In re Donrell S.

Rule 23 order filed NOS. 5-08-0010, 5-08-0327, & 5-08-0553
August 4, 2009;
Motion to publish granted IN THE
December 10, 2009.
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT
________________________________________________________________________
In re DONRELL S., ) Appeal from the
Alleged to Be a Person Subject to Involuntary ) Circuit Court of
Admission ) Randolph County.
)
(The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner- ) No. 07-MH-288
Appellee, v. Donrell S., Respondent-Appellant). )
____________________________________________ )
)
In re HAL K., )
Alleged to Be a Person Subject to Involuntary )
Admission ) No. 08-MH-31
)
(The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner- )
Appellee, v. Hal K., Respondent-Appellant). )
____________________________________________ )
)
In re LANCE H., )
Alleged to Be a Person Subject to Involuntary ) No. 08-MH-170
Admission )
) Honorable
(The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner- ) William A. Schuwerk, Jr.,
Appellee, v. Lance H., Respondent-Appellant). ) Judge, presiding.
________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE CHAPMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
The respondents, Donrell S., Hal K., and Lance H., appeal orders finding them subject
to involuntary admission after each waived his right to a hearing. Because this court has
recently found that the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (Mental Health
Code) (405 ILCS 5/1-100 et seq. (West 2006)) does not contemplate or permit such a blanket
waiver of all the procedural safeguards provided to respondents on petitions for involuntary
admission, we reverse.
These three cases involve patients with long histories of mental illness and multiple
previous involuntary admissions. In September 2004, respondent Donrell S. was
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involuntarily admitted to Chester Mental Health Center (Chester). He was diagnosed with
schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type, and suffered paranoid delusions. On November 29,
2007, the State filed the petition for continued involuntary admission at issue in this appeal.
At the outset of the December 5 hearing on that petition, Donrell's attorney, Jeremy W alker,
informed the court that Donrell had "expressed a desire to waive the right to a hearing." The
following discussion followed:
"THE COURT: Mr. [S.], do you wish to give up your right to have a hearing
this morning?
RESPONDENT [Donrell S.]: I want to appeal.
THE COURT: Do you want to have a hearing?
RESPONDENT: Waive.
THE COURT: I'll accept your waiver."
The court then found that Donrell S. was subject to involuntary commitment. That was the
full extent of the hearing. Donrell S. filed his notice of appeal on January 2, 2008.
The second respondent in this appeal, Hal K., has a far longer history. His first
involuntary admission to a facility occurred in 1980; however, his symptoms of anger and
paranoia date back to 1961, when he was 13 years old. In 1988, Hal was found not guilty
by reason of insanity on charges of attempted murder, aggravated battery, and armed
violence in Cook County. In July 2006, he was transferred to Chester and became a civil
involuntary admittee after his Thiem date had passed. People v. Thiem, 82 Ill. App. 3d 956,
962, 403 N.E.2d 647, 652 (1980) (explaining that an order committing a defendant found not
guilty by reason of insanity must specify a maximum period of confinement equal to the
longest sentence the defendant could have received had he been convicted).
On February 14, 2008, the State filed the petition for continued involuntary admission
that forms the basis of this appeal. A hearing on the petition was set for February 20. Hal
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was represented at the hearing by Jeremy Walker, the same attorney who represented Donrell
S. at his hearing. Walker told the court that, after discussing the petition prior to coming to
court that morning, Hal "expressed a desire to waive his right to a hearing this morning."
The court asked Hal if he wanted to give up his right to a hearing, and the following
conversation ensued:
"RESPONDENT [Hal K.]: I don't know what the advantage is in having a
hearing.
THE COURT: So you want to give it up, correct?
RESPONDENT: I guess.
THE COURT: I'll accept your waiver."
The court then found Hal subject to involuntary admission and entered an order to that effect.
This was the full extent of the hearing.
On March 20, 2008, Hal K. filed a pro se motion to reconsider. He alleged that he
only waived the hearing because he was advised by his former attorney that he had no chance
of winning at the hearing. On May 21, the court held a hearing on the motion. Hal appeared
with new counsel. Through counsel, he argued, as he does on appeal, that the M ental Health
Code does not permit the waiver of the statutorily mandated procedures in their entirety. The
court interrupted and the following exchange took place:
"THE COURT: Well, here, I don't know what you're talking about there, but
we've been doing these things down here for 30 years, and we've been taking waivers
from recipients for over 30 years that I'm aware of. I don't know what they do in
Alton. Do they take waivers in Alton?
MS. GOEBEN [counsel for Hal K.]: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: No waivers of hearings at all?
MS. GOEBEN: No."
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The court rejected Hal's arguments. The court took judicial notice that, in 13 previous
hearings, Hal sometimes had waived the hearing and sometimes had not. The court found
that this pattern indicated that Hal "knew what he was doing" when he waived the right to
a hearing. The court therefore denied the motion to reconsider. Hal K. filed a notice of
appeal on June 10, 2008.
Lance H.'s earliest admission to a facility was in 1997. On February 29, 2008, Lance
H. was admitted to Chester after he reached his parole date on a sentence for sexual assault.
On March 4, Lance signed an application to be admitted voluntarily to Chester. On June 4,
however, he was found subject to involuntary admission. On August 28, 2008, the State
filed a petition for continued involuntary admission. The entire September 3 hearing on the
petition echoed the hearings on the petitions for continued involuntary admission of Donrell
S. and H al K . It began with attorney Jeremy Walker informing the court that he had
discussed the proceedings with Lance that very morning and that Lance "expressed a desire
to waive his right to a hearing." The remainder of the hearing consisted of the following
exchange:
"THE COURT: Mr. [H.], do you wish to give up your right to have a hearing
this morning?
RESPONDENT [Lance H.]: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: I'll accept your waiver."
On October 1, 2008, Lance H. filed a motion to reconsider, through newly appointed
counsel Barbara Goeben. He argued that (1) the Mental Health Code does not permit a
complete waiver of a hearing on a petition for involuntary admission to a facility and (2)
even assuming that the hearing can be waived in its entirety, Lance did not understand the
consequences of waiving his right to a hearing. The court denied the motion to reconsider
on October 3. Lance H. filed his appeal on October 30, 2008. Because the three cases
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present identical issues, this court consolidated them for purposes of argument and decision.
We begin by noting that all three of these appeals are moot. The order involuntarily
admitting Donrell S. expired on June 2, 2008; the order admitting Hal K. expired on August
18, 2008; and the order admitting Lance H. expired on December 1, 2008. Because the
orders appealed have expired, we cannot grant effective relief to any of these respondents.
This makes the issues raised in these appeals moot. In re Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d 482, 490,
702 N.E.2d 555, 559 (1998). Ordinarily, courts lack jurisdiction to consider moot issues
because our rulings on those issues are, essentially, advisory. In re Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d
at 490-91, 702 N.E.2d at 559. However, we may consider these appeals if they fall within
a recognized exception to the mootness doctrine. In re Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d 345, 351, 910
N.E.2d 74, 78 (2009).
We find that the instant appeal falls within the recognized exception for cases that are
capable of repetition yet avoiding review. In order to fit within this exception, an appeal
must meet two criteria. First, the order appealed "must be of a duration too short to be fully
litigated prior to its cessation." In re Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d at 358, 910 N.E.2d at 82. This
criterion is clearly met here. Initial orders for involuntary admission expire after 90 days.
Orders for continued involuntary admission, such as those involved here, expire after 180
days (although we note that the order entered finding Lance H. subject to involuntary
admission expired in 90 days). This is too little time to permit an appeal to be fully litigated
before the orders expire.
In addition, there must be a "reasonable expectation that the same complaining party
would be subjected to the same action again." In re Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d at 491, 702
N.E.2d at 559. The potential future action need not be identical to the action appealed;
however, it must be similar enough that the resolution of the issue raised in the otherwise-
moot appeal will likely have an effect on a future case involving the appellant. In re Alfred
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H.H., 233 Ill. 2d at 359, 910 N.E.2d at 82. As noted, these three respondents all have a long
history of mental illness, and all three have been found subject to involuntary admission
more than once. We may also take judicial notice of the fact that Lance H. has an appeal
pending before this court which raises the identical issue after a subsequent order finding him
subject to continued involuntary commitment. Moreover, as previously discussed, the record
of the hearing on Hal K.'s motion to reconsider demonstrates that precisely this issue has
arisen more than once during proceedings on petitions involving Hal. Thus, we find that
these three respondents are very likely to be subjected to the same action again. We will
therefore consider this appeal under the capable-of-repetition-yet-avoiding-review exception.
This court recently addressed the issues raised in this appeal in In re Michael H., 392
Ill. App. 3d 965, 912 N.E.2d 703 (2009). There, as here, the respondent was found subject
to continuing involuntary admission to Chester after waiving his right to a hearing on the
petition for continued commitment. In re Michael H., 392 Ill. App. 3d at 968, 912 N.E.2d
at 706. There, as here, the respondent argued on appeal that (1) the Mental Health Code
does not permit the complete waiver of a hearing, (2) alternatively, the court must at least
make a reasonable inquiry into both the respondent's capacity to waive his rights and his
understanding of the consequences of doing so, and (3) if a respondent does agree to be
admitted, he must be treated as a voluntary admittee, with all the rights that entails. In re
Michael H., 392 Ill. App. 3d at 970, 912 N.E.2d at 708; see 405 ILCS 5/3-403 (West 2006)
(providing that a voluntarily admitted patient may request a discharge at any time); 405 ILCS
5/3-404 (West 2006) (requiring the facility to reassess a voluntarily admitted patient's need
for continued hospitalization after 30 days and providing that the patient's failure to confirm
in writing his or her desire for continued admission at that time will be interpreted to mean
the patient no longer wishes to be admitted).
In accepting these arguments, we noted that the Mental Health Code does not
6
expressly prohibit an "agreed" order for involuntary admission. In re Michael H., 392 Ill.
App. 3d at 978, 912 N.E.2d at 714. However, we found that such an order is at odds with
various provisions of the Mental Health Code. In re Michael H., 392 Ill. App. 3d at 978, 912
N.E.2d at 714. We emphasized the statutory provisions governing agreed orders for less
restrictive mental health care (see 405 ILCS 5/3-801.5 (West 2006)) and the provisions
relating to voluntary admission (see 405 ILCS 5/3-403, 3-801 (West 2006)).
We explained that even when a respondent agrees to an order for outpatient care,
before entering the agreed order, the court must make two critical inquiries. The court must
determine whether the respondent understands the conditions of the order. In re Michael H.,
392 Ill. App. 3d at 977, 912 N.E.2d at 713 (citing 405 ILCS 5/3-801.5(a)(2) (West 2006)).
The court must also determine whether the treatment proposed in the order will be in the
respondent's best interests. In re Michael H., 392 Ill. App. 3d at 977, 912 N.E.2d at 713
(citing 405 ILCS 5/3-801.5(a)(1) (West 2006)). In other words, even where a respondent
agrees to an order for treatment, the court cannot treat this agreement as a complete waiver
of the statutory procedures put in place to protect his rights.
Even assuming a similar procedure would be permissible with respect to a
commitment order, we found that the court's inquiry into Michael's understanding of the
rights he was waiving was "woefully inadequate." In re Michael H., 392 Ill. App. 3d at 975,
912 N.E.2d at 711. We note that the lack of any meaningful inquiry into these three
respondents' capacity to waive their rights was far more egregious than what occurred in the
Michael H. case. There, at least the court asked if Michael understood what his attorney told
the court, to which Michael replied: " 'Yeah. He said I would be here for another six
months.' " In re Michael H., 392 Ill. App. 3d at 968, 912 N.E.2d at 706. We found this
inquiry to be inadequate because the court did not determine whether Michael understood
the burden the State would have to meet if he went forward with the hearing or whether he
7
understood that he had the option of requesting a voluntary admission and seeking to dismiss
the pending petition for involuntary admission. In re Michael H., 392 Ill. App. 3d at 975,
912 N.E.2d at 711.
Here, the "inquiries" were even more lacking. The court asked Lance H. only if he
wanted to waive the hearing. W hen the court asked Donrell S. if he wanted to give up his
right to a hearing, Donrell stated that he wanted to appeal, which indicated that he did not
understand what he was waiving at all. Hal K. told the court that he did not know what
advantage there was in having a hearing, and when asked if that meant he wanted to waive
it, he replied, "I guess." At best, this indicates ambivalence toward the so-called waiver. See
In re Michael H., 392 Ill. App. 3d at 977, 912 N.E.2d at 713 (explaining that a respondent
might waive his hearing because he believes it would be futile, rather than because he truly
wants to waive it). This we cannot endorse.
Moreover, in our Michael H. decision, we found several reasons to treat orders for
involuntary admission differently from orders for alternative care. First, we found that those
orders are inherently more restrictive than other mental health orders. In re Michael H., 392
Ill. App. 3d at 972, 912 N.E.2d at 709. Next, we found that even if procedures applicable
to agreed orders for outpatient care are followed, an "agreed" order for involuntary admission
would be inconsistent with the provisions of the Mental Health Code governing both agreed
orders for outpatient care and orders for voluntary admission. We explained that an agreed
order for outpatient care may not include a requirement that the respondent be admitted to
a facility. In re Michael H., 392 Ill. App. 3d at 977, 912 N.E.2d at 713 (citing 405 ILCS 5/3-
801.5(a)(4) (West 2006)). Likewise, it may not be construed as a finding that the respondent
is subject to involuntary admission. In re Michael H., 392 Ill. App. 3d at 978, 912 N.E.2d
at 713 (citing 405 ILCS 5/3-801.5(d) (West 2006)).
We further explained that, if a respondent requests a voluntary admission while a
8
petition for involuntary admission is pending, the court may either dismiss the petition
immediately or "require proof that dismissing the petition is in the best interests of the
respondent and the public." In re Michael H., 392 Ill. App. 3d at 978, 912 N.E.2d at 714
(citing 405 ILCS 5/3-801 (West 2006)). If the court dismisses the petition, then the
respondent is to be treated as a voluntarily admitted patient. If, on the other hand, the court
does not dismiss the petition, it will remain pending "subject to all the procedural safeguards
ordinarily applicable" before the court can order the respondent committed involuntarily.
In re Michael H., 392 Ill. App. 3d at 978-79, 912 N.E.2d at 714.
Finally, we considered the purpose of these requirements. We explained that they
ensure that neither a respondent's agreement to an order for outpatient care nor a respondent's
decision to be admitted voluntarily can be used as a way to circumvent the requirements
applicable to a petition for involuntary commitment. In re Michael H., 392 Ill. App. 3d at
978, 912 N.E.2d at 714. In light of this, we held that a respondent in proceedings on a
petition for involuntary admission cannot effectively waive the entire hearing and all the
rights that entails unless he is treated as a voluntary admittee. In re Michael H., 392 Ill. App.
3d at 978-79, 912 N.E.2d at 714. That holding controls our decision today.
For the reasons stated, we reverse the orders finding Donrell S., Hal K., and Lance
H. to be subject to continued involuntary admission.
Reversed.
GOLDENHERSH and SPOM ER, JJ., concur.
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NOS. 5-08-0010, 5-08-0327, & 5-08-0553
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT
___________________________________________________________________________________
In re DONRELL S., ) Appeal from the
Alleged to Be a Person Subject to Involuntary ) Circuit Court of
Admission ) Randolph County.
)
(The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner- ) No. 07-MH-288
Appellee, v. Donrell S., Respondent-Appellant). )
____________________________________________ )
)
In re HAL K., )
Alleged to Be a Person Subject to Involuntary )
Admission ) No. 08-MH-31
)
(The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner- )
Appellee, v. Hal K., Respondent-Appellant). )
____________________________________________ )
)
In re LANCE H., )
Alleged to Be a Person Subject to Involuntary ) No. 08-MH-170
Admission )
) Honorable
(The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner- ) William A. Schuwerk, Jr.,
Appellee, v. Lance H., Respondent-Appellant). ) Judge, presiding.
___________________________________________________________________________________
Rule 23 Order Filed: August 4, 2009
Motion to Publish Granted: December 10, 2009
Opinion Filed: December 10, 2009
___________________________________________________________________________________
Justices: Honorable Melissa A. Chapman, J.
Honorable Richard P. Goldenhersh, J., and
Honorable Stephen L. Spomer, J.,
Concur
___________________________________________________________________________________
Attorney Barbara A. Goeben, Staff Attorney, Legal Advocacy Service, Guardianship &
for Advocacy Commission, M etro E. Regional Office, 4500 College Avenue, Suite
Appellants 100, Alton, IL 62002
___________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys Stephen E. Norris, Deputy Director, Kevin D. Sweeney, Staff Attorney, State's
for Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, 730 E. Illinois Highway 15, P.O. Box 2249, M t.
Appellee Vernon, IL 62864; Hon. Randall Rodewald, Randolph County State's Attorney,
Randolph County Courthouse, #1 Taylor Street, Chester, IL 62233
___________________________________________________________________________________