People v. Kerns

ILLINOIS OFFICIAL REPORTS
Appellate Court
People v. Kerns, 2012 IL App (3d) 100375
Appellate Court THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
Caption JONATHAN KERNS, Defendant-Appellant.
District & No. Third District
Docket No. 3-10-0375
Filed February 29, 2012
Held The two-year term of mandatory supervised release imposed by the trial
(Note: This syllabus court following defendant’s conviction for criminal sexual assault was
constitutes no part of not authorized, where it was not within the range of a minimum of three
the opinion of the court years to a maximum of defendant’s natural life as dictated by section 5-8-
but has been prepared 1(d)(4) of the Unified Code of Corrections, and the term of “3 years to
by the Reporter of Life–To Be Determined” listed in Department of Corrections records was
Decisions for the void on the ground that it is the trial court’s duty to sentence defendant
convenience of the to a term of MSR within the statutory guidelines; therefore, the term of
reader.)
MSR imposed by the trial court was vacated and the cause was remanded
to the trial court with directions to impose an indeterminate MSR term of
three years to natural life.
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Peoria County, No. 09-CF-726; the
Review Hon. Glenn H. Collier, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Affirmed in part and vacated in part; cause remanded with directions.
Counsel on Peter A. Carusona, of State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Ottawa, and
Appeal Carrie B. Stevens, of Law Offices of Catherine Burkey, of Grand
Junction, Colorado, for appellant.
Jerry Brady, State’s Attorney, of Peoria (Terry A. Mertel and Richard T.
Leonard, both of State’s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of
counsel), for the People.
Panel JUSTICE LYTTON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Presiding Justice Schmidt and Justice Carter concurred in the judgment
and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Defendant Jonathan Kerns was convicted of criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12-
13(a)(1) (West 2008)) and sentenced to seven years in prison. On appeal, he argues that (1)
his indeterminate term of mandatory supervised release (MSR) imposed by the Department
of Corrections (DOC) is void, and (2) the cause should be remanded with directions to the
trial court to impose a specific term of MSR pursuant to section 5-8-1(d)(4) of the Unified
Code of Corrections (Code) (730 ILCS 5/1-1-1 et seq. (West 2008)). We vacate and remand
with directions.
¶2 In February 2010, a jury convicted defendant of criminal sexual assault. The trial court’s
sentencing judgment reflected defendant’s sentence of seven years and imposed a two-year
term of MSR. After sentencing, the DOC’s inmate records listed defendant’s MSR term as
“3 Yrs to Life–To Be Determined.”
¶3 ANALYSIS
¶4 Defendant claims that the DOC lacked the authority to impose an indeterminate term of
MSR of three years to life when the trial court sentenced him to two years of MSR.
¶5 The imposition of MSR is statutorily required. See 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(d) (West 2008).
When construing the meaning of a statute, the primary objective of this court is to ascertain
and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Southern Illinoisan v. Illinois Department of
Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390 (2006). That intent is best determined by examining the
language of the statute itself; where the language is clear and unambiguous it must be given
effect. Orlak v. Loyola University Health System, 228 Ill. 2d 1 (2007). A statute should be
read as a whole and construed so as to give effect to every word, clause and sentence. People
ex rel. Department of Corrections v. Hawkins, 2011 IL 110792. It should not be read so as
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to render any part superfluous or meaningless. Hawkins, 2011 IL 110792, ¶ 23. Statutory
construction is a question of law that we review de novo. People v. Alcozer, 241 Ill. 2d 248
(2011).
¶6 Under the Code, a sentence is defined as the “disposition imposed by the court on a
convicted defendant.” 730 ILCS 5/5-1-19 (West 2008). The pronouncement of a sentence is
the judicial act that conforms to the judgment of the court. People v. Allen, 71 Ill. 2d 378
(1978). A sentence imposed by the court in a criminal case must be authorized by law.
People v. Majer, 131 Ill. App. 3d 80 (1985). The dispositions available to courts include
probation, conditional discharge and a term of imprisonment. 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3 (West 2008).
¶7 Section 5-8-1(d) of the Code states that “every sentence shall include as though written
therein a term [of MSR] in addition to the term of imprisonment.” 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(d)
(West 2008); see also People v. Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d 177 (2005) (MSR is part of a
defendant’s sentence). The MSR term for the offense of criminal sexual assault “shall range
from a minimum of 3 years to a maximum of the natural life of the defendant.” 730 ILCS
5/5-8-1(d)(4) (West 2008).
¶8 The Code also provides the DOC, through the Prisoner Review Board, the ability to
terminate a term of MSR early. 730 ILCS 5/3-3-8 (West 2008). Article 3 of the Code governs
the Department of Corrections and addresses the powers and duties of the Prisoner Review
Board. 730 ILCS 5/3-1-1 et seq. (West 2008). Under section 3-3-8(b), the Prisoner Review
Board may enter an order releasing a defendant from MSR when it determines “that he is
likely to remain at liberty without committing another offense.” 730 ILCS 5/3-3-8(b) (West
2008). The Prisoner Review Board is also authorized to set conditions for parole and
mandatory supervised release imposed under section 5-8-1(d) of the Code. 730 ILCS 5/3-3-7,
3-14-2.5 (West 2008). However, article 3 contains no language that gives the Board the
power to impose a term of MSR required under section 5-8-1(d).
¶9 I
¶ 10 Appropriate Term of MSR Under Section 5-8-1(d)(4)
¶ 11 Defendant concedes that the two-year term of MSR imposed by the trial court is
unauthorized and that MSR for criminal sexual assault is dictated by section 5-8-1(d)(4).
However, he argues that, by requiring a range of three years to natural life, section 5-8-
1(d)(4) intends that a specific term within that range will be imposed.
¶ 12 “Except as otherwise provided in the statute defining the offense ***, a sentence of
imprisonment for a felony shall be a determinate sentence set by the court under this Section
***.” 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a) (West 2008). The legislature created an exception for the sex
offenses listed in section 5-8-1(d)(4). The MSR term for those offenses, including criminal
sexual assault, ranges from a minimum of three years to a maximum of the length of
defendant’s natural life. See 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(d)(4) (West 2008). Every other period of
MSR in section 5-8-1(d) is set at a specific number of years. See 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(d) (West
2008).
¶ 13 In People v. Rinehart, 2012 IL 111719, the supreme court considered the issue of whether
section 5-8-1(d)(4) requires the trial court to set a determinate MSR term within the statutory
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range. The court read the statute in conjunction with other provisions of the Code and
determined that section 5-8-1(d)(4) “contemplate[d] indeterminate MSR terms, not
determinate terms.” Rinehart, 2012 IL 111719, ¶ 30.
¶ 14 II
¶ 15 Authority to Impose MSR
¶ 16 Defendant requests that we remand the cause with directions that the trial court sentence
him to the appropriate term of MSR. He maintains that, under the plain language of the
sentencing statute, the power to impose an MSR term is exclusively the function of the trial
court. We agree.
¶ 17 Although Rinehart does not speak directly to this issue, the law is clear that the trial court
possesses the exclusive authority to sentence a defendant. The grant of authority to impose
MSR is located within the section of the Code addressing the sentencing power of the trial
court. See 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1 (West 2008). Thus, the structure of the statute demonstrates that
the legislature intended to give the trial court sole authority to impose a term of MSR as part
of a defendant’s sentence. See 730 ILCS 5/5-1-19 (West 2008).
¶ 18 In this case, the DOC imposed a term of MSR under section 5-8-1(d)(4) of the Code. 730
ILCS 5/5-8-1(d)(4) (West 2008). However, it is the trial court’s duty, not the DOC’s, to
sentence a defendant to a term of MSR within the statutory guidelines. See 730 ILCS 5/5-1-
19 (West 2008). As a result, defendant’s MSR term of three years to natural life, as imposed
by the DOC, is void. See People v. Thompson, 209 Ill. 2d 19 (2004) (a sentence not
authorized by statute is void). We therefore remand the cause to the trial court to impose an
indeterminate MSR term of three years to natural life under section 5-8-1(d)(4).
¶ 19 CONCLUSION
¶ 20 We vacate the term of MSR imposed by the circuit court and remand with instructions
to sentence defendant to an indeterminate term of MSR as provided by section 5-8-1(d)(4)
of the Code and enter a corrected sentencing order. See 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(d)(4) (West 2008).
The judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County is affirmed in part and vacated in part,
and the cause is remanded with directions.
¶ 21 Affirmed in part and vacated in part; cause remanded with directions.
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