People v. Howard

ILLINOIS OFFICIAL REPORTS
Appellate Court
People v. Howard, 2012 IL App (3d) 100925Appellate Court THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
Caption EVERETT L. HOWARD, Defendant-Appellant.
District & No. Third District
Docket No. 3-10-0925
Filed May 29, 2012
Held Defendant’s conviction for aggravated domestic battery was reduced to
(Note: This syllabus aggravated battery due to the State’s failure to establish that defendant
constitutes no part of and the victim were involved in a dating relationship.
the opinion of the court
but has been prepared
by the Reporter of
Decisions for the
convenience of the
reader.)
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Knox County, No. 09-CF-393; the Hon.
Review Stephen C. Mathers, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Affirmed as modified.
Counsel on Gabrielle Green, of State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Ottawa, for
Appeal appellant.
John T. Pepmeyer, State’s Attorney, of Galesburg (Terry A. Mertel and
Nadia L. Chaudhry, both of State’s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s
Office, of counsel), for the People.
Panel JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE delivered the judgment of the court, with
opinion.
Justice O’Brien concurred in the judgment and opinion.
Presiding Justice Schmidt dissented, with opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Defendant, Everett L. Howard, was convicted of aggravated domestic battery (720 ILCS
5/12-3.3(a) (West 2008)), a Class 2 felony, and sentenced to 30 months’ probation and 60
days in jail. He appeals his conviction, arguing that the evidence failed to establish that he
was in a dating relationship with the victim and, therefore, his conviction should be reduced
to aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12-4(a) (West 2008)), a Class 3 felony. We agree and
reduce defendant’s conviction from aggravated domestic battery to aggravated battery.
¶2 FACTS
¶3 Defendant was charged with aggravated domestic battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3.3(a) (West
2008)), unlawful restraint (720 ILCS 5/10-3(a) (West 2008)), and domestic battery (720
ILCS 5/12-3.2(a)(1) (West 2008)). The cause proceeded to a bench trial.
¶4 At trial, the victim testified that on the night of the incident she met up with defendant
and other friends at a local bar. While there, she agreed to meet defendant at his residence
after they left the bar separately. At defendant’s house, the victim and defendant had a couple
beers and then engaged in sexual intercourse. When they were finished, defendant went to
the bathroom, and when he returned to the bedroom, he was angry. He grabbed the victim
by the hair and pulled her off the bed. After a failed attempt to defend herself, defendant got
on top of the victim and struck her numerous times with a closed fist.
¶5 Both the victim and defendant testified regarding the status of their relationship. When
asked if they were in a dating relationship, both stated that they were not; however, they had
had around 15 sexual encounters beginning approximately a year and a half before the
incident. The victim stated that their relationship was strictly sexual in nature. Defendant
considered the relationship to be a series of “one-night stands” and stated that he had never
bought the victim flowers. The two had never spent an entire night together and did not
spend much time in each other’s company outside the presence of their group of friends.
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¶6 The trial court found defendant guilty of aggravated domestic battery after concluding
that he and the victim were in a dating relationship. Defendant was sentenced to 30 months’
probation and 60 days’ incarceration. Defendant appeals.
¶7 ANALYSIS
¶8 Defendant argues that the evidence at trial failed to establish that he was in a dating
relationship with the victim. When presented with a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence, it is not the function of this court to retry defendant; rather, the relevant question
is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237 (1985). A conviction will only be overturned where
the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory as to justify a reasonable doubt
of defendant’s guilt. People v. Smith, 185 Ill. 2d 532 (1999).
¶9 In order to be convicted of domestic battery, the State must prove that the accused and
the victim were family or household members. 720 ILCS 5/12-3.2(a)(1) (West 2008). Family
or household members include persons who have or have had a dating or engagement
relationship. 725 ILCS 5/112A-3(3) (West 2008). Here, the State attempted to prove that
defendant and the victim had a dating relationship.
¶ 10 At trial, evidence established that defendant and the victim had numerous sexual
encounters; however, it is not enough to show that defendant and the victim had an intimate
relationship. The State must show that they had a dating relationship. People v. Young, 362
Ill. App. 3d 843 (2005). The Second District has defined a dating relationship to mean
serious courtship, which must be, at a minimum, an established relationship with a
significant romantic focus. Id. While defendant and the victim clearly had an established
relationship, we do not find that their relationship had a romantic focus. Both defendant and
the victim testified that they were not dating and defendant stated that he never bought the
victim flowers. Defendant and the victim were not exclusive, and the relationship did not
contain any sort of shared expectation of growth. Rather, defendant and the victim engaged
in random sexual encounters which were physical in nature, not romantic.
¶ 11 Based on the evidence, we find that the State did not establish a dating relationship and
defendant cannot be convicted of the Class 2 felony of aggravated domestic battery. Thus,
we reduce defendant’s conviction to the Class 3 felony of aggravated battery. While we
reduce defendant’s conviction, we believe that the sentence imposed by the trial court is
appropriate for the Class 3 felony of aggravated battery. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 615(b); 730 ILCS
5/5-4.5-40(d) (West 2008). Therefore, we allow defendant’s sentence to stand.
¶ 12 CONCLUSION
¶ 13 The judgment of the circuit court of Knox County is affirmed as modified.
¶ 14 Affirmed as modified.
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¶ 15 PRESIDING JUSTICE SCHMIDT, dissenting:
¶ 16 The issue before us, as the majority concedes (supra ¶ 9), is whether after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have
found that the defendant and his victim have or have had a dating relationship. People v.
Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237 (1985); 725 ILCS 5/112A-3(3) (West 2008).
¶ 17 The victim testified that sometime after meeting defendant through friends, her
relationship with him evolved into more than just friends, although she testified she was “not
really” dating defendant. Nonetheless, there is evidence that defendant and his victim “hung
out” together, drank together, played pool together, talked on the phone and spent time at
each other’s homes. They had sexual relations approximately 15 times, including the night
of the incident. This relationship was not the “intimate friendship and intimate working
relationship” referred to in People v. Young, 362 Ill. App. 3d 843, 851 (2005).
¶ 18 I am troubled by the majority’s apparent requirement that a dating relationship for
purposes of section 112A-3(3) (725 ILCS 5/112A-3(3) (West 2008)) must include a “shared
expectation of growth.” (Emphasis added.) Supra ¶ 10. I do not want to even guess what
percentage of domestic relationships that requirement would exclude from coverage. It would
seem that very often in a relationship expectations of growth are not mutual. Also, the
majority finds it significant that defendant never sent flowers to the victim. Supra ¶ 10. Well,
there goes at least another 80% of the relationships! Under the statute, the victim and the
accused must simply have or have had a dating relationship. Because I believe reasonable
people could find, based on the evidence presented, that this is or was a dating relationship
regardless of what the participants called it, a rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. With all due respect, I submit that
the majority has improperly engaged in a reweighing of the evidence.
¶ 19 I would affirm the trial court. Therefore, I respectfully dissent
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