People v. Anderson

NO. 4-06-0021 Filed 1/9/07
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) Macon County
CHARLES J. ANDERSON, ) No. 01CF369
Defendant-Appellant. )
) Honorable
) James R. Coryell,
) Judge Presiding.
_________________________________________________________________
PRESIDING JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the opinion of
the court:
In March 2001, the State charged defendant, Charles J.
Anderson, with burglary (720 ILCS 5/19-1(a) (West 2000)). In May
2002, the trial court granted defendant's request to participate
in counseling under the Drug Court Treatment Act (730 ILCS 166/1
through 35 (West 2002)) in exchange for (1) defendant's jury-
trial waiver and (2) his stipulation to the evidence that could
be considered at a bench trial on the burglary charge in the
event he was unsuccessfully dismissed from the Act's drug-treat-
ment program.
In December 2005, the trial court found that defendant
had violated the terms of the drug-treatment program and ordered
him removed from it. The court then took judicial notice of
defendant's earlier waiver and stipulation and ultimately sen-
tenced him to 14 years in prison for burglary.
Defendant appeals, arguing that (1) the trial court
erred by removing him from the drug-treatment program because it
had no jurisdiction to do so and (2) he is entitled to an addi-
tional two days' credit against his sentence. Because we agree
only with defendant's second argument, we affirm as modified and
remand with directions.
I. BACKGROUND
As earlier stated, in May 2002, defendant was accepted
into the drug-treatment program in exchange for his jury-trial
waiver and his stipulation to the evidence that would be consid-
ered at a bench trial in the event he was unsuccessfully dis-
missed from the drug-treatment program. That written stipulation
of evidence made clear that defendant committed the March 2001
burglary with which the State had charged him.
To participate in the drug-treatment program, defendant
was also required to sign a Macon County drug-court-participant
agreement (hereinafter the agreement). The agreement was 3 1/2
pages long and imposed multiple requirements upon defendant, such
as his participation in drug-treatment sessions. The agreement
provided, in pertinent part, as follows:
"1. I agree to participate in the
[d]rug [c]ourt [p]rogram for a period of up
to 24 months, during which time the charges
pending against me in this cause will be held
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in abeyance pending successful completion of
the program.
2. I understand that upon successful
completion of the [d]rug [c]ourt [p]rogram
that this case will be dismissed, and I will
not be prosecuted for the offenses alleged
herein.
3. I hereby waive my right to a prelim-
inary hearing, my right to a speedy trial, my
right to a trial by jury, and my right to
confront and cross[-]examine the witnesses
against me. I have executed a [s]tipulation
of [e]vidence in this case[,] pursuant to
which I agree that all police reports, foren-
sic reports, and all other reports relevant
to the charge(s) filed in my case are admis-
sible as evidence against me at trial.
***
5. I agree to obey all laws, and to
abstain from the use of controlled
substances, cannabis, or alcohol.
* * *
14. I understand that I may be unsuc-
cessfully terminated from the [d]rug [c]ourt
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[p]rogram if:
A. I fail to comply with any of
the conditions of the [d]rug
[c]ourt [p]rogram;
B. I commit any criminal offense;
C. I request unsuccessful termina-
tion from the program.
***
16. I understand that upon unsuccessful
termination from the [d]rug [c]ourt [p]rogram
this cause will proceed to immediate trial by
the [c]ourt. I understand that the aforemen-
tioned [s]tipulation of [e]vidence will con-
stitute the evidence received by the [c]ourt
at trial."
Prior to defendant's signing the agreement, the trial
court explained its provisions to him in open court. The court
also admonished defendant pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 402(a)
(177 Ill. 2d R. 402(a)). After defendant indicated he understood
and agreed, the court accepted and entered defendant's agreement
and stipulation of evidence.
In January 2003, the trial court's docket entry re-
vealed, without any further explanation, that the cause was
reallotted for a bench trial the following week. At that later
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hearing, the court summarily dismissed defendant from the drug-
treatment program, reviewed the May 2002 stipulation, and indi-
cated that it contained a sufficient factual basis to support a
conviction for burglary. In March 2003, the court sentenced
defendant to 14 years in prison on the original burglary charge.
Defendant appealed, arguing, in part, that his rights
to due process were violated when he was not afforded a hearing
prior to being dismissed from the drug-treatment program. This
court agreed and reversed and remanded. People v. Anderson, 358
Ill. App. 3d 1108, 1116, 833 N.E.2d 390, 396 (2005).
On remand in September 2005, the State filed a motion
to terminate defendant from the drug-treatment program. In
December 2005, after conducting several evidentiary hearings, the
trial court found that defendant had violated the program's
conditions by committing a theft in January 2003. The court
ordered that defendant be "revoked" from the drug-treatment
program.
At a sentencing hearing later in December 2005, the
trial court considered the presentence investigation report
(PSI), which showed, in pertinent part, that (1) defendant's
first burglary conviction occurred in 1955, (2) since that time,
he had 10 more burglary convictions, and (3) he had 2 convictions
for escaping from a penal institution and numerous theft convic-
tions. After considering the evidence, the PSI, and counsel's
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arguments, the court sentenced defendant to 14 years in prison
for burglary and awarded him 1,399 days of credit for time
previously served in jail or prison.
This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Defendant's Claim That the Trial Court Lacked Jurisdiction
To Terminate His Participation in the Drug-Treatment
Program and Sentence Him to Prison
Defendant first argues that because his participation
in the drug-treatment program was for a period of two years that
ended on May 17, 2004, the trial court had no authority in
December 2005 to revoke his participation in that program and
sentence him to prison. Specifically, he contends that because
the State did not file a petition to terminate his participation
in the drug-treatment program until September 2005, the State had
taken no action to toll the two-year duration of the drug-treat-
ment program. In making this argument, defendant seeks to draw a
parallel to section 5-6-4(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections
(730 ILCS 5/5-6-4(a) (West 2002)), dealing with the revocation of
probation, which provides the following:
"Personal service of the petition for
violation of probation or the issuance of
such warrant, summons[,] or notice shall toll
the period of probation *** until the final
determination of the charge, and the term of
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probation *** shall not run until the hearing
and disposition of the petition for viola-
tion."
We are unpersuaded.
A critical problem with defendant's contention is that
the Act, unlike the Unified Code, contains no language setting
forth how long a defendant's participation in the drug-treatment
program shall be. In contrast, section 5-6-2(b) of the Unified
Code (730 ILCS 5/5-6-2(b) (West 2002)) explicitly sets forth how
long a defendant's period of probation shall be--providing, for
example, that the period of probation for a Class 2 felony (like
burglary) shall not exceed four years (730 ILCS 5/5-6-2(b)(1)
(West 2002)). No need exists for the Act to contain a provision
to toll the length of a defendant's participation in a drug-
treatment program because no statutory time limit for such
participation exists.
Defendant concedes that the drug-treatment program
differs from probation in that probation is a sentence, while
participation in the drug-treatment program is preadjudicatory,
as this court noted in Anderson, 358 Ill. App. 3d at 1112-13, 833
N.E.2d at 393-94. That difference may account for why the
legislature has not seen fit to be as explicit and demanding
regarding a defendant's participation in a drug-treatment program
under the Act as the legislature has been regarding sentences of
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probation and conditional discharge, which occupy all of article
6 of the Unified Code. See 730 ILCS 5/5-6-1 through 5-6-4.1
(West 2002).
In any event, the agreement defendant signed contained
no absolute deadline of 24 months. Instead, it provided that
defendant would participate "for a period of up to 24 months,
during which time the charges pending against [him] in this cause
will be held in abeyance pending successful completion of the
program." (Emphasis added.) No provision of the Act nor any
other provision of law barred the State from resurrecting defen-
dant's dormant burglary charge after the initial 24 months of
defendant's participation in that program.
Further, we are particularly disinclined to impose such
a bar under the circumstances of this case, where the State's
September 2005 motion to terminate defendant from the program was
based upon his alleged commission of a January 2003 residential
burglary and theft, which defendant was clearly informed about at
defendant's September 2003 sentencing hearing. Testimony was
presented at that hearing concerning those charges. Even though
this court later reversed and remanded, the evidence presented at
that hearing certainly put defendant on notice both of the
State's position and that what the State was alleging constituted
the basis for revoking defendant's participation in the drug-
treatment program. In fact, the same evidence was presented
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again at the evidentiary hearings the trial court conducted in
response to the State's September 2005 motion to terminate
defendant from the drug-treatment program. Thus, even if the
tolling provisions of section 5-6-4(a) of the Unified Code
applied to defendant's case, the State's only failure here was a
technical one--that is, not filing an earlier motion to terminate
defendant from the drug-treatment program, thereby putting him on
notice (which the record shows he had anyway).
B. Defendant's Claim That He Is Entitled to
Additional Credit for Time Served
Defendant also argues that he is entitled to two
additional days' credit for time served prior to his December
2005 sentencing. He claims that the record shows that he is
entitled to 1,401 days of credit, yet the trial court credited
him with only 1,399 days. The State concedes this argument, and
we accept the State's concession. We thus remand with instruc-
tions that the court amend the sentencing order to reflect two
additional days of credit.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's
judgment as modified and remand with directions to amend the
sentencing order as indicated.
Affirmed as modified; cause remanded with directions.
KNECHT and TURNER, JJ., concur.
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