People v. M.L.

No. 3--09--0547
_________________________________________________________________
Filed December 30, 2009
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
A.D., 2009
In re I.B., ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
) of the 10th Judicial Circuit,
a Minor ) Peoria County, Illinois,
)
(The People of the State of )
Illinois, )
)
Petitioner-Appellee, ) No. 08--JA--218
)
v. )
)
M.L., ) Honorable
) Chris L. Fredericksen,
Respondent-Appellant). ) Judge, Presiding.
_________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE delivered the opinion of the court:
_________________________________________________________________
The trial court found the respondent father, M.L., unfit to
care for the minor, I.B., and that it was in the best interest of
the minor that the respondent's parental rights be terminated.
The respondent appeals, arguing that: (1) the trial court was
prohibited from finding him unfit because he was a minor, age 15
years old; (2) he was denied his right to procedural due process
because the State sought to find him unfit under section 1(D)(e)
of the Adoption Act (Act) (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(e) (West 2008)), and
he was not allowed the opportunity to correct the conditions that
led to the removal of the minor; and (3) the trial court's best
interest determination was against the manifest weight of the
evidence. We affirm.
FACTS
On November 4, 2008, the State filed a juvenile petition,
alleging that the minor (born May 25, 2008) was: (1) abused; and
(2) neglected in that his environment was injurious to his
welfare. The petition alleged that the minor was abused between
July 1, 2008, and October 26, 2008, because the respondent (born
on July 26, 1993) and Stephanie, the minor's mother, inflicted
physical injuries on the minor by other than accidental means in
that: (1) the minor was at Methodist Medical Center on
October 26, 2008, and was diagnosed with bruising to a number of
areas of the body, multiple rib fractures, a fractured tibia, a
fractured fibula, and a fractured radius in the wrist; (2)
Stephanie had shaken and squeezed the minor; and (3) the
respondent had bitten the minor on the cheek, shaken and squeezed
the minor, and lifted the minor in the air by the minor's ankles.
The petition alleged that the minor was living in an
environment injurious to his welfare because: (1) of the
allegations of abuse; (2) the respondent and Stephanie attempted
to leave the hospital with the minor after bruises were found on
the minor but were stopped by security; (3) the respondent and
Stephanie initially told hospital staff and the police that the
minor's injuries were caused by the minor hitting himself in the
face or sleeping on a bottle, which appeared unlikely based on
the minor's age; (4) the respondent and Stephanie repeatedly lied
to the police as to the cause of the minor's injuries; (5)
Stephanie had been aware of the respondent's abusive actions but
2
had not taken action to protect the minor; (6) Stephanie had been
previously indicated for inadequate supervision of her aunt's
children on April 17, 2008, by the Department of Children and
Family Services (DCFS); and (7) the minor, the respondent, and
Stephanie lived with the minor's maternal grandmother, who had a
long history with DCFS and the juvenile court. Pursuant to a
court order, the minor was placed in temporary shelter care.
On November 25, 2008, the State filed a petition for
termination of parental rights. The petition alleged that the
respondent was unfit because he committed extreme or repeated
cruelty to the minor in that: (1) he squeezed the minor by the
ribs, held the minor upside down by his ankles, bit the minor on
the cheek, and shook the minor; and (2) the minor had been
diagnosed with bruising to a number of areas of the body,
multiple rib fractures, a fractured tibia, a fractured fibula,
and a fractured radius in the wrist. 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(e) (West
2008).
On January 15, 2009, the trial court held an adjudication
hearing on the juvenile petition and found that the allegations
had been proven by a preponderance of the evidence. The trial
court concluded that the minor was abused and neglected because
of the physical abuse inflicted by the respondent and Stephanie.
On January 29, 2009, the trial court held a dispositional
hearing. The trial court found the respondent unfit to care for
the minor and ordered that the minor be made a ward of the court.
The trial court also ordered the respondent to complete service
3
plan tasks, such as a psychological examination and a domestic
violence course. The trial court denied visitation because the
respondent was in jail on charges of aggravated battery and
aggravated domestic battery related to the minor's injuries.
On March 11, 2009, the trial court held a hearing on the
petition to terminate parental rights. The State entered the
minor's medical records into evidence and presented the testimony
of the officers who investigated the allegations of abuse. The
respondent told the officers that the minor received the chest
bruises either because he had thrown the minor in the air and
caught him while they were playing or because he had hugged the
minor too hard. The respondent stated that the minor got the
bruise on his cheek because he bit the minor on the cheek when
the minor would not stop crying. The respondent admitted that he
had lifted the minor by the ankles and raised him over his head
when he was playing with the minor. After doing this a few
times, the respondent heard a popping noise and the minor began
to cry. The respondent also admitted that he shook the baby when
he cried. Stephanie told the officers that the respondent
squeezed the minor and caused a popping noise. The trial court
found that the petition had been proven by clear and convincing
evidence.
On April 9, 2009, Amber Nichols of Catholic Charities filed
a best interest hearing report. The report indicated that the
minor had been placed with his foster parents since November 25,
4
2008. The foster parents had previously adopted the minor's
uncle, who was 16 years old.
The report indicated that the foster parents had provided
for the minor's needs, as the minor appeared to be in good
health. The report also indicated that the foster parents and
the minor had bonded to one another. The foster parents
expressed a commitment to adopt the minor.
The minor had no visitation with the respondent since he was
placed in foster care because the respondent was in jail on the
pending criminal charges arising from the abuse. The report
indicated that the respondent had not had the opportunity to
complete service plan tasks because he was in custody on the
criminal charges. The respondent had not signed a release form
so that Nichols could speak with his counselor in the detention
center.
On April 23, 2009, Nichols filed an addendum to her best
interest report. The addendum indicated that the respondent had
been given a plea offer, which included a prison sentence.
On the same date, the trial court held a best interest
hearing. Nichols testified that the minor had no apparent
permanent problems and that his health appeared to be
appropriate. She also testified that the respondent could not do
his service plan tasks because they were not available in jail.
The trial court found that it was in the best interest of the
minor to terminate the respondent's parental rights.
The respondent appeals.
5
ANALYSIS
On appeal, the respondent first argues that the trial court
was prohibited from finding him unfit because he was a minor, age
15 years old. The respondent claims, without citation to
authority, that his minority imposed a legal impediment and that
the trial court should have been prevented from finding him unfit
until he reached the age of majority. In particular, he notes
that minors cannot enter into certain contracts and that they may
voluntarily sign an acknowledgment of paternity but that
paternity would not be established conclusively until six months
after the minor reaches majority. See 750 ILCS 45/5(b) (West
2008).
While we agree that a minor cannot enter into certain
contracts and that a minor's voluntary acknowledgment of
paternity does not conclusively establish paternity until the
minor reaches majority, it is unclear how this is relevant to
this case. The respondent, a minor, was found to be the father
of the child through court-ordered paternity testing, and an
acknowledgment of paternity was unnecessary.
The respondent appears to argue that he was not subject to
the Act (750 ILCS 50/0.01 et seq. (West 2008)) because of his
minority. The Act is not so limited. The Act recognizes that a
"putative father" may be a "male who is less than 18 years of
age." 750 ILCS 50/1(R) (West 2008). It also provides that a
consent to adoption or a surrender of a child is not voidable
because the parent is a minor. 750 ILCS 50/11(a) (West 2008).
6
The Act applied to the respondent, and the trial court was not
prohibited from finding the respondent unfit because of his
minority. See In re M.M., 261 Ill. App. 3d 71, 634 N.E.2d 36
(1994) (affirming the trial court's finding of unfitness and
termination of parental rights where the parents were wards of
the court).
The respondent next argues that he was denied his right to
procedural due process because the State sought to find him unfit
under section 1(D)(e) of the Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(e) (West
2008)), and he was not allowed the opportunity to correct the
conditions that led to the removal of the minor. The respondent
cites no relevant authority to support his argument, and he does
not challenge the finding of unfitness.
Section 1(D) of the Act lists statutory grounds which
support a finding of unfitness, not a list of parental rights.
In re B.R., 282 Ill. App. 3d 665, 669 N.E.2d 347 (1996). Section
1(D)(e) provides that a parent may be found unfit for extreme or
repeated cruelty to a child. 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(e) (West 2008).
It does not entitle a parent to a specific period of time before
a trial court may find a parent unfit on this ground. See B.R.,
282 Ill. App. 3d 665, 669 N.E.2d 347 (finding that the parent was
not entitled to a period of time to correct her problems where
the ground of unfitness did not entitle her to any time to
correct the problems); In re M.M., 261 Ill. App. 3d 71, 634
N.E.2d 36 (finding that parents were not entitled to 12 months
between the adjudication of neglect and filing of the termination
7
petition to make progress toward the return of the children
because they were found unfit based on their failure to maintain
a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to
the children's welfare). Therefore, we find the respondent's
argument is without merit.
Lastly, the respondent argues that the trial court's best
interest determination was against the manifest weight of the
evidence.
Once the trial court has found the parent to be unfit, all
considerations must yield to the best interest of the child. In
re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 818 N.E.2d 1214 (2004). Accordingly,
at the best interest hearing, the parent's interest in
maintaining a parent-child relationship yields to the child's
interest in a stable, loving home life. D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347,
818 N.E.2d 1214. The State must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that termination is in the child's best interest. D.T.,
212 Ill. 2d 347, 818 N.E.2d 1214. The court's decision requires
consideration of statutory factors, including: (1) the child's
physical safety and welfare; (2) the development of the child's
identity; (3) the child's sense of attachment, including love,
security, familiarity, and continuity of relationships with
parental figures; (4) the risks related to substitute care; and
(5) the preferences of persons available to care for the child.
705 ILCS 405/1--3(4.05) (West 2008). The "trial court is not
required to explicitly mention, word-for-word," the statutory
factors in its decision. In re Janira T., 368 Ill. App. 3d 883,
8
894, 859 N.E.2d 1046, 1056 (2006). On review, the trial court's
determination will not be disturbed unless it is contrary to the
manifest weight of the evidence. In re Austin W., 214 Ill. 2d
31, 823 N.E.2d 572 (2005).
The trial court's best interest finding was not against the
manifest weight of the evidence. The evidence showed that the
minor had bonded with his foster parents, who provided for his
needs and expressed a desire to adopt him. Under the care of his
foster parents, the minor was in good health and appeared to be
developing normally. The minor had no bond with the respondent
because he was in custody for the criminal charges related to the
abuse for almost half of the minor's life, and the minor's
physical safety and welfare would be in jeopardy with the
respondent based on the prior acts of abuse. Thus, it was not
against the manifest weight of the evidence for the trial court
to terminate the respondent's parental rights.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court
of Peoria County is affirmed.
Affirmed.
SCHMIDT, J., concurs.
JUSTICE McDADE, specially concurring:
I concur in the judgment of the majority but write
separately to clarify that there are some circumstances where a
parent is entitled to a specific period of time to correct the
conditions that led to the removal of the minor.
9
While section 1(D)(e) of the Adoption Act (Act) (750 ILCS
50/1(D)(e) (West 2008)) does not entitle a parent to a specific
period of time before a trial court may find the parent unfit,
section 1(D)(m) (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m) (West 2008)) of the Act
does. Section 1(D)(m)(ii) provides that a parent can be deemed
unfit where he or she has failed to “make reasonable progress
toward the return of the child to the parent within 9 months
after an adjudication of neglected or abused minor *** or
dependent minor” has been made. 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West
2008). If the State had sought a finding of unfitness on this
basis, section (1)(D)(m)(ii) would have guaranteed respondent 9
months after I.B. was adjudicated abused and neglected to make
reasonable progress toward the return of I.B. See 750 ILCS
50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2008). Thus, the question of whether a
parent is entitled to a specific period of time to correct the
conditions that led to the removal of the minor is dependent upon
what prong the State seeks to establish the parent’s unfitness.
10