In re Lisa G.C.

NOS. 4-06-0046, 4-06-0133 cons. Filed 6/5/07
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
In re LISA G.C., a Person Found Subject ) Appeal from
to Involuntary Admission, ) Circuit Court of
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Sangamon County
Petitioner-Appellee, ) No. 05MH655
v. )
LISA G.C., ) Honorable
Respondent-Appellant. ) Leslie J. Graves,
) George H. Ray,
) Judges Presiding.
________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE COOK delivered the opinion of the court:
On December 8, 2005, a petition for the involuntary
admission of respondent, Lisa G.C., was filed pursuant to section
3-600 of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code
(Code) (405 ILCS 5/3-600 (West 2004)). After a December 30,
2005, hearing, the trial court ordered respondent hospitalized in
a Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities
facility for 90 days. On January 4, 2006, respondent appealed,
No. 4-06-0046.
On January 25, 2006, pending her appeal, respondent
filed a petition for discharge. The trial court appointed
counsel to represent respondent. The court held a hearing on
January 27, 2006, at which time the petition was denied. On
February 1, 2006, respondent appealed, No. 4-06-0133. We have
consolidated the two appeals.
In No. 4-06-0046, respondent appeals her initial
hospitalization, contending (1) her procedural due-process rights
were violated and (2) the State failed to prove by clear and
convincing evidence her involuntary admission was warranted. In
No. 4-06-0133, respondent appeals the denial of her petition for
discharge, contending the State failed to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that she remained subject to involuntary
admission. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
On December 8, 2005, Brian Boston, of Carlinville Area
Hospital, signed a petition for emergency involuntary admission
asserting respondent was mentally ill, was reasonably expected to
inflict serious physical harm upon herself or another in the near
future due to her mental illness, and was in need of immediate
hospitalization for the prevention of such harm. The petition
was accompanied by a medical certificate by Dr. W.J. Townsend
stating respondent was subject to involuntary admission and in
need of immediate hospitalization. That same date the trial
court set a hearing date for December 9, 2005. At that time,
respondent was being treated at Memorial Medical Center (Memo-
rial).
On December 9, 2005, Dr. Shyam Bhat's medical certifi-
cate, reaching the same conclusion as Dr. Townsend, was filed and
the State requested a continuance. The trial court granted a
continuance until December 16, 2005.
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On December 16, 2005, the trial court entered an order
on a preprinted form, which stated that on the State's motion, by
agreement of the parties and pursuant to section 3-908 of the
Code (405 ILCS 5/3-908 (West 2004)), respondent was transferred
to McFarland Mental Health Center (McFarland). On December 16,
2005, the hearing was continued to December 23, 2005, by agree-
ment of the parties.
On December 19, 2005, a notice of change in status
dated December 16 was filed, indicating respondent had been
transferred to McFarland on December 16, 2005. Also on December
19, 2005, Dr. Gregory Gergay filed a medical certificate. On
December 20, 2005, Dr. G. Midathala filed a medical certificate.
On December 23, 2005, on the State's motion, the trial court
continued respondent's hearing to December 30, 2005. On December
29, 2005, Dr. James Myers filed a medical certificate supporting
respondent's involuntary commitment.
At the December 30, 2005, hearing, Dr. Myers, a clini-
cal psychologist, testified he was currently treating respondent.
Respondent demonstrated paranoid delusions. Dr. Myers noted
respondent indicated (1) she had information about the World-
Trade-Center-bombing terrorist attack, the Pentagon terrorist
attack, and the Oklahoma City bombing and "spoke in a very
descriptive manner about people involved in various nefarious
attacks"; (2) she knew George Bush and Senator Durbin were
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involved in the Twin Towers terrorist attack; (3) she had a
granddaughter who was decapitated in a police car and she saw
another family member walking away from the police car, but she
could not say how she knew this information; (4) three of her
five children had been murdered; and (5) people were threatening
her.
Respondent also paced back and forth during much of her
interview with Dr. Myers and carried a packet of information,
including a telephone book, which she also carried in court.
Besides evaluating respondent, Dr. Myers reviewed two prior State
hospitalizations in order to make a diagnosis of schizo-affective
disorder. Dr. Myers believed respondent could reasonably be
expected to inflict serious physical harm on herself or others as
a result of her mental illness. He suggested her paranoid
delusions would make it likely she would be aggressive and
violent if she believed someone with whom she identifies is
threatened. She might act aggressively and violently to protect
them.
Dr. Myers further stated since respondent had been at
McFarland, she had not taken any medication or participated in
treatment as she did not believe she was mentally ill. Dr. Myers
found respondent to be in need of treatment, opined that
McFarland was the least-restrictive alternative for treatment,
and recommended a commitment period of 90 days.
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Respondent testified that between 13 and 14 members of
her family had been murdered over the past 38 years by her mother
and her brother-in-law. They bought Tylenol, which the murder
victims took, and it killed them. She knew the government was
involved, although her brother-in-law told her the Pentagon did
not deal with that. Respondent stated she wanted the people who
murdered her family to stand trial "very publicly." She stated
she did not want to physically harm the murderers, she just
wanted to press charges. Respondent further stated she had no
desire to hurt herself and called the police when her sister
attacked her.
After hearing the evidence, the trial court found
respondent suffered from a mental illness, was at risk of harming
herself or another, and needed treatment. The court committed
respondent for 90 days. Respondent appealed.
Pending her appeal, on January 25, 2006, respondent
filed a petition for discharge that is the subject of appeal in
No. 4-06-0133. On January 27, 2006, the trial court held a
hearing. At the hearing, respondent testified that she had an
address in one city and owned a trailer in another city. Respon-
dent also stated she was an inactive licensed practical nurse
(LPN) and had two living children. Three of her children had
died. If she could get a vehicle, respondent claimed she could
work as a waitress or use her inactive nurse’s license. With her
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income and the occasional use of public aid, respondent stated
that in the past she had supported herself and her children.
Respondent claimed she was not suicidal and only had high blood
pressure "after they put illicit drugs in my drink and broke into
my trailer *** smearing blood on me." Respondent stated she
treats her aches in pains with "jalapenos, spicy food, and
Tylenol." Respondent believed she could care for herself and
would not physically harm herself or another.
On cross-examination, respondent explained that on
December 8, 2005, she called "9-1-1" because her nephew insulted
her and he would not leave, then her daughter struck her. When
she went with the police officer to fill out reports, he took her
to Carlinville Hospital and contacted Brian from Macoupin County
Mental Health. Respondent informed Brian that she knew the name
of the girl that they decapitated and that she had a picture of
her. She added that the girl’s name was Carrie and that Carrie's
husband, Tom, served in the Navy. Respondent continued to talk
about illicit drugs being put into her drinks and blood being
smeared on her. She also maintained that three of her children
had been murdered, one at a dentist's office. Respondent re-
ferred to Enron, George Ryan, rape, and murder during the cross-
examination.
The trial court denied the petition. The court noted
that respondent had not testified clearly, had not explained
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whether she had a place to live, and was clearly in need of
further treatment. Respondent appeals this ruling as well.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Procedural Due Process
In No. 4-06-0046, respondent asserts her right to due
process was violated when she was initially committed because (1)
she was improperly transferred to McFarland and (2) her commit-
ment hearing was not timely held.
In involuntary-commitment proceedings, strict compli-
ance with statutory procedures is required since such proceedings
affect important liberty interests. In re Rovelstad, 281 Ill.
App. 3d 956, 964-65, 667 N.E.2d 720, 725 (1996). Whether the
State strictly complied with the procedural requirements of the
Code is a question of law to be reviewed de novo. In re George
O., 314 Ill. App. 3d 1044, 1046, 734 N.E.2d 13, 15-16 (2000).
Reversal is required for failure to comply with the requirements
of the Code where respondent is prejudiced by such failure. In
re Louis S., 361 Ill. App. 3d 763, 768, 838 N.E.2d 218, 222
(2005). Because respondent is unable to demonstrate how she was
prejudiced by any alleged failure to comply with procedural
requirements, we find her right to due process was not violated.
1. Transfer to McFarland
Respondent argues that she was improperly transferred
to McFarland. On December 19, 2005, a notice of change in status
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dated December 16 was filed, indicating respondent had been
transferred to McFarland from Memorial on December 16, 2005.
Further, on December 16, 2005, the trial court entered an order
stating that, on the State's motion, by agreement of the parties,
and pursuant to section 3-908 of the Code (405 ILCS 5/3-908 (West
2004)), respondent was transferred to McFarland.
Sections 3-908 through 3-910 of the Code (405 ILCS 5/3-
908 through 3-910 (West 2004)) address transfer between Depart-
ment facilities of a person receiving treatment. Specifically,
section 3-908 addresses the procedure for transferring patients
between state facilities. 405 ILCS 5/3-908 (West 2004). Section
3-908 does not address transfers such as this one in which a
patient is transferred from a private facility to a state facil-
ity. In In re Hays, 102 Ill. 2d 314, 320, 465 N.E.2d 98, 101
(1984), the Supreme Court of Illinois, when addressing the issue
of whether a petition for involuntary commitment of a voluntarily
admitted patient may properly be brought when the patient has not
made a request to be discharged, noted that "[w]hile a State
facility may transfer a patient to another State facility when it
is deemed 'clinically advisable,' a private institution may not
invoke these provisions of the Code." Further, in Louis S., this
court found the only means by which a respondent could be trans-
ferred from Memorial, a private institution, to McFarland, a
state institution, was (1) in a dispositional order after he was
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found to be a person subject to involuntary commitment or (2) by
a discharge from Memorial and the initiation of emergency invol-
untary commitment proceedings under the Code, and since the
respondent's transfer was not by either of those means, his
transfer to McFarland was improper. Louis S., 361 Ill. App. 3d
at 770, 838 N.E.2d at 223.
In this case, respondent's transfer to McFarland was
not accomplished by either of the means discussed in Louis S.
While the transfer may have been improper, the State argues
respondent did not suffer any prejudice because she agreed to the
transfer to McFarland. Respondent argues her transfer was
presumptively prejudicial because it was a transfer to a more
restrictive state facility and occurred prior to her hearing on
the petition for involuntary commitment. We agree with the
State.
Respondent has not demonstrated how she suffered any
prejudice by a transfer with which she originally agreed. Upon
respondent's initial admission, the State complied with the
Code's requirements for involuntary admission as two certificates
from a physician and psychiatrist who had examined respondent
were timely filed. See 405 ILCS 5/3-601, 3-602 (West 2004).
Once admitted to McFarland, respondent was examined by a physi-
cian within 24 hours who found her to be subject to involuntary
admission. Another psychiatrist examined her the next day and
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concluded the same. Both doctors informed respondent of her
rights before the examinations. The State treated respondent's
admission to McFarland as an initial involuntary admission, and
all procedural safeguards were followed.
Most significant is respondent's agreement to the
transfer. Respondent could have objected to the transfer and
required the State to discharge her from Memorial, and then re-
institute an emergency involuntary-commitment proceeding to have
her placed in McFarland. Instead of going through the whole
process of reinstituting proceedings with the almost certain
outcome of her placement in McFarland, respondent agreed to
forego repeating the process and get to the involuntary-commit-
ment hearing more quickly. Respondent cannot now claim on appeal
she was prejudiced by her agreement.
We find it unremarkable that the record is devoid of
how respondent came to "agree" to the transfer as the trial court
is not required to set forth the bases or reasons for its rul-
ings. People ex rel. Madigan v. Petco Petroleum Corp., 363 Ill.
App. 3d 613, 636, 841 N.E.2d 1065, 1083 (2006). The trial court
need not always make a record, as in many cases there may be no
dispute when a ruling is made and no need to go into detail to
explain it. A litigant should not be allowed to stand by while a
ruling is made and then object for the first time in the appel-
late court. In the present case, if there was a misstatement in
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the trial court's ruling, respondent's attorney should have so
advised the court. A record would then have been made. We
should resolve any doubts due to the incompleteness of the record
against the respondent, the appellant. Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99
Ill. 2d 389, 392, 459 N.E.2d 958, 959 (1984).
2. Timeliness of the Hearing
Respondent next argues her hearing was untimely and
unduly delayed. Section 3-611 of the Code requires that "the
court shall set a hearing" regarding the petition for involuntary
commitment "to be held within [five] days, excluding Saturdays,
Sundays[,] and holidays, after receipt of the petition." 405
ILCS 5/3-611 (West 2004). Respondent was admitted on December 8,
2005, and though her hearing was originally set for December 9,
2005, her hearing was not held until December 30, 2005.
To comply with section 3-611, respondent's hearing
should have been held on or before December 15. The hearing was
not held until December 30, 2005, due to three continuances.
Section 3-800(b) sets forth a procedure in which trial courts may
grant continuances in mental-health cases. 405 ILCS 5/3-800(b)
(West 2004). Section 3-800(b) states the following:
"If the court grants a continuance on its
own motion or upon the motion of one of
the parties, the respondent may continue
to be detained pending further order of the
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court. Such continuance shall not extend
beyond 15 days except to the extent that
continuances are requested by the respondent."
405 ILCS 5/3-800(b) (West 2004).
In this case, respondent was detained for 22 days,
including weekends and holidays, before her hearing. Three
continuances were granted. Respondent was admitted December 8
with the hearing set for December 9. On December 9 on the
State's motion, the hearing was continued to December 16. On
December 16, by agreement of the parties, the hearing was contin-
ued to December 23. On December 23, on the State's motion, the
hearing was continued to December 30. The State argues that none
of the continuances, including the last continuance that pushed
the detention beyond 15 days, were for a period of greater than
15 days, so the plain language of section 3-800(b) was not
violated. Respondent argues her hearing had to be held on or
before December 15 according to section 3-611 and section 3-
800(b) should not apply.
We find that section 3-800(b) plainly allows the trial
court to grant continuances beyond the deadline imposed by
section 3-611. While the parties disagree as to the length of
delay allowed by section 3-800(b), we need not determine the
precise allowable length of delay because respondent has not
established prejudice. According to section 3-611, respondent's
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hearing should have been held before December 15. Section 3-
800(b), though, allows for continuances. After the first 7-day
continuance, respondent agreed to the second 7-day continuance
requested on December 16 to December 23, bringing respondent's
detention to 15 days total, including weekends. The continuance
requested on December 23 was for seven more days. The hearing
held on December 30 was only 15 days after the deadline estab-
lished under section 3-611. Respondent has not established how
the three seven-day continuances prejudiced her in light of her
agreement to the second seven-day continuance.
In support of her position, respondent cites generally
In re Williams, 140 Ill. App. 3d 708, 489 N.E.2d 347 (1986). In
that case, the court determined that the Code mandated that the
hearing be held within 20 days and the 5 1/2 months of detention
between the respondent's initial detention and hearing was
clearly a serious abuse of that respondent's rights. Williams,
140 Ill. App. 3d at 712, 489 N.E.2d at 351. While prejudice is
clear from a 5 1/2-month delay, such prejudice cannot be presumed
from a delay of 22 days when the respondent agreed to a 7-day
continuance.
B. Clear and Convincing Evidence for Involuntary Admission
Respondent next argues that the State failed to prove
she was reasonably expected to seriously harm herself or another
in the near future. A person may be involuntarily admitted if it
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is established by clear and convincing evidence (405 ILCS 5/3-808
(West 2004)) that the person has a mental illness and "because of
his or her illness is reasonably expected to inflict serious
physical harm upon himself or herself or another in the near
future." 405 ILCS 5/1-119(1) (West 2004). The standard of
review for an involuntary-commitment proceeding is whether the
judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re
Knapp, 231 Ill. App. 3d 917, 919, 596 N.E.2d 1171, 1172 (1992).
The trial court's decision is given great deference and, absent a
showing that it is against the manifest weight of the evidence,
it "'will not be set aside at the appellate level, even if the
reviewing court, after applying the clear and convincing stan-
dard, would have ruled differently.'" In re Bennett, 251 Ill.
App. 3d 887, 888, 623 N.E.2d 942, 944 (1993), quoting In re Orr,
176 Ill. App. 3d 498, 505, 531 N.E.2d 64, 69 (1988).
The trial court's finding that respondent was mentally
ill is not in dispute. Dr. Myers diagnosed respondent as having
schizo-affective disorder. While respondent does not dispute
that she has a mental illness, she claims Dr. Myers' testimony
never clearly and convincingly proved that, due to her mental
illness, she was reasonably expected to threaten or imminently
harm herself or another. Respondent points to Dr. Myers' testi-
mony that established that she had never been committed, had
never been physically aggressive, and had never expressed to him
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an intent to harm herself or anyone else.
We note first that a treating psychiatrist's opinion of
potential dangerousness need not be derived from firsthand
observations of violence and may be based on knowledge of inci-
dents derived from medical history records. In re Houlihan, 231
Ill. App. 3d 677, 683, 596 N.E.2d 189, 194 (1992). An examining
physician may properly consider a respondent's complete medical
history in forming her opinion concerning that respondent's
current and future dangerousness. In re Robert H., 302 Ill. App.
3d 980, 986, 707 N.E.2d 264, 269 (1999). Further, the court does
not have to wait until respondent hurts himself or someone else
before involuntarily committing him. In re Manis, 213 Ill. App.
3d 1075, 1077, 572 N.E.2d 1213, 1214 (1991). Because the court
is in a superior position to determine witness credibility and to
weigh evidence, we give great deference to the court's findings.
Knapp, 231 Ill. App. 3d at 919, 596 N.E.2d at 1172.
Dr. Myers testified that he personally met with and
examined respondent. Upon examining respondent, Dr. Myers noted
that she spoke "in a very descriptive manner" about people
involved in "nefarious activities" such as the World Trade Center
bombing, the attack on the Pentagon, and Oklahoma City. During
the interview, respondent paced back and forth and carried a
packet of information that she also carried to court. Respondent
had been hospitalized, possibly on a voluntary basis, on two
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prior occasions. Respondent suffered from paranoid delusions,
and "given the severity of her delusions," Dr. Myers opined that
she was likely to act aggressively. While Dr. Myers acknowledged
that respondent had not been aggressive while at McFarland, he
noted that she was reported to have become "increasingly aggres-
sive towards her family" when in the community and had refused
treatment at McFarland.
In the emergency petition, the officer who dealt with
respondent wrote that respondent believed several people, includ-
ing local politicians and authorities, were "out to get her" and
her father had stated that respondent had begun to say that these
people should die and talked of getting weapons. Dr. Townsend
wrote in his certificate that respondent "had made threatening
comments/gestures toward local government officials and ha[d]
started to talk of acquiring weapons to use on these officials."
Further, Dr. Townsend noted respondent was getting aggressive
with her daughter. In Dr. Bhat's certificate, he wrote that
respondent talked about getting weapons and believed the State's
Attorney was out to get her. Dr. Gregory found respondent showed
"increasingly delusional and threatening behavior." Dr.
Midathala reported in his certificate that respondent believed
local government officials were out to get her, particularly the
State’s Attorney, and believed that those people should die.
In respondent's comprehensive physical, psychiatric,
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and social investigation, Dr. Midathala reported that respondent
was "suspicious" and "slightly hostile." He described her affect
as "angry, irritable, increased intensity, and decreased range."
Respondent's speech was described as "increased rate and volume,
pressure of speech present" and delusions were "probably persecu-
tion, grandiose." Dr. Midathala described respondent's judgment
and insight as poor, particularly because she does not believe
she has a mental illness and does not want to take medication.
Finally, respondent's testimony showed that she be-
lieved that more than 10 of her family members were murdered and
the government was involved. She stated she did not want to hurt
herself but her sister had attacked her and she was "not going to
be their punching bag anymore."
Based on respondent's medical records, Dr. Myers'
testimony, and respondent's testimony, the trial court's finding
that respondent was subject to involuntary admission was not
against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Respondent also argues that the State failed to show
that hospitalization was the least-restrictive form of treatment
available. Section 3-810 of the Code requires that the trial
court instruct that a report be prepared as to appropriateness
and availability of alternative treatment settings. 405 ILCS
5/3-810 (West 2004). Section 3-811 of the Code requires that the
court order the least-restrictive treatment alternative. 405
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ILCS 5/3-811 (West 2004). While the trial court did not explic-
itly discuss the various treatment alternatives in this case,
section 3-810 does not require a detailed report on treatment
alternatives. Louis S., 361 Ill. App. 3d at 771, 838 N.E.2d at
224. The court may order commitment if the report in its en-
tirety, coupled with the evidence at the hearing, shows hospital-
ization is the least-restrictive alternative. Louis S., 361 Ill.
App. 3d at 771, 838 N.E.2d at 224.
In this case, Dr. Myers testified that hospitalization
was the least-restrictive treatment option available. The
comprehensive psychiatric evaluation showed respondent made
"numerous delusional statements" that were described as violent,
involving bombings, decapitation, and murder. Dr. Myers opined
that it was "very likely that in order to protect someone who[m]
she feels[,] similar to herself, when she feels that person or
herself is threatened, given the severity of the crimes in her
delusions, *** that she might very well act aggressively and
violently to protect." The report and evidence at trial support
the court's finding that commitment was the least-restrictive
alternative.
C. Denial of Petition for Discharge
In No. 4-06-0133, respondent argues that the trial
court erred in denying her petition for discharge because the
State failed to present clear and convincing evidence that she
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was in need of continued involuntary admission. Section 3-900 of
the Code allows for a committed person to file a petition for
discharge at any time (405 ILCS 5/3-900 (West 2004)). The
respondent has the obligation of presenting a prima facie case
that he should be discharged. In re Smoots, 189 Ill. App. 3d
289, 291, 544 N.E.2d 1235, 1237 (1989). The respondent's own
sworn statements may be treated as a prima facie case for dis-
charge. Smoots, 189 Ill. App. 3d at 291, 544 N.E.2d at 1237. If
the respondent is able to present a prima facie case, the State
must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent’s
petition should be denied. Smoots, 189 Ill. App. 3d at 291, 544
N.E.2d at 1237.
In this case, respondent failed to present a prima
facie case. Respondent's petition for discharge did not state
the reasons she was requesting the discharge. Respondent instead
described talking with police officers about "police brutality,"
her transfer to McFarland, forced medication, and a denial of
attorney-client privilege. When she testified, respondent never
clearly answered where she would live, describing an address in
one town and a trailer in another town. When asked how she would
care for her basic physical needs, respondent stated:
"Well, first of all they have my driver's
license because they tried to kill me in
'95, car wreck and entrapment in '96. It’s
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all involved in George Ryan license for
bribes. Goes along with Kevin Grady had
my driver's license. I could work even as
a waitress or any other, you know, job.
I am not incapacitated. My nurse's license
are [sic] inactive."
When asked if she eats regularly, respondent discussed her mother
leaving a house to her and her father getting mad at her when she
tells him that. Respondent stated she did not feel like taking
her own life, but when asked if she ever told anybody at
McFarland that she might take her own life, she stated, "Here,
no." When asked if she had a desire to physically harm anyone,
she stated, "No. But I am not going to be beat on either."
Later in the hearing, when asked if she thought there was any
chance she could engage in serious physical harm to herself or
another, respondent stated, "If they don't attack me, I will be
fine." Throughout the hearing, respondent discussed how "they"
put illicit drugs in her drink and smeared blood on her. Respon-
dent also discussed Enron, George Ryan, rape, and murder.
Based on respondent's testimony, which the trial court
described as containing "numerous thoughts" and "ramblings"
"making little, if any sense," the court's finding that respon-
dent failed to establish a prima facie case for discharge is not
against the manifest weight of the evidence.
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D. The Dissent
Justice Knecht's dissent addresses important questions
about the handling of these cases. Does a petition for involun-
tary admission require some consideration of respondent's best
interests? Or is it more a ritual, where the courts simply make
sure that all boxes have been checked? Is respondent's counsel,
or respondent herself, allowed to make any decisions? It is
important that statutory requirements be complied with but
elimination of any ability on the part of the court or counsel to
exercise discretion and act in the best interest of respondent
frustrates the purpose of the Code. Unfortunately, technical
violations in these cases are usually raised for the first time
in the appellate court, without having been addressed by the
trial court.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's
judgment.
Affirmed.
STEIGMANN, P.J., concurs.
KNECHT, J., dissents.
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JUSTICE KNECHT dissents:
Respondent was improperly transferred to McFarland
Mental Health Center. The Code does not permit the transfer of a
respondent from a private facility to a Department facility in
these circumstances. There is no statutory authority to initiate
such a transfer.
The State should not have made the transfer motion,
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respondent's counsel should not have agreed to the transfer, the
judge should not have entered the order, and McFarland should not
have accepted respondent's transfer; and this court should
reverse.
Respondent's counsel is her lawyer, not her social
worker. Counsel has no authority to acquiesce to the transfer of
the client from a local hospital to a confined mental-health
facility operated by the department simply because such a trans-
fer may appear inevitable. When a petition is filed seeking to
take away someone's liberty--even if the world at large believes
it is for the person's own good--it is an adversarial proceeding.
The State had an obligation to timely bring the petition to
hearing, observe the rights of respondent and prove the case.
Instead, respondent was transferred to a restrictive
state facility before the hearing. She was transferred in
advance to the same facility where she would be confined when,
and if, anyone proved she belonged there. Prejudice is inherent
in such a transfer. When the hearing finally took place, it had
been continued three times. A cynic would suggest there was less
motivation to hold the hearing with dispatch because she was
already confined where medical professionals wanted her to be.
Perhaps if I had a family member who needed treatment,
I would think such a transfer was a good idea. Perhaps the
legislature should authorize such transfers. Until that occurs,
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I contend this respondent was improperly transferred to her
prejudice. There is no dispute respondent is mentally ill. Her
schizo-affective disorder rendered her delusional with poor
judgment. The majority suggests respondent agreed to the trans-
fer. If she agreed, what weight should be given to that agree-
ment given her illness?
Mental-health cases are treated differently than other
proceedings because we have permitted them to become different.
Just as society is uncomfortable with the mentally ill, so too
are lawyers and courts. That discomfort may make us forget the
purpose of the statutory framework is to protect the seriously
mentally ill, not just from themselves, but from us.
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