People v. Land

NO. 4-05-0593 Filed 8/9/06
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) County McLean
WILLIAM DUNCAN LAND, ) No. 90CF647
Defendant-Appellant. )
) Honorable
) Ronald C. Dozier,
) Judge Presiding.
_________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the opinion of the court:
In June 2005, defendant, William Duncan Land, an
Illinois Department of Corrections inmate, filed a petition to
vacate judgment under section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Proce-
dure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2004)) and for habeas corpus
relief. Later that month, the trial court sua sponte dismissed
defendant's petition, upon determining that (1) defendant's
sentence is not void and (2) defendant's claims had previously
been rejected on direct appeal and in petitions for postconvic-
tion relief.
Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court lacked
the authority to summarily dismiss his habeas corpus petition and
section 2-1401 petition. We disagree and affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In July 1991, a jury convicted defendant of three
counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault (Ill. Rev. Stat.
1989, ch. 38, par. 12-14(b)(1)), for incidents involving his
daughter, C.L., who was then seven years old. The trial court
later sentenced him to 20 years in prison on each count, with
those sentences to be served consecutively. In March 1993, this
court affirmed defendant's convictions. People v. Land, 241 Ill.
App. 3d 1066, 609 N.E.2d 1010 (1993).
In April 1994, defendant pro se filed a petition for
relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1
through 122-8 (West 1992)). The trial court later dismissed
defendant's petition, upon finding it to be frivolous and pa-
tently without merit (725 ILCS 5/122-2.1 (West 1994)), and in
March 1996, this court affirmed the dismissal (People v. Land,
No. 4-94-0980 (March 28, 1996) (unpublished order under Supreme
Court Rule 23)).
In February 1998, defendant pro se filed a second
postconviction petition. In that petition, defendant claimed
that his sentence is void because the trial court erroneously
imposed consecutive sentences under the belief that it was
required to do so under section 5-8-4(a) of the Unified Code of
Corrections (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 1005-8-4(a) (now
730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(a) (West 1996))). The trial court (1) found
that defendant had forfeited this claim by failing to raise it
either on direct appeal or in his first postconviction petition
and (2) dismissed defendant's petition as frivolous and patently
without merit (725 ILCS 5/122-2.1 (West 1996)). Defendant
appealed, and this court affirmed the dismissal, upon concluding
that defendant's sentence was not void. People v. Land, 304 Ill.
App. 3d 169, 173-74, 710 N.E.2d 471, 473-74 (1999).
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In June 2005, defendant filed his petition for relief
from judgment and habeas corpus relief. In the petition, defen-
dant argued that (1) his sentence is void, (2) this court's 1999
decision was erroneous, and (3) he is entitled to immediate
release from prison (based on what he claims his sentence should
have been, minus the good-time credit he accrued).
Later in June 2005, the trial court entered a written
order sua sponte dismissing defendant's petition. Specifically,
the court noted, in pertinent part, that (1) defendant's sentence
is not void because it falls within the permissible statutory
range and (2) defendant had the opportunity to raise this issue
on direct appeal and in two previous postconviction petitions.
This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
Defendant urges this court to (1) reconsider its prior
holdings that trial courts have the authority to sua sponte
dismiss meritless section 2-1401 petitions and (2) decline to
follow the Fifth District's decision in People v. Tiller, 361
Ill. App. 3d 803, 805-06, 838 N.E.2d 969, 971-72 (2005), holding
that trial courts may sua sponte dismiss meritless habeas corpus
petitions. We adhere to our prior holdings and agree with the
Fifth District.
In Mason v. Snyder, 332 Ill. App. 3d 834, 842, 774
N.E.2d 457, 464 (2002), this court held that a trial court has
the authority to sua sponte dismiss a mandamus petition, upon
finding it to be frivolous and patently without merit. In People
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v. Bramlett, 347 Ill. App. 3d 468, 472-73, 806 N.E.2d 1251, 1254-
55 (2004), we held that trial courts also have authority to
summarily dismiss frivolous section 2-1401 petitions, based on
the same rationale. In People v. Ryburn, 362 Ill. App. 3d 870,
876, 841 N.E.2d 1013, 1017-18 (2005), we were asked to reconsider
our holding in Bramlett, and we declined to alter our position.
In Tiller, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 806, 838 N.E.2d at 972,
the Fifth District held that trial courts have authority to sua
sponte dismiss meritless habeas corpus petitions. In so holding,
the Fifth District noted that, like mandamus cases, habeas corpus
relief is a very limited and specific form of relief. The court
upheld sua sponte dismissal where the defendant's petition for
habeas corpus relief challenged the nature of his sentences and
failed to raise any claim that he was otherwise entitled to be
discharged from prison. Tiller, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 806, 838
N.E.2d at 972.
We acknowledge that the Second and Third Districts, as
well as some divisions of the First District, have disagreed with
these holdings. Our sister districts in disagreement have cited
the following as their primary rationale: (1) concern for the
petitioner's right to amend his pleading and (2) that it is up to
the legislature to provide trial courts with such authority. See
People v. Coleman, 358 Ill. App. 3d 1063, 1069-70, 835 N.E.2d
387, 392-93 (2005); People v. Winfrey, 347 Ill. App. 3d 987, 989-
90, 808 N.E.2d 589, 591-92 (2004). We are not persuaded that by
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recognizing the trial court's inherent authority to sua sponte
dismiss patently frivolous mandamus, habeas corpus, and section
2-1401 petitions, we interfere with either the rights of peti-
tioners or the legislature.
By holding that trial courts have the inherent author-
ity to sua sponte dismiss meritless mandamus, habeas corpus, and
section 2-1401 petitions, we in no way suggest that trial courts
should cease to exercise their discretion in granting petitioners
leave to amend their petitions. Instead, we simply acknowledge
(1) the trial court's capacity to recognize a frivolous filing
and (2) its authority to dispose of such a petition without
further expending judicial resources. In Owens v. Snyder, 349
Ill. App. 3d 35, 45, 811 N.E.2d 738, 747 (2004), the First
District recognized that when a petition is completely devoid of
merit, no reason exists to require the trial court to do more.
In addressing a petitioner's meritless mandamus petition, Justice
Wolfson wrote as follows:
"There was nothing plaintiff could do to make
it any better. He simply was off the track
and could not get back on. We do not believe
the legislature intended to require judges
and clerks to jump through useless hoops
aimed toward impossible goals. *** This
judge apparently saw the plaintiff's com-
plaint for what it was--a totally deficient
claim for mandamus relief." Owens, 349 Ill.
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App. 3d at 45, 811 N.E.2d at 747.
Presiding Justice O'Malley picked up on this theme in her special
concurrence in People v. Anderson, 352 Ill. App. 3d 934, 952, 817
N.E.2d 1000, 1015 (2004) (O'Malley, P.J., specially concurring),
when she wrote: "If the appellate court, based on a cold record
and absent input from defendant, could clearly see and appreciate
the fatal flaws in defendant's petition, I fail to see why the
circuit court should not be trusted to do the same."
We recognize and agree that trial courts should not sua
sponte dismiss a mandamus, habeas corpus, or section 2-1401
petition merely because a flaw exists in the pleadings. We
further do not suggest that courts should exercise their author-
ity to sua sponte dismiss patently frivolous petitions lightly.
Thus, we initially admonished trial courts in Mason to clearly
set forth their analysis regarding the deficiencies of a mandamus
petition. Mason, 332 Ill. App. 3d at 843, 774 N.E.2d at 464.
The First District echoed these concerns in Owens, when it wrote
as follows:
"We hold a trial judge has the inherent
authority to dismiss a patently frivolous
mandamus complaint before service on the
defendant is issued. But we urge trial
judges to use this power with caution, espe-
cially in cases related to criminal proceed-
ings. We also suggest trial judges give
reasons for early dismissals, for the benefit
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of the losing litigant and for those called
on to review trial court orders." Owens, 349
Ill. App. 3d at 45, 811 N.E.2d at 747.
The holdings of the Second and Third Districts suggest
that the hands of the trial courts are tied until the legislature
provides a mechanism for disposing of patently frivolous manda-
mus, habeas corpus, and section 2-1401 petitions. While we would
welcome statutory provisions that explicitly provide for the
prompt dismissal of such petitions, we fail to see why the
resources of the courts and the named respondents should be
expended when a petition is hopelessly flawed and the trial court
knows it. Allowing a case to proceed when everyone involved
knows what the ultimate result will be elevates form over sub-
stance and does so to the detriment of everyone involved--except
for the petitioner, who in many cases is the only participant in
this process with an unlimited amount of time on his hands.
We note that section 3-6-3(d) of the Unified Code of
Corrections (730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(d) (West 2004)) provides for
revocation of an inmate's good-time credit as a penalty for the
filing of frivolous lawsuits. Although a "lawsuit" under section
3-6-3(d) includes a postconviction petition and a habeas corpus
petition, section 2-1401 petitions are not currently included.
There thus does not exist any statutory deterrent for the filing
of frivolous section 2-1401 petitions by an inmate. If the trial
court lacks the inherent authority to dismiss patently frivolous
section 2-1401 petitions, there is nothing to stop a vexatious
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inmate--or some 40,000 of them--from filing multiple section 2-
1401 petitions. In our view, the courts and the respondents
should not be required to expend their limited resources respond-
ing to such petitions because the legislature has not expressly
provided a mechanism for disposing of them.
In sum, we (1) adhere to our prior holdings in Mason,
Bramlett, and Ryburn; (2) hold that the trial court had the
inherent authority to sua sponte dismiss defendant's patently
frivolous habeas corpus petition; and (3) conclude that the court
did not err by dismissing defendant's combination habeas corpus-
section 2-1401 petition.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's
judgment.
Affirmed.
McCULLOUGH and KNECHT, JJ., concur.
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