People v. Taylor

NO. 5-06-0514
N O T IC E
Decision filed 04/07/08. The text of
IN THE
this dec ision m ay b e changed or
corrected prior to the filing of a
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
P e t i ti o n for Re hea ring or the
disposition of the same.
FIFTH DISTRICT
________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Fayette County.
)
v. ) No. 06-CF-20
)
ROBERT C. TAYLOR, ) Honorable
) S. Gene Schwarm,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH delivered the opinion of the court:
After a jury trial in the circuit court of Fayette County, defendant, Robert C. Taylor,
was found guilty of domestic battery in violation of section 12-3.2(a)(1) of the Criminal Code
of 1961 (Criminal Code) (720 ILCS 5/12-3.2(a)(1) (West 2004)). He was sentenced to 60
days in the county jail, with credit for 5 days served, fined a total of $500 plus court costs,
ordered to obtain an alcohol substance-abuse evaluation and comply with any recommended
terms, and ordered to pay a $10-per-month probation fee. On appeal, defendant raises the
following issues: (1) whether the State proved defendant guilty of domestic battery beyond
a reasonable doubt and (2) whether defendant is entitled to a credit of $5 per day toward the
fine he was assessed for time he spent in custody prior to sentencing. We affirm in part and
remand.
BACKGROUND
On December 16, 2005, Officer Todd Emerick of the Vandalia police department
responded to a 9-1-1 call at defendant's house. Defendant told Officer Emerick that Lisha
Clary broke into his house and attacked him. After interviewing the parties and witnesses,
1
Emerick arrested defendant. Defendant was later charged by information with domestic
battery "in that said defendant, without legal justification, knowingly caused bodily harm to
Lisha Clary, a family or household member of the defendant, in that said defendant struck
Lisha Clary in the mouth with said defendant's hands" in violation of section 12-3.2(a)(1) of
the Criminal Code. Defendant was also charged with battery for striking Lisha Clary's
daughter, K.F., in the mouth.
On August 17, 2006, both counts proceeded to a jury trial. K.F., age 15, testified that
she and defendant's daughter, A.M., are friends. K.F. spent the night with A.M. at
defendant's house on the night of December 16, 2005. They were asleep in A.M.'s bedroom
when they were awakened by a loud noise in defendant's bedroom. They went to see what
caused the noise and found K.F.'s mother standing inside the room and defendant and Betty
Kophazy sitting on the bed.
After seeing another woman on defendant's bed, K.F. ran out of the house, using the
back door. The door was intact when she ran out. She reentered and found defendant
throwing tables at her mother and saw defendant hit her mother in the face. K.F. then got
between defendant and her mother and hit defendant. Defendant hit K.F. back, cutting her
face.
K.F. testified that at the time of the incident, she and her mother had been staying at
defendant's house for a couple of weeks and that her mom and defendant had been "going
out." During the weeks they were living at defendant's house, K.F. witnessed defendant and
her mother hugging and kissing. Both K.F. and A.M. encouraged the relationship between
their parents. K.F. testified that her mother slept in defendant's bedroom during the time they
stayed at defendant's house. K.F. kept her clothes in a bag in A.M.'s room. She was "pretty
sure" that her mom kept her clothes and a bag of pills in defendant's bedroom. After
defendant hit her, K.F. again fled the house via the back door. She broke the window out of
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the door attempting to get out of the house and cut her arm on some glass.
Lisha Clary, age 42, testified that she had been staying at defendant's house for
approximately three weeks prior to the night in question. She said that she and defendant
"were dating" and that she slept in his bedroom. She stated that some of her clothes were in
a bag and that some of her clothes were in a closet alongside defendant's bed. She testified
that she kept her medication at defendant's house. She had been at defendant's house earlier
in the day, left, and returned around midnight. She initially testified that she did not have a
key to defendant's house. The door was unlocked. She later recalled that defendant left a key
for her to use. She entered the house, walked through the kitchen and living room, and went
to defendant's bedroom. She found defendant lying on his bed with his head in the lap of
another woman, Betty Kophazy. Betty was sitting on the bed and was wearing clothes, but
defendant was naked.
Clary asked defendant if she could get her bag of clothes and medication, but
defendant refused. Defendant got off the bed, came at her, and started striking her with his
fists. She ran out of the bedroom and into the living room. Defendant picked up the coffee
table and hit her in the back with it, causing her to fall to the floor. She got up and went into
the kitchen, where defendant continued to hit her. K.F. intervened and hit defendant.
Defendant then hit K.F. twice. K.F. got scared and tried to run out the back door. K.F. could
not get the door open and her arm went through the storm window.
Defendant called the police from a telephone in his room. The police arrived on the
scene. The police first talked to Clary and K.F. The police then went into the bedroom and
talked to defendant. Defendant was handcuffed and taken out the back door. Clary denied
hitting defendant in the bedroom.
On cross-examination, Clary admitted that she had been convicted of aggravated
battery on July 26, 2006, on an unrelated matter in Fayette County and had served a sentence
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of 30 days in the county jail. The State stipulated that Clary also had been convicted of theft
in a previous matter. Clary gave a written statement to police on the night in question. At
that time she listed her address as 621 North Fifth in Vandalia, which is not defendant's
address.
On rebuttal, Clary said that she and defendant had engaged in sex. She recalled that
they had engaged in sex a "couple days before" the night in question.
Todd Emerick, a police officer who responded to the domestic disturbance call at
defendant's house, testified that upon his arrival, he and his partner knocked on the door, but
no one answered. They walked around the house and found broken glass outside the kitchen
door. They heard yelling inside the house and could not get anyone's attention. Ultimately,
they identified themselves as police officers and walked inside. They observed K.F. in the
kitchen. Emerick described her as "very upset, crying," and "hysterical." After interviewing
the parties and the witnesses, they arrested defendant and transported him to jail.
While defendant reported that Lisha Clary broke into his house, Emerick noted that
he and his partner found broken glass outside the kitchen door, which indicated that
something or someone broke the glass from the inside, pushing out. Emerick further noted
that there was broken glass in the living room and that a coffee table appeared to have been
thrown. Emerick originally charged defendant with battery and listed the victim as K.F.
A.M ., age 15, testified for the defense. Defendant is her father and she resides with
him at his rental house, where the incident occurred. She said that at the time of the offense,
no one else lived with them. She has been friends with K.F. since fifth grade. K .F.
frequently spent the night at her house, and sometimes Lisha Clary would also spend the
night on the weekends, with Clary sleeping on the couch. A.M. admitted that Clary left some
clothes at the house, but she said that they always stayed in a green cloth bag in the living
room. She said that prior to the day in question, she never saw defendant kiss or hug Lisha
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Clary. According to A.M ., defendant and Clary were just friends.
On December 16, 2005, A.M. and K.F. heard a thud, so they went into defendant's
bedroom to investigate. They saw defendant and Betty sitting on the bed. Clary was
standing across the room and was "yelling." A.M. went back to her bedroom and K.F. went
outside. A.M. saw Clary pick up a lamp but did not see what she did with it because A.M.
went back into her room. A.M. did hear glass breaking. At some point, Betty came into her
room and told her she could calm down because the police had arrived. The police tried to
interview A.M., but she told them she did not see much because she was in her room. She
did not tell the police that she saw Clary pick up a lamp.
Betty Kophazy testified that she now lives with defendant and A.M. at the house in
which the incident occurred and that she is defendant's girlfriend. She moved in at the end
of February or early March 2006. On the night in question, she was fully clothed and sitting
on defendant's bed when she heard the sound of glass crashing. She told defendant,
"Somebody's just broke your window out." After a little more ruckus, she heard someone
banging on the bedroom door, which was shut. Clary then came into the room and asked
defendant where her pills were. Defendant told Clary he did not know. Clary then started
hitting defendant and cussing at him. According to Kophazy, defendant covered himself and
did not strike back. Clary then went after Kophazy. Kophazy tried to jump over the top of
defendant, at which time she kicked Clary in the chest, and Clary fell to the floor. Clary went
into the living room and started breaking things, while defendant called the police from a
phone in his bedroom.
Kophazy went into the living room and found broken glass all over. Clary was in the
kitchen and K.F. was on the back porch. K.F. was pale and said she had cut her arm on the
door. Kophazy told K.F. to sit before she fainted. Clary told Kophazy to get away from her
daughter, so Kophazy went back to defendant's bedroom until the police arrived. Kophazy
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testified that defendant never hit Clary. Defendant just wanted Clary out of his house, but
the police ended up arresting defendant. Kophazy had seen Clary earlier in the evening at
a bar and believed that Clary was drunk when she arrived at defendant's house.
On the night in question, Kophazy told the police she did not see anything. Kophazy
admitted that when defendant was arrested, she did not tell the police that they were making
a mistake. She said that her main concern was A.M. and that she had tried to calm her and
tell her that it would be okay because her father did not do anything wrong. Kophazy has a
felony conviction for possession of cannabis.
During deliberations, the jurors sent a question to the judge that asked whether they
should convict defendant of battery if they believed that defendant had hit K.F. accidentally
when she was intervening between Clary and defendant. The judge responded: "Your
question is contained in the instructions. Please refer to your instructions." The jury found
defendant guilty of domestic battery regarding Clary but not guilty of battery regarding K.F.
Defendant was sentenced to 60 days in the county jail and fined $500. Defendant now
appeals.
ANALYSIS
The first issue we are asked to address is whether defendant was proven guilty of
domestic battery. Defendant argues he was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
because the State failed to prove that Lisha Clary was a household member or involved in
a dating relationship with defendant. He asks that his conviction be reduced to simple
battery. The State replies that it presented sufficient evidence to prove that defendant and
Clary were in a dating relationship and shared a common dwelling and that, thus, he was
proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of domestic battery. We agree that the State
presented sufficient evidence to show that Clary and defendant were in a dating relationship.
Section 12-3.2 of the Criminal Code provides in pertinent part as follows:
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"(a) A person commits domestic battery if he intentionally or knowingly
without legal justification by any means:
(1) Causes bodily harm to any family or household member as defined
in subsection (3) of Section 112A-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of
1963, as amended[.]" (Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS 5/12-3.2(a)(1) (West
2004).
Subsection 3 of section 112A-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, which is
referenced in section 12-3.2 of the Criminal Code, defines "Family or household members"
and provides that these terms include not only "spouses, former spouses, parents, children,
stepchildren[,] and other persons related by blood or by present or prior marriage" but also
"persons who share or formerly shared a common dwelling" and "persons who have or have
had a dating or engagement relationship." 725 ILCS 5/112A-3(3) (West 2004). Subsection
3 of section 112A-3 further provides that "neither a casual acquaintanceship nor ordinary
fraternization between 2 individuals in business or social contexts shall be deemed to
constitute a dating relationship." 725 ILCS 5/112A-3(3) (West 2004).
When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, it is not the function of
a reviewing court to retry the defendant. People v. Evans, 209 Ill. 2d 194, 209, 808 N.E.2d
939, 947 (2004). Rather, a reviewing court must consider whether, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Ward, 215
Ill. 2d 317, 322, 830 N.E.2d 556, 559 (2005). Here, defendant was convicted following a
jury trial; therefore, it was the province of the jury to determine the credibility of witnesses,
evaluate the evidence, and resolve any inconsistencies therein. People v. Penrod, 316 Ill.
App. 3d 713, 721, 737 N.E.2d 341, 350 (2000). A conviction should not be reversed "unless
the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable[,] or unsatisfactory that it raises a reasonable
7
doubt of defendant's guilt." Evans, 209 Ill. 2d at 209, 808 N.E.2d at 947.
In the instant case, we agree with the State that the evidence, when viewed in the light
most favorable to the prosecution, shows that defendant and the victim, Lisha Clary, were
involved in a "dating relationship." Clary specifically testified that she and defendant "were
dating." She described her relationship with defendant as more than platonic and revealed
that she and defendant had engaged in sex as recently as two days prior to the date in
question. Both she and her daughter testified that they had been living at defendant's house
for approximately three weeks prior to the incident in question. Clary kept both clothes and
medications at the defendant's house. She testified that she slept in defendant's bed. Clary's
daughter testified that she believed that her mother and defendant were "going out," because
she saw them hugging and kissing during the weeks they lived at defendant's house. Clary's
and K.F.'s testimony showed that the parties' relationship was neither a casual acquaintance
nor ordinary fraternization, but a romantic relationship between two adults who were living
in the same household.
Defendant relies on People v. Young, 362 Ill. App. 3d 843, 840 N.E.2d 825 (2005),
in support of his contention that the evidence failed to show he and Clary were "family or
household members" as required for a domestic battery conviction. However, Young is
distinguishable from the instant case. First, the Young court found that the complainant and
the defendant did not have a fixed residence and resided in homeless shelters and that there
was no evidence that they had formed a household. Young, 362 Ill. App. 3d at 850, 840
N.E.2d at 830. The Young court specifically stated that "for two people to 'share a common
dwelling' is for them to stay in one place together on an extended, indefinite, or regular
basis." Young, 362 Ill. App. 3d at 849, 840 N.E.2d at 830. Here, Clary and defendant stayed
together at defendant's rental property, not a homeless shelter. According to Clary's
testimony and her daughter's testimony, Clary lived with defendant for three weeks prior to
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December 16, 2005.
Second, in Young, the complaining witness actually denied the existence of a dating
relationship with the defendant, claiming instead that the two had only a social relationship.
Young, 362 Ill. App. 3d at 845, 840 N.E.2d at 827. The court found that because the
complaining witness chose the word "social" to describe the parties' relationship, there was
direct evidence that she did not think the focus of the relationship was romantic. Young, 362
Ill. App. 3d at 852, 840 N.E.2d at 832. Here, on the other hand, the complaining witness
believed her relationship with defendant was romantic. She had lived with defendant for
three weeks prior to the date in question. During that time, she slept in defendant's bed and
engaged in sex with defendant. Her daughter confirmed that the nature of the relationship
was romantic. According to K.F. both she and defendant's daughter encouraged the romantic
relationship between their parents. K.F. said she saw defendant and her mother hugging and
kissing during the weeks she and her mother lived at defendant's house.
The Young court noted particular changes to the statute in question that indicate the
General Assembly's intention to address particular problems of abuse within intimate
relationships:
"Until 1993, the section encompassed only people who would fall within the ordinary
understanding of former and current family and household members: ' "Family or
household members" includes spouses, former spouses, parents, children,
stepchildren[,] and other persons related by blood or marriage, persons who share or
formerly shared a common dwelling, and persons who have or allegedly have a child
in common.' 725 ILCS 5/112A-3(3) (West 1992). Effective 1993, the General
Assembly added to the definition 'persons who have or have had a dating or
engagement relationship, [and] persons with disabilities and their personal assistants.'
Pub. Act 87-1186, eff. January 1, 1993. These are tw o groups that one might not
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naturally include in a class with family or household members, but for which the
problems of abuse are similar to those in more strictly domestic relationships. By
broadening the definition this way, the General Assembly made it reach most intimate
relationships." Young, 362 Ill. App. 3d at 850-51, 840 N.E.2d at 831.
While the relationship in Young was not the type of intimate relationship our General
Assembly envisioned, the relationship here is.
We agree with the Young court to the extent that just because persons share lodgings
does not necessarily mean that they share a common dwelling. Young, 362 Ill. App. 3d at
849, 840 N.E.2d at 830. However, we need not reach the issue of whether Clary and
defendant shared a common dwelling, because they clearly shared a dating relationship. Not
only did they live in the same house, but also they shared the same bed for three weeks prior
to the incident. Their relationship was a kind in which problems of abuse might arise.
Overall, we find the evidence sufficient to support a finding that defendant and Clary were
family or household members within the meaning of the statute, so we will not reduce
defendant's conviction to the lesser-included offense of battery.
The second issue we are asked to address is whether defendant is entitled to a credit
of $5 per day toward the fine he was assessed for time spent in custody prior to sentencing.
Defendant argues he served five days in custody prior to sentencing and that, thus, he is
entitled to a credit of $25 toward his $500 fine. The State concedes that defendant is entitled
to a credit of $5 per day for the time he spent in pretrial custody, but it asserts that defendant
was in jail only for two days prior to posting bail and, accordingly, is entitled to a credit of
only $10. We give defendant the benefit of the doubt that he is entitled to a $25 credit
toward his fine. This case is remanded with directions to modify the mittimus to reflect a $25
credit toward the $500 fine.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's conviction and sentence are affirmed. The
cause is remanded with directions to modify the mittimus to reflect a $25 credit toward the
$500 fine imposed by the trial court.
Affirmed in part; cause remanded with directions.
DONOVAN and WEXSTTEN, JJ., concur.
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NO. 5-06-0514
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT
___________________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Fayette County.
)
v. ) No. 06-CF-20
)
ROBERT C. TAYLOR, ) Honorable
) S. Gene Schwarm,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
___________________________________________________________________________________
Opinion Filed: April 7, 2008
___________________________________________________________________________________
Justices: Honorable Richard P. Goldenhersh, J.
Honorable James K. Donovan, J.,
Honorable James M. Wexstten, J.,
Concur
___________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys Daniel M . Kirwan, Deputy Defender, Paige Clark Strawn, Assistant Defender,
for Office of the State Appellate Defender, Fifth Judicial District, 117 North Tenth
Appellant Street, Suite 300, Mt. Vernon, IL 62864
___________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys Hon. Steve Friedel, State's Attorney, Fayette County Courthouse, Vandalia, IL 62471;
for Norbert J. Goetten, Director, Stephen E. Norris, Deputy Director, David Murrell,
Appellee Staff Attorney, Office of the State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, 730 E. Illinois
Highway 15, Suite 2, P.O. Box 2249, Mt. Vernon, IL 62864
___________________________________________________________________________________