Reppert v. Southern Illinois University

NO. 4-06-1014 Filed 8/15/07
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
JERRY REPPERT and the GAZETTE DEMO- ) Appeal from
CRAT, ) Circuit Court of
Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) Sangamon County
v. ) No. 06MR481
SOUTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY and )
WALTER V. WENDLER, ) Honorable
Defendants-Appellees. ) Leo J. Zappa, Jr.,
) Judge Presiding.
_________________________________________________________________
PRESIDING JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the opinion of
the court:
In August 2006, plaintiffs, Jerry Reppert and the
Gazette Democrat, filed a complaint against defendants, Southern
Illinois University (SIU) and SIU chancellor Walter V. Wendler,
seeking disclosure of the employment contracts of several SIU
employees. In October 2006, the trial court granted defendants'
motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs' claim that the Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/1 through 11 (West 2004))
compelled disclosure of the requested documents. In November
2006, the court granted defendants' motion to dismiss the remain-
ing counts with prejudice.
Plaintiffs appeal, arguing that the trial court erred
by granting summary judgment on their FOIA claim. We agree and
reverse and remand for further proceedings.
I. BACKGROUND
The following facts were gleaned from the parties’
pleadings and exhibits.
In March 2006, plaintiffs submitted a request to SIU
under the FOIA for the following:
"1. Employment contracts covering the
time period of January 1, 2000, to the pres-
ent for [SIU] President Glenn Poshard,
[f]ormer [SIU] President James Walker,
[Wendler,] and [SIU] employees John Jackson
and Mike Lawrence.
2. Independent contractor contracts, if
applicable, covering the time period of Janu-
ary 1, 2000, to the present for [SIU] employ-
ees John Jackson and Mike Lawrence."
In April 2006, SIU denied plaintiffs' request, and plaintiffs
appealed the denial. Wendler denied the appeal and informed
plaintiffs of their right to appeal the denial through the
judicial-review process.
In August 2006, plaintiffs filed a three-count com-
plaint against defendants, seeking the disclosure of the docu-
ments in question. The complaint alleged as follows: (1) the
Illinois Constitution required the disclosure of any contract
that obligated the expenditure of public funds (count I), (2) the
FOIA compelled disclosure of any such documents (count II), and
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(3) Wendler had a ministerial duty to release the documents to
the public (count III).
In September 2006, defendants filed a motion to dismiss
counts I and III of plaintiffs' complaint and a motion for
summary judgment as to count II. In their summary-judgment
motion, defendants argued that (1) the employment contracts were
part of each employee's personnel file and (2) the contracts were
thus per se exempt from disclosure under section 7(1)(b)(ii) of
the FOIA (the personnel-file exemption) (5 ILCS 140/7(1)(b)(ii)
(West 2004)). In October 2006, plaintiffs filed a response to
the summary-judgment motion, arguing, in part, that the fact that
the contracts were included in personnel files did not mean that
they were exempt from disclosure under the FOIA. Later in
October 2006, the trial court granted defendants' motion for
summary judgment as to count II. In so doing, the court found
that the requested employment contracts were exempt from disclo-
sure under the FOIA, pursuant to the personnel-file exemption (5
ILCS 140/7(1)(b)(ii) (West 2004)). In November 2006, the court
granted with prejudice defendants' motion to dismiss counts I and
III.
This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Summary Judgments and the Standard of Review
Summary judgment is proper if, "when viewed in the
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light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the pleadings,
depositions, admissions, and affidavits on file demonstrate that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Illinois State Chamber of Commerce v. Filan, 216 Ill. 2d 653,
661, 837 N.E.2d 922, 928 (2005); see 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West
2004). "Summary judgment should only be granted if the movant's
right to judgment is clear and free from doubt." Bluestar Energy
Services, Inc. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, No. 1-06-1277, slip
op. at 5 (June 29, 2007), ___ Ill. App. 3d ___, ___, ___ N.E.2d
___, ___. We review de novo the trial court's grant of summary
judgment. Big Sky Excavating, Inc. v. Illinois Bell Telephone
Co., 217 Ill. 2d 221, 234, 840 N.E.2d 1174, 1182 (2005).
B. The FOIA
Aside from our de novo standard of review being dic-
tated by the summary-judgment posture of this case, this case
involves a question of statutory interpretation. We review de
novo issues of statutory interpretation. NDC LLC v. Topinka, No.
2-05-1206, slip op. at 23 (June 15, 2007), ___ Ill. App. 3d ___,
___, ___ N.E.2d ___, ___. In Southern Illinoisan v. Illinois
Department of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415, 844 N.E.2d 1,
14 (2006), the supreme court discussed statutory interpretation
of the FOIA, as follows:
"Our review of the FOIA *** is guided by
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several well-established principles of statu-
tory construction. It is well settled that
the primary objective of [a] court when con-
struing the meaning of a statute is to ascer-
tain and give effect to the intent of the
General Assembly. [Citation.] In determin-
ing legislative intent, our inquiry begins
with the plain language of the statute, which
is the most reliable indication of the legis-
lature's objectives in enacting a particular
law. [Citation.] A fundamental principle of
statutory construction is to view all provi-
sions of a statutory enactment as a whole.
Accordingly, words and phrases should not be
construed in isolation, but must be inter-
preted in light of other relevant provisions
of the statute. [Citation.] In construing a
statute, we presume that the legislature, in
its enactment of legislation, did not intend
absurdity, inconvenience[,] or injustice."
The purpose of the FOIA is to open governmental records
to the light of public scrutiny. Thus, under the FOIA, a pre-
sumption exists that public records be open and accessible.
Bluestar Energy Services, slip op. at 6, ___ Ill. App. 3d at ___,
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___ N.E.2d at ___. The legislative intent is set forth in
section 1 of the FOIA, which provides, in pertinent part, as
follows:
"Pursuant to the fundamental philosophy
of the American constitutional form of gov-
ernment, it is declared to be the public
policy of the State of Illinois that all
persons are entitled to full and complete
information regarding the affairs of govern-
ment and the official acts and policies of
those who represent them as public officials
and public employees consistent with the
terms of this Act. Such access is necessary
to enable the people to fulfill their duties
of discussing public issues fully and freely,
making informed political judgments and moni-
toring government to ensure that it is being
conducted in the public interest." 5 ILCS
140/1 (West 2004).
Based upon the legislature's clearly stated public policy and
intent, the supreme court has held that "the FOIA is to be
accorded 'liberal construction.'" Southern Illinoisan, 218 Ill.
2d at 416, 844 N.E.2d at 15, quoting Bowie v. Evanston Community
Consolidated School District No. 65, 128 Ill. 2d 373, 378, 538
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N.E.2d 557, 559 (1989). Thus, "the exceptions to disclosure set
forth in the FOIA are to be read narrowly so as not to defeat the
FOIA's intended purpose." Southern Illinoisan, 218 Ill. 2d at
416, 844 N.E.2d at 15. Accordingly, "[e]ach public body shall
make available to any person for inspection or copying all public
records, except as otherwise provided in [s]ection 7 of this
Act." 5 ILCS 140/3(a) (West 2004); see also Southern Illinoisan,
218 Ill. 2d at 417, 844 N.E.2d at 15 (noting that when a public
body receives a request for information, it must comply unless
one of the narrow statutory exceptions applies).
Section 2(c) of the FOIA defines "public re-
cords," in pertinent part, as follows:
"(c) *** 'Public records'
includes, but is expressly not limited
to: *** (vii) all information in any
account, voucher, or contract dealing
with the receipt of expenditure of
public or other funds of public bod-
ies; (viii) the names, salaries, ti-
tles, and dates of employment of all
employees and officers of public bod-
ies ***." 5 ILCS 140/2(c) (West
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2004).
Section 7 of the FOIA provides, in pertinent part, as
follows:
"(1) The following shall be exempt from
inspection and copying:
***
(b) Information that, if dis-
closed, would constitute a clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy, unless the disclosure is
consented to in writing by the
individual subjects of the informa-
tion. The disclosure of informa-
tion that bears on the public du-
ties of public employees and offi-
cials shall not be considered an
invasion of personal privacy.
Information exempted under this
subsection (b) shall include but is
not limited to:
***
(ii) personnel files and per-
sonal information maintained with
respect to employees, appointees or
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elected officials of any public
body[,] or applicants for those
positions[.]" (Emphasis added.) 5
ILCS 140/7(1)(b)(ii) (West 2004).
If the public body seeks to invoke one of section 7's exemptions,
it must give written notice setting forth the particular exemp-
tion claimed to authorize the denial. Then, the party seeking
disclosure of information under the FOIA can challenge the public
body's denial at the trial level. The burden of proof at the
trial level is on the public body to establish that the requested
documents are exempt from disclosure. Bluestar Energy Services,
slip op. at 7, ___ Ill. App. 3d at ___, ___ N.E.2d at ___.
In addition, section 8 of the FOIA provides as follows:
"If any public record that is exempt
from disclosure under [s]ection 7 of this Act
contains any material which is not exempt,
the public body shall delete the information
which is exempt and make the remaining infor-
mation available for inspection and copying."
5 ILCS 140/8 (West 2004).
C. Plaintiffs' Claim That the Trial Court Erred by Granting
Summary Judgment in Defendants' Favor as to Count II
Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred by granting
summary judgment in defendants' favor as to count II. We agree.
Liberally construing the FOIA in accord with its
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intended purpose, we conclude that the statutory definition
of "public records" includes the information contained
in the employment contracts at issue. Indeed, at oral
argument, defendants' counsel conceded that the information
contained in the contracts was not confidential. In addition,
reading section 7(1)(b) of the FOIA narrowly, as we must, we
conclude that the individual contracts constitute "information
that bears on the public duties of public employees and offi-
cials" (5 ILCS 140/7(1)(b) (West 2004)). Thus, such documents
"shall not be considered an invasion of personal privacy" and, as
a matter of law, are not exempt from disclosure under section 7
(5 ILCS 140/7(1)(b) (West 2004)). Contrary to defendants'
suggestion, the mere fact that personnel files are per se exempt
from disclosure under section 7(1)(b)(ii) does not mean that the
individual contracts are also per se exempt simply because they
are kept in those files. See CBS, Inc. v. Partee, 198 Ill. App.
3d 936, 942, 556 N.E.2d 648, 651 (1990) ("To hold that all
information contained in a personnel file is exempt from public
disclosure simply because it is in a personnel file would permit
a subversion of the broad purposes of the [FOIA]"). In that
regard, we note that section 8 of the FOIA (5 ILCS 140/8 (West
2004)) explicitly permits the disclosure of nonexempt documents
(such as the employment contracts here) that are contained within
exempt public records (such as personnel files). Accordingly, we
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conclude that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment
in defendants' favor, and we reverse and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
In so concluding, we decline to follow the Third
District's decision in Copley Press, Inc. v. Board of Education
for Peoria School District No. 150, 359 Ill. App. 3d 321, 834
N.E.2d 558 (2005). In that case, the Third District concluded
that performance evaluations and a letter summarizing the evalua-
tions were exempt under the personnel-file exemption of the FOIA
(5 ILCS 140/7(1)(b)(ii) (West 2004)). In so doing, the Copley
court also stated as follows:
"Given its plain and ordinary meaning, a
'personnel file' can reasonably be expected
to include documents such as a resume or
application, an employment contract, policies
signed by the employee, payroll information,
emergency contact information, training re-
cords, performance evaluations[,] and disci-
plinary records." Copley Press, Inc., 359
Ill. App. 3d at 324, 834 N.E.2d at 561.
We view the above-quoted language as broad dicta. Further, to
the extent that the Copley court purported to hold that employ-
ment contracts are per se exempt from disclosure under the FOIA,
we decline to follow it.
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III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we reverse the trial court's
judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
MYERSCOUGH and KNECHT, JJ., concur.
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