People v. Dovgan

ILLINOIS OFFICIAL REPORTS
Appellate Court
People v. Dovgan, 2011 IL App (3d) 100664
Appellate Court THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.
Caption IGORIS DOVGAN, Defendant-Appellee.
District & No. Third District
Docket No. 3-10-0664
Filed December 5, 2011
Held The trial court improperly relied on section 6-500 of the Uniform
(Note: This syllabus Commercial Driver’s License Act, which requires an alcohol test to be
constitutes no part of administered within two hours of the driver being “stopped or detained,”
the opinion of the court in granting defendant commercial truck driver’s motion to suppress the
but has been prepared results of a breath test administered 4½ hours after his arrest, since
by the Reporter of defendant was charged under the Illinois Motor Carrier Safety Law, not
Decisions for the the Uniform Commercial Driver’s License Act, and section 6-500 was
convenience of the inapplicable to his prosecution.
reader.)
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Will County, No. 09-CF-1359; the Hon.
Review Amy Bertani-Tomczak, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Reversed and remanded.
Counsel on James Glasgow, State’s Attorney, of Joliet (Terry A. Mertel and Laura E.
Appeal DeMichael, both of State’s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of
counsel), for the People.
No brief filed for appellee.
Panel JUSTICE SCHMIDT delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justice Wright concurred in the judgment and opinion.
Justice Holdridge specially concurred, with opinion.
OPINION
¶1 The State charged defendant, Igoris Dovgan, with two counts of aggravated driving under
the influence in violation of sections 18b-103, 18b-105 and 18b-108(b) of the Illinois Vehicle
Code (Vehicle Code) (625 ILCS 5/18b-103, 18b-105, 18b-108(b) (West 2008)). The circuit
court of Will County granted defendant’s motion to suppress evidence of a breath test
administered 4½ hours after defendant’s arrest. The State appeals.
¶2 FACTS
¶3 The facts of this matter were not disputed below. Trooper Korando arrived on the scene
of a traffic crash on Interstate 80 at 9:48 a.m. on May 11, 2009. The crash involved a
commercial motor vehicle driven by defendant. Upon arrival, Trooper Korando placed
defendant under arrest. The arresting trooper remained at the scene of the accident for an
extended period of time. The trooper administered a breath test to defendant at 2:35 p.m.,
which indicated defendant’s blood alcohol content to be 0.032.
¶4 The bill of indictment alleged:
“Count I
*** [D]efendant, a commercial motor vehicle driver, willfully operated a commercial
motor vehicle *** at a time when he had a measured alcohol concentration in his blood
or breath, based on the definition of blood or breath units in Chapter 625, Section 11-
501.2, as prohibited by 49 CFR 392.5, in violation of Chapter 625, Section 5/18b-103,
Section 5/18b-105 and section 5/18b-108(b) of the Illinois Compiled Statutes ***.
Count II
*** [D]efendant, a commercial motor vehicle driver, willfully operated a commercial
motor vehicle *** at a time when he had a detectable presence of alcohol on his person,
as prohibited by 49 CFR 392.5, in violation of Chapter 625, Section 5/18b-103, Section
-2-
5/18b-105 and section 5/18b-108(b) of the Illinois Compiled Statutes ***.”
¶5 Defendant filed a motion to suppress, claiming that the State administered his alcohol test
outside the two-hour time limit imposed by section 6-500 of the Vehicle Code. 625 ILCS
5/6-500 (West 2008). As such, defendant claimed the results of the tests were inadmissible.
After originally rejecting defendant’s argument, the trial court granted defendant’s motion
to suppress. Following denial of its motion to reconsider, the State filed a certificate of
substantial impairment. This appeal followed.
¶6 ANALYSIS
¶7 When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we apply the
two-part standard of review adopted by the Supreme Court in Ornelas v. United States, 517
U.S. 690 (1996); People v. Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d 530 (2006). We are to review a trial
court’s findings of historical fact for clear error, give due weight to any inferences drawn
from those facts by the trial court and reverse those findings only if they are against the
manifest weight of the evidence. Id. at 542. However, we remain free to undertake our own
assessment of the facts in relation to the issues and draw our own conclusions when deciding
what relief should be granted. Id. As such, we review de novo the trial court’s ultimate legal
ruling as to whether suppression is warranted. Id.
¶8 Contained within the Vehicle Code are numerous different rules, laws and acts. See 625
ILCS 5/18b-100 et seq. (West 2008) (Illinois Motor Carrier Safety Law (IMCSL)); 625 ILCS
5/18c-1101 et seq. (West 2008) (Illinois Commercial Transportation Law); 625 ILCS 5/11-
100 et seq. (West 2008) (the Rules of the Road); 625 ILCS 5/6-500 et seq. (West 2008) (the
Uniform Commercial Driver’s License Act (UCDLA)). At issue in this appeal is section 6-
500, which states as follows:
“Notwithstanding the definitions set forth elsewhere in this Code, for purposes of the
Uniform Commercial Driver’s License Act (UCDLA), the words and phrases listed
below have the meanings ascribed to them as follows:
***
(2) Alcohol concentration. ‘Alcohol concentration’ means:
(A) the number of grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath; or
(B) the number of grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood; or
(C) the number of grams of alcohol per 67 milliliters of urine.
Alcohol tests administered within 2 hours of the driver being ‘stopped or detained’
shall be considered that driver’s ‘alcohol concentration’ for the purposes of enforcing this
UCDLA.” 625 ILCS 5/6-500 (West 2008).
¶9 Defendant convinced the trial court that this section of the UCDLA mandated
suppression of the results of his breath test conducted beyond two hours after he had been
stopped or detained. The State argued to the trial court that it never charged defendant with
violating the UCDLA and, as such, section 6-500 is totally inapplicable to defendant’s
prosecution. The State noted that it alleged defendant operated a commercial motor vehicle
in violation of the IMCSL (625 ILCS 5/18b-100 et seq. (West 2008)): specifically, sections
-3-
18b-103, 18b-105, and 18b-108. The State reiterates those arguments on appeal, claiming the
trial court erred in using a section of the UCDLA as authority to suppress evidence in a
prosecution initiated under the IMCSL. Alternatively, the State asserts that even if section
6-500 of the UCDLA is applicable to this matter, proper application of the statute does not
mandate suppression of the results of defendant’s breath test.
¶ 10 Defendant has not filed a responsive brief in this matter and, as such, we review this
appeal pursuant to the standards set forth in First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis
Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128 (1976) (see also People v. Miller, 212 Ill. App. 3d 195
(1991)). The Talandis court held that reversal should not be automatic when an appellee fails
to file a brief but, instead, when the record is simple and the claimed error is such that the
reviewing court can easily decide the matter without the aid of an appellee’s brief, the court
should decide the merits of the appeal. Talandis, 63 Ill. 2d at 133; Miller, 212 Ill. App. 3d
at 199. If a case is complex, a court of review should not be compelled to serve as an
advocate for the appellee. Talandis, 63 Ill. 2d at 133; Miller, 212 Ill. App. 3d at 199. We find
this matter is not complex and that it can be decided without the aid of defendant’s brief.
¶ 11 As noted above, both the UCDLA and the IMCSL are found within the Vehicle Code.
625 ILCS 5/1-100 et seq. (West 2008). Our task of determining whether the trial court
properly suppressed the results of defendant’s breath test calls upon us to interpret statutes
contained within the Vehicle Code. Specifically, we must determine how section 6-500 of
the UCDLA applies, if it applies at all, to someone charged under the IMCSL.
¶ 12 The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the
legislature’s intent, while presuming the legislature did not intend to create absurd,
inconvenient, or unjust results. In re E.B., 231 Ill. 2d 459 (2008); In re B.L.S., 202 Ill. 2d 510
(2002). The language of the statute is the best indication of legislative intent, and we must
give that language its plain and ordinary meaning. Id. at 515. “Because all provisions of a
statutory enactment are viewed as a whole [citations], words and phrases should not be
construed in isolation, but must be interpreted in light of other relevant provisions of the
statute [citations]. *** Accordingly, in determining the intent of the legislature, the court may
properly consider not only the language of the statute, but also the reason and necessity for
the law, the evils sought to be remedied, and the purpose to be achieved.” In re Detention of
Lieberman, 201 Ill. 2d 300, 308 (2002).
¶ 13 We acknowledge, as defendant argued to the trial court, that section 6-500 of the UCDLA
defines “alcohol concentration” as that which results from a breath test administered within
two hours of a driver being stopped or detained. 625 ILCS 5/6-500 (West 2008). However,
that definition begins by noting it is limited by “the definitions set forth elsewhere in this
Code” and further only applies “for the purposes of enforcing [the] UCDLA.” 625 ILCS 5/6-
500 (West 2008).
¶ 14 Through section 18b-105 of the IMCSL, the legislature adopted various provisions of the
Code of Federal Regulations. 625 ILCS 5/18b-105(b) (West 2008). Section 18b-105(b) states
that the “following parts of Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations, as now in effect, are
hereby adopted by reference as though they were set out in full: *** Part 382–Controlled
Substances and Alcohol Use and Testing; *** Part 392–Driving of Motor Vehicles.” 625
-4-
ILCS 5/18b-105(b) (West 2008).
¶ 15 Part 382 states:
“Alcohol concentration (or content) means the alcohol in a volume of breath expressed
in terms of grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath as indicated by an evidential breath
test under this part.” 49 C.F.R. § 382.107 (2010).
¶ 16 Section 392.5(a)(1) prohibits any driver from using alcohol “within 4 hours before going
on duty or operating, or having physical control of, a commercial motor vehicle.” 49 C.F.R.
§ 392.5(a)(1). Section 392 further states that “no driver shall *** [u]se alcohol *** or have
any measured alcohol concentration or detected presence of alcohol, while on duty, or
operating, or in physical control of a commercial motor vehicle.” 49 C.F.R. § 392.5(a)(2).
¶ 17 We find nothing in either part 382 or part 392 of title 49 of the Code of Federal
Regulations that limits the definition of “alcohol concentration” to results from tests
administered within two hours of the driver being stopped or detained as is found within
section 6-500 of the UCDLA. We note the definition of “alcohol concentration” found in
section 382.107 of title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations contains no time limitation
whatsoever. 49 C.F.R. § 382.107. The definition of “alcohol concentration” found within the
IMCSL, under which the State charged defendant, differs from that contained within the
UCDLA. Again, our legislature was clear in its language that the definition of “alcohol
concentration” found in section 6-500 of the UCDLA only applies “for the purposes of
enforcing [the] UCDLA” and does not trump “the definitions set forth elsewhere in this
Code.” 625 ILCS 5/6-500 (West 2008).
¶ 18 As the State did not charge defendant under the UCDLA but, instead, charged him under
the IMCSL, which contains a competing definition of “alcohol concentration,” we hold as
a matter of law that section 6-500 of the UCDLA is inapplicable to this prosecution. As such,
we find the trial court improperly relied upon section 6-500 (625 ILCS 5/6-500 (West 2008))
as authority to suppress the results of defendant’s breath test.
¶ 19 Courts have routinely held the timing of a breath exam goes to the weight of the test and
not its admissibility. People v. Zator, 209 Ill. App. 3d 322, 332 (1991) (“Illinois law is well
settled that any delay between the time of the incident and the breathalyzer test goes to the
weight given the results, viewed in light of the totality of the circumstances.”). While we may
one day be called upon to determine whether and how section 6-500 alters that general
principal, today is not that day.
¶ 20 CONCLUSION
¶ 21 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Will County is reversed
and this matter remanded for further proceedings.
¶ 22 Reversed and remanded.
¶ 23 JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE, specially concurring:
¶ 24 I agree with the majority’s judgment and analysis. I write separately to note that, even if
-5-
the results of the breath test were properly suppressed, the State likely could have proceeded
against the defendant on count II of the indictment based entirely on the testimony of the
arresting officer. Count II alleged that the defendant “willfully operated a commercial motor
vehicle *** at a time when he had a detectable presence of alcohol on his person, as
prohibited by 49 CFR 392.5,” which the Illinois Motor Carrier Safety Law adopts by
reference. See 625 ILCS 5/18b-105 (West 2008). During the bond hearing, the State
informed the court that the arresting officer “noted an odor of alcohol on the defendant’s
breath” immediately after the accident. If the officer were able to testify to that effect, such
testimony alone could establish that the defendant operated a commercial motor vehicle at
a time when he had a “detectable presence of alcohol on his person,” in violation of section
18b-105.
-6-