People v. Jones

No. 3-07-0006
_________________________________________________________________
Filed November 7, 2008
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
A.D., 2008
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
ILLINOIS, ) of the Tenth Judicial Circuit
) Peoria County, Illinois
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
v. ) No. 05-CF-351
)
SHONE L. JONES ) Honorable
) Scott Shore
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding.
_________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE LYTTON delivered the Opinion of the court:
_________________________________________________________________
Defendant, Shone Jones, was charged with a 13-count
indictment. Defendant’s attorney requested a hearing to determine
defendant’s fitness to stand trial. A jury found defendant fit,
and defendant’s case proceeded to trial. After all of the evidence
had been presented at trial, defense counsel moved for a mistrial
so that defendant could be examined for fitness. The trial court
denied the motion. Defendant was found guilty of 11 of the charges
against him and was sentenced to 25 years in prison. On appeal,
defendant argues that the trial court erred in finding him fit to
stand trial and denying his motion for a mistrial. We reverse and
remand.
BACKGROUND
In April, 2005, defendant was charged with four counts of
armed violence, three counts of aggravated discharge of a firearm,
three counts of aggravated unlawful restraint, one count of
unlawful possession by a felon, one count of criminal damage to
property, and one count of unlawful possession of a controlled
substance. In June, 2005, defendant’s attorney, Thomas Iben, asked
that defendant undergo a psychiatric evaluation.
On August 3, 2005, defendant wrote a handwritten note to the
trial judge alleging that Iben violated his sixth amendment rights.
The trial judge construed the note to be a motion for new counsel
and scheduled a hearing on the motion. On August 9, 22, and 23,
2005, defendant submitted handwritten correspondence to the court
in which he alleged that the State filed fabricated and fraudulent
documents, that Iben was working against him, that Iben and the
assistant State’s Attorney, Joseph Bembenek, committed misconduct,
and that the court was practicing "illegal justice."
On August 26, 2006, the trial court held a hearing on
defendant’s motion for new counsel. At that hearing, defendant
accused Iben of violating his constitutional rights. The trial
court granted defendant’s request for new counsel. Hugh Toner was
appointed as defendant’s new counsel.
On September 21, 2005, the trial court received three more
handwritten letters from defendant. In those letters, defendant
2
accused Iben of being involved in a conspiracy with the State and
accused Judge Galley of professional violations. On September 28,
2005, Toner filed a motion to require defendant to undergo a
psychological examination. During the hearing on that motion,
defendant disrupted the court and was warned that the hearing would
be held without him if he continued to be disruptive.
On October 6 and 9, 2005, defendant sent nine more letters to
the trial court, alleging that Judge Galley, Judge Shore, Toner and
Bembenek all committed constitutional and/or ethical violations.
He claimed that all of the attorneys and judges were against him.
From October 12 to November 10, 2005, defendant sent eight more
letters to the court, accusing the circuit clerk’s office of
assisting the State in criminal acts and alleged that the State and
police were involved in a conspiracy against him.
On November 28, 2005, Toner notified the court that defendant
was not cooperating with him regarding the psychological
evaluation. At that time, the trial court admonished defendant
that he should cease writing letters to the court. Defendant said
he understood.
On December 9 and 13, 2005, defendant sent five more letters
to the trial court, alleging that Judge Galley, Bembenek, Iben and
Toner all defrauded the court and displayed "a pattern of
misconduct." On December 14, 2005, defendant sent a handwritten
motion to suppress evidence along with a handwritten letter to the
3
clerk of the court. In his letter, defendant alleged that
"something * * * wasn’t right about [the] court reporter who was at
my hearing Dec. 7, 2005. Her fingers wasn’t moving like they
suppose too [sic]."
On December 21, 2005, Toner notified the court in writing that
he believed there was a bona fide doubt as to defendant’s fitness
and requested a hearing before a jury to determine if defendant was
fit to stand trial. From December 28, 2005 to February 9, 2006,
defendant sent several more letters to the trial court. In those
letters, he alleged that Bembenek framed him, that Toner was not
effectively representing him and that police officers involved in
his case falsified documents and lied to the grand jury.
On February 17, 2006, Toner requested that defendant be
appointed a separate attorney to represent him during the fitness
hearing. The trial court granted the request and entered an order
stating: "Court finds bona fide doubt as to Defendant’s fitness."
Marcia Straub was appointed to represent defendant at the fitness
hearing. From March 24 to May 15, 2005, defendant sent several
more handwritten letters to the court, alleging that "everybody in
this case has been showing bias against me."
On June 20, 2006, a hearing in front of a jury to determine
defendant’s fitness to stand trial began. The State and defense
counsel stipulated that all of the letters defendant filed with the
court between August 9, 2005 and December 14, 2005 would be
4
considered by the jury as evidence.
The State’s only witness was Dr. Sohee Lee, an expert in the
field of psychiatry. Dr. Lee attempted to interview defendant on
two different occasions. On the first occasion, defendant told Dr.
Lee that he didn’t want to talk to him because he would "just make
a story and try to turn me as a crazy person and put me away to the
crazy house." On the second occasion, defendant refused to say
anything to Dr. Lee.
Dr. Lee reviewed the police reports, grand jury transcript and
correspondence that defendant sent to the court and concluded that
defendant was probably suffering from a grandiose and persecutory
type of delusional disorder. According to Dr. Lee, defendant
believes he was falsely accused and illegally detained and that the
entire court system is trying to punish him. Dr. Lee saw evidence
of this from the police report and defendant’s letters.
Dr. Lee also concluded that defendant has false beliefs and
misinterprets reality, such as his belief that the court reporter
was "acting funny." Because of defendant’s delusions, Dr. Lee
thought that defendant would not be able to comprehend the charges
against him or cooperate with his defense attorney. Dr. Lee
testified that there was a substantial probability that defendant
would attain fitness within one year if he was properly medicated.
Defendant presented himself as his only witness. Defendant’s
jaw was wired shut, so he responded to questions in writing. He
5
was able to identify his current and former attorneys, as well as
the current and former judges in his case. He knew that he was
charged with 13 counts and said that he was able to understand the
charges against him. He testified that he told Dr. Lee that he
didn’t want to talk because he "didn’t need no examination to beat
the case."
The jury found defendant fit to stand trial, and the trial
court entered an order reflecting the jury’s decision. On June 30,
2006, Toner filed a notice of intent to rely on the defense of
insanity in defendant’s trial. The trial court appointed Dr. Lee
to conduct a psychiatric evaluation of defendant and told defendant
that if he did not cooperate in the examination, he may be barred
from raising an insanity defense. On July 3, 2006, defendant wrote
two more letters to the court in which he accused Toner of ethics
violations and falsifying evidence.
On July 15, 2006, Dr. Lee appeared at the Peoria County Jail
to perform his psychiatric examination of defendant. Defendant
again refused to speak to Dr. Lee. On July 19, 2006, the State
filed a motion to bar defendant from offering any evidence of
insanity. On July 20, 2006, the trial court ruled that defendant
was barred from producing expert evidence or testimony of insanity.
On the same day, Toner advised the court that defendant accused him
of putting a contract or hit out on him. The trial court found the
charge baseless. The record reflects that defendant was
6
"jabbering" throughout the court proceeding and had to be warned by
the trial judge to "be more cooperative."
On August 2, 2006, Toner advised the court that defendant was
refusing to talk and cooperate with him. The trial court ordered
defendant to cooperate with Toner. On August 4, 2006, defendant
sent another letter to the trial court, accusing the clerk, court
reporters and judges of "fraud and criminal acts."
Before jury selection in defendant’s trial began on August 28,
2006, the trial court advised defendant that he had the right to
wear street clothes and not be visibly shackled, but defendant
chose to wear his prison attire and hand and feet shackles. Toner
again advised the court that he did not believe that defendant was
fit to stand trial. The trial court replied, "On the issue of
fitness, we’ve gone over all of this." Before the jury entered the
courtroom, the court reminded defendant that he did not have to
wear shackles. At that time, defendant requested that his wrist
shackles be removed but wanted the leg shackles to remain.
On the second day of trial, the trial court again questioned
defendant about his desire to be shackled and in prison garb. This
time, defendant told the court that he wanted to wear street
clothes and be unshackled.
On the third day of trial, defendant addressed the court and
accused Toner of "not abiding by the scopes of representation,
misconduct, dishonesty, deceit, misrepresentation" and "not
7
addressing the issue I want to address." Toner explained that "for
a long period of time, my client wouldn’t talk to me." Toner
stated that he would have called some witnesses on defendant’s
behalf, but defendant would not permit it.
After the close of evidence, Toner requested a mistrial "for
the purpose of having [defendant] examined for fitness." According
to Toner, defendant was "unable to truly assist in preparation and
participating in the [trial] process, because he becomes obsessed
and focused on essentially what have been described as * * * almost
a paranoid fascination of delusion that people are out to get him."
The trial court denied the motion, explaining that although he was
initially concerned with defendant’s decision to wear jail clothing
and remained shackled "that did not raise a sufficient concern as
to fitness of the Defendant for me to find [a] bona fide doubt, and
the issue has been previously addressed by a jury, and I accept the
verdict that was previously rendered that the Defendant was, in
fact, fit to proceed to trial."
The jury found defendant guilty of four counts of armed
violence, two counts of aggravated discharge of a firearm, two
counts of aggravated unlawful restraint and one count each of
unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon, criminal damage to
property and unlawful possession of a controlled substance.
Defense counsel filed a motion for a new trial, arguing in
part that the court erred in "allowing the Jury verdict on the
8
issue of Fitness" and "denying the Defense’s motion for a mistrial
concerning the Defendant’s mental status." On December 4, 2006,
defendant sent a final letter to the trial court, again alleging
that his constitutional and statutory rights had been violated and
asserting that "[a]s far as I can tell everything is illegal that
have anything do with my case."
On December 22, 2006, the trial court held a hearing on post-
trial motions and sentencing. The court heard arguments on defense
counsel’s motion for a new trial and on defendant’s claims that
Toner did not effectively represent him. The trial court denied
the motion for a new trial and found that defendant’s allegations
against Toner did not raise a bona fide issue as to ineffective
assistance. The trial court then sentenced defendant to 25 years
imprisonment.
ANALYSIS
I.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in finding him fit
to stand trial because the State conceded that he was unfit, the
uncontradicted expert testimony was that he was unfit and defense
counsel repeatedly advised the court that defendant was not
assisting in his defense.
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment bars
9
prosecuting a defendant who is unfit to stand trial. People v.
Shum, 207 Ill. 2d 47, 57, 797 N.E.2d 609, 615 (2003). A defendant
is unfit to stand trial if, based on a mental or physical
condition, he is unable to understand the nature and purpose of the
proceedings against him or to assist in his defense. 725 ILCS
5/104-10 (West 2006); People v. Burton, 184 Ill. 2d 1, 13, 703
N.E.2d 49, 55 (1998).
When a bona fide doubt of defendant’s fitness has been raised,
the party alleging that defendant is fit has the burden of proving,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that defendant is fit to stand
trial. See People v. Baugh, 358 Ill. App. 3d 718, 732, 832 N.E.2d
903, 915 (2005). A court’s ruling on the issue of fitness will be
reversed if it is against the manifest weight of the evidence.
People v. Jamison, 197 Ill. 2d 135, 153, 756 N.E.2d 788, 797
(2001); Burton, 184 Ill. 2d at 13, 703 N.E.2d at 55.
In reaching its fitness determination, the trial court is not
required to accept the opinions of psychiatrists. People v.
Baldwin, 185 Ill. App. 3d 1079, 1086, 541 N.E.2d 1315, 1320 (1989).
The trial court should assess the credibility and weight to give an
expert’s testimony and independently analyze and evaluate the
factual basis for the expert’s opinion. See Baugh, 358 Ill. App.
3d at 732, 832 N.E.2d at 915; Baldwin, 185 Ill. App. 3d at 1086,
541 N.E.2d at 1320. However, a trial court cannot reject an
expert’s opinion that a defendant is unfit without testimony or
10
evidence that defendant was fit, other than defendant’s own
statement. See People v. McKinstray, 30 Ill. 2d 611, 616-17, 198
N.E.2d 829, 832 (1964); People v. Schoreck, No. 2-06-0452, slip op.
at 21-24 (Ill. App. Aug. 15, 2008); Baldwin, 185 Ill. App. 3d at
1087, 541 N.E.2d at 1321.
An incompetent defendant is not a reliable witness regarding
his own competency. See McKinstray, 30 Ill. 2d at 616-17, 198
N.E.2d at 832; Schoreck, No. 2-06-0452, slip op. at 21-22; Baldwin,
185 Ill. App. 3d at 1086, 541 N.E.2d at 1320. As explained by our
supreme court in McKinstray:
"To accept defendant’s opinion that he is able to co-
operate with counsel in his defense, when the purpose of
the hearing is to determine that very fact, would make a
sham out of the sanity hearing, especially here where
there is * * * the opinion of the sole medical witness
that the defendant, although understanding the nature of
the crime with which he was charged, was unable to co-
operate with his counsel * * *." McKinstray, 30 Ill.2d
at 616-17, 198 N.E.2d at 832.
Similarly, the court in Schoreck held that a trial court cannot
consider a defendant’s opinions about whether he is fit to stand
trial, understands the proceedings against him or can participate
in his defense, "for such would be clear question-begging" and
"would circumvent the fitness inquiry." Schoreck, No. 2-06-0452,
11
slip op. at 21 and 22.
Here, defendant provided his opinion at the fitness hearing
that he understood the proceedings against him. The only other
evidence presented was the uncontradicted testimony of the
psychiatric expert, Dr. Lee, who testified that defendant suffered
from a grandiose and persecutory type of delusional disorder that
rendered him unable to understand the charges against him and
unable to assist in his defense. Dr. Lee ’s opinion was supported
by his review of many documents, including over 30 letters
defendant wrote to the court showing defendant’s false beliefs and
misinterpretation of reality.
Since the uncontradicted expert testimony was that defendant
was unfit and the only evidence to the contrary was defendant’s own
statement, the jury’s conclusion that defendant was fit to stand
trial was against the manifest weight of the evidence. See
McKinstray, 30 Ill. 2d at 616-17, 198 N.E.2d at 832; Baldwin, 185
Ill. App. 3d at 1087, 541 N.E.2d at 1321. The trial court should
not have entered an order finding defendant fit based on the jury’s
verdict but should have entered a directed verdict of unfitness
based on the evidence presented. See McKinstray, 30 Ill. 2d at
617, 198 N.E.2d at 832.
Because defendant was unfit to stand trial two months before
his trial and no subsequent hearing was held finding defendant fit,
defendant should not have been placed on trial. See Shum, 207 Ill.
122d at 57, 797 N.E.2d at 615. The judgment convicting defendant
must be reversed. See McKinstray, 30 Ill. 2d at 617, 198 N.E.2d at
832. On remand, the trial court shall conduct a new hearing to
determine if defendant is now fit to stand trial. See 725 ILCS
5/104-16 (West 2006).
II.
Because we find that the jury’s finding of fitness was against
the manifest weight of the evidence and reverse defendants’
convictions on that basis, we need not consider defendant’s
additional argument that the trial court erred in denying the
motion for a mistrial.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the Circuit Court of Peoria County is reversed
and remanded.
Reversed and remanded.
MCDADE, PJ., and WRIGHT, J., concurring.
13