In re Todd K.

NO. 4-06-0525 Filed 2/20/07
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
In re: TODD K., a Person Found Subject ) Appeal from
to Involuntary Admission, ) Circuit Court of
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Sangamon County
Petitioner-Appellee, ) No. 06MH399
v. )
TODD K., ) Honorable
Respondent-Appellant. ) George H. Ray,
) Judge Presiding.
_________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE COOK delivered the opinion of the court:
On June 16, 2006, respondent, Todd K., was found to be
a person subject to involuntary admission and was ordered hospi-
talized for 90 days. Respondent appeals. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
On June 9, 2006, Robert Fitzgerald filed a petition for
the emergency involuntary admission of respondent along with
three certificates of qualified professionals stating respondent
is subject to involuntary admission. At a hearing on June 16,
2004, Dr. Stacey Horstman, respondent's treating psychiatrist,
testified that she was acquainted with respondent through a prior
hospitalization, had treated him for the past week, and had
attempted to examine him on June 9, 2004. At the examination,
respondent refused to get out of bed and speak to Dr. Horstman,
stating that he wished to speak with "the other doctor," who did
not seem to exist. Dr. Horstman noted that respondent appeared
disorganized and seemed to be responding to internal stimuli.
Dr. Horstman stated respondent had schizophrenia, and
due to his mental illness, respondent was at risk of inflicting
harm upon others. In reaching this opinion, Dr. Horstman consid-
ered respondent's past medical records that revealed that respon-
dent was brought to the hospital on this most recent occasion
because he tried to choke a mental-health staff member. Further,
the records showed that respondent had been hospitalized in the
past for assaulting a police officer.
Dr. Horstman considered respondent in need of treatment
and formulated a plan for that treatment. According to her
treatment plan, Dr. Horstman opined that the least-restrictive
treatment option was involuntary commitment for 90 days.
The State rested after presenting Dr. Horstman's
testimony, and respondent moved for a directed finding. Respon-
dent's motion was denied, and respondent testified. Respondent
answered that he had "not really" been present for the hearing
thus far and did not hear the testimony of Dr. Horstman. Respon-
dent testified that he did not attack or choke anyone but admit-
ted he was confrontational with a police officer who accused him
of the attack. Respondent then renewed his motion for a directed
finding, and the motion was denied.
The trial court found that based upon Dr. Horstman's
testimony, respondent was subject to involuntary admission as he
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suffered from a mental illness and was likely to inflict harm
upon himself or others if he was not hospitalized and treated.
The court reviewed the treatment plan and determined that invol-
untary commitment for 90 days was the least-restrictive alterna-
tive. This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
Respondent argues that his procedural due-process
rights were violated when his guardian was not notified or
consulted about respondent's hearing. Further, respondent claims
that the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence
that involuntary admission was warranted.
A. Procedural Due-Process Violation
We review the issue of whether respondent's procedural
due-process rights were violated de novo as the allegations
involve only questions of law. In re George O., 314 Ill. App. 3d
1044, 1046, 734 N.E.2d 13, 15 (2000).
Respondent argues that although his guardian was
provided with a copy of the petition for emergency involuntary
admission of respondent, the failure to notify the guardian of
the hearing violated his procedural due-process rights. Sections
3-609 and 3-611 of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabili-
ties Code (Code) (405 ILCS 5/3-609, 3-611 (West 2004)) direct
that appropriate notice be served upon respondent, his attorney,
and his guardian after a petition is filed and after the court
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sets a hearing. Respondent argues failure to comply with the
Code requires vacating his involuntary admission.
The State responds that respondent has forfeited this
issue by failing to raise this objection before the trial court
or preserve it in his posttrial motion. Further, respondent has
not demonstrated any prejudice from this technical violation.
The record shows that respondent's guardian was served
with a copy of the petition and was referenced in the treatment
plan as having been contacted.
Even if we deemed this issue not forfeited, respondent
has not demonstrated prejudice from the lack of formal notice of
the hearing to his guardian. See In re Nau, 153 Ill. 2d 406,
419, 607 N.E.2d 134, 140 (1992) (reversal of a commitment order
is not warranted based upon a procedural defect if the defect was
harmless as the purpose of the statute was met). Notice to the
guardian, like notice to the respondent, should be to give the
guardian a chance to assist the respondent in preparing for the
proceeding and a chance to be heard. See Nau, 153 Ill. 2d at
419, 607 N.E.2d at 140, quoting In re Splett, 143 Ill. 2d 225,
232, 572 N.E.2d 883, 886 (1991). The record suggests that
despite the guardian's failure to attend the hearing, respon-
dent's guardian was aware of the situation as he received a copy
of the petition and was contacted for the treatment plan. As the
guardian was aware of the proceeding, he had the chance to assist
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respondent, and the failure to formally notify him of the time
and date of the hearing was harmless. Because respondent was
afforded all of the procedural safeguards contemplated by the
statute, respondent's due-process rights were not violated.
B. Clear and Convincing Evidence of Involuntary Admission
A person may be involuntarily admitted if it is estab-
lished by clear and convincing evidence (405 ILCS 5/3-808 (West
2004)) that the person has a mental illness and "because of his
or her illness is reasonably expected to inflict serious physical
harm upon himself or herself or another in the near future" (405
ILCS 5/1-119(1) (West 2004)). The standard of review for an
involuntary-commitment proceeding is whether the judgment is
against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re Knapp, 231
Ill. App. 3d 917, 919, 596 N.E.2d 1171, 1172 (1992). The trial
court's decision is given great deference and, absent a showing
that it is against the manifest weight of the evidence, it "'will
not be set aside at the appellate level, even if the reviewing
court, after applying the clear and convincing standard, would
have ruled differently.'" In re Bennett, 251 Ill. App. 3d 887,
888, 623 N.E.2d 942, 944 (1993), quoting In re Orr, 176 Ill. App.
3d 498, 505, 531 N.E.2d 64, 69 (1988).
The trial court's finding that respondent was mentally
ill is not in dispute. Dr. Horstman testified respondent had
been treated for schizophrenia in the past and opined that
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respondent was still suffering from schizophrenia. According to
respondent, however, Dr. Horstman's testimony never clearly and
convincingly proved that due to respondent's mental illness, he
was reasonably expected to threaten or imminently harm another.
Dr. Horstman did not observe or have any knowledge of the alleged
"choking" incident and did not observe any other incidents that
would support her conclusion that respondent was a danger.
Further, respondent denied that he ever choked anyone and only
agreed that he was confrontational when he was accused.
We do not agree with respondent that Dr. Horstman's
opinion was based purely on someone telling her that respondent
had tried to choke someone. Dr. Horstman testified that she was
acquainted with respondent through a prior commitment, and the
records show that the prior commitment was due to respondent's
aggravated battery to a police officer and resisting arrest.
Further, the treatment plan discussed respondent's long-standing
history of schizophrenia and his noncompliance with taking his
medications for the past year. The plan discussed how respondent
had reportedly been increasingly agitated and aggressive. When
respondent was taken to the emergency room after the police found
him wandering the streets after the alleged choking incident,
respondent was disoriented, had poor personal hygiene, seemed to
be responding to internal stimuli, and became so aggressive that
restraints were necessary. This evidence, as well as Dr.
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Horstman's observations of respondent, supported her opinion that
respondent was a danger to others.
Respondent suggests that Dr. Horstman's opinion that he
was likely to hurt someone in the near future is speculative
unless she witnessed an incident or act of aggression herself.
We disagree. A treating psychiatrist's opinion of potential
dangerousness need not be derived from firsthand observations of
violence and may be based on knowledge of incidents derived from
medical history records. In re Houlihan, 231 Ill. App. 3d 677,
683, 596 N.E.2d 189, 194 (1992). An examining physician may
properly consider a respondent's complete medical history in
forming her opinion concerning that respondent's current and
future dangerousness. In re Robert H., 302 Ill. App. 3d 980,
986, 707 N.E.2d 264, 269 (1999). "A commitment order should be
affirmed where there is evidence of prior conduct along with
evidence that the respondent remains in need of mental treat-
ment." Robert H., 302 Ill. App. 3d at 986-87, 707 N.E.2d at 269.
Further, the court does not have to wait until respondent hurts
himself or someone else before involuntarily committing him. In
re Manis, 213 Ill. App. 3d 1075, 1077, 572 N.E.2d 1213, 1214
(1991).
Because the trial court is in a superior position to
determine witness credibility and to weigh evidence, we give
great deference to the trial court's findings. Knapp, 231 Ill.
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App. 3d at 919, 596 N.E.2d at 1172. The court was in the best
position to determine that respondent's denial of the attack was
not credible and Dr. Horstman's opinion that respondent was a
danger to others was. Based on Dr. Horstman's testimony, the
trial court's finding that respondent was subject to involuntary
admission was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Respondent argues, though, that the State presented
insufficient evidence to show that involuntary admission was the
least-restrictive alternative. Respondent's medical records show
that he has a history of involuntary admissions and noncompliance
with taking his prescribed medications. The treatment plan
suggested he had not taken his medications for a year. While
respondent has a legal guardian who supports him and he receives
social security disability, respondent had recently been evicted
according to the treatment plan. As the evidence suggested
respondent was not taking his medication, had a history of
violence toward others, and had recently been acting aggres-
sively, the trial court could easily conclude that involuntary
commitment was the least-restrictive alternative.
Based on the information in the treatment plan and Dr.
Horstman's opinion that involuntary admission was the least-
restrictive alternative, the trial court's findings that respon-
dent is a person who is mentally ill, that respondent poses a
danger to others, and that involuntary commitment is the least-
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restrictive alternative are not against the manifest weight of
the evidence.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's
judgment.
Affirmed.
STEIGMANN, P.J., and MYERSCOUGH, J., concur.
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