In re Marriage of Tantiwongse

No. 3-05-0287
_________________________________________________________________
Filed March 16, 2007.
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
A.D., 2007
In re Marriage of ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
SARMPOP TANTIWONGSE, ) of the Twelfth Judicial Circuit,
) Will County, Illinois
Petitioner, )
)
and )
)
MARTHA TANTIWONGSE, )
) No. 00-D-1382
Respondent-Appellant, )
)
v. )
)
LAW OFFICES OF EDWARD R. )
JAQUAYS, ) Honorable
) Robert J. Baron
Appellee. ) Judge Presiding
_________________________________________________________________
PRESIDING JUSTICE LYTTON delivered the Opinion of the Court:
_________________________________________________________________
The Law Offices of Edward R. Jaquays law firm (Jaquays) sought
attorney fees from its former client, Martha Tantiwongse. The
trial court accepted a stipulation requiring Martha to pay Jaquays
$5,100 for the work it performed on Martha’s behalf. The trial
court also ordered Martha to pay Jaquays $2,353 for attorney fees
Jaquays incurred collecting the fees Martha owed. Martha appeals,
arguing that the trial court erred by (1) accepting the
stipulation, and (2) ordering her to pay Jaquays attorney fees for
collecting from her. We affirm the order allowing the stipulated
fees but reverse the court’s order requiring Martha to pay Jaquays
attorney fees for collection.
In September 2000, Martha retained Jaquays to represent her in
a marriage dissolution action. The primary attorneys working on
her case were Edward Jaquays and Victoria McKay Kennison. Martha
signed a retainer agreement with Jaquays, requiring her to pay
interest at the rate of one percent per month and twelve percent
per year for any amounts she did not pay within fifteen days of
being billed. Section seven of the retainer agreement set forth
additional consequences of Martha’s failure to pay:
“In the event of default of payment of attorney’s
fees and costs due, and it becomes necessary to institute
suit to enforce payment of outstanding attorney’s fees,
then client agrees to pay all costs of collection,
including attorney’s fees to be billed at the hourly rate
hereinabove specified.”
Jaquays represented Martha in her dissolution action for six
months. In March 2001, Jaquays filed a motion to withdraw and a
petition for attorney fees, seeking $8,403.94 in legal fees. The
trial court granted Jaquays leave to withdraw and subsequently
entered an order granting Jaquays all of its fees. Martha filed a
motion to vacate the order, arguing that she was not present to
contest Jaquays’ fee petition because she had been directed to the
wrong courtroom. The trial court vacated the judgment. In
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September 2002, Jaquays filed an amended petition for fees, seeking
$11,004.95 in legal fees and interest from Martha.
In April 2004, the parties entered in a stipulation in which
Martha and Jaquays agreed that Martha owed Jaquays $5,100 for legal
services and expenses as of May 30, 2001. Both parties also agreed
to submit the following unresolved issues to the court for final
determination: (1) what amount of interest, if any, Martha should
pay on the $5,100; (2) what amount, if any, Martha should pay
Jaquays for attorney fees and costs incurred in collecting its
fees; and (3) what amount, if any, Martha should pay for interest
on attorney fees incurred for collection. Martha was represented
by an attorney, David Epstein, when she agreed to and signed the
stipulation.
Thereafter, Jaquays filed a supplemental petition for final
adjudication of attorney fees. In that petition, Jaquays requested
interest at the rate of one percent per month or twelve percent per
year from May 30, 2001 until the date Martha paid Jaquays $5,100.
Jaquays also requested $7,426.75, plus interest, for attorney fees
it incurred in collecting Martha’s fees. According to the itemized
billings attached to the petition, Edward Jaquays and Victoria
McKay Kennison performed all of the work to collect the fees Martha
owed. In response to Jaquays’ petition, Martha disputed Jaquays'
collection costs and interest but did not contest the terms of the
stipulation or dispute that she owed Jaquays $5,100.
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The trial court ruled that Martha was required to pay one
percent interest per month from the date of the stipulation to the
date she paid Jaquays $5,100. The court further ordered Martha to
pay Jaquays $2,353 in attorney fees for collecting the amounts she
owed. The court denied Jaquays’ request for interest on those
fees. Martha filed a motion to reconsider. Several months later,
she filed a motion to vacate the stipulation. The trial court
denied both motions.
I. STIPULATION
Martha argues that the trial court should not have enforced
the stipulation agreement because it was the result of Jaquays’
excessive billing and, thus, vitiated by fraud and contrary to
public policy.
Illinois courts favor stipulations that are designed to
simplify, shorten, or settle litigation and save costs for the
parties. In re Marriage of Ealy, 269 Ill. App. 3d 971, 647 N.E.2d
307 (1995). A court may reject an otherwise valid stipulation only
if it is fraudulent, unreasonable, or in violation of public
policy. Opper v. Brotz, 277 Ill. App. 3d 1024, 661 N.E.2d 1159(1996). A court will not relieve parties from a stipulation in the
absence of a clear showing that the matter stipulated to is untrue,
and then only when an objection is seasonably made. See Estate of
Moss v. Vulgamott, 109 Ill. App. 2d 185, 248 N.E.2d 513 (1969). A
trial court’s decision to accept a stipulation will not be
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disturbed absent a manifest abuse of discretion. See Bloome v.
Wiseman, Shaikewitz, McGivern, Wahl, Flavin & Hesi, P.C., 279 Ill.
App. 3d 469, 664 N.E.2d 1125 (1996).
Here, Martha has offered nothing which rises to the level of
manifest abuse. While represented by counsel, Martha voluntarily
signed the stipulation agreement, admitting that she owed Jaquays
$5,100. Although Martha now argues that fraud vitiated the
stipulation, nothing in the record indicates that the stipulation
was fraudulent, unreasonable, or violated public policy. Despite
Martha’s claim that Jaquays’ billings were excessive, we find no
evidence that Jaquays committed fraud or violated public policy in
billing her for the legal services it provided. The stipulation
required Martha to pay $5,100, significantly less than the amount
Jaquays sought from Martha in September 2002. The stipulation was
reasonable and properly enforced by the trial court.
II. ATTORNEY FEES FOR COLLECTION
Martha also argues that the trial court erred by awarding
attorney fees to Jaquays for its efforts in collecting the legal
fees. She claims that the section of the retainer agreement that
allows for such fees violates public policy.
Courts will not enforce terms of a contract that violate
public policy. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd. v. Gleason, 181 Ill. 2d 460, 693
N.E.2d 358 (1998). It is against public policy to allow an
attorney to represent himself and charge for professional services
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in his own cause. Cheney v. Ricks, 168 Ill. 533, 48 N.E. 75(1897); Garrett v. Peirce, 74 Ill. App. 225 (1897). This is true
even if a contract specifically allows for the recovery of attorney
fees. See Gray v. Robertson, 174 Ill. 242, 51 N.E. 248 (1898):
Lustig v. Horn, 315 Ill. App. 3d 319, 732 N.E.2d 613 (2000).
Lawyers representing themselves simply do not incur legal
fees. Hamer v. Lentz, 132 Ill. 2d 49, 547 N.E.2d 191 (1989).
Thus, attorneys who represent themselves in an action are not
entitled to recover their own attorney fees. See Kehoe v.
Saltarelli, 337 Ill. App. 3d 669, 786 N.E.2d 605 (2003); In re
Marriage of Pitulla, 202 Ill. App. 3d 103, 559 N.E.2d 819 (1990);
Stein v. Kaun, 244 Ill. 32, 91 N.E.2d 77 (1910).
The retainer agreement entered into between Martha and Jaquays
provided that Martha would pay all costs and attorney fees Jaquays
incurred to collect the legal fees Martha owed. In its petition
for fees, Jaquays claimed to incur attorney fees for the work
Edward Jaquays and Victoria McKay Kennison performed to collect
their legal fees from Martha. Edward Jaquays and Victoria McKay
Kennison are employed by the Jaquays law firm and were the
attorneys who represented Martha in her dissolution action. As
such, they were representing themselves in the collection action
against Martha and could not incur any legal fees on their own
behalf. See Hamer, 132 Ill. 2d 49, 547 N.E.2d 191. Thus, they
were not entitled to recover attorney fees for collecting from
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Martha. See Kehoe, 337 Ill. App. 3d 669, 786 N.E.2d 605; Pitulla,
202 Ill. App. 3d 103, 559 N.E.2d 819; Stein, 244 Ill. 32, 91 N.E.2d
77. Since Jaquays chose to handle its own fee collection, it
did not incur any legal fees in doing so and was not entitled to
recovery from Martha. Thus, the trial court erred in awarding
Jaquays its collection fees. See Gray, 174 Ill. 242, 51 N.E. 248(1898): Lustig, 315 Ill. App. 3d 319, 732 N.E.2d 613.
The judgment of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed
in part and reversed in part.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
CARTER and HOLDRIDGE, JJ., concurring.
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