People v. Griffin

Filed 9/30/08 NO. 4-05-1016
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) McLean County
LONA R. GRIFFIN, ) No. 01CF90
Defendant-Appellee. )
) Honorable
) Scott Drazewski,
) Judge Presiding.
_________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the opinion of the court:
In June 2001, a jury convicted defendant, Lona R.
Griffin, of first degree murder of her infant son, Joseph. The
trial court later sentenced her to 25 years in prison. On
appeal, this court reversed defendant's conviction and remanded
for further proceedings. People v. Griffin, 351 Ill. App. 3d
838, 856, 815 N.E.2d 52, 66 (2004). On remand, defendant filed
two motions to suppress evidence, arguing that the police improp-
erly obtained statements that she made during two separate
custodial interrogations because they (1) did not first inform
her of her constitutional rights pursuant to the United States
Supreme Court's holding in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16
L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966), and (2) used the "question
first-warn later" technique repudiated by the Supreme Court in
Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 159 L. Ed. 2d 643, 124 S. Ct.
2601 (2004). In October 2005, the court granted defendant's
motions.
The State appeals, arguing that the trial court erred
by granting defendant's motions to suppress evidence. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In January 2001, the State charged defendant with first
degree murder, alleging that she knowingly caused Joseph's death
when she forcefully pressed his face and chest into her chest,
causing him to suffocate, knowing her acts created a strong
probability of death or great bodily harm (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2)
(West 2000)). Following a June 2001 trial, a jury convicted
defendant of first degree murder and the trial court sentenced
her as earlier stated.
In August 2004, this court reversed defendant's convic-
tion and remanded the case for further proceedings. Specifi-
cally, this court concluded that the trial court erred by failing
to provide the appropriate jury instruction regarding the mental
state of knowledge in response to the jury's question regarding
the difference between knowledge and intent. Griffin, 351 Ill.
App. 3d at 855, 815 N.E.2d at 66.
In May 2005, defendant filed a motion to suppress
evidence, arguing that the police improperly obtained statements
she made during a custodial interrogation on January 24, 2001,
because they did not first inform her of her Miranda rights.
Later in May 2005, defendant filed a supplemental motion to
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suppress evidence, arguing that (1) statements she made during a
custodial interrogation on January 24, 2001, after being informed
of her Miranda rights, should be suppressed because the interro-
gating officers used the "question first-warn later" technique
repudiated by the Supreme Court in Seibert; and (2) statements
she made on January 25, 2001, should be suppressed because the
interrogating officers had not reinformed her of her Miranda
rights.
At the hearing on her motions to suppress evidence,
Bloomington police detective Clay Wheeler, a 14-year veteran,
testified that on January 23, 2001, he interviewed defendant in a
private waiting room in a Bloomington hospital. The tape-re-
corded interview lasted approximately 20 minutes and consisted of
questions concerning the circumstances surrounding Joseph's
injuries. Defendant willingly answered his questions. At the
conclusion of the interview, Wheeler left and returned to his
police station.
On January 24, 2001, Wheeler received notification that
Joseph had died. At Joseph's autopsy, the forensic pathologist
told Wheeler that Joseph’s cause of death was nonaccidental
asphyxia (suffocation). Specifically, Wheeler was informed that
Joseph had been deprived of oxygen for at least four minutes.
Wheeler then decided to reinterview defendant.
Wheeler went to defendant's home and asked her to
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accompany him to the police station to answer questions regarding
Joseph's death. Wheeler testified at the hearing that he wanted
to question defendant at the station because (1) it was a con-
trolled setting that would minimize outside interruption and (2)
it would afford him the opportunity to videotape the questioning
to ensure the details of their conversation were available and
accurate. Defendant agreed but wanted her father, who was in her
home at that time, to accompany her.
Wheeler transported defendant and her father to the
station in an unmarked police car. Upon their arrival, Wheeler
separated defendant from her father and ordered him to go to a
public waiting room. Defendant asked Wheeler if her father could
accompany her, but Wheeler refused to allow defendant's father to
be present during her interrogation.
At approximately 4:30 p.m., defendant was placed in an
interrogation room that had one small window located on the
door's entrance. Wheeler told defendant that he was going to
close the door for privacy but that if she needed anything, to
let him know. Wheeler then closed the interrogation room door,
which remained unlocked. However, Wheeler testified that defen-
dant was not free to roam the police station despite Wheeler's
statement to her that (1) she was not under arrest and (2) she
was free to leave at any time.
A short time later, Wheeler and at least one other
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detective began interrogating defendant. After interrogating her
for approximately 2 hours and 10 minutes, defendant stated that
she believed it was possible that she caused Joseph to stop
breathing. Wheeler then informed defendant of her rights pursu-
ant to the Supreme Court's holding in Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478-
79, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 726, 86 S. Ct. at 1630. Defendant said that
she understood her rights and waived them. Wheeler then immedi-
ately resumed interrogating defendant. At approximately 7:28
p.m., Wheeler concluded the interrogation and placed defendant
under arrest.
The next day, defendant, who was then in custody in the
McLean County jail, asked to speak with one of the detectives who
had questioned her. When Wheeler and another detective arrived
at the jail, defendant could not remember why she asked to speak
with them. Instead of formally informing defendant of her
Miranda rights, Wheeler reminded her that "she still had the
rights [he] had [previously] explained to her and [that] she did
not have to talk to [him]." Wheeler testified that defendant
responded that she understood her rights and that "she did not
mind talking to him." In response to Wheeler's questions,
defendant (1) stated that what she had told Wheeler the previous
day was true and (2) acknowledged that she had held Joseph close
to her chest and squeezed him until he stopped breathing.
Defendant testified that when Wheeler transported her
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and her father to the police station, she was not searched,
handcuffed, or told that she was under arrest. Defendant testi-
fied that during the police station interrogation on January 24,
2001, she (1) was not told that she was free to leave at any
time, (2) was asked the same questions that she had earlier
answered, (3) did not think she could stop answering questions,
(4) thought the interrogation room door was locked, and (5)
believed she was under arrest. Defendant also testified that
during the interrogation the next day at the jail, she could not
recall (1) whether Wheeler had informed her about her Miranda
rights or (2) what they spoke about.
Alvin A. House, a clinical psychologist, testified that
defendant had an intelligence quotient of approximately 70, which
fell within the borderline category of intellectual functioning.
House opined that based on the various tests he administered,
defendant had below-average mental abilities.
In addition to the testimony provided at defendant's
hearing on her motion to suppress evidence, the parties stipu-
lated to the admission of the videotaped interrogation conducted
on January 24, 2001, and the accompanying transcript.
In October 2005, the trial court found that, with
regard to the January 24, 2001, interrogation, defendant (1)
knowingly and intelligently waived her Miranda rights, (2) was
subjected to a custodial interrogation prior to being informed of
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her Miranda rights, and (3) was subjected to an improper custo-
dial interrogation in violation of Seibert, which negated defen-
dant's Miranda waiver. In addition, the court also found that
defendant's statements on January 25, 2001, were inadmissible
because she was not reinformed of her Miranda rights prior to
being subjected to further police interrogation. Therefore, the
court entered an order suppressing defendant's statements made on
January 24 and 25, 2001.
This appeal followed.
II. THE STATE'S CLAIM THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY
GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE
The question before this court is whether defendant's
statements in response to police questioning on January 24 and
25, 2001, should be suppressed. The State argues that the trial
court erred by granting defendant's motions to suppress evidence.
Specifically, the State contends that because (1) defendant was
not in custody prior to being informed of her Miranda rights and
(2) defendant's postwarning statements were not obtained in
violation of the Supreme Court's holding in Seibert, her January
24, 2001, statements are admissible. The State also contends
that officers were not required to reinform defendant of her
Miranda rights on January 25, 2001, because there was no substan-
tial probability that defendant's January 24, 2001, Miranda
warnings were so stale and remote that defendant was unaware of
her rights at the time of the January 25, 2001, interrogation.
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Thus, the State asserts that defendant's January 25, 2001,
statements are also admissible. We address the State's conten-
tions in turn.
A. Standard of Review
In People v. Slater, 228 Ill. 2d 137, 149, 886 N.E.2d
986, 994 (2008), the Supreme Court of Illinois recently stated
the applicable standard of review in determining the appropriate-
ness of the trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress as
follows:
"In determining whether a trial court
has properly ruled on a motion to suppress,
findings of fact and credibility determina-
tions made by the trial court are accorded
great deference and will be reversed only if
they are against the manifest weight of the
evidence. [Citations.] We review de novo,
however, the ultimate question posed by the
legal challenge to the trial court's ruling
on a suppression motion. [Citation.] ***
Where a defendant challenges the admissibil-
ity of a confession through a motion to sup-
press, the State bears the burden of proving
the confession was voluntary by a preponder-
ance of the evidence. [Citations.]"
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B. Custodial Interrogation
1. The Definition of Custodial Interrogation
In Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478-79, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 726, 86
S. Ct. at 1630, the Supreme Court held the following:
"[W]hen an individual is taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom
by the authorities in any significant way and
is subjected to questioning, the privilege
against self-incrimination is jeopardized.
*** He must be warned prior to any question-
ing that he has the right to remain silent,
that anything he says can be used against him
in a court of law, that he has the right to
the presence of an attorney, and that if he
cannot afford an attorney[,] one will be
appointed for him prior to any questioning if
he so desires."
The Supreme Court defined custodial interrogation as
"questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person
has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom
of action in any significant way." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 16
L. Ed. 2d at 706, 86 S. Ct. at 1612. Thus, "'Miranda warnings
are required only where there has been such a restriction on a
person's freedom as to render him "in custody." It was that sort
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of coercive environment to which Miranda by its terms was made
applicable, and to which it is limited.'" (Emphasis omitted.)
People v. Hetzel, 181 Ill. App. 3d 85, 92, 536 N.E.2d 909, 913
(1989), quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 50 L. Ed.
2d 714, 719, 97 S. Ct. 711, 714 (1977).
2. Factors That Determine Whether an
Interrogation Is Custodial
"The determination of whether a defendant is 'in
custody' for Miranda purposes involves '[t]wo discrete inquiries
***: first, what were the circumstances surrounding the interro-
gation; and second, given those circumstances, would a reasonable
person have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the
interrogation and leave.'" People v. Braggs, 209 Ill. 2d 492,
505-06, 810 N.E.2d 472, 481 (2003), quoting Thompson v. Keohane,
516 U.S. 99, 112, 133 L. Ed. 2d 383, 394, 116 S. Ct. 457, 465
(1995).
When examining the circumstances surrounding the
interrogation, the supreme court has held that the following
factors are relevant in determining whether a statement was made
in a custodial setting:
"(1) the location, time, length, mood, and
mode of the questioning; (2) the number of
police officers present during the interroga-
tion; (3) the presence or absence of family
and friends of the individual; (4) any indi-
- 10 -
cia of a formal arrest procedure, such as the
show of weapons or force, physical restraint,
booking[,] or fingerprinting; (5) the manner
by which the individual arrived at the place
of questioning; and (6) the age, intelli-
gence, and mental makeup of the accused."
Slater, 228 Ill. 2d at 150, 886 N.E.2d at
995.
"Regarding the reasonable-person portion of the custody
inquiry, 'the accepted test is what a reasonable person, innocent
of any crime, would have thought had he or she been in the
defendant's shoes.'" People v. Croom, 379 Ill. App. 3d 341, 349,
883 N.E.2d 681, 688 (2008), quoting Braggs, 209 Ill. 2d at 506,
810 N.E.2d at 482.
Although police officers conducting an interrogation
may tell a suspect that she is not under arrest and is therefore
free to leave at any time--as the State claims occurred here--a
suspect may still reasonably perceive that she was in custody.
People v. Gorman, 207 Ill. App. 3d 461, 475, 565 N.E.2d 1349,
1358 (1991). Just as "no talismanic incantation [is] required to
satisfy [Miranda's] strictures" (California v. Prysock, 453 U.S.
355, 359, 69 L. Ed. 2d 696, 701, 101 S. Ct. 2806, 2809 (1981)),
an officer's statement to a suspect that she is free to leave at
any time--thus, implying that she is in control although she sits
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in an interrogation room located inside the police station,
staring at two imposing police officers who doubt her answers to
their questions--similarly holds no magical qualities and may be
rendered nugatory by the circumstances in which it was said.
Indeed, any control the police exercised over the suspect has
historically been viewed by courts as inconsistent with the
contention that the police told her she was free to go. See
Gorman, 207 Ill. App. 3d at 475, 565 N.E.2d at 1358 (mentioning
cases where the court found suspects to be in custody during
their interrogations because the police exercised control over
them at the police station).
3. Factors That Some Courts Have Discussed in Determining
Whether an Interrogation Is Custodial
Some courts have discussed the intent, knowledge, or
focus of the police at the time of a suspect's interrogation as
valid factors in determining whether the defendant was in custody
for Miranda purposes. However, in People v. Goyer, 265 Ill. App.
3d 160, 166, 638 N.E.2d 390, 394 (1994), this court clarified
"the very limited relevancy of a police officer's intent, knowl-
edge, or focus" with regard to custodial interrogations. The
officer's private thoughts are irrelevant because the officer's
undisclosed knowledge, suspicion, intent, focus, subjective view,
or thoughts can neither influence the suspect nor affect the
coercive atmosphere of the interrogation. Goyer, 265 Ill. App.
3d at 167, 638 N.E.2d at 395.
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In so clarifying, we reaffirmed our holding in Gorman
that "if undisclosed, an officer's subjective thoughts and
beliefs are irrelevant to the assessment whether the defendant is
in custody." Goyer, 265 Ill. App. 3d at 167, 638 N.E.2d at 395.
See Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323, 128 L. Ed. 2d
293, 298, 114 S. Ct. 1526, 1529 (1994) ("initial determination of
custody depends on the objective circumstances of the interroga-
tion, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interro-
gating officers or the person being questioned"). Thus, "[t]he
intent of police officers is relevant only to the extent that it
may assist the trier of fact in determining whether the police,
through their verbal and nonverbal conduct, created a coercive
atmosphere requiring the Miranda warnings." Gorman, 207 Ill.
App. 3d at 473, 565 N.E.2d at 1356.
We find support for reaffirming our holding in Gorman
in the supreme court's recent decision in Slater, 228 Ill. 2d at
150,886 N.E.2d at 995, which omitted the intent, knowledge, or
focus of the police at the time of a suspect's interrogation from
the relevant factors the supreme court listed that determine
whether a statement was made in a custodial setting. We do not
view the supreme court's omission as inadvertent. Instead, we
conclude the supreme court means what it said--namely that a
police officer's focus on a suspect is not a relevant factor for
Miranda purposes in determining whether a statement was made in a
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custodial setting.
Nonetheless, we acknowledge the supreme court's even
more recent decision in People v. Lopez, 229 Ill. 2d 322, 346,
892 N.E.2d 1047, 1061 (2008), where the court wrote the follow-
ing:
"In [People v.] Melock[, 149 Ill. 2d 423,
436-37, 599 N.E.2d 941, 946 (1992)], we con-
sidered several factors when determining
whether a reasonable person would not have
felt free to leave, such as: the intent of
the officer; the understanding of the defen-
dant; whether defendant was told he was free
to leave or that he was under arrest; whether
the defendant would have been restrained if
he attempted to leave; the length of the
interrogation; and whether Miranda warnings
were given." (Emphasis added.)
Because the decision of the supreme court in Lopez
contains no indication that it was disregarding what it said
three months earlier in Slater about factors to be considered
when determining whether a person was in custody, we will con-
tinue to follow its holding in Slater, which is more consistent
with the teaching of the United States Supreme Court in Stansbury
on this subject.
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4. The Interrogation in This Case
The State first contends that because defendant was not
in custody prior to being informed of her Miranda rights, her
prewarning statements are admissible. We disagree.
In this case, the trial court made the following
findings in determining that defendant was subjected to a custo-
dial interrogation prior to being informed of her Miranda rights:
(1) the officers transported defendant to the police station at
(a) their request and (b) a date and time they chose; (2) the
officers did not allow defendant's father to be present during
the interrogation; (3) defendant was required to first ask for
police assistance prior to engaging in an activity that required
her to leave the interrogation room; (4) when the officers left
defendant alone, they closed the interrogation room door; (5) the
interrogation room was windowless (the court later amended its
findings to reflect that a small window was located on the
interrogation room door); (6) the officers situated themselves
between defendant and the interrogation room door; (7) defendant
was 20 years old, had below-average intelligence, and was inexpe-
rienced with the criminal justice system; (8) defendant was the
focal point of the investigation; and (9) before informing
defendant of her Miranda rights, the officers were openly skepti-
cal of her answers and "exhorted, enticed, and cajoled her until
they [received] the answers that they were seeking."
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Our review of the record reveals that the trial court's
findings are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. In
so concluding, we note that the court considered the police
officers' undisclosed knowledge and focus in determining whether
defendant was in custody for Miranda purposes. Specifically, the
court noted that defendant was the (1) focal point of the inves-
tigation because the officers were aware of the cause of Joseph's
death and (2) only person with Joseph at the time of his death.
For the reasons we mentioned earlier, the court should not have
considered these factors. However, given that the court appro-
priately considered the other factors in finding defendant was
subjected to a custodial interrogation prior to being informed of
her Miranda rights, we adhere to our conclusion that the court's
determination was not against the manifest weight of the evi-
dence.
We find support for our conclusion by reviewing the
circumstances at the police station. As earlier stated, the
interrogating officers claimed that they told defendant she was
free to leave the police station at any time. If this statement
were in fact true, it meant that defendant had the maximum amount
of control over the circumstances of her interrogation. After
all, if she had the power to end the questioning whenever she
wished and to simply walk away, then setting reasonable condi-
tions short of walking away should also be in her power. How-
- 16 -
ever, defendant attempted to exercise that lesser control and was
rebuffed--that is, she requested that her father be present
during the interrogations and the officers declined her request.
By doing so, the officers betrayed their earlier statement to
her, implying that she was in charge, and sent a clear message
that they were in control. Thus, their actions were inconsistent
with their statement to defendant and support the trial court's
finding that she was in custody.
5. Epilogue
a. The Defendant's Burden of Production
As earlier stated, for the safeguards announced in
Miranda to apply, the determination that a defendant was in
custody requires an objective analysis of the circumstances
surrounding the interrogation from the point of view of a reason-
able person in the suspect's position, innocent of any crime.
However, "[w]ithout affirmative evidence that the defendant
believed he was in custody, the trial court need not consider
what a reasonable person in the same position would have believed
and can simply deny the motion to suppress." Goyer, 265 Ill.
App. 3d at 164, 638 N.E.2d at 393.
In Goyer, 265 Ill. App. 3d at 165, 638 N.E.2d at 393,
this court posed the following hypothetical to clarify the issue:
would the trial court need to consider what a reasonable person
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in the defendant's circumstances would believe if the defendant
testified that he did not believe he was in custody, but rather,
believed he was free to leave at any time? In responding that
the trial court would not, this court held that
"when a defendant makes a motion to suppress
his statements because he was in custody and
not advised of his Miranda rights, before the
trial court can conclude that defendant was
in custody, it must first find that (1) de-
fendant subjectively believed he was in cus-
tody, and (2) a reasonable person in defen-
dant's position, innocent of any crime, would
also believe himself to be in custody. [Ci-
tation.] Thus, a defendant bringing such a
motion to suppress bears the burden of pro-
duction to show that he subjectively believed
himself to be in custody during the police
questioning." Goyer, 265 Ill. App. 3d at
165, 638 N.E.2d at 393-94.
In many cases, this issue is not argued because a
defendant typically testifies--as did defendant in this case--
that she believed she was in custody. Regardless, we reaffirm
our holding in Goyer that a defendant who seeks to suppress his
statements on the ground that he was in custody during the police
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interrogation must first testify that he did in fact believe he
was in custody during the interrogation.
b. Police Station Interrogations
Initially, we note that the parties in this case did
not argue--and correctly so--that Wheeler's interview of defen-
dant conducted at the hospital on January 23, 2001, was a custo-
dial interrogation. This may be because the coercive environment
and restriction on defendant's freedom so important to a finding
that she was in custody was totally absent in analyzing the
circumstances surrounding that interview. However, the same is
not true of the interrogation the police conducted the next day
inside the police station.
Over 17 years ago, this court addressed the risks that
police officers take in conducting what they claim to be non-
custodial interrogations at a police station. In Gorman, 207
Ill. App. 3d at 470, 565 N.E.2d at 1355, this court stated that
"[w]henever the police choose to conduct 'non[]custodial interro-
gations' at the police station, there is a substantial risk that
a court subsequently will disagree that the circumstances were
noncustodial." See People v. Wheeler, 281 Ill. App. 3d 447, 456,
667 N.E.2d 158, 164 (1996) (where the court recognized that when
"police select a police station as the location for questioning a
suspect, this setting naturally supports the argument that the
suspect was subject to a custodial interrogation").
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This risk arises because a defendant's inevitable
claim--as in this case--that his statements were the result of a
custodial interrogation, will become an issue for a court to
resolve based on the factors previously discussed. Thus, "[t]he
placement of furniture, the size of the room, the presence of
armed officers, whether doors were opened or closed (and if
closed, whether they were locked), the transport of the suspect
into the depths of a building where ingress and egress is typi-
cally controlled by security measures," are all circumstances
surrounding the interrogation that might give support to a
defendant's claim that he did not believe he was free to leave.
Gorman, 207 Ill. App. 3d at 471, 565 N.E.2d at 1355.
As we stated in Gorman, if interrogating officers truly
desire to minimize this risk, they should create a noncustodial
interrogation environment by conducting their interrogations
outside of the police station, such as at "the local Burger King
restaurant, a nearby park, the suspect's own residence, or in any
location of the suspect's choosing." (Emphasis in original.)
Gorman, 207 Ill. App. 3d at 471, 565 N.E.2d at 1355. Thus, we
reemphasize that "'Miranda warnings are required only where there
has been such a restriction on a person's freedom as to render
him "in custody."'" Gorman, 207 Ill. App. 3d at 470, 565 N.E.2d
at 1354, quoting Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495, 50 L. Ed. 2d at 719,
97 S. Ct. at 714. If the police wish to interrogate a suspect
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without first informing him of his Miranda rights, they must
ensure that they do not do so in a custodial setting.
C. Seibert and the "Question First-Warn Later" Technique
1. The Supreme Court's Decision in Seibert
In Seibert, 542 U.S. at 617, 159 L. Ed. 2d at 658, 124
S. Ct. at 2613 (plurality opinion of Souter, J., joined by
Stevens, Ginsberg, and Breyer, JJ.), the Supreme Court held that
a suspect's incriminating statements made after police had
administered Miranda warnings were inadmissible because the
officer's interrogation technique rendered the Miranda warnings
ineffective. The statements at issue in Seibert had been ob-
tained by the deliberate use of the "question first-warn later"
technique--that is, where the interrogating officer strategically
withholds Miranda warnings from a suspect until he makes incrimi-
nating statements and then, after obtaining a waiver of his
Miranda rights, questions the suspect again by confronting him
with his prewarning statements. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 604, 159 L.
Ed. 2d at 650, 124 S. Ct. at 2605.
The Seibert plurality reasoned that the employment of
this technique frustrated the intent of Miranda because "[u]pon
hearing warnings only in the aftermath of interrogation and just
after making a confession, a suspect would hardly think he had a
genuine right to remain silent, let alone persist in so believ-
ing[,] once the police began to lead him over the same ground
- 21 -
again." Seibert, 542 U.S. at 613, 159 L. Ed. 2d at 655-56, 124
S. Ct. at 2611.
Thus, to determine whether Miranda warnings delivered
while in the midst of a custodial interrogation could effectively
advise the suspect of his basic constitutional rights, the
plurality advocated evaluating the (1) completeness and detail of
the prewarning interrogation, (2) overlapping content of the two
statements, (3) timing and setting of the first and the second
interrogations, (4) continuity of police personnel, and (5)
extent to which the interrogator's questions treated the second
round of interrogation as continuous with the first. Seibert,
542 U.S. at 615, 159 L. Ed. 2d at 657, 124 S. Ct. at 2612.
Concurring in the judgment, Justice Kennedy narrowed
the approach taken by the plurality opinion by stating that "[i]f
the deliberate two-step strategy has been used, postwarning
statements that are related to the substance of prewarning
statements must be excluded unless curative measures are taken
before the postwarning statement is made." Seibert, 542 U.S. at
622, 159 L. Ed. 2d at 661, 124 S. Ct. at 2616 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). Such "curative measures" could include "a substan-
tial break in time and circumstances between the prewarning
statement and the Miranda warning," or "an additional warning
that explains the likely inadmissibility of the prewarning
custodial statement." Seibert, 542 U.S. at 622, 159 L. Ed. 2d at
- 22 -
661, 124 S. Ct. at 2616 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
2. Application of Seibert to Defendant's
Postwarning Statements
The State contends that defendant's postwarning state-
ments on January 24, 2001, are admissible because they were not
obtained in violation of the Supreme Court's holding in Seibert.
We disagree.
In this case, the trial court found--as in Seibert--
that (1) the officers' questioning during the unwarned portion of
the interrogation was systematic, exhaustive, and managed with
psychological skill; (2) prior to being informed of her Miranda
rights, little, if any, incriminating evidence was left unsaid by
defendant; (3) the officers did not advise defendant that her
prewarning statements could not be used against her; (4) the
officers did not dispel the oddity of warning defendant that she
had the right to remain silent and right to counsel after they
led her through a systematic and exhaustive interrogation; (5)
the postwarning questioning immediately followed the Miranda
warnings; (6) the police officers' postwarning questions treated
the postwarning portion of the interrogation as a continuation of
the prewarning portion; (7) it was clear that the officer's
strategy was meant to undermine defendant's Miranda warnings; and
(8) defendant's Miranda warnings were invalidated by the offi-
cers' use of the "question first-warn later" technique.
Our review of the record reveals that the trial court
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correctly assessed the time line, content, and context of defen-
dant's custodial interrogation in determining the deliberateness
of the officers' conduct. Thus, given our standard of review, we
conclude that the court's findings are not against the manifest
weight of the evidence.
D. The State's Claim That the Trial Court Erred by Suppressing
Defendant's January 25, 2001, Statements
Last, the State contends that the officers were not
required to reinform defendant of her Miranda rights on January
25, 2001. Specifically, the State asserts that because there was
no substantial probability that defendant's January 24, 2001,
Miranda warnings were so stale and remote that defendant was
unaware of her rights at the time of the January 25, 2001,
interrogation, those warnings did not need to be repeated. We
disagree.
Here, the trial court found that because defendant's
January 24, 2001, Miranda waiver was invalidated by the officers'
deliberate use of the "question first-warn later" technique
repudiated by the Supreme Court in Seibert, defendant was "de-
prived of the knowledge essential to making a free and rational
choice" regarding a waiver of her Miranda rights on January 25,
2001.
Because we earlier concluded that the trial court's
findings that defendant's January 24, 2001, Miranda waiver was
invalidated was not against the manifest weight of the evidence,
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we reject the State’s claim. In other words, given the court's
findings that the Miranda warnings defendant received on January
24, 2001, were rendered nugatory because of the Seibert violation
(which we affirm), this record no longer contains any valid
Miranda warnings that the State may claim were still valid the
next day. Therefore, we need not address whether the officers
would have been required to reinform defendant of her Miranda
rights prior to her January 25, 2005, interrogation.
In closing, we commend the trial court for the care and
consideration it took in this case. Its findings demonstrated a
clear understanding of the facts, which this court found to be
especially helpful.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's
judgment.
Affirmed.
APPLETON, P.J., and McCULLOUGH, J., concur.
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