People v. Lyons

NO. 4-06-0110 Filed 6/21/07
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) Macon County
DARRELL LYONS, ) No. 05CF1121
Defendant-Appellant. )
) Honorable
) James R. Coryell,
) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE APPLETON delivered the opinion of the court:
On August 8, 2005, an anonymous informant, "John Doe,"
and a sheriff's deputy appeared before a judge on a request that
a search warrant be executed. In the complaint for a search
warrant, Doe and the officer stated that over the course of a few
days preceding the complaint, the two had arranged a controlled
purchase of cocaine from defendant, Darrell Lyons. Based on the
statements to the judge, the police obtained a search warrant for
defendant and his residence at 1903 North 35th Street in Decatur.
As a result of the execution of the search warrant, defendant was
charged with four counts related to the possession of controlled
substances. Before the trial, defendant filed a motion to
suppress the evidence, but that motion was denied. After a
stipulated bench trial, defendant was found guilty of two counts
of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver
and sentenced to concurrent prison terms of nine years and three
years, respectively. He now appeals his conviction and sentence.
We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
On August 11, 2005, the State charged defendant with
unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to
deliver between 100 and 400 grams of cocaine (720 ILCS
570/401(a)(2)(B) (West 2004)) (count I), unlawful possession of
more than 100 grams but less than 400 grams of cocaine (720 ILCS
570/402(a)(2)(B) (West 2004)) (count II), unlawful possession of
a controlled substance with intent to deliver between 30 and 500
grams of marijuana (720 ILCS 550/5(d) (West 2004)) (count III),
and unlawful possession of between 30 and 500 grams of marijuana
(720 ILCS 550/4(d) (West 2004)) (count IV). These charges
stemmed from the Macon County sheriff's office's execution of a
search warrant of 1903 North 35th Street, Decatur, Illinois.
On October 17, 2005, defendant filed a motion to
suppress, alleging the search warrant was obtained without
probable cause. On December 21, 2005, the trial court conducted
a hearing on defendant's motion to suppress. Defendant presented
the testimony of Macon County Sheriff's Deputy James Root, who
testified that he obtained a drug-search warrant on August 8,
2005. In his complaint for the warrant, Root alleged that, with
the help of a confidential informant, Doe (who was also named as
a complainant), he organized a controlled purchase of cocaine
- 2 -
between an unsuspecting third party and defendant, who was at the
time known only as "Big Country."
According to Deputy Root's testimony, Doe met Root at
an undisclosed location in Decatur. Root searched Doe's vehicle
and person for contraband and found none. Root gave Doe an
undisclosed quantity of cash for the anticipated purchase of
cocaine. Doe left in his own vehicle to meet with the unsuspect-
ing third party. Root followed. Once inside Doe's vehicle, the
third party telephoned "Big Country" and then directed Doe to
drive to another undisclosed location to meet "Big Country." Doe
gave the third party the cash.
Meanwhile, a surveillance team observed a male, fitting
Doe's description of "Big Country," exit the residence at 1903
North 35th Street in Decatur, enter a red Oldsmobile, and drive
to the meeting location. There, according to Root's testimony,
the third party exited Doe's vehicle and met with "Big Country"
outside of Doe's presence. The third party then rejoined Doe and
the two left the meeting location in Doe's vehicle. The surveil-
lance team followed "Big Country" from the meeting back to the
North 35th Street residence. Root said Doe took the third party
to an undisclosed location and then met with Deputy Root at a
predetermined location. Doe handed Root a plastic bag of a
substance that later tested positive for cocaine.
Root testified that he did not conduct a search of the
- 3 -
third party prior to the transaction, and he therefore was not
able to positively confirm whether that person possessed the
cocaine prior to the meeting with "Big Country." Additionally,
Root said the surveillance team did not see "Big Country" carry-
ing anything as he walked out of the residence to his vehicle.
Defendant's counsel argued that the allegations in the
complaint were insufficient to justify the issuance of a warrant
that targeted "Big Country" and the North 35th Street residence.
Defendant claimed there was an insufficient nexus between the
cocaine that was delivered and defendant and/or defendant's
residence. The trial court disagreed, finding that "while there
are alternative explanations for where the controlled substance
came from, one of them includes that it came from 'Big Country,'
and I think that's sufficient to establish that there is probable
cause here." The court denied defendant's motion.
At defendant's February 6, 2006, trial, he indicated he
wished to preserve his right to appeal the trial court's order
denying his motion to suppress. As a result, the parties agreed
to (1) a stipulated bench trial as to counts I and III (the
possession with intent to deliver counts); (2) a recommended
sentence of concurrent prison terms of nine years and three
years, respectively; and (3) the State's dismissal of the remain-
ing two counts. The trial court considered the factual basis and
entered a judgment consistent with the agreement. This appeal
- 4 -
followed.
II. ANALYSIS
Defendant appeals from the trial court's order denying
his motion to suppress. He claims the search warrant was ob-
tained in the absence of any probable cause because (1) nothing
linked defendant to the cocaine that was delivered during the
controlled purchase, and (2) neither Doe nor the unsuspecting
third party was proved to be sufficiently reliable or trustwor-
thy. He claims any evidence found pursuant to the execution of
the search warrant of defendant's residence was illegally seized
and, as a result, his convictions must be reversed.
We review de novo a trial court's ruling on a motion to
suppress when the underlying facts are not in dispute and the
only question is the adequacy of the affidavit attached to the
complaint for the warrant. People v. Cooke, 299 Ill. App. 3d
273, 277-78, 701 N.E.2d 526, 529 (1998). The judge asked to
issue the search warrant must look at the totality of the circum-
stances. Utilizing practicality and common sense, the issuing
judge must decide whether "'there is a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular
place.'" Cooke, 299 Ill. App. 3d at 278, 701 N.E.2d at 529,
quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527,
548, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983).
For a search warrant to be valid, the complaint and
- 5 -
supporting affidavit are not required to show beyond a reasonable
doubt that the warrant should be issued; rather, they need only
establish probable cause. People v. Stewart, 104 Ill. 2d 463,
475-76, 473 N.E.2d 1227, 1232 (1984). "To determine probable
cause, a sufficient nexus between a criminal offense, the items
to be seized, and the place to be searched must be established.
[Citation.] When there is no direct information to establish a
nexus, reasonable inferences may be entertained to create the
nexus." People v. Beck, 306 Ill. App. 3d 172, 178-79, 713 N.E.2d
596, 601 (1999).
Relying on the reasonable inferences that the issuing
judge may have drawn upon, we conclude that the totality of the
circumstances suggests the following: Defendant left his resi-
dence on North 35th Street upon receiving a telephone call from
the unsuspecting third party requesting that defendant sell him a
specified amount of cocaine. It reasonably follows that defen-
dant drove to the specified location to deliver the cocaine to
the third party in exchange for the cash Doe had given to the
third party. Defendant either exited the residence carrying the
cocaine or he kept the supply in his vehicle. Because the
surveillance team was waiting outside of the North 35th Street
residence, it is reasonable to infer that they had been informed
that that address was in fact defendant's residence.
Although the affidavit did not specifically indicate
- 6 -
that defendant kept contraband in that house, this gap of infor-
mation "'can be filled merely on the basis of the affiant-offi-
cer's experience that drug dealers ordinarily keep their supply,
records[,] and monetary profits at home.'" Beck, 306 Ill. App.
3d at 178, 713 N.E.2d at 601, quoting 2 W. LaFave, Search &
Seizure §3.7(d), at 379 (3d ed. 1996). It was reasonable for the
issuing judge to infer that defendant left his residence to meet
the third party for the purpose of selling him cocaine. It was
reasonable for the issuing judge to infer that the cocaine was
delivered by defendant to the third party. And, it was reason-
able for the issuing judge to infer that defendant was in posses-
sion of other controlled substances, currency, and drug parapher-
nalia at the North 35th Street residence. We find the issuing
court had a substantial basis for determining the existence of
probable cause.
Defendant also claims the State failed to establish
that Doe was a sufficiently reliable and trustworthy source of
information. He claims the facts presented to the issuing court
did not establish that Doe could "be relied on to provide credi-
ble information to police." We find this requirement unnecessary
here. This court has previously found that "[w]hen the informant
has appeared before the issuing judge, the informant is under
oath, and the judge has had the opportunity to personally observe
the demeanor of the informant and assess the informant's credi-
- 7 -
bility, additional evidence relating to informant reliability and
corroboration by police as discussed in Illinois v. Gates, 462
U.S. 213, 238-39, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527, 548, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332
(1983), is not necessary." People v. Hancock, 301 Ill. App. 3d
786, 792, 704 N.E.2d 431, 436 (1998). Gates discussed the
importance of police corroboration of an informant's tip when the
issuing court has before it only an affidavit based on hearsay
information. When the informant personally appears before the
issuing court, such corroboration is unnecessary. People v.
Phillips, 265 Ill. App. 3d 438, 448, 637 N.E.2d 715, 721 (1994).
Deputy Root and Doe personally appeared together before the
issuing judge. Thus, the judge had the opportunity to personally
observe Doe, assess his credibility, and, to the judge's specifi-
cations, determine the basis of Doe's knowledge.
III. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we affirm the trial court's order
denying defendant's motion to suppress. We find the complaint,
affidavit, and personal request for a warrant contained suffi-
cient probable cause to justify the issuance of the search
warrant for defendant and the premises at 1903 North 35th Street.
As part of our judgment, we grant the State its statutory $50
assessment against defendant as costs of this appeal.
Affirmed.
MYERSCOUGH and COOK, JJ., concur.
- 8 -
- 9 -