. Change of Permanency Goal
C.L. submits that the trial court erred by changing the
permanency goal in its second permanency review order. The State
argues that we lack jurisdiction to review this issue because a
permanency review order is not a final order.
With exceptions that are inapplicable to this case, an
appellate court's jurisdiction is limited to review of a trial
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court's final judgment. 155 Ill. 2d R. 301; Flores v. Dugan, 91
Ill. 2d 108, 435 N.E.2d 480 (1982); In re Tiona W., 341 Ill. App.
3d 615, 793 N.E.2d 105 (2003). Permanency review orders are not
final orders, and therefore an appellate court lacks jurisdiction
to review an issue regarding a permanency review order. In re
V.M., 352 Ill. App. 3d 391, 816 N.E.2d 776 (2004).
In the present case, C.L. is challenging the trial court's
change of permanency goal in its second permanency review order.
Under V.M., the second permanency review order was not a final
order, and therefore we do not have jurisdiction to review this
issue. Consequently, we need not consider this question further.
II. Dismissal from the Case
C.L. contends that the trial court erred by dismissing her
from the case.
Initially, we note that we have jurisdiction over this issue.
In In re Winks, 150 Ill. App. 3d 657, 502 N.E.2d 35 (1986), the
court ruled that a trial court's order dismissing a party as a
respondent is a final order as to that party. In this case, the
trial court's order dismissing C.L. as a party was a final order
regarding her. Thus, we have jurisdiction to consider this
question. See 155 Ill. 2d R. 301; Flores, 91 Ill. 2d 108, 435
N.E.2d 480; Tiona W., 341 Ill. App. 3d 615, 793 N.E.2d 105.
Our resolution of C.L.'s issue concerns our interpretation of
section 1--5(2)(a) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS
405/1--5(2)(a) (West 2004)). The section states, "Though not
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appointed guardian or legal custodian or otherwise made a party to
the proceeding, any current or previously appointed foster parent
or relative caregiver, or representative of an agency or
association interested in the minor has the right to be heard by
the court, but does not thereby become a party to the proceeding."
705 ILCS 405/1--5(2)(a) (West 2004). Interpretation of a
statutory provision is a question of law, which we review de novo.
In re Jaime P., 223 Ill. 2d 526, 861 N.E.2d 958 (2006).
In re A.K., 250 Ill. App. 3d 981, 620 N.E.2d 572 (1993),
concerned the dismissal of a presumed father from a juvenile case.
The paternity of the child was presumed because the minor was born
during the marriage. Later, the presumed father was determined
not to be the child's biological father, and he was dismissed from
the juvenile case. The A.K. court examined an earlier version of
section 1--5(2)(a) that was essentially similar to the present
version of the statute. The court in A.K. ruled that under the
statute, the presumed father had the right to be heard by the
trial court in the juvenile matter, but affirmed the trial court's
dismissal of the presumed father as a party to the case.
In the instant case, C.L. was S.B.'s guardian at the time the
State filed its original juvenile petition alleging that the child
was neglected. At that time, C.L. was named as a respondent in
the petition. In the dispositional order, DCFS was appointed as
S.B.'s guardian, ending C.L.'s guardianship of the child. C.L.
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was dismissed from the case in the second permanency review order
after the dispositional order.
At the time of the dismissal, C.L. was no longer S.B.'s
guardian, but she was a previously appointed relative caregiver.
Thus, under section 1--5(2)(a), C.L. had the right to be heard by
the court concerning the juvenile matter. See 705 ILCS 405/1--
5(2)(a) (West 2004); A.K., 250 Ill. App. 3d 981, 620 N.E.2d 572.
However, she did not have the right to be a party to the
proceedings. See 705 ILCS 405/1--5(2)(a) (West 2004); A.K., 250
Ill. App. 3d 981, 620 N.E.2d 572. Therefore, we hold that the
trial court did not err as a matter of law by dismissing C.L. from
the case in the second permanency review order after the
dispositional order. See 705 ILCS 405/1--5(2)(a) (West 2004);
A.K., 250 Ill. App. 3d 981, 620 N.E.2d 572.
Furthermore, we note that the trial court exercised an
abundance of patience with C.L. after the court appointed DCFS as
the child's guardian. Even though not required to do so by
statute, the trial court gave C.L. several opportunities to
complete tasks in order to have S.B. returned to her care. The
record shows that C.L. failed to complete the tasks. C.L.'s
failure to complete the court-ordered tasks supported the trial
court's decision to dismiss her from the case.
CONCLUSION
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For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the
Peoria County circuit court dismissing C.L. as a party to this
case.
Affirmed.
SCHMIDT and CARTER, JJ., concur.
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