People v. Palmer

Filed 5/23/08 NO. 4-07-0620
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) Macon County
LEON PALMER, ) No. 01CF1149
Defendant-Appellant. )
) Honorable
) John K. Greanias,
) Judge Presiding.
_________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the opinion of the court:
In January 2006, a jury convicted defendant, Leon
Palmer (who had earlier waived his right to counsel and had
chosen to represent himself), of residential burglary (720 ILCS
5/19-3 (West 2000)). The trial court later sentenced him to 30
years in prison to be served consecutively with a sentence he had
been serving.
Defendant appeals, arguing that (1) because a bona fide
doubt existed as to his fitness, the trial court erred by allow-
ing him to represent himself at trial without first ordering a
fitness evaluation; (2) the prosecutor's closing argument (a)
improperly attacked defendant's integrity and tactics and (b)
impugned the exercise of his constitutional right to represent
himself; and (3) the court abused its discretion by refusing to
revoke defendant's waiver of counsel for postsentencing proceed-
ings. Because we agree only with defendant's third argument, we
affirm and remand with directions.
I. BACKGROUND
Because defendant challenges neither the sufficiency of
the evidence against him nor its admissibility, we discuss the
evidence and the case's procedural history only to the extent
necessary to put his arguments in context.
In August 2001, the State charged John Doe (identified
only by a description of his deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA)) with
(1) residential burglary (720 ILCS 5/19-3 (West 2000)) (committed
in August 2000), (2) two counts of aggravated criminal sexual
assault (720 ILCS 5/12-14(a)(2) (West 1998)), (3) unlawful
restraint (720 ILCS 5/10-3(a) (West 1998)), and (4) aggravated
battery (720 ILCS 5/12-4(b)(8) (West 1998)) (committed in July
1999). In June 2005, based upon a DNA match, the State moved to
amend the charging instrument to allege that defendant was the
offender. The State explained that it did not know the of-
fender's actual name when it filed the August 2001 charges. The
trial court later granted the State's motion to amend.
In August 2005, defendant appeared in court on these
charges and stated that he wanted to represent himself. The
court admonished him in accordance with Supreme Court Rule 401
(134 Ill. 2d R. 401) and accepted his waiver of his right to
counsel.
In September 2005, the State advised the trial court
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that because defendant had an extensive criminal record, the
possible sentences he faced upon conviction differed from those
that the court explained to defendant when he waived his right to
counsel. The court then informed defendant that it was going to
readmonish him regarding his right to counsel and the correct
penalties he faced. The court also explained that defendant had
another opportunity to accept the appointment of the public
defender's office. After the court again admonished defendant
pursuant to Rule 401, defendant (1) persisted in his intent to
represent himself and (2) again declined the court's offer of
appointed counsel. Defendant also expressed his unhappiness with
the proceedings, stating that they were "pointless."
During the course of pretrial and posttrial proceed-
ings, defendant pro se filed the following documents: (1) an
August 2005 motion to dismiss indictment instanter; (2) an
October 2005 motion for severance; (3) a November 2005 motion to
dismiss charges; (4) a January 2006 motion to dismiss instanter;
(5) a March 2006 motion to reduce his sentence and/or motion to
reconsider his sentence; (6) a May 2006 petition for court-
appointed counsel in relation to filing an amended motion, brief,
and written argument in postjudgment proceedings; (7) a July 2006
petition for writ of coram nobis; (8) a July 2006 petition for
relief from judgment; (9) a July 2006 petition to this court "for
leave to [file an] interlocutory appeal"; (10) a January 2007
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letter to the trial court requesting an extension of time to
complete his research so that he could file an amended sentencing
motion; and (11) a July 2007 motion to reduce his sentence.
In defendant's October 2005 handwritten motion for
severance, he wrote the following: "That the above said cases
was [sic] alleged to have been committed years apart[,] and if
said cases [are] allowed to be consolidated[,] it will prejudice
the jury." Defendant prevailed on this motion, given that the
State, in response, elected to try defendant only on the
residential-burglary charge.
In defendant's November 2005 pro se motion to dismiss,
he "vehemently denie[d] having been anywhere near the alleged
crime scene on the day of the event" and contended that the only
evidence the State had against him were "the bloodstain and the
semen [which] were years old when tested and finally reported[,]
causing at least drying, contamination[,] and generally deterio-
ration of the DNA sample." He asserted that this DNA evidence,
without corroboration, was insufficient to establish his guilt.
The trial court denied this motion, and the case proceeded to
trial.
During defendant's opening statement at trial, he
informed the jurors that his blood was present in the residence
and that he would try to show them how it got there. He also
told the jury that someone (whose name he did not know) who was
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related to the people who lived in the residence invited defen-
dant into the house to drink a beer. When he dropped the beer,
he cut his finger, and "a splatter got on the wall."
The State then presented evidence that a window in a
Decatur residence was broken out, and a bloodstain was left,
apparently by the burglar, on a table inside the residence near
the window. The family living in the residence testified (1) as
to the circumstances surrounding the burglary, (2) that they did
not know defendant, and (3) that he did not have permission to be
in their residence. Police and expert testimony described how
the bloodstain was processed and resulted in a DNA match for
defendant. After the State rested, defendant declined to put on
any evidence. Based on the evidence, the jury found defendant
guilty of residential burglary.
At defendant's February 2006 sentencing hearing, the
trial court received the presentence investigation report (PSI),
which showed that defendant was 50 years old and had eight prior
felony convictions, with his first occurring 30 years earlier.
Defendant's convictions included two for residential burglary,
two for burglary, and one for attempted burglary.
The State also presented testimony from a woman who
stated that as she walked home in Decatur on an evening in July
1999, a man began speaking with her and then dragged her from the
road. As she fought with him, the man hit her, knocking her
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unconscious. When she awakened, she was undressed and the tampon
she had been wearing due to her menstruation had been removed.
Decatur police officers later found her clothing and the tampon,
and subsequent testing showed the semen stain found on the
woman's shorts matched defendant's DNA profile.
The State's presentation of this evidence upset defen-
dant, who complained that he had not yet been convicted of this
1999 event and was present in court instead for sentencing
regarding the 2000 residential burglary. The trial court ex-
plained that the State was entitled to present this evidence, and
defendant responded that he wanted to leave the courtroom,
explaining, "You just go on and do what you got to do because I
don't want to hear no [sic] more of this kangaroo type of stuff."
After the State completed presenting evidence regarding
the 1999 incident, defendant returned to the courtroom, and the
trial court sentenced him to 30 years in prison on the
residential-burglary charge.
In March 2006, defendant pro se filed a motion to
reduce his sentence and/or reconsider the sentence. In later
pleadings related to that motion, defendant for the first time
asked for appointed counsel to represent him. In June 2006, the
trial court denied defendant's request for appointed counsel,
explaining as follows:
"(1) Defendant waived his constitutional
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right to assistance of counsel for proceed-
ings in the [c]ircuit [c]ourt; (2) although
defendant has the right to appointed counsel
on appeal, he does not have the absolute
right to revoke his waiver at this stage of
the proceedings in the [c]ircuit [c]ourt; and
(3) defendant has not shown good cause for
the [c]ircuit [c]ourt to exercise its discre-
tion to allow withdrawal of defendant's waiv-
er of counsel."
In July 2006, defendant pro se filed with this court
his "petition for leave to [file] an interlocutory appeal," which
he stated was being made "pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 308"
(155 Ill. 2d R. 308). In that petition, defendant asserted that
the trial court erred by not appointing counsel at the
postsentencing stage in view of the "obvious behavior problems
during trial which created sufficient doubt about [defendant's]
competence." Defendant added the following: "The trial court
has ignored its reasonable duty to take reasonable measures to
thwart failures of fairness by not investigating his competency
before allowing him to represent his own criminal case *** and
waive counsel." In August 2006, this court denied defendant's
petition, explaining that Rule 308 does not apply to criminal
cases.
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Also in July 2006, defendant pro se filed for writ of
coram nobis, challenging his conviction on the ground that the
trial court did not make inquiries to determine whether he was
competent to waive counsel. In support of that petition, defen-
dant asserted the following:
"Given the behavior by [defendant], including
outward fits of disorderly conduct during
trial, a sufficient doubt about [defendant's]
competence was created which required and
warranted further inquiry. The correct cour-
se was to suspend trial until evaluation
could be made."
In July 2007, the trial court conducted a hearing on
defendant's posttrial motions, including his petition for writ of
coram nobis, found them to be without merit, and denied them.
This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Defendant's Claim That the Trial Court Erred by Not
Ordering a Fitness Evaluation of Him
Defendant first argues that his conviction and sentence
must be reversed and remanded because the trial court erroneously
allowed him to represent himself at trial without first ordering
a fitness evaluation when a bona fide doubt existed as to his
fitness. Citing People v. Sandham, 174 Ill. 2d 379, 382, 673
N.E.2d 1032, 1033 (1996), and section 104-11(a) of the Code of
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Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/104-11(a) (West 2004)), he
contends that although a defendant is presumed fit to stand
trial, the court must still order a fitness hearing sua
sponte when a bona fide doubt of fitness arises. Defendant then
asserts that
"[t]hroughout the proceedings in this case,
the court never questioned [defendant's]
fitness to represent himself, despite re-
peated indications before and during trial
that [he] was unable to understand the nature
of the proceedings. Because a bona fide dou-
bt existed as to [defendant's] fitness, the
court had a sua sponte duty to appoint compe-
tent counsel and to have [defendant] evalu-
ated for fitness."
In support of defendant's claim that the record demon-
strates that a bona fide doubt arose as to his fitness to stand
trial or to represent himself, he cites the following: (1) when
the trial court described one of defendant's motions as "gibber-
ish" and asked him to explain it, defendant responded that he
could not see the papers "because of [his] eyes [and his] medical
problems"; (2) when defendant was readmonished regarding his
waiver of counsel under Supreme Court Rule 401, he objected to
the proceedings and initially stood mute in response to the
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court's questions; thereafter, when the court asked if he would
like the public defender's office to be appointed to represent
him, he replied, "I plead the fifth on that"; (3) the remarks
defendant made in his opening statement, particularly about how
he had been in the burglarized residence legitimately and cut his
finger there; (4) "throughout the trial, [defendant] expressed
confusion as to the nature of each exhibit and how one spot of
blood could yield several exhibits"; (5) "[defendant] had trouble
understanding that [one of the residence's occupants] had infor-
mation that might be harmful to [his] case"; (6) defendant told
the probation officer who wrote the PSI that defendant had been
suffering from diabetes for 5 1/2 years, had poor vision, had
arthritis, and his mental health was "not too good" as a result
of depression; and (7) defendant claimed that he took LSD (lyser-
gic acid diethylamide) every day for a year, 20 years earlier,
and had extensively smoked cannabis and crack cocaine. Defendant
summarized his argument as follows: "The defendant's demeanor,
irrationality, and mental[-]health issues should have triggered a
bona fide doubt of fitness to waive counsel." We deem defen-
dant's argument to be wholly without merit.
As the supreme court explained in People v. Johnson,
206 Ill. 2d 348, 361-62, 794 N.E.2d 294, 303 (2002), a defendant
is considered to be fit if he understands the nature of the
proceedings and can assist in his own defense. In Faretta v.
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California, 422 U.S. 806, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, 95 S. Ct. 2525(1975), the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant had
an absolute right to represent himself in a criminal case.
Following Faretta, the Supreme Court of Illinois held that
fitness to waive counsel requires no more than fitness to stand
trial. People v. Redd, 173 Ill. 2d 1, 23, 670 N.E.2d 583, 594
(1996). The standard of review regarding the issue of whether a
bona fide doubt existed as to defendant's fitness is abuse of
discretion. Sandham, 174 Ill. 2d at 382, 673 N.E.2d at 1033.
This record compellingly demonstrates that defendant
fully understood the nature of the proceedings and was clearly
able to assist in his own defense. Our earlier reference to some
of the documents defendant filed in this case strongly supports
this conclusion. Indeed, his three-page August 2005 motion to
dismiss indictment instanter demonstrated not only defendant's
command of the English language and his ability to write well,
but also his understanding of some legal technicalities. For
instance, in his October 2005 pro se motion, defendant wrote the
following: "Illinois law mandates that a person (inmate) shall
be taken before the nearest[,] most accessible magistrate in that
area (county), without unnecessary delay[,] and the same holds
true for anyone indicted by an information/indictment."
That portions of some of defendant's motions appeared
to the trial court to be "gibberish" does nothing to diminish our
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conclusion. See Redd, 173 Ill. 2d at 24, 670 N.E.2d at 595(noting that the defendant's numerous and voluminous motions and
his imprecision in expressing himself as an attorney did not
demonstrate that he lacked the mental capacity to waive counsel).
Indeed, given the technical nature of the rules that apply to
evidence and procedure in criminal cases, we would have expected
to see more instances of "gibberish" than the court found.
We explicitly reject defendant's contentions that any
deficiencies in his pro se representation lend any support
whatsoever to his claim that he was somehow not fit to waive his
right to counsel. See Redd, 173 Ill. 2d at 24, 670 N.E.2d at 594("Defendant's ability to articulate his case and to precisely
motion the court are merely measures of his proficiency or lack
thereof as a lawyer. His ability to represent himself is not
indicative of his competence to choose self-representation").
Ten years ago, this court noted that "a defendant's decision to
represent himself is universally viewed as unwise" (People v.
Williams, 277 Ill. App. 3d 1053, 1058, 661 N.E.2d 1186, 1190
(1996)), and we adhere to that opinion. Nonetheless, given
Faretta, a defendant retains the constitutional right to choose
to represent himself in a criminal trial no matter how unwise
that decision may be. Thus, as long as a trial court has prop-
erly admonished a defendant in accordance with Supreme Court Rule
401, we will not protect defendant from the consequences of his
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unwise decision to represent himself.
Were we to hold otherwise, we would be inviting defen-
dants "to game the system," a circumstance a California court
called, "[p]laying 'the Faretta game'." People v. Williams, 220
Cal. App. 3d 1165, 1169-70, 269 Cal. Rptr. 705, 707 (1990). Both
trial and reviewing courts must ever be wary of a defendant who
tries to use the exercise of one constitutional right--here, the
decision to represent himself at trial--against another--the
right to stand trial or waive counsel only if he is fit to do so-
-especially when that defendant can attempt to change the court-
room dynamics simply by his own conduct or, more likely, his own
misconduct.
Almost 30 years ago (even before Faretta), the Fifth
District addressed a situation very much like the one in this
case. In People v. Black, 68 Ill. App. 3d 309, 312, 385 N.E.2d
899, 902 (1979), the defendant was convicted of armed robbery
after waiving his right to counsel and choosing to defend him-
self. He argued on appeal that the trial court abused its
discretion by failing sua sponte to order a fitness hearing. The
Fifth District rejected that argument, writing as follows:
"An accused is not entitled to such a hearing
unless the trial court has notice of facts
which raise a bona fide doubt of defendant's
fitness or competency. [Citation.] A care-
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ful reading of the record reveals no evidence
that defendant was unable to understand the
nature and purpose of the proceedings against
him nor unable to prepare a defense. [Cita-
tion.] Apparently[,] defendant's alleged
'irregular conduct' before and at trial was
no more than an attempt to disrupt these
proceedings. Accordingly, the trial court
did not err in failing to order a fitness
hearing on its own motion." Black, 68 Ill.
App. 3d at 314-15, 385 N.E.2d at 903.
We fully agree with Black's analysis and conclusion and hold that
they apply to this case.
In support of our rejection of defendant's argument, we
note that the trial court demonstrated its awareness of the issue
of fitness when the court, at the September 2005 readmonition
pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 401 regarding defendant's waiver
of his right to counsel (at which proceeding defendant expressed
his displeasure), stated the following:
"For the record[,] I am going to add we have
had this defendant in court before. There is
no basis to find him unfit, so I am not even
going to consider a fitness report. We have
seen his actions. This is [sic] the actions
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of a person who understands what is going on,
and there is no reason to file a fitness
petition."
We conclude that (1) the record fully supports this determination
by the experienced trial court and (2) the court did not abuse
its discretion by not ordering a fitness examination of defen-
dant.
B. Defendant's Claim That the Prosecutor's Improper
Closing Argument Requires Reversal
Defendant next argues that reversal is required because
the prosecutor's "intentional misconduct included attacks on the
integrity and tactics of the pro se defendant, and impugned
[defendant's] exercise of his constitutional right to represent
himself." Defendant concedes that he made no objection to the
prosecutor's alleged improper argument but asks this court to
review the issue as plain error. Not only do we conclude that no
plain error is present, we conclude that the prosecutor's remarks
did not constitute error at all. See People v. Williams, 193
Ill. 2d 1, 27, 737 N.E.2d 230, 245 (2000) ("Before invoking the
plain[-]error exception, however, 'it is appropriate to determine
whether error occurred at all.' People v. Wade, 131 Ill. 2d 370,
376[, 546 N.E.2d 553, 555] (1989)").
In People v. Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d 92, 123, 871 N.E.2d
728, 745 (2007), the Supreme Court of Illinois recently discussed
the applicable law when a defendant complains of a prosecutor's
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closing argument and wrote the following:
"Prosecutors are afforded wide latitude
in closing argument. [Citation.] In review-
ing comments made at closing arguments, this
court asks whether or not the comments engen-
der substantial prejudice against a defendant
such that it is impossible to say whether or
not a verdict of guilt resulted from them."
The supreme court in Wheeler also wrote that "[w]hether state-
ments made by a prosecutor at closing argument were so egregious
that they warrant a new trial is a legal issue this court reviews
de novo." Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d at 121, 871 N.E.2d at 744.
During the initial portion of the prosecutor's closing
argument, he said that a case of this kind "is probably the
hardest type of case for a prosecutor to handle because it looks
like Goliath is picking on David, but the thing that you have to
realize is that the defendant has a constitutional right to
defend himself." The prosecutor then mentioned that whether the
jury believed defendant's decision to represent himself was a
wise choice or not, defendant made that decision, which was his
right. The prosecutor also mentioned that he had "tried to
extend [defendant] courtesies and treat him like another lawyer"
and did not try to cut corners, adding that the State "gave you a
case just like [defendant] would have [had] with an attorney
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representing him." The prosecutor concluded by emphasizing to
the jury that the only evidence it could consider was that which
"comes from the witness stand, and things that [defendant] may
have been saying that weren't backed up or weren't produced as
evidence in court, you can't consider."
Regarding these rather mild remarks by the prosecutor,
defendant argues to this court that "[b]y emphasizing that
[defendant] represented himself, the prosecutor set up his
rebuttal during which he demeaned [defendant's] exercise of the
right to self-representation." Before the prosecutor spoke in
rebuttal, defendant presented his closing argument pro se and
informed the jury that he had his argument all written out but
that he hated "to try to talk with paper so I am just going to
speak from here, I mean, from my heart." Defendant then men-
tioned "the people from forensics [who] spoke about DNA," and
added, "I really didn't complete high school or nothing [sic]
like that. I am not going for no [sic] sympathy from nobody
[sic], but I was trying to understand what they was [sic] talking
about [regarding] the DNA and the exhibits." Defendant also
explained his difficulty speaking about the scientific exhibits
"because I was confused so I don't know who else might have been
confused by the confusion."
Defendant concluded his closing argument with a request
that the jury "realize and take into consideration that ***
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things ain't [sic] always the way they appear to be, and you know
*** everything is not always put out there for you to understand.
Some things are not able to be said. *** I'm pretty sure
whatever decision you come up with [will] come from your hearts."
In the prosecutor's rebuttal argument, which was very
short, he first noted the strength of the DNA evidence against
defendant and, in view of that, remarked
"Sometimes, the best defense in the world is,
maybe, not hire a high-powered attorney,
represent yourself, and play on the sympathy
of the jury.
That has no part in your decision in
this case. The decision should come from the
testimony you heard from the witness stand
and not sympathy that [defendant] is trying
to engender."
Defendant deems the prosecutor's rebuttal as containing
"intentional insults designed to discredit [defendant] in the
jurors' eyes as to his role as defense attorney." Further,
defendant contends that these comments penalized him "for assert-
ing his constitutional right to exercise his right to represent
himself and improperly diminished his presumption of innocence."
Given the circumstances of this case, we view the
prosecutor's remarks as entirely proper. Defendant's
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pro se representation was the 800-pound gorilla in the courtroom,
and absent an explanation concerning this situation, the jury
might well have speculated about it and felt sympathy for defen-
dant's plight, when in fact none was due. Further, absent some
explanation, this situation might appear to the jury to be like
Goliath picking on David.
In so concluding, we adhere to the views we recently
expressed in People v. Montgomery, 373 Ill. App. 3d 1104, 1118,
872 N.E.2d 403, 415 (2007):
"To slightly revise a common saying
regarding campaigning for elective office,
trying felony cases before a jury 'ain't
beanbag.' These are serious matters with
high stakes, and we expect advocates in our
adversary system of justice to use all of
their forensic skills to persuade the jury of
the wisdom or justice of their respective
positions."
C. Defendant's Claim That the Trial Court Abused Its
Discretion by Refusing To Revoke His Waiver of
Counsel For Postsentencing Proceedings
Last, defendant argues that the trial court abused its
discretion by refusing to revoke his waiver of counsel for
postsentencing proceedings. He points out that after sentencing,
he pro se filed a series of pleadings, including a motion to
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reconsider his sentence, and asked for the appointment of counsel
to represent him. The trial court denied his request. The State
concedes defendant's argument on this point, and we accept the
State's concession.
In People v. Baker, 92 Ill. 2d 85, 91-92, 440 N.E.2d
856, 859 (1982), the Supreme Court of Illinois held that a
defendant's waiver of the right to counsel carries through to all
subsequent proceedings unless (1) the defendant later requests
counsel or (2) other circumstances suggest that the waiver is
limited to a particular stage of the proceedings. Here, after
representing himself at trial and at the sentencing hearing,
defendant sought the appointment of counsel to represent him on
his motion to reconsider his sentence.
In People v. Williams, 358 Ill. App. 3d 1098, 1105, 833
N.E.2d 10, 16 (2005), this court held that a hearing on the
motion to reconsider sentence is a critical stage of the criminal
proceedings. Thus, an indigent defendant is entitled to the
appointment of counsel at that stage. However, in June 2006, the
trial court denied defendant's request for appointed counsel at
that stage, ruling, in part, that (1) defendant did not have the
absolute right to revoke his waiver and (2) he had not shown good
cause for the court to exercise its discretion to allow with-
drawal of defendant's waiver of counsel. We conclude that the
court erred by ruling that defendant needed to show good cause
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for his request.
In People v. Burton, 184 Ill. 2d 1, 24, 703 N.E.2d 49,
60 (1998), the Supreme Court of Illinois addressed the timing of
a defendant's request to waive counsel and wrote the following:
"A number of courts have held that a defen-
dant's request is untimely when it is first
made just before the commencement of trial,
after trial begins, or after meaningful pro-
ceedings have begun. [Citations.] Once such
proceedings have begun, the trial judge has
discretion to deny a defendant's request to
represent himself."
Several years before Burton, this court similarly addressed the
subject in People v. Ward, 208 Ill. App. 3d 1073, 1081-82, 567
N.E.2d 642, 647-48 (1991), in which we strongly suggested a
series of specific points for trial courts to discuss with a
defendant who has informed the court that he wishes to waive his
right to counsel (in addition to the Rule 401 admonitions). One
of the points we urged a court to make was that "in the event the
court accepts defendant's decision to represent himself, defen-
dant will not be given an opportunity to change his mind during
trial." Ward, 208 Ill. App. 3d at 1082, 567 N.E.2d at 648.
If a trial court has fully complied with Rule 401 (and
especially if the court has followed our Ward suggestions), the
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court can hold the defendant to his election to proceed pro
se even though the defendant subsequently changes his mind during
trial. Indeed, considering (1) the importance of judicial
administration and (2) the need to avoid giving a defendant the
opportunity "to game the system" (as discussed earlier), a court
would be justified in informing a defendant of a deadline (per-
haps a few weeks before the trial date) by which his decision to
proceed pro se at trial will become irrevocable, making clear
that it is not just at trial itself that the decision will become
irrevocable.
However, nothing about the circumstances in this case--
namely, defendant's request for court-appointed counsel to assist
him on his postsentencing motion suggests any abuse of the
system. For whatever reason, defendant finally changed his mind
about the wisdom of pro se representation. We emphasize that
defendant's change of mind occurred at a new stage of the pro-
ceedings, which constituted a clean slate for the trial court's
consideration of the issue. Thus, the court erred by requiring
him to demonstrate good cause for doing so.
Accordingly, although we affirm defendant's
residential-burglary conviction, we remand for the appointment of
counsel for postsentencing purposes in accordance with the views
expressed herein.
III. CONCLUSION
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For the reasons stated, we affirm defendant's
residential-burglary conviction and remand for further proceed-
ings in accordance with the views expressed herein. Because the
State has in part successfully defended a portion of the criminal
judgment, we grant the State its statutory assessment of $50
against defendant as costs of this appeal. See People v. Smith,
133 Ill. App. 3d 613, 620, 479 N.E.2d 328, 333 (1985), citing
People v. Nicholls, 71 Ill. 2d 166, 179, 374 N.E.2d 194, 199
(1978).
Affirmed and remanded with directions.
APPLETON, P.J., and KNECHT, J., concur.
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