People v. Young

NO. 4-07-0115 Filed 4/3/08
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from
Plaintiff-Appellee ) Circuit Court
v. ) of Morgan County
NELSON A. YOUNG, ) No. 05CF136
Defendant-Appellant )
) Honorable
) Richard T. Mitchell,
) Judge Presiding
_________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH delivered the opinion of the court:
In July 2005, the State charged defendant, Nelson A.
Young, with first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West
2004)); the charge was later amended to first degree murder under
section 9-1(a)(2) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Code) (720 ILCS
5/9-1(a)(2) (West 2004)). In July 2006, a jury convicted defen-
dant of the amended first-degree-murder charge. In August 2006,
the trial court sentenced him to 40 years' imprisonment. Defen-
dant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in allowing
evidence of prior convictions. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
On July 21, 2005, the State charged defendant with
first degree murder under section 9-1(a)(1) of the Code (720 ILCS
5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2004) (knows such acts will cause death)),
alleging that on July 19, 2005, defendant stabbed Eva Mae Davis,
killing her, knowing that his act created the strong probability
of death or great bodily harm. On July 26, 2005, the charge was
amended to first degree murder under section 9-1(a)(2) of the
Code (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2) (West 2004) (knows that such acts
create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm)),
alleging that on July 19, 2005, defendant stabbed Eva Mae Davis,
killing her, knowing that his act created the strong probability
of death or great bodily harm, correcting the citation to be
consistent with the charge alleged.
On June 29, 2006, the State filed a motion in limine to
admit, inter alia, prior convictions of aggravated battery and
aggravated assault and testimony from the victim of that assault.
Defendant had pleaded guilty on both charges, the battery was
committed with a knife, the assault victim was to testify that
defendant threatened the victim with a knife, and defendant
threatened that he was going to kill the victim.
On July 6, 2006, a hearing was held on the motion in
limine. The State argued that the prior convictions and testi-
mony should be admitted for reasons other than a propensity to
commit crimes, that is, reasons such as intent, modus operandi,
motive, and absence of mistake or accident. Defendant argued
that the crimes were not similar enough to show modus operandi
because, defendant asserted, the prior crimes were only similar
to this charge in that a knife was used each time. Defendant
argued as a result, the probative value would be outweighed by
the prejudicial effect. Defendant conceded that if accident was
asserted as a defense, the prior convictions might be admissible
to show lack of accident, but defense counsel said no such
defense was planned.
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The trial court denied the motion, stating it would not
allow the State to present defendant's prior convictions during
the State's case in chief. The court cautioned, though, that
were defendant to testify that the stabbing was a accident or
that defendant otherwise lacked intent, the court would allow the
State to use the evidence at issue to rebut defendant's testi-
mony.
On July 11, 2006, the jury was selected, and the trial
commenced the next day. The evidence showed that on July 19,
2005, defendant placed calls to his brother, John Young, and
cousin, Joe Morgan, both in North Carolina. He told each that
defendant and his girlfriend, Eva Mae Davis, had struggled after
Eva had charged at defendant with a knife and that he had acci-
dentally stabbed her in the heart, killing her. Defendant asked
each for money so defendant could travel to North Carolina.
Morgan went to his local sheriff's office to report the
crime. The North Carolina sheriff's office contacted the Jack-
sonville police department. Officers from Jacksonville went to
defendant's residence, where they found the victim's body in a
bed, covered with a sheet.
On July 19, 2005, Illinois State Police officer Michael
Narish, a crime-scene investigator, was called to the scene to
collect evidence. He testified that the victim's clothing did
not have any blood on it and her remains appeared to have been
cleaned, except for the bottom of her feet. In processing the
scene, Officer Michael Narish found additional evidence, includ-
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ing a filet knife.
Doctor Travis Hindman, a forensic pathologist, testi-
fied that he performed the victim's autopsy. Dr. Hindman testi-
fied the victim had a stab wound to her chest, which went through
her lung and cut her heart. In his opinion, this wound was the
cause of death, and it was possible that the wound could have
been made with the filet knife found by Officer Michael Narish.
The victim also had cuts on her left leg and left hand consistent
with the sort of wounds a person would receive when the person is
in a defensive posture, though Hindman was not certain the wounds
were sustained as the victim defended herself. The blood on the
bottom of her feet indicated that she was able to walk after
being stabbed. Chemical tests also showed the presence of
cocaine and marijuana in the victim. Dr. Hindman testified that
marijuana could stay in the body for days while cocaine would be
eliminated within hours.
Tracy Sulwer, an employee of the Illinois State Police,
Division of Forensic Services, testified that she found defen-
dant's bloody fingerprints on a phone and doorknob taken from the
crime scene. Sulwer also testified that the only print that she
could find on the knife was from the defendant.
Amanda Humke, a forensic scientist with the Illinois
State Police crime lab, testified that she did deoxyribonucleic
acid (DNA) analysis on blood samples found during the investiga-
tion. Humke testified that the DNA test performed on blood found
on a telephone, doorknob, and shirt collected at the scene showed
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that the blood was the victim's, while the shirt's tag had a
mixture of blood consistent with the victim's and defendant's
DNA.
Michelle Montgomery testified that she had a father-
daughter-like relationship with defendant. Montgomery had dated
defendant's son, and defendant had dated Montgomery's mother.
Although neither of those relationships continued to July 2005,
Montgomery and defendant had continued to keep in almost daily
contact with each other. Montgomery testified that defendant had
admitted, prior to the victim's death, to hitting the victim.
Montgomery also testified that defendant told her that he would
have to leave the victim or hurt her really bad, at one point
saying that he would have to kill the victim to get away from the
relationship.
Montgomery testified that defendant called her at about
7:30 a.m. on July 19, 2005, and asked her if she would keep in
touch no matter what happened. Defendant also told her that he
needed to leave town. Montgomery could hear the defendant and
the victim arguing in the background. Montgomery told defendant
that she was still in bed and would talk to him later. Montgom-
ery tried to call defendant back but did not get through to him.
Defendant returned Montgomery's phone call around 1:30 p.m. that
day and said that he was trying to get in touch with his family
in North Carolina. Defendant wanted Montgomery's help to get
defendant to the bus station in Springfield. Defendant called
back again about 2:15 or 2:20 p.m. and said he was on his way to
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Montgomery's house, where he arrived about 2:30 p.m. Once there,
defendant ate some food Montgomery made for him and made three or
four phone calls. Montgomery knew that defendant placed the
first of the phone calls to his daughter, Vanessa, telling his
daughter that he was running out of time and needed to get out of
town. Montgomery testified she did not know who else defendant
called or what was said.
Montgomery testified that while defendant was still at
her home, Montgomery received a telephone call from her sister.
She told Montgomery defendant had killed the victim. Montgomery
told defendant he had to leave, and defendant responded that only
Montgomery could help him at that point, and he was going to
explain but did not know how. Later the same day, there was a
loud knock at Montgomery's door. Montgomery's boyfriend answered
the door and about 12 people charged in, including the victim's
family members. They asked where defendant was, found him,
dragged him outside, fought with him, and the police came.
Defendant testified in his own defense. He testified
that he and the victim had dated for about a year, occasionally
living together, and that their relationship had ups and downs.
Defendant testified he hit the victim two or three times on one
occasion, but he described it as a mistake. Defendant explained
the victim woke him up from being passed out drunk. Defendant
testified that they both used crack cocaine regularly and smoked
it together on July 18, 2005. The victim left defendant's house
sometime that night. On July 19, 2005, defendant left in the
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early morning to look for the victim so he could get his bicycle
from her and ride to the store to get beer. He did not find her.
He went to the store, bought a bottle of beer, and returned home
to find the victim there.
Defendant testified that he went into the bedroom.
Defendant and the victim had an argument because he wanted to go
to sleep, and she wanted to go back to her house. Defendant
testified that one of the victim's family members, L.A. Jackson,
visited with the victim, and when Jackson left, the victim was
upset and anxious to leave the house. The victim said that she
had something to do and would do it with or without defendant.
Defendant also testified that she had a sock tied around her leg
in the area of the cut that Dr. Hindman testified about. Defen-
dant said that he asked the victim about her leg, and she said
she had cut her leg at her house. Defendant testified after that
exchange, he heard a loud noise and went to the kitchen finding
that the victim was attempting to leave the house through the
back door. She had a knife in her hand.
Defendant testified that he told the victim to give him
the knife. Defendant testified the victim charged him, drawing
the knife back to the level of her head with her right hand while
telling defendant he better get back. Defendant grabbed the
victim's right arm with his left hand and took the knife from
her. Defendant testified that they wrestled over the knife, she
grabbed him, he fell with his back against her, then he turned
around to find the knife was in her chest. The victim told
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defendant to call an ambulance, then she fell and lost conscious-
ness. Defendant testified that he pulled the knife out of her
chest, carried her to his bedroom, attempted cardiopulmonary
resuscitation on her, and found that she was already dead. He
testified that, because she had died so quickly, he did not call
an ambulance.
Defendant testified that he then cleaned himself up,
and cleaned her body, put new clothes on her body, and covered it
with a sheet. Defendant called his daughter and Montgomery from
his house. At about 1:30 p.m., defendant rode his bicycle to
Montgomery's house. Defendant testified that once at Montgom-
ery's house he called his daughter a second time, and he called a
sister, brother, and cousin, telling each what was happening and
asking for money. Defendant testified he was scared to call the
police because he feared the victim's family would hear about
what had happened and kill him before the police arrived.
Defendant testified that he was hiding in Montgomery's kitchen
closet when about 12 people, including members of the victim's
family, came in the house, grabbed him, and beat him. He did not
remember anything else until three days later when he was in
jail.
After the defense rested, the State renewed its motion
in limine to admit the previous convictions in evidence and
permit testimony by the victim of the prior assault. The State
based its argument on the defendant's assertion that the stabbing
was an accident. The trial court allowed the State's motion with
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respect to the prior convictions, which were stipulated to, but
did not allow the victim of the previous assault to testify.
On July 14, 2006, both sides presented closing argu-
ments. The jury deliberated for just under two hours before
returning a verdict of guilty on the amended charge of first
degree murder. On August 22, 2006, the trial court sentenced
defendant to 40 years' imprisonment. This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred
in allowing evidence of defendant's prior convictions.
A. Standard of Review
Whether to admit other-crimes evidence is within the
trial court's discretion, and this court will not disturb that
ruling absent an abuse of discretion. People v. Spyres, 359 Ill.
App. 3d 1108, 1113, 835 N.E.2d 974, 978 (2005) (trial court's
admitting evidence of receipt of other cannabis shipments af-
firmed where the defendant asserted that he was merely the
roommate of a drug trafficker). A trial court abuses its discre-
tion "'only where the trial court's decision is arbitrary,
fanciful, or unreasonable or where no reasonable man would take
the view adopted by the trial court.'" People v. Hayes, 319 Ill.
App. 3d 810, 819, 745 N.E.2d 31, 40 (2001) (trial court's admit-
ting evidence of theft of a maroon Chevrolet Caprice by the
defendant where the defendant testified that he had no possession
of that car at the time of the abduction at issue in trial),
quoting People v. Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d 353, 364, 583 N.E.2d 515,
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519 (1991).
B. The Charge Was Amended To Make It Consistent
With the Allegation
On July 21, 2005, the State charged defendant with
first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2004)). Although
first degree murder as defined in section 9-1(a)(1) requires that
the perpetrator intends to kill or do great bodily harm to the
victim, the information alleged that on July 19, 2005, defendant
stabbed Eva Mae Davis, killing her, knowing that his act created
the strong probability of death or great bodily harm. On July
26, 2005, the charge was amended to first degree murder under
section 9-1(a)(2), which is the citation consistent with the
information as charged.
C. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by
Admitting Evidence of Defendant's Previous Convictions
Defendant argues that the only similarity between this
case and his prior convictions is use of a knife, and distin-
guishes the situations by pointing out that the victims of the
two previous crimes were male and were not domestic partners of
defendant. Defendant argues that while evidence of previous
domestic abuse was relevant, and properly admitted, the prior
crimes were irrelevant. However, because the prior convictions
were admitted to show intent or lack of accident, mere general
areas of similarity are sufficient. People v. Adams, 308 Ill.
App. 3d 995, 1004, 721 N.E.2d 1182, 1188 (1999) (trial court's
admitting evidence of the defendant's assaulting previous fiancée
after she discovered the defendant was involved in a homosexual
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relationship affirmed in case where the defendant on trial for
murder asserted he accidentally killed current girlfriend). A
greater degree of identity would be required if the prior convic-
tions were admitted to show modus operandi or that the crime was
part of a common design or plan. Adams, 308 Ill. App. 3d at
1003, 721 N.E.2d at 1188.
The trial court initially denied the State's motion to
admit the other-crimes evidence when defendant was not expected
to testify that the stabbing was an accident, but the court
granted the motion after defendant testified that the stabbing
was an accident.
Evidence of defendant's prior convictions was admitted
for a purpose other than to show propensity. The record shows
the evidence of prior convictions was admitted for the limited
purpose of showing the defendant's intent or lack of accident.
The trial court specifically noted it weighed the
probative value of the evidence against its prejudice. The court
made its determination very near the end of the trial and was in
the best position to weigh those factors in the context of the
entire case. The court did not abuse its discretion. The court
initially denied the State's motion to admit defendant's previous
convictions until it became clear how they were probative. That
is, they were not admitted until they were relevant to disprove
defendant's explanation of the stabbing as an accident.
Moreover, the trial court gave a limiting instruction
with the jury instructions (Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions,
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Criminal, No. 3.14 (4th ed. 2000)) that the other-crimes evidence
was admitted only "on the issue of defendant's motive." A
limiting instruction reduces any prejudice created by admitting
other-crimes evidence. Hayes, 319 Ill. App. 3d at 820, 745
N.E.2d at 41. The instruction successfully prevented the jury
from considering the previous convictions as evidence of defen-
dant's propensity to commit a crime. People v. King, 165 Ill.
App. 3d 464, 469, 518 N.E.2d 1309, 1313 (1988) (no reversible
error where evidence of prior crime was admitted to show intent
but limiting instruction referenced identification and design).
Other-crimes evidence is not admissible to prove a
defendant's propensity to commit a crime but may be admissible to
prove modus operandi, intent, identity, motive, or absence of
mistake. Spyres, 359 Ill. App. 3d at 1112, 835 N.E.2d at 977.
Other-crimes evidence is also admissible as part of a continuing
narrative of the event giving rise to the offense. People v.
Thompson, 359 Ill. App. 3d 947, 951, 835 N.E.2d 933, 936 (2005)
(trial court's admitting evidence of earlier altercation affirmed
where it provided context for the crime for which the defendant
was being tried).
However, even if relevant, other-crimes evidence may be
excluded if its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its
probative value. Spyres, 359 Ill. App. 3d at 1112, 835 N.E.2d
977. "Whether the probative value of other-crimes evidence is
outweighed by its prejudicial impact is a determination left to
the trial court's discretion, and we will not disturb that
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decision absent a clear abuse of discretion." Spyres, 359 Ill.
App. 3d at 1114, 835 N.E.2d at 979.
Defendant submits numerous cases to support his conten-
tion that the trial court erred in admitting other-crimes evi-
dence. However, even defendant's cases demonstrate a reluctance
to overturn a trial court's determination to admit such evidence.
Indeed, only one case cited by defendant results in a reversal by
the reviewing court. People v. Connolly, 186 Ill. App. 3d 429,
434-35, 542 N.E.2d 517, 521 (1989) (evidence of burglaries
committed three years earlier not distinctive enough to prove
modus operandi and not probative for any other permissible
purpose).
The determination of "whether the evidence of other
crimes is so closely connected with the main issue that it tends
to prove the accused guilty of the crime for which he is being
tried" is to be made based on the facts of each case. People v.
Wilson, 46 Ill. 2d 376, 380-81, 263 N.E.2d 856, 859 (1970) (trial
court's admitting evidence of the defendant's prior drug transac-
tion with informant affirmed where the defendant asserted that
drugs belonged to someone else and he did not know they were in
his apartment). As in Spyres and Wilson, the other-crimes
evidence was relevant in that it tended to negate defendant's
contention that he lacked intent. While an innocent state of
mind might be present in one instance, the more often it occurs
with similar results, the less likely that it was without crimi-
nal intent. See People v. Charles, 238 Ill. App. 3d 752, 761,
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606 N.E.2d 603, 610 (1992) (affirming admission of evidence that
the defendant shot someone with a shotgun 15 minutes earlier to
negate the defendant's assertion of self-defense). In this case,
the trial court found the other-crimes evidence should be admit-
ted because defendant was asserting that the stabbing was an
accident. This court finds no reversible error.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's
admission of other-crimes evidence. As part of our judgment, we
grant the State its $50 statutory assessment against defendant as
costs of this appeal.
Affirmed.
APPLETON, P.J., and STEIGMANN, J., concur.
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