People v. King

NO. 4-05-0401 Filed: 7/14/06
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) Macon County
ALPHONZO KING, JR., ) No. 04CF1116
Defendant-Appellee. )
) Honorable
) Theodore E. Paine,
) Judge Presiding.
______________________________________________________________
PRESIDING JUSTICE TURNER delivered the opinion of the
court:
On September 15, 2004, the police made a warrantless
arrest of defendant, Alphonzo King, Jr., and thereafter, the
Illinois Department of Corrections (DOC) issued a parole-hold
warrant for defendant. The next day, the State charged defendant
with two counts of unlawful possession of a controlled substance
with the intent to deliver (720 ILCS 570/401(a)(2)(D), (c)(2)
(West 2004)) and two counts of unlawful possession of a con-
trolled substance (720 ILCS 570/402(a)(2)(D), (c) (West 2004)).
The trial court set defendant's bail at $100,000, but defendant
did not post bond. On March 29, 2005, the court entered a
recognizance bond for defendant. However, defendant remained in
jail on the parole-hold warrant. On April 21, 2005, defendant
filed a motion to dismiss the charges based on a violation of the
speedy-trial act (725 ILCS 5/103-5 (West 2004)). After a hear-
ing, the court granted defendant's motion and dismissed the
charges.
The State appeals, arguing the trial court should not
have dismissed the charges because (1) the intrastate detainers
statute (730 ILCS 5/3-8-10 (West 2004)) applied to defendant
because he was being held on a parole-hold warrant; and (2) if
the intrastate detainers statute did not apply when he first made
his speedy-trial demand, it applied when the court released him
on a recognizance bond on the pending charges; and (3) defen-
dant's release on the recognizance bond before the 120-day term
had expired restarted the speedy-trial term at zero. We reverse
and remand.
I. BACKGROUND
On September 15, 2004, the police arrested defendant
after executing a search warrant for an apartment and finding
some cocaine weighing between one and five grams near defendant.
The police discovered 50 additional grams of crack cocaine and
more than 900 grams of powder cocaine in other areas of the
apartment.
On September 16, 2004, the State charged defendant as
stated, and the trial court set bail at $100,000. A pretrial
bond report filed that same day indicated DOC had issued a
parole-hold warrant. DOC had released defendant on parole on
December 3, 2003, and was to discharge him on January 10, 2005.
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Defendant did not post bond.
On December 27, 2004, February 10, 2005, and March 29,
2005, the State made requests for a continuance, and defendant
objected and made a trial demand. Also, on March 29, 2005, the
trial court released defendant on a recognizance bond, but he
remained in jail on the parole-hold warrant.
On April 21, 2005, defendant filed a motion to dismiss
the charges because of a speedy-trial violation. The next day,
the trial court held a hearing on defendant's motion. On April
25, 2005, the court entered a docket entry allowing defendant's
motion and making the following findings: (1) defendant had been
in custody since September 15, 2004, for a total of 220 days as
of April 22, 2005; (2) on March 29, 2005, the court authorized
defendant's release on recognizance; (3) defendant was not
released from custody on that date because DOC had issued a
parole-hold warrant as a result of the charges in this case; (4)
continuances from October 12, 2004, to December 27, 2004, and
March 21, 2005, to March 28, 2005, were attributable to defendant
for a total of 83 days; and (5) defendant was entitled to dis-
charge based on People v. Burchfield, 62 Ill. App. 3d 754, 379
N.E.2d 375 (1978), which was approved in People v. Hillsman, 329
Ill. App. 3d 1110, 769 N.E.2d 1100 (2002). This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
Generally, a reviewing court considers a trial court's
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ultimate ruling on a motion to dismiss charges under an abuse-of-
discretion standard, but where the issues present purely legal
questions, the standard of review is de novo. See People v.
Brener, 357 Ill. App. 3d 868, 870, 830 N.E.2d 692, 693-94 (2005).
Here, the State only raises legal questions, and thus we review
the issues de novo.
A. Intrastate Detainers Statute
The State first asserts the intrastate detainers
statute (730 ILCS 5/3-8-10 (West 2004)) was the controlling
speedy-trial provision, not subsection (a) of the speedy-trial
act (725 ILCS 5/103-5(a) (West 2004)).
As recently noted by our supreme court, the Illinois
legislature has enacted three principal speedy-trial statutes.
See People v. Wooddell, 219 Ill. 2d 166, 174, 847 N.E.2d 117, 122
(2006). First, subsection (a) of the speedy-trial act (725 ILCS
5/103-5(a) (West 2004)) provides an automatic 120-day
speedy-trial right for persons held in custody on the pending
charge and does not require such persons to file a demand to
exercise that right. However, delay caused by the defendant is
excluded from the 120-day period, and delay is considered agreed
to by defendant unless he or she objects to the delay by making
an oral or written demand for trial. 725 ILCS 5/103-5(a) (West
2004). Second, subsection (b) of the speedy-trial act (725 ILCS
5/103-5(b) (West 2004)) contains a 160-day speedy-trial right for
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persons released on bond or recognizance, and this period begins
to run only when the accused files a written speedy-trial demand.
Third, the intrastate detainers statute (730 ILCS 5/3-8-10 (West
2004)) applies the speedy-trial right contained in subsection (b)
of the speedy-trial act (725 ILCS 5/103-5(b) (West 2004)) to
persons committed to DOC who have charges pending. Our supreme
court has indicated a defendant is subject to the speedy-trial
statute that applies when he or she makes the speedy-trial
demand. Wooddell, 219 Ill. 2d at 179, 847 N.E.2d at 124.
Here, the State asserts the intrastate detainers
statute applied when defendant made his demand and was the
controlling speedy-trial statute. At the time of defendant's
December 27, 2004, oral trial demand, defendant was in jail on
the pending charges in this case and DOC's parole-hold warrant
based on the pending criminal charges. The cases upon which the
trial court relied, Burchfield, 62 Ill. App. 3d 754, 379 N.E.2d
375, and Hillsman, 329 Ill. App. 3d 1110, 769 N.E.2d 1100, do not
address the applicability of the intrastate detainers statute.
Thus, we address whether the intrastate detainers statute applies
to a defendant in jail on a DOC parole-hold warrant based on
pending charges for which he is also in jail. This issue pres-
ents a question of statutory interpretation.
Statutory construction's fundamental rule requires
courts to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent.
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Thus, courts must consider the statute in its entirety, keeping
in mind the subject it addresses and the legislature's apparent
objective in enacting it. Wooddell, 219 Ill. 2d at 170, 847
N.E.2d at 120. The statutory language provides the best indica-
tion of legislative intent, and therefore, courts give the
language its plain and ordinary meaning. Wooddell, 219 Ill. 2d
at 170-71, 847 N.E.2d at 120. When the statute's language is
clear and unambiguous, a court must apply the statute without
resort to further statutory-construction aids. Wooddell, 219
Ill. 2d at 171, 847 N.E.2d at 120.
The intrastate detainers statute provides as follows:
"Except for persons sentenced to death,
subsection[s] (b), (c)[,] and (e) of
[s]ection 103-5 of the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure of 1963 [(725 ILCS 5/103-5(b), (c),
(e) (West 2004))] shall also apply to persons
committed to any institution or facility or
program of the Illinois [DOC] who have un-
tried complaints, charges[,] or indictments
pending in any county of this [s]tate, and
such person shall include in the demand under
subsection (b), a statement of the place of
present commitment, the term, and length of
the remaining term, the charges pending
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against him or her to be tried and the county
of the charges, and the demand shall be ad-
dressed to the [S]tate's [A]ttorney of the
county where he or she is charged with a copy
to the clerk of that court and a copy to the
chief administrative officer of the [DOC]
institution or facility to which he or she is
committed. The [S]tate's [A]ttorney shall
then procure the presence of the defendant
for trial in his county by habeas corpus.
Additional time may be granted by the court
for the process of bringing and serving an
order of habeas corpus ad prosequendum. In
the event that the person is not brought to
trial within the allotted time, then the
charge for which he or she has requested a
speedy trial shall be dismissed." 730 ILCS
5/3-8-10 (West 2004).
Thus, in determining whether the intrastate detainers statute
applies to a defendant, the only question is whether the defen-
dant was "committed to [an] institution or facility or program of
the Illinois [DOC]" when the defendant made the trial demand.
730 ILCS 5/3-8-10 (West 2004); see also Wooddell, 219 Ill. 2d at
179, 847 N.E.2d at 124.
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Section 3-1-2(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections
(Unified Code) (730 ILCS 5/3-1-2(b) (West 2004)) defines
"'[c]ommitment'" as "a judicially determined placement in the
custody of [DOC] on the basis of delinquency or conviction."
Under section 3-14-2(a) of the Unified Code (730 ILCS 5/3-14-2(a)
(West 2004)), DOC retains custody of all persons placed on parole
or mandatory supervised release. Further, section 3-1-2(g) of
the Unified Code states "'[d]ischarge'" is "the final termination
of a commitment to the [DOC]." 730 ILCS 5/3-1-2(g) (West 2004).
"'Discharge' does not include release on *** mandatory release
or parole release." 730 Ill. Ann. Stat. 5/3-1-2(g), Council
Commentary-1973, at 11 (Smith-Hurd 1997). In this case,
defendant was in the county jail on a parole-hold warrant for
violating his mandatory supervised release when he made his first
oral trial demand. Thus, based on the plain language of the
statute, we conclude defendant was committed to DOC at the time
of his speedy-trial demand.
However, the intrastate detainers statute states the
person must be committed to an "institution or facility or
program" of DOC. 730 ILCS 5/3-8-10 (West 2004). The State
contends that in this case, the Macon County jail was such an
institution or facility. In support of its argument, the State
cites People v. Davis, 92 Ill. App. 3d 869, 873, 416 N.E.2d 85,
87 (1981), where the Second District found the intrastate
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detainers statute applied to a person incarcerated in a county
correctional facility. There, the circuit court had committed
the defendant to 364 days' in DOC, but she served the term in a
county facility. Davis, 92 Ill. App. 3d at 870-71, 416 N.E.2d at
85-86. In reaching its conclusion, the court noted DOC was
authorized to assign persons committed to it for service of
sentence (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, pars. 1003-1-2(b),
(c), 1003-2-2), and the defendant did not assert she was not so
assigned to the county facility. Davis, 92 Ill. App. 3d at 873,
416 N.E.2d at 87.
Here, defendant does not argue we should not follow
Davis in this case where he remained in county jail on his
parole-hold warrant. As the defendant in Davis, defendant was
committed to DOC, and DOC had the authority to assign him to an
institution (see 730 ILCS 5/3-2-2(b) (West 2004)). On a motion
to dismiss based on a speedy-trial violation, the defendant bears
the burden of proof. People v. Childress, 321 Ill. App. 3d 13,
20, 746 N.E.2d 783, 790 (2001). As in Davis, defendant did not
present any evidence that his remaining in county jail was not
the result of a DOC assignment.
Additionally, section 3-1-2(d) of the Unified Code (730
ILCS 5/3-1-2(d) (West 2004)) defines "'[c]orrectional
[i]nstitution or [f]acility'" as "any building or part of a
building where committed persons are kept in a secured manner."
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A "'[c]ommitted [p]erson'" is "a person committed to the [DOC]."
730 ILCS 5/3-1-2(c) (West 2004). Here, defendant was a person
committed to DOC and kept in a secured manner.
Accordingly, we conclude that, since DOC essentially
had authority over defendant no matter where he was held, the
county jail was the equivalent of a DOC institution or facility
under these circumstances. Thus, the intrastate detainers
statute was the applicable speedy-trial provision.
The intrastate detainers statute applies subsection (b)
of the speedy-trial act (725 ILCS 5/103-5(b) (West 2004)), which
requires a written trial demand. Since defendant's December 2004
oral trial demand did not comply with the intrastate detainers
statute, no speedy-trial violation occurred.
Defendant insists we must follow the Third District's
Burchfield and our Hillsman. However, in Hillsman, we expressly
declined to analyze the State's intrastate-detainers-statute
argument because the State failed to raise it in the trial court.
Hillsman, 329 Ill. App. 3d at 1113-14, 769 N.E.2d at 1103.
Moreover, the Burchfield court also never addressed the applica-
bility of the intrastate detainers statute, and the Third Dis-
trict declined to follow it in People v. Lykes, 124 Ill. App. 3d
604, 607, 464 N.E.2d 849, 852 (1984), for that very reason.
We note our decision follows Lykes, where the Third
District found the intrastate detainers statute was the appropri-
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ate speedy-trial provision. Lykes, 124 Ill. App. 3d at 607-08,
464 N.E.2d at 852-53. In that case, the defendant had been
arrested and held in county jail for seven days. Lykes, 124 Ill.
App. 3d at 605, 464 N.E.2d at 850. DOC then transferred the
defendant because of a supervised-release violation based on the
pending criminal charges. Lykes, 124 Ill. App. 3d at 605, 464
N.E.2d at 850. The defendant made his speedy-trial demand after
his transfer, and the violation charge was not adjudicated until
after he was convicted on the criminal charges. Lykes, 124 Ill.
App. 3d at 605, 464 N.E.2d at 850-51. The Lykes court found that
upon his transfer to DOC, the defendant was a person committed to
DOC with charges pending against him. Lykes, 124 Ill. App. 3d at
608, 464 N.E.2d at 853. To treat defendants charged with parole
violations that DOC has assigned to a county jail facility
different than those assigned to a state penitentiary would yield
an absurd result. See Chatham Foot Specialists, P.C. v. Health
Care Service Corp., 216 Ill. 2d 366, 396, 837 N.E.2d 48, 66
(2005) (stating courts do "not interpret a statute so as to
achieve an absurd result"). Defendants housed in either location
do not endure a loss of liberty while awaiting trial on the
criminal charges due to the mandatory-supervised-release viola-
tions. See Wooddell, 219 Ill. 2d at 174, 847 N.E.2d at 122
(explaining the reasons behind the demand requirement and 160-day
speedy-trial period of the intrastate detainers statute).
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Since we have found the intrastate detainers statute
applied when defendant first made his trial demand, we need not
address the State's other arguments.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reason stated, we reverse the trial court's
dismissal of defendant's charges and remand for further proceed-
ings.
Reversed and remanded.
MYERSCOUGH and KNECHT, JJ., concur.
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