Ross v. Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund

Rule 23 order filed NO. 5-07-0172
July 22, 2009;
Motion to publish granted IN THE
December 1, 2009.
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT
________________________________________________________________________
ROBIN ROSS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) St. Clair County.
)
v. ) No. 06-MR-76
)
ILLINOIS MUNICIPAL RETIREMENT FUND, )
ILLINOIS MUNICIPAL RETIREMENT FUND )
BOARD OF TRUSTEES, and THE ST. CLAIR )
COUNTY HOUSING AUTHORITY, ) Honorable
) Andrew J. Gleeson,
Defendants-Appellants. ) Judge, presiding.
________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE CHAPMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
In July 2003, the Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund Board of Trustees (Board of
Trustees) issued a final administrative decision terminating temporary total disability benefits
to the plaintiff, Robin Ross. She filed an action seeking administrative review of that
decision, naming as defendants the Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund (IMRF) "and its
Board of Trustees." However, she served only one summons, which was addressed to the
IMRF. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiff had failed to
properly name or serve the Board of Trustees. Eventually, the plaintiff filed a motion for a
voluntary dismissal without prejudice. Nearly one year later, she filed a new complaint for
administrative review, this time serving separate summonses on the IMRF and the Board of
Trustees. The defendants moved to dismiss for a lack of jurisdiction. The circuit court
denied their motion to dismiss, found the Board of Trustees' decision to be against the
manifest weight of the evidence, and reversed the administrative decision. The defendants
appeal, arguing that (1) the court lacked jurisdiction and (2) the administrative decision was
1
supported by the evidence. We reverse.
The plaintiff, Robin Ross, began working for the St. Clair County Housing Authority
in January 1983. As an employee of a municipal agency, she participated in the IMRF. She
last worked as a public housing manager in May 2001, after which time she stopped working
due to various health problems, including back problems and anxiety. The plaintiff received
total temporary disability benefits from June 15, 2001, to August 31, 2002. In December
2002, the plaintiff appealed the decision to terminate her benefits. On July 24, 2003, the
benefit review committee of the Board of Trustees recommended to the Board of Trustees
that the decision to terminate the plaintiff's benefits should be upheld. The full Board of
Trustees met the following day and adopted this recommendation. In a letter dated July 29,
the Board of Trustees informed the plaintiff of this decision.
On August 15, 2003, the plaintiff filed a complaint pursuant to the Administrative
Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq. (West 2002)). She named as defendants the "Illinois
Municipal Retirement Fund and its Board of Trustees and the St. Clair County Housing
Authority." She contended that the Board of Trustees' decision was contrary to section 7-147
of the Illinois Pension Code (40 ILCS 5/7-147 (West 2002)) because she was unable to
perform the duties of any position the housing authority might reasonably assign to her. On
August 18, she mailed one summons to the St. Clair County Housing Authority and another
to the IMRF. On August 21, the summons addressed to the IMRF was delivered to the legal
department that serves both the IMRF and the Board of Trustees.
On September 15, the St. Clair County Housing Authority filed its answer. On
September 22, the IMRF and the Board of Trustees (collectively, defendants) filed a motion
to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)
(West 2002)). In it, they alleged that the summons was addressed solely to the IMRF but
that the Board of Trustees was the party who had made the decision. They further alleged
2
that the plaintiff "failed to properly name the Board of Trustees" in her complaint. They
argued that the failure to properly name and serve the Board of Trustees is a basis to dismiss
the complaint. As an alternative basis, the defendants asserted that the plaintiff failed to
serve the complaint within 35 days of the final administrative decision, as required by statute
(735 ILCS 5/3-103 (West 2002)).
Eventually, on March 28, 2005, the plaintiff filed a motion for the voluntary dismissal
of her complaint without prejudice, pursuant to section 2-1009 of the Code of Civil
Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1009 (West 2004)). The court granted that motion the following
day and ruled that the defendants' pending motion to dismiss "is hereby held in abeyance and
may be refiled, and ruled upon by the Court, should [the] plaintiff choose to refile her
Complaint for Administrative Review." The plaintiff contends, and the defendants
acknowledge, that the understanding of both parties at the time was that the plaintiff intended
to refile the complaint so she could properly name and serve the Board of Trustees as a
defendant.
On March 27, 2006, the plaintiff filed her second complaint for administrative review.
This time, she named as defendants the IMRF, the "[IMRF] Board of Trustees," and the St.
Clair County Housing Authority. On March 28, she mailed three separate summonses, one
to each defendant. The summonses sent to the IMRF and the Board of Trustees were sent
to the same address.
On April 28, 2006, the IMRF and the Board of Trustees filed a motion to dismiss
pursuant to section 2-619, along with a supporting memorandum. They argued that the
Administrative Review Law does not allow a plaintiff to refile a complaint for administrative
review after a voluntary dismissal. They also alleged that the bases for dismissal set forth
in their motion to dismiss the plaintiff's first complaint remained valid bases to dismiss the
second petition.
3
On July 18, 2006, the plaintiff filed a response to the defendants' motion to dismiss.
She alleged that she had filed her motion for voluntary dismissal pursuant to an agreement
of the parties. She explained that the understanding of both parties was that she would refile
the action. On July 25, the defendants filed a reply in support of their motion to dismiss.
They argued that it does not matter whether there was an agreement concerning the refiling
of the case, that the Administrative Review Law is a departure from common law, and that
its requirements must therefore be strictly complied with in order to vest the trial court with
jurisdiction.
On August 2, 2006, the court held a hearing on the matter. The court took the matter
under advisement and ordered each party to prepare a proposed order. On September 6, the
court entered an order denying the defendants' motion to dismiss. The court then reviewed
the administrative record. The parties agreed to allow the court to make its decision based
solely on review of the record itself. On March 2, 2007, the court entered an order finding
that the Board of Trustees' decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence and
reversing the decision accordingly. The defendants then filed this appeal.
The defendants argue first that the circuit court erred in denying their motion to
dismiss because it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's complaint. The court
lacked jurisdiction, they argue, because the Administrative Review Law does not permit a
complaint for administrative review to be refiled after it has been dismissed voluntarily. See
735 ILCS 5/3-102 (West 2004). As an alternative to this argument, they contend that the
second petition should have been dismissed for the reasons asserted in their renewed motion
to dismiss. They further contend that the court erred in finding the administrative decision
to be against the manifest weight of the evidence. We conclude that the court lacked
jurisdiction to consider the petition because the Administrative Review Law specifically
provides that a voluntarily dismissed petition may not be refiled. Because we reverse on this
4
basis, we will not address the other issues raised in this appeal.
The Administrative Review Law provides statutory authority for courts to review the
decisions of administrative agencies. Unlike most other types of cases, the courts'
jurisdiction to hear administrative review cases flows from the Administrative Review Law,
not the Illinois state constitution. Fredman Brothers Furniture Co. v. Department of
Revenue, 109 Ill. 2d 202, 210, 486 N.E.2d 893, 895 (1985) (relying on Ill. Const. 1970, art.
VI, §9). Thus, its requirements are jurisdictional. Fredman Brothers Furniture Co., 109 Ill.
2d at 210, 486 N.E.2d at 895-96 (explaining that when jurisdiction is conferred by statute,
"that jurisdiction is limited to the language of the act conferring it"). A failure to strictly
adhere to those requirements deprives a court of subject matter jurisdiction over a petition
seeking administrative review. Fredman Brothers Furniture Co., 109 Ill. 2d at 210, 486
N.E.2d at 896.
The Administrative Review Law provides that a petition for administrative review
must be filed and served on the defendants within 35 days after the final administrative
decision is served on the party seeking review. 735 ILCS 5/3-103 (West 2004). In addition,
it is necessary to name as defendants all the parties of record in the administrative
proceedings. 735 ILCS 5/3-107(a) (W est 2004). It is also necessary to serve each necessary
party with a summons. 735 ILCS 5/3-105 (West 2004). Here, although the Board of
Trustees is "an arm of [the] IMRF," the administrative agency that rendered the decision at
issue was the Board of Trustees, not the IMRF. Ultsch v. Illinois Municipal Retirement
Fund, 226 Ill. 2d 169, 189, 874 N.E.2d 1, 13 (2007). Thus, the Board of Trustees itself had
to be named and served. As previously noted, these statutory requirements are jurisdictional.
The statutes specifically provide certain exceptions to these requirements in order to
avoid potentially harsh results. For example, section 3-107(a) of the Administrative Review
Law (735 ILCS 5/3-107(a) (West 2004)) provides that a plaintiff's failure to name individual
5
employees of the appropriate agency does not divest a court of jurisdiction over the
complaint. The same statute provides that even a failure to name the appropriate agency will
not deprive a court of jurisdiction as long as the head of the appropriate agency is named as
a defendant in his or her official capacity. 735 ILCS 5/3-107(a) (West 2004). Similarly,
section 3-105 provides that a failure to serve individual employees will not deprive a court
of jurisdiction as long as the appropriate agency is named, and it further provides that the
service of a summons on the head or director of an agency, in his or her official capacity,
will be deemed to be service on the agency itself. 735 ILCS 5/3-105 (West 2004). Under
very narrow circumstances, if the court determines that an agency that has not been named
in the complaint was a party to the administrative proceedings, the court can allow the
plaintiff to amend the complaint to add that agency and grant the plaintiff 21 days' leave to
serve the agency. This is limited to situations in which the final administrative decision does
not name the agency. 735 ILCS 5/3-107(a) (West 2004).
In Worthen v. Village of Roxana, 253 Ill. App. 3d 378, 623 N.E.2d 1058 (1993), this
court ruled that under a very narrow circumstance, a plaintiff could amend her petition for
review, to comply with the relevant filing requirements, after it had been filed. There, the
plaintiffs had served all the necessary parties but failed to name one necessary party in the
caption of their petition. They promptly sought leave to add the unnamed party. Worthen,
253 Ill. App. 3d at 381, 623 N.E.2d at 1060-61. This court found that "what appears to be
a clerical error in failing to add the [name of the Pollution Control Board, which was a party
to the administrative proceedings,] to the caption of the petition for review" did not deprive
the court of jurisdiction to consider the petition. Worthen, 253 Ill. App. 3d at 382, 623
N.E.2d at 1061. Three facts were relevant to this conclusion: first, the Pollution Control
Board had actual notice because it had been properly served; second, the plaintiffs sought
to correct the error through a timely motion to amend the petition to add the Pollution
6
Control Board to the caption; and third, as stated, the error appeared to be clerical in nature.
Worthen, 253 Ill. App. 3d at 382, 623 N.E.2d at 1061. We emphasized that the failure to
name the agency in the original petition did not deprive the court of jurisdiction based on the
facts presented by that case "and only [those] facts." Worthen, 253 Ill. App. 3d at 382, 623
N.E.2d at 1061.
None of the statutory exceptions outlined are applicable here. The plaintiff contends
that, under Worthen, the court had jurisdiction to consider her complaint. This argument
assumes that the court's jurisdiction could survive her motion for a voluntary dismissal,
however, and we find that it could not.
Just as the Administrative Review Law provides procedural requirements necessary
to vest courts of this state with jurisdiction over complaints for administrative review, it also
includes provisions that terminate that jurisdiction. The Administrative Review Law
provides that, if a party seeks a voluntary dismissal, as the plaintiff did here, the court's
jurisdiction to review the administrative decision terminates and the decision becomes final
and unappealable. 735 ILCS 5/3-102 (West 2004) (providing that all administrative review
proceedings "shall terminate upon the date of the entry of any Order" (emphasis added)
voluntarily dismissing a petition under section 2-1009 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735
ILCS 5/2-1009 (West 2004))). Once the court's jurisdiction is terminated, the administrative
decision is no longer subject to review by any court. 735 ILCS 5/3-102 (W est 2004).
The plaintiff contends, however, that she dismissed her petition voluntarily pursuant
to an agreement with the defendants. She contends that the understanding of all the parties
was that she would refile her petition and properly serve the Board of Trustees. As a result,
she argues, the defendants "voluntarily waived [their] right to raise [section 3-102 of the
Administrative Review Law] as a defense." This argument fails, however, because of the
jurisdictional nature of the statute. In administrative review, subject matter jurisdiction
7
cannot be waived or "conferred by any form of laches, consent, *** or estoppel." Board of
Education of the City of Chicago v. Box, 191 Ill. App. 3d 31, 35, 547 N.E .2d 627, 630
(1989). Therefore, once the court entered an order dismissing the plaintiff's petition pursuant
to section 2-1009, it lost jurisdiction to review the agency's decision to terminate her
benefits. Because the court no longer had jurisdiction to review the administrative decision,
the court erred in denying the defendants' motion to dismiss the refiled petition.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the order of the circuit court and reinstate the
decision of the Board of Trustees.
Reversed; administrative decision reinstated.
STEW ART and SPOMER, JJ., concur.
8
NO. 5-07-0172
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT
___________________________________________________________________________________
ROBIN ROSS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) St. Clair County.
)
v. ) No. 06-MR-76
)
ILLINOIS MUNICIPAL RETIREMENT FUND, )
ILLINOIS MUNICIPAL RETIREMENT FUND )
BOARD OF TRUSTEES, and THE ST. CLAIR )
COUNTY HOUSING AUTHORITY, ) Honorable
) Andrew J. Gleeson,
Defendants-Appellants. ) Judge, presiding.
___________________________________________________________________________________
Rule 23 Order Filed: July 22, 2009
Motion to Publish Granted: December 1, 2009
Opinion Filed: December 1, 2009
___________________________________________________________________________________
Justices: Honorable Melissa A. Chapman, J.
Honorable Bruce D. Stewart, J., and
Honorable Stephen L. Spomer, J.,
Concur
___________________________________________________________________________________
Attorney Michael B. W einstein, Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund, 2211 York Road, Suite
for 500, Oak Brook, IL 60523-2337
Appellants
___________________________________________________________________________________
Attorney Gregory M. Skinner, 4010 North Illinois Street, Swansea, IL 62226
for
Appellee
___________________________________________________________________________________