Ford v. Walker

NO. 4-06-1060 Filed: 11-5-07
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
BOBBY FORD, ) Appeal from
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) Sangamon County
ROGER E. WALKER, JR.; Administrative ) No. 06MR305
Review Board Person SHERRY BENTON; )
Illinois Prisoner Review Board Chair- )
man NORMAN SUNA; Formal Head Warden )
GUY D. PIERCE; Formal Head Warden )
Designee Unknown "PP"; Adjustment Com- )
mittee Chairperson DAVID A. LINGLE; ) Honorable
and Cochairperson ANABELLE MOTTELER, ) Patrick W. Kelley,
Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge Presiding.
_________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE McCULLOUGH delivered the opinion of the court:
Plaintiff, Bobby Ford, an inmate in the Illinois
Department of Corrections (DOC), filed a complaint against
defendants, Roger E. Walker, Jr. (DOC's Director); Administrative
Review Board (Administrative Board) person Sherry Benton; Illi-
nois Prisoner Review Board (Prisoner Review Board) Chairman
Norman Suna; Formal Head Warden Designee Unknown "PP"; Adjustment
Committee Chairperson David A. Lingle; and Cochairperson Anabelle
Motteler, alleging his due-process rights were violated during
four prison disciplinary proceedings. On November 21, 2006, the
trial court granted defendants' motions to dismiss. Plaintiff
appeals, arguing the court erred by dismissing his complaint.
On June 2, 2006, plaintiff filed a pro se "petition for
mandamus under 42 U.S.C. [section] 1983," alleging his due-
process rights were violated during four prison disciplinary
proceedings that resulted in revocation of good-conduct credits.
He asserted due-process violations occurred at the adjustment-
committee level of proceedings, including (1) insufficient
evidence of his guilt to some of the charged offenses, (2) denial
of his right to call witnesses, (3) denial of the opportunity to
appear at one of his disciplinary hearings, (4) the failure of
prison officials to timely conduct one of his disciplinary
hearings, and (5) the failure of prison officials to conduct one
of the disciplinary hearings at the same prison where the corre-
sponding disciplinary report was issued. Plaintiff also alleged
defendants failed to correct the due-process violations on
review, and DOC's Director, the Prisoner Review Board, and the
Administrative Board failed to provide "factual information" for
their decisions.
Plaintiff requested the trial court hold the manner in
which his good-conduct credits were revoked to be unconstitu-
tional; compel restoration of his good-conduct credits and
expungement of disciplinary reports; order defendants to provide
him with a factual basis for decisions relating to the denial of
his grievances, revocation of his good-conduct credits, and his
prolonged placement in punitive segregation; and order defendants
to adhere to and abide by the rules and laws governing revocation
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of good-conduct credits. Additionally, plaintiff asserted he was
entitled to $100,000 in compensatory and punitive damages from
each defendant and litigation expenses.
Documents attached to plaintiff's complaint showed he
received four disciplinary reports while imprisoned. On Septem-
ber 28, 2005, he received the first disciplinary report at issue.
In connection with that report, the adjustment committee found
plaintiff guilty of insolence and disobeying a direct order. It
recommended revocation of three months of good-conduct credits.
Plaintiff filed a grievance, which was denied upon review by the
Administrative Board. The record does not contain the disciplin-
ary report, the adjustment-committee report, or plaintiff's
grievance; the above information is gleaned from the Administra-
tive Board's report.
On October 7, 2005, plaintiff received the second
disciplinary report, citing him with disobeying a direct order,
intimidation or threats, and insolence. An adjustment-committee
hearing was conducted, during which two of plaintiff's three
witnesses were called. The adjustment-committee report states
the third witness was "not contacted due to being [the] reporting
employee." The adjustment committee found plaintiff guilty of
disobeying a direct order and insolence and recommended revoca-
tion of one month of plaintiff's good-conduct credits. Plaintiff
filed a grievance but the Administrative Board denied it.
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On October 28, 2005, plaintiff was issued a third
disciplinary report, citing him with assault. The adjustment
committee report shows a hearing was conducted and three of
plaintiff's four witnesses were called. The fourth witness was
not called because his testimony was deemed to be cumulative.
Following the hearing, the adjustment committee found plaintiff
guilty of assault and recommended revocation of six months of his
good-conduct credits. Plaintiff filed a grievance, which the
Administrative Board denied . On January 17, 2006, the Prisoner
Review Board adjusted the loss of good-conduct credits to three
months.
On January 16, 2006, plaintiff received the fourth
disciplinary report at issue, citing him with assault, fighting,
and threats or intimidation. The adjustment-committee report
shows a hearing was conducted, but plaintiff requested no wit-
nesses and refused to appear. The adjustment committee found
plaintiff guilty of all three cited offenses and recommended
revocation of one year's good-conduct credits. The record shows
plaintiff filed a grievance but does not contain a final decision
by the Administrative Board.
Defendants filed motions to dismiss plaintiff's peti-
tion pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure
(735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2004)), alleging he failed to state a
cause of action for mandamus relief. On November 21, 2006, the
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trial court granted defendants' motions.
This appeal followed.
Initially, defendants contend plaintiff failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies in connection with his first,
second, and fourth disciplinary reports. Specifically, they note
plaintiff failed to attach the following documents to his com-
plaint: (1) an adjustment-committee report for his first disci-
plinary hearing, (2) grievances he filed in connection with his
first, second, and fourth disciplinary reports, and (3) the
Administrative Board's decision in connection with his fourth
disciplinary report.
A party aggrieved by an administrative decision cannot
seek judicial review unless he has first pursued all available
administrative remedies. Johnson v. Department of Corrections,
368 Ill. App. 3d 147, 150, 857 N.E.2d 282, 285 (2006). The
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies applies to
grievances filed by inmates. Johnson, 368 Ill. App. 3d at 150,
857 N.E.2d at 285.
Contrary to defendants' contentions, the documents
plaintiff attached to his complaint were sufficient to show he
exhausted administrative remedies in connection with his first
three disciplinary reports. However, with respect to his fourth
disciplinary report, plaintiff failed to show his grievance had
administrative finality and, therefore, did not meet his burden
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of showing the exhaustion of administrative remedies. See Reyes
v. Walker, 358 Ill. App. 3d 1122, 1125-26, 833 N.E.2d 379, 382
(2005). Although plaintiff attached the Administrative Board's
final decision to his appellate brief (showing reduction of the
amount of his good-conduct credits to zero), documents appended
to briefs that were not included in the record on appeal will be
ignored. In re Parentage of Melton, 321 Ill. App. 3d 823, 826,
748 N.E.2d 291, 294 (2001). Thus, our review is limited to
proceedings in connection with only the first three disciplinary
reports.
On appeal, plaintiff argues the trial court erred by
granting defendants' motions to dismiss. A section 2-615 motion
challenges the legal sufficiency of a complaint. Gilchrist v.
Snyder, 351 Ill. App. 3d 639, 642, 814 N.E.2d 147, 150 (2004).
Pursuant to that section, "[d]ismissal is appropriate only where,
viewing the allegations in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, it is clear that no set of facts can be proved under
the pleadings that will entitle the plaintiff to relief."
Gilchrist, 351 Ill. App. 3d at 642, 814 N.E.2d at 150. A trial
court's dismissal of a complaint pursuant to section 2-615 is
subject to de novo review. Gilchrist, 351 Ill. App. 3d at 642,
814 N.E.2d at 150.
"An allegation of a due-process-rights violation ***
states a cause of action in mandamus." Dye v. Pierce, 369 Ill.
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App. 3d 683, 687, 868 N.E.2d 293, 296 (2006). Mandamus is an
extraordinary remedy that may be used to compel a public officer
to perform his official duties that do not involve an exercise of
discretion. Lewis E. v. Spagnolo, 186 Ill. 2d 198, 229, 710
N.E.2d 798, 813 (1999). "A writ of mandamus will not be granted
unless the plaintiff can show a clear, affirmative right to
relief, a clear duty of the defendant to act, and clear authority
in the defendant to comply with the writ." Spagnolo, 186 Ill. 2d
at 229, 710 N.E.2d at 813. Such relief "'is not appropriate to
regulate a course of official conduct or to enforce the perfor-
mance of official duties generally.'" Cannon v. Quinley, 351
Ill. App. 3d 1120, 1127, 815 N.E.2d 443, 449 (2004), quoting
Hatch v. Szymanski, 325 Ill. App. 3d 736, 739, 759 N.E.2d 585,
588 (2001).
In his complaint, plaintiff argued he was denied due
process during his prison disciplinary proceedings. Principles
of due process require an inmate receive (1) notice of disciplin-
ary charges at least 24 hours prior to a hearing, (2) the oppor-
tunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence when
consistent with institutional safety and correctional goals, and
(3) a written statement by the fact finder of the evidence relied
upon to support a finding of guilt. Cannon, 351 Ill. App. 3d at
1127, 815 N.E.2d at 449, citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,
563-66, 41 L. Ed. 2d 935, 955-56, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 2978-79 (1974).
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First, plaintiff contended his due-process rights were
violated because the adjustment committee's guilty findings in
connection with his October 7, 2005, and October 25, 2005,
disciplinary reports were not supported by the evidence. To find
an inmate guilty of a charged offense, the adjustment committee
"must be reasonably satisfied there is some evidence that the
offender committed the offense." 20 Ill. Adm. Code §504.80(j)(1-
), as amended by 27 Ill. Reg. 6214, 6229 (eff. May 1, 2003).
Plaintiff's claims are insufficient to show his due-process
rights were violated. The relevant adjustment-committee deci-
sions were attached to his complaint. Each decision shows the
committee provided the basis for its guilty finding and included
the facts relied upon by the committee. A review of those
documents shows the committee's decisions were supported by "some
evidence" as required.
Second, plaintiff argued he was denied his right to
call witnesses at his October 13, 2005, disciplinary hearing.
The adjustment committee may deny an inmate's witness request "if
the witness's testimony would be irrelevant, cumulative, or would
jeopardize the safety or disrupt the security of the facility,
among other reasons." Cannon, 351 Ill. App. 3d at 1131, 815
N.E.2d at 452. Since it is within the committee's discretion to
deny an inmate's witness request, such a decision may not be
challenged in an mandamus petition. Cannon, 351 Ill. App. 3d at
1131, 815 N.E.2d at 452.
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The remainder of plaintiff's alleged due-process
violations concern proceedings in connection with only his fourth
disciplinary report. Because he failed to prove exhaustion of
administrative remedies as to that report, we do not consider
those allegations on appeal.
Here, plaintiff failed to allege facts that would
entitle him to mandamus relief for due-process violations at the
adjustment-committee level of disciplinary proceedings. It
follows that there were no errors to correct on review from those
proceedings, and plaintiff's argument to that effect also fails.
In his complaint, plaintiff further argued DOC's
director, the Administrative Board, and the Prisoner Review Board
were required, but failed, to provide "factual information" for
their decisions. To support his position, plaintiff cited
section 3-5-1(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS
5/3-5-1(b) (West 2004)), which provides as follows:
"If [DOC] or the Prisoner Review Board makes
a determination *** which affects the length
of the period of confinement or commitment,
the committed person and his counsel shall be
advised of factual information relied upon
*** to make the determination."
Pursuant to section 3-5-1(b), "any time a decision affecting the
length of commitment is made, the committed person is entitled to
know the factual basis for that decision." Hynes v. Snyder, 355
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Ill. App. 3d 394, 402, 823 N.E.2d 231, 238 (2005).
In this instance, the decisions affecting the length of
plaintiff's commitment were the revocations of his good-conduct
credit. The record reflects he was advised of the factual basis
for the revocations at the adjustment-committee level of proceed-
ings. Section 3-5-1(b) does not require more than this. (Al-
though plaintiff failed to attach one of the adjustment commit-
tee's decisions to his complaint, we note his argument is based
on the fact that he did not receive "factual information" from
the director, the Administrative Board, or the Prisoner Review
Board, not that he failed to receive the appropriate information
from the adjustment committee.)
In this case, plaintiff failed to allege facts suffi-
cient to show due-process violations at the adjustment-committee
level or that he failed to receive the "factual information"
relied upon to revoke his good-conduct credits. His complaint
failed to state a cause of action for mandamus relief.
Finally, we note, defendant filed a pro se "petition
for mandamus under 42 U.S.C. [section] 1983." Plaintiff's
complaint did not distinguish between claims for mandamus relief
and claims brought under section 1983. Nevertheless, revocation
of good-conduct credit may be reviewed pursuant to section 1983
of the Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. §1983 (2000)) where the inmate
seeks damages or injunctive relief. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 554-55,
41 L. Ed. 2d at 950, 94 S. Ct. at 2974; see also Mason v. Snyder,
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332 Ill. App. 3d 834, 844, 774 N.E.2d 457, 465 (2002) (Cook, J.,
dissenting). However, for the same reasons already stated,
plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts that would entitle
him to relief.
Additionally, "where success in a prisoner's [section]
1983 damages action would implicitly question the validity of
conviction or duration of sentence, the litigant must first
achieve favorable termination of his available state, or federal
habeas, opportunities to challenge the underlying conviction or
sentence." Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 751, 158 L. Ed. 2d
32, 36, 124 S. Ct. 1303, 1304 (2004), citing Heck v. Humphrey,
512 U.S. 477, 129 L. Ed. 2d 383, 114 S. Ct. 2364 (1994). Here,
plaintiff's success in this action would implicitly question the
validity of his disciplinary proceedings and the duration of his
sentence. Thus, his section 1983 claim must also fail because he
failed to show a previous successful challenge to his disciplin-
ary proceedings.
Here, plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts that
would entitle him to mandamus relief or relief under section
1983. The trial court did not err by granting defendants'
motions to dismiss.
For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's
judgment.
Affirmed.
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KNECHT and TURNER, JJ., concur.
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