People v. Reed

Filed 12/15/09 NO. 4-08-0056
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) Macon County
CHRISTOPHER J. REED, ) No. 05CF1248
Defendant-Appellant. )
) Honorable
) James R. Coryell,
) Judge Presiding.
_________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE TURNER delivered the opinion of the court:
In January 2006, the State charged defendant, Christo-
pher J. Reed, with three counts of first degree murder (720 ILCS
5/9-1(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 2004)) for the death of Tywon Renier.
After a September 2006 trial, a jury found defendant guilty of
first degree murder and answered a special interrogatory, indi-
cating the State had not proved beyond a reasonable doubt defen-
dant had personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused
Renier's death. Defendant filed several posttrial motions, all
of which the trial court denied. At an August 2007 sentencing
hearing, the court sentenced defendant to 50 years' imprisonment.
Defendant filed a motion to reconsider and reduce his sentence,
which the court also denied.
Defendant appeals, asserting (1) the jury's negative
answer to the special interrogatory was fatal to its guilty
verdict and (2) the State failed to prove defendant's guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In the early hours of August 8, 2005, Renier was shot
to death near Bass Place, a club and tavern in Decatur, Illinois.
In January 2006, the State charged defendant by information with
three counts of first degree murder. The charges specifically
alleged defendant used a handgun to shoot Renier without lawful
justification and with (1) the intent to kill Renier or (2) the
knowledge said act would cause Renier's death or (3) the knowl-
edge that such act created a strong probability of death or great
bodily harm to Renier, thereby causing Renier's death.
In September 2006, the trial court held a jury trial on
the charges. The following is the evidence relevant to the
issues on appeal. Micah Morgan testified he and several of his
friends, including Renier, went to Decatur in two vehicles during
the Decatur Celebration. Morgan drove his car, a silver Cadillac
with Lamborghini-style doors, and Renier's brother, Adrian
Thomas, drove a black Aurora with spinners. When they got to
Decatur, they drove by the celebration, which was ending, and
then went to a drive-thru liquor store. After the liquor store,
they went to someone's house for about an hour before heading to
Bass Place. Morgan parked his car on the "back street" and stood
around outside.
About an hour and a half later, Morgan observed an
altercation start to erupt. He witnessed Donte Hendrix punch
someone through an open car window. The individual jumped out of
the car, and the crowd chased and jumped on the individual.
- 2 -
After the individual got away, Genaro "Leo" Hendrix, Donte's
brother, grabbed Donte and started "cussing him out." Renier
then hit Leo. Leo responded by hitting Renier three times before
the pair was separated. Morgan backed up Renier and told him to
leave. When Morgan turned back around, he observed defendant,
whom he had never seen before, and Leo whispering. He denied
defendant came up and said, "get out of my car." Morgan testi-
fied some other individual had said, "get off my car." Morgan
then tried to help Donte explain to Leo it was a mistake. Renier
was standing three to five feet behind Morgan.
Next, Morgan observed defendant come from behind a van
and start shooting. Morgan identified defendant in court as the
shooter. Morgan stated he heard at least seven shots fired in
rapid succession and was struck by the shell casings. He heard
windows breaking and the car being hit. Morgan did not know
Renier had been hit until he fell to the ground. When defendant
was done shooting, Morgan saw defendant drop the gun and then
pick it up again. Defendant then fled the scene. Morgan denied
seeing defendant with a second gun. After defendant had run
away, Morgan heard Thomas yelling for help with his brother and
"more gunshots going back toward[] the street, not toward the
main street, toward[] the back street." Morgan helped get Renier
in the black Aurora. The Aurora and another car that belonged to
the group, a Pontiac, sustained damage during the shooting.
Morgan testified he did not talk to the police that
night because he had a "mistrustful relationship" with them. He
- 3 -
also did not talk to the police when he was arrested three weeks
after the incident on unrelated charges. He explained it was
"just the world we live by out there." In January 2006, Morgan
gave a statement to Detective Frank Hubbard. Morgan indicated he
had decided to talk because he was upset with defendant. Morgan
had shared a cell with defendant in the Macon County jail for
less than 24 hours. Only a few words were exchanged about the
incident, but defendant had asked Morgan to write a statement
indicating defendant was not at Bass Place at the time of the
incident. Morgan further testified the "Squad" and "Young Money"
were Springfield gangs that fight amongst each other. Morgan
denied he and the victim were members of Young Money. Morgan
also stated the victim had a tattoo of the word "squad," which
the victim and several friends had gotten after a friend's death.
Morgan acknowledged he had a misdemeanor conviction for
cannabis possession and four pending cases in Sangamon County.
He further testified he had been charged in Macon County with
attempt (murder), aggravated discharge, and unlawful use of a
firearm. As to the latter charges, Morgan had been released on a
recognizance bond and filed a speedy-trial demand. He denied his
release on the recognizance bond was subject to him giving a
statement to police. The State later dismissed the charges when
it could not locate witnesses.
Detective Hubbard testified that, during his January
1996 interview of Morgan, Morgan stated defendant came up pushing
individuals and saying, "get out of my car." Morgan also stated
- 4 -
that, after defendant dropped the first gun, he lifted up his
shirt and retrieved a second gun. Additionally, Detective
Hubbard testified several items recovered from the scene were
sent to the crime lab for analysis and none of the items identi-
fied defendant.
Joseph Vigneri testified he was Morgan's attorney in
the case where Morgan was charged in an alleged shooting inci-
dent. Vigneri talked with Detective Hubbard and reached an
agreement where Morgan would provide the police with a videotaped
statement regarding defendant's involvement in the Bass Place
incident and the State's Attorney's office would not object to
Morgan being released on a recognizance bond. Vigneri discussed
the agreement with Morgan at the jail. Vigneri also told Morgan
that giving a truthful statement may help in the ultimate dispo-
sition of his case but Vigneri "couldn't be sure."
Jovawn Hendrix testified he is the brother of Leo and
Donte and has the nickname "Spoony." Jovawn did not know Renier
or Morgan but did know Jesse Bates. On the night in question, he
was at Bass Place with Leo and Jarius Spence and was in and out
of the club. He admitted having one drink of hard liquor, which
affected him a "little bit." He along with Leo observed Donte
and Renier "fighting some other guys from Springfield." Leo
separated Donte from the fight by grabbing him around his neck.
Renier then "spent" Leo around like he was going to hit him, and
Jovawn jumped in the middle and pushed Renier. Cory Vincent then
jumped in the middle of them. Renier inquired if Donte was okay,
- 5 -
and Donte explained Leo and Jovawn were his older brothers.
Renier said, "he would ride out with Donte." Donte "rode out
with him" when a fight took place earlier in the night at JB's.
Jovawn knew defendant through Leo and had seen him out
other times in the past. He identified defendant in court.
Jovawn first observed defendant come from outside the club four
or five minutes after the fight. At that point, the misunder-
standing between Leo and Renier and been resolved, and Renier was
known to be a friend. Renier was standing at the car talking to
somebody from Springfield in a Cadillac. Renier pointed up at
Leo and Jovawn, and Leo told defendant about what had happened.
Renier then started walking up toward them with his hand in his
pocket and said to Leo, "What's up?" It looked like Renier had a
gun and was going to shoot them. Jovawn saw defendant shoot a
big, long revolver once and "got low" to avoid getting hit. He
heard a "few" more shots. When asked if defendant acted in self-
defense, Jovawn replied, "Most likely. Just nervous probably.
Didn't know what was going on." Jovawn did not see defendant
with a second gun. Jovawn testified he knew defendant by the
nickname "Magic."
Jovawn did not give a statement to the police that
night because he did not want to get involved. When he went to
the police station two days after the event, he did not tell the
police the same story as he told the jury. Jovawn denied telling
the police he was inside Bass Place the entire night and was
unaware of the shooting. Jovawn further stated that, if he told
- 6 -
the police that statement, it was because he did not want to get
involved.
Jovawn had three felony convictions and a pending
possession-of-a-controlled-substance charge. Jovawn had not
received any promises regarding his pending charge in exchange
for his testimony. However, he did give a prior statement to
police regarding the Bass Place incident in exchange for the
State not objecting to him receiving probation in an earlier
case. Also, under that agreement, Jovawn's conviction and
sentence for driving while license suspended were vacated.
Sergeant Shane Brandel testified he interviewed Jovawn
on August 10, 2005, and Jovawn stated he stayed inside Bass Place
the entire time and never went outside. Jovawn stated he was
unaware of a shooting. Jovawn also stated he only saw Leo one
time that night and never saw Donte. During the interview,
Jovawn's demeanor was uncooperative.
Bates testified he was a Springfield resident. How-
ever, he grew up in Decatur and knew Donte and Leo. On the
evening at issue, he went to Decatur with Renier, Morgan, Thomas,
Latay Vincent, Cory Vincent, and Jacoby Carr. They took three
cars, a Pontiac, a Cadillac with Lamborghini doors, and an Aurora
with spinning rims. In Decatur, they drove around, went to JB's,
drove around again, went to the Elk's, and then to Bass Place.
Bates was sitting in one of the cars when he heard someone
mention a fight. Bates got out of the car. He saw Leo grab
Donte, and Renier hit Leo. Bates heard Donte say that Leo was
- 7 -
his brother. After that, Bates saw someone come around a car.
The person said some cuss words and then shot Renier six or seven
times at "point[-]blank range." Bates described the shooter as
light-skinned and chubby. Bates acknowledged he had told the
police the shooter was around 5 feet 10 inches tall, weighed 200
to 220 pounds, and had a "very muscular build."
At the time of defendant's trial, Spence was in police
custody due to an arrest for a drug offense. On the stand, he
denied giving Detective Scott Cline a recorded statement on
August 17, 2005. He later admitted an officer had shown him
photographs and asked him to point out "Magic." Spence stated he
told the officer he did not know a "Magic" and denied telling the
officer anything else.
Detective Cline testified he interviewed Spence on
August 17, 2005, and recorded the interview. He described
Spence's demeanor during the interview as "reluctant." During
the interview, Detective Cline showed Spence a photographic
lineup that included a photograph of defendant. Spence did not
identify anyone in the lineup. In Detective Cline's opinion, the
lineup photograph of defendant did not accurately depict defen-
dant as he was thinner in the photograph. Detective Cline had
known defendant for 10 years, and defendant had gained "quite a
bit of weight" over the years. Detective Cline guessed defendant
was 5 feet 10 or 11 inches and stated defendant's nicknames were
"Magic" and "Magic Folks."
The State played Detective Cline's interview of Spence.
- 8 -
Spence stated "Magic," Leo, and Donte were at Bass Place. He did
not see Spoony. Spence had seen "Magic" a couple of times and
described him as chubby, shorter than him (6 feet 1 inch), clean
shaven, with a bob haircut. A fight broke out near a car. Magic
was not involved in the fight. Magic came up to the crowd and
pulled up his shirt, displaying two guns in his waistband.
Shortly thereafter, Spence heard shots ringing out everywhere,
including the parking lot.
Thomas testified Renier was following Donte around the
parking lot. Thomas took his eyes off Renier for a minute and
then saw Leo choking Renier. Thomas went over there and got
Renier out of the "mix." While Thomas was taking Renier back to
the car, Thomas and Leo were having words, Donte was in the
middle of Thomas and Leo, and Renier was apologizing for hitting
Leo. Thomas then apologized for Renier, but Leo "wasn't trying
to hear that." Thomas was trying to put Renier in the car, but
Renier wanted to fight Leo because he had enough of Leo, who was
not accepting his apologies. Thomas heard gunshots and dropped
to the ground. Prior to the shots, Donte, Leo, and Renier were
in his immediate area. Leo was "steady walking toward us," and
Donte was "steady holding back." Those were the only people
Thomas could remember in his eyesight. Thomas heard 10 rapid-
fire shots but did not see who was shooting. Thomas testified
Leo was 5 feet 10 inches with a thin build, dark skin, and gold
teeth. Thomas did not recall telling Detective Tim Carlton the
man he described as Leo was the man who shot Renier. Thomas
- 9 -
further stated it could have been Leo, but Thomas did not see the
shooter as he was trying to put Renier in the car.
Detective Carlton testified he interviewed Thomas at
the hospital after Renier had died. Thomas was "very somber" and
difficult to interview because of "his state of mind." Thomas
told Detective Carlton that, as he was escorting Renier to the
vehicle, an individual pulled out a gun and just started shooting
Renier at point-blank range. Thomas described the individual as
5 feet 10 inches, dark-skinned, very thin build, and gold teeth.
Roosevelt Bass testified his father owned Bass Place
and he worked there. On August 8, 2005, he was standing in the
doorway of Bass Place and saw the fighting and the sparks of the
gun. He had seen defendant once or twice before that evening.
Bass testified he could see the shooter well enough to know it
was not defendant. Bass stated he did not know who the shooter
was. Bass insisted he told the police after the incident that he
could see who was shooting but did not know who it was.
Officer Nathan Binkley testified he was a Decatur
police officer on August 8, 2005, and responded to the incident
at Bass Place. In the course of his investigation, he inter-
viewed Bass. Bass stated he was inside the building when he
heard the gunshots and was unable to see who was shooting.
Officer Binkley's interview with Bass was brief because Bass
indicated he had not seen the crime.
Dr. Jessica Bowman, the forensic pathologist who
performed Renier's autopsy, testified Renier had a total of 30
- 10 -
gunshot wounds, which included both entry and exit wounds.
Renier's cause of death was a "gunshot wound to the chest with
full thickness injury of the right cardiac atrium." That injury
"would have killed him pretty quickly." Dr. Bowman also noted an
abdominal gunshot wound "might have caused death" if the afore-
mentioned wound had not been sustained. The two lethal wounds
were caused by bullets that entered the front of the body. A
third wound, which was above the fatal wound, penetrated internal
organs, but "survival might have been possible" had the other two
wounds not been sustained.
Detective Randall Chaney, a crime-scene technician with
the Decatur police department, testified he observed three
separate sets of shell casings at the scene. The first set was
on Calhoun Street, just east of an entrance to Bass Place. Four
9-millimeter shell casings ran in a line near the west curb of
Calhoun Street. Four other 9-millimeter casings were in a group
farther north on Calhoun Street. Six other 9-millimeter casings
appear to have been included in the first set. The second set
was located near the intersection of Locust and Calhoun Streets,
200 feet north of the first set. It contained three .40-caliber
shell casings. The third set was in the parking lot of Bass
Place, slightly north and west of the first set. The third set
contained three 9-millimeter shell casings, which contained
special markings indicating it contained extra powder. Blood was
also located on Calhoun Street near the club's east entrance.
Three projectiles were found in the middle of Calhoun Street just
- 11 -
north of the blood.
Krail Lattig, a forensic scientist in the firearm and
tool mark identification section of the Illinois State Police
crime lab, testified (1) the 14 shell casings contained in the
first set were fired from the same firearm, (2) the three .40-
caliber shell casings contained in the second set were fired from
the same gun, and (3) the three projectiles were all fired from
the same weapon. Lattig did not specifically address whether the
casings found in the third set were fired from the same gun.
However, he opined a minimum of three guns and a maximum of four
guns produced the firearms evidence recovered from Bass Place
after the incident.
During deliberations, the jury sent a note, requesting
the transcript of several witnesses' testimony and asking a
question regarding guilt and reasonable doubt. The judge ad-
dressed the note, referring the jury to its recollection of the
evidence and the jury instructions. The jury later returned a
guilty verdict but answered the special interrogatory in the
negative.
In October 2006, defendant filed a posttrial motion,
asserting the State failed to prove defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt and noting the jury's guilty verdict was incon-
sistent with its answer to the special interrogatory. In Novem-
ber 2006, the trial court denied the motion and appointed defen-
dant new counsel due to a conflict of interest. In July 2007,
new counsel filed two more posttrial motions, which the trial
- 12 -
court denied.
At the August 2007 sentencing hearing, the trial court
sentenced defendant to 50 years' imprisonment. Defendant filed a
motion to reconsider and reduce his sentence, which the court
denied on December 18, 2007.
On January 17, 2008, defendant filed a timely notice of
appeal from his conviction and sentence in substantial compliance
with Supreme Court Rule 606 (210 Ill. 2d R. 606). The only error
in the notice of appeal was the statement that defendant's
sentence was 50 months' probation. In April 2008, this court
granted defendant leave to file a late notice of appeal pursuant
to Rule 606(c) (210 Ill. 2d R. 606(c)) to fix the error.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Special Interrogatory
In this case, the trial court gave the following
standard instruction for first degree murder:
"To sustain the charge of [f]irst
[d]egree [m]urder, the State must prove the
following propositions:
First Proposition: That the defendant
performed the acts which caused the death of
Tywon Renier.
Second Proposition: That when the de-
fendant did so, he intended to kill or do
great bodily harm to Tywon Renier;
or
- 13 -
he knew that his acts would cause death
to Tywon Renier;
or
he knew that his acts created a strong
possibility of death or great bodily harm to
Tywon Renier.
If you find from your consideration of
all of the evidence that each one of these
propositions has been proved beyond a reason-
able doubt, you should find the defendant
guilty.
If you find from your consideration of
all of the evidence that any one of these
propositions has not been proved beyond a
reasonable doubt, you should find the defen-
dant not guilty."
See Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 7.02 (4th
ed. 2000) (hereinafter IPI Criminal 4th).
Moreover, at the request of the State, the trial court
asked the jury the following special interrogatory:
"If you find the defendant guilty of
[f]irst [d]egree [m]urder, your foreperson
will preside during your deliberations on one
additional question. In addition to the
verdict forms, you will be provided two forms
that are answers to the question: '[H]as the
- 14 -
State proven beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant personally discharged a firearm
that proximately caused death to Tywon
Renier?'
Your agreement on an answer must be
unanimous. Your answer must be in writing
and signed by all of you including your
foreperson."
The State had submitted the special interrogatory to
obtain a sentence enhancement under section 5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(iii)
of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS
5/5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(iii) (West 2004), as amended by Pub. Act 94-165,
§5, eff. July 11, 2005 (2005 Ill. Laws 1808, 1817)), in compli-
ance with Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 147 L. Ed.
2d 435, 455, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2362-63 (2000). During jury
deliberations the jury asked the trial court the following
question: "If we find defendent [sic] guilty but the [S]tate did
not prove it beyond a reasonable doubt, what does that mean in
layman's terms?" In response to the question, the court told the
jury to review its instructions, and the jury later returned a
guilty verdict and unanimously answered the special interrogatory
in the negative.
Defendant contends the jury's negative answer to the
special interrogatory was fatal to the guilty verdict. We
disagree.
In People v. Jackson, 372 Ill. App. 3d 605, 609-12, 874
- 15 -
N.E.2d 123, 127-29 (2007), this court addressed special interrog-
atories in criminal cases. We explained no statutory authority
exists for the use of special interrogatories in criminal cases.
Jackson, 372 Ill. App. 3d at 610, 874 N.E.2d at 128. Even in
civil cases where statutory authority does exist, courts must use
special interrogatories with great care. Jackson, 372 Ill. App.
3d at 610, 874 N.E.2d at 128. For a special interrogatory to be
in proper form in civil cases, the interrogatory must (1) relate
to an ultimate issue of fact on which the parties' rights depend
and (2) have a potential answer that would be inconsistent with a
general verdict the jury might return. Jackson, 372 Ill. App. 3d
at 611, 874 N.E.2d at 128. The civil statute provides that,
"'[w]hen the special finding of fact is inconsistent with the
general verdict, the former controls the latter and the court may
enter judgment accordingly.'" Jackson, 372 Ill. App. 3d at 611,
874 N.E.2d at 128, quoting 735 ILCS 5/2-1108 (West 2000). We
noted the special interrogatory at issue in that case was im-
proper under the civil rules because its answer could not control
the general verdict. Jackson, 372 Ill. App. 3d at 611, 874
N.E.2d at 128.
After discussing the civil rules and the facts of the
case at issue, we concluded that, absent a statute, the type of
special interrogatories used in civil cases should not be used in
criminal cases. Jackson, 372 Ill. App. 3d at 612, 874 N.E.2d at
129. We further noted no authority existed to ask a special
interrogatory that would impinge upon a first-degree-murder
- 16 -
verdict. Jackson, 372 Ill. App. 3d at 612, 874 N.E.2d at 129.
Thus, this court "refuse[d] to consider the answer to the 'spe-
cial interrogatory' beyond the purpose for which it was
asked--whether there could be a sentence enhancement." Jackson,
372 Ill. App. 3d at 612, 874 N.E.2d at 129.
Defendant contends this case is distinguishable from
Jackson because the special interrogatory at issue in this case
was proper under the civil rules and the jury's findings cannot
be reconciled. However, in Jackson, we analyzed the special
interrogatory under the civil rules to highlight the interroga-
tory's impropriety and why such rules were inapplicable in
criminal cases. The crux of the Jackson decision is that, unlike
civil cases, no statutory authority exists for special interroga-
tories that would impinge on a jury's verdict in criminal cases.
See Jackson, 372 Ill. App. 3d at 612, 874 N.E.2d at 129. Thus,
we found the proper way to address an unauthorized special
interrogatory was to consider it only for its purpose of deter-
mining whether a sentence enhancement applied. See Jackson, 372
Ill. App. 3d at 612, 874 N.E.2d at 129.
We emphasize Illinois criminal law does not contain a
provision analogous to section 2-1108 of the Code of Civil
Procedure of 1963 (735 ILCS 5/2-1108 (West 2004)). Accordingly,
by asking us to apply the civil statute to criminal cases,
defendant is requesting us to judicially create a rule for
criminal cases. We decline to undertake a role that belongs to
the legislature. Thus, contrary to defendant's desires, no law
- 17 -
exists establishing an inconsistent answer to a special interrog-
atory trumps the verdict in criminal cases.
Case law addressing inconsistent guilty and acquittal
verdicts supports our conclusion a guilty verdict cannot be
challenged based on an answer to a special interrogatory. In
People v. Jones, 207 Ill. 2d 122, 133-34, 797 N.E.2d 640, 647
(2003), our supreme court held defendants could "no longer
challenge convictions on the sole basis that they are legally
inconsistent with acquittals on other charges." The Jones court
found persuasive the statements the United States Supreme Court
made in United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 83 L. Ed. 2d 461,
105 S. Ct. 471 (1984), as to why inconsistent verdicts in crimi-
nal cases should not be vacated. Jones, 207 Ill. 2d at 133, 797
N.E.2d at 647. The Powell Court articulated constitutional law
does not require consistency in the verdicts and inconsistent
verdicts can often be explained as a product of juror lenity.
Jones, 207 Ill. 2d at 130, 797 N.E.2d at 645. The Court ex-
plained as follows:
"'"'The most that can be said in such
cases is that the verdict shows that either
in the acquittal or the conviction the jury
did not speak their real conclusions, but
that does not show that they were not con-
vinced of the defendant's guilt. We inter-
pret the acquittal as no more than their
assumption of a power which they had no right
- 18 -
to exercise, but to which they were disposed
through lenity.'"'" Jones, 207 Ill. 2d at
130, 797 N.E.2d at 645, quoting Powell, 469
U.S. at 63, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 467, 105 S. Ct.
at 475, quoting Dunn v. United States, 284
U.S. 390, 393, 76 L. Ed. 356, 359, 52 S. Ct.
189, 190 (1932), quoting Steckler v. United
States, 7 F.2d 59, 60 (2d Cir. 1925).
Moreover, the Powell Court set forth the following
three additional reasons for refusing to allow defendants to
challenge convictions on the basis of inconsistency.
"First, when a jury enters inconsistent ver-
dicts, no one knows who the error benefits.
Or, as the court put it, 'it is unclear whose
ox has been gored.' Powell, 469 U.S. at 65,
83 L. Ed. 2d at 469, 105 S. Ct. at 477. All
that a reviewing court knows is that either
in the conviction or the acquittal the jury
did not follow the instructions. Second, the
court was concerned with fashioning a rule
that would allow only the defendant to chal-
lenge an inconsistent verdict. Even though
the inconsistency could harm either side, the
government is precluded from challenging an
acquittal on inconsistency grounds. Powell,
469 U.S. at 65, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 469, 105 S.
- 19 -
Ct. at 477. Finally, a defendant is still
protected from jury irrationality because the
defendant can always challenge his or her
conviction on sufficiency of the evidence
grounds. Powell, 469 U.S. at 67, 83 L. Ed.
2d at 470, 105 S. Ct. at 478." Jones, 207
Ill. 2d at 130-31, 797 N.E.2d at 645.
The situation at hand is very similar to the one in
Powell, where the jury's conviction of the defendant on one count
was inconsistent with its acquittal of him on another count
because the jury found the same essential element both did and
did not exist. Jones, 207 Ill. 2d at 135-36, 797 N.E.2d at 648.
When a guilty verdict and a negative answer to a special inter-
rogatory like the one at issue are irreconcilable, the jury has
also found an essential element was proved beyond a reasonable
doubt and not proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, the
aforementioned reasoning set forth in Powell would also apply to
inconsistencies between a verdict and a special interrogatory
like the one at issue here.
Defendant contends this case is different because (1)
the jury's question indicates the ox that has been gored and (2)
the jury was not exercising lenity. See Powell, 469 U.S. at 65,
83 L. Ed. 2d at 468-69, 105 S. Ct. at 477. While the jury's
question suggests the jury was thinking the State failed to prove
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the trial court
instructed the jury to read and follow its instructions. The
- 20 -
jury instructions specifically stated the State had to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt "defendant performed the acts which
caused the death of Tywon Renier" to find defendant guilty of
first degree murder. The jury later returned a guilty verdict
and a negative answer to the special interrogatory. The jury
could have just as easily changed its mind on the sufficiency of
the evidence but answered in the negative to the special inter-
rogatory, thinking it was benefitting defendant. We note the
jury need not be familiar with criminal law to determine a
negative answer to the interrogatory would favor defendant.
Whatever the jury was thinking is still pure speculation on our
part even with the jury's question. Thus, contrary to defen-
dant's assertion, we do not know whom the error would benefit.
Thus, we disagree with defendant the jury's question makes
Powell's reasoning inapplicable to this case. Moreover, we note
that, even with legally inconsistent findings, sufficiency-of-
the-evidence review is a sufficient safeguard against jury
irrationality. Jones, 207 Ill. 2d at 148-49, 797 N.E.2d at 655,
citing Powell, 469 U.S. at 67, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 470, 105 S. Ct. at
478.
Accordingly, we continue to find a guilty verdict
cannot be challenged based on an inconsistent answer to a special
interrogatory absent a statute providing such. Since we have
determined a defendant cannot challenge a conviction based on an
inconsistent answer to a special interrogatory, we need not
determine whether the guilty verdict and negative answer to the
- 21 -
special interrogatory are actually inconsistent because, even if
they were, it would have no impact on the jury's guilty verdict.
See People v. Pelt, 207 Ill. 2d 434, 440, 800 N.E.2d 1193, 1196
(2003).
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Defendant also contends the State's evidence was
insufficient to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of
first degree murder.
In analyzing this issue, our function is not to retry
the defendant. People v. Evans, 209 Ill. 2d 194, 209, 808 N.E.2d
939, 947 (2004). Rather, we review this issue under the well-
established standard of "whether, after viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier
of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt." People v. Carpenter, 228 Ill. 2d
250, 265, 888 N.E.2d 105, 114 (2008). This court "will not
reverse a conviction unless the evidence is so unreasonable,
improbable[,] or unsatisfactory that it raises a reasonable doubt
of defendant's guilt." Evans, 209 Ill. 2d at 209, 808 N.E.2d at
947. Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has declared
"[s]ufficiency-of-the-evidence review involves assessment by the
courts of whether the evidence adduced at trial could support any
rational determination of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."
(Emphasis added.) Powell, 469 U.S. at 67, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 470,
105 S. Ct. at 478; see also People v. Steidl, 142 Ill. 2d 204,
226, 568 N.E.2d 837, 845 (1991) (refusing to consider statements
- 22 -
that were never entered into evidence). Thus, we will not
consider any evidence that was not presented at trial.
Additionally, we note the Powell Court indicated
sufficiency-of-the-evidence review (1) is independent of a jury's
determination the evidence on another count was insufficient and
(2) "should not be confused with the problems caused by inconsis-
tent verdicts." Powell, 469 U.S. at 67, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 470, 105
S. Ct. at 478. Thus, inconsistent verdicts are not part of the
sufficiency-of-the-evidence analysis. See People v. Allen, 344
Ill. App. 3d 949, 958 n.2, 801 N.E.2d 1115, 1123 n.2 (2003).
Likewise, we find the alleged inconsistent answer to the special
interrogatory is not part of the sufficiency-of-the-evidence
analysis.
In support of his argument, defendant notes no physical
evidence links him to the crime scene, the two witnesses that
named him as the shooter received benefits from the State, and
the other witness gave descriptions that did not match defendant.
The lack of physical evidence in a case does not raise a reason-
able doubt where an eyewitness has positively identified the
defendant as the perpetrator of the crime. See People v. Clarke,
391 Ill. App. 3d 596, 610, 915 N.E.2d 1, 13 (2009). In this
case, both Morgan and Jovawn identified defendant as the person
who shot Renier. Defendant contends no reasonable trier of fact
would have believed Morgan and Jovawn because they did not
identify defendant as the shooter until they received benefits
from the State.
- 23 -
In support of his contention, defendant cites cases
addressing accomplice and jailhouse-informant testimony. Such
testimony has been identified as having inherent weaknesses. See
People v. Penrod, 316 Ill. App. 3d 713, 720, 737 N.E.2d 341, 348
(2000) (accomplice testimony); People v. Saxon, 374 Ill. App. 3d
409, 423 n.4, 871 N.E.2d 244, 256 n.4 (2007) (McDade, J., dis-
senting) (noting the testimony of a jailhouse informant, espe-
cially when obtained in exchange for a deal, special treatment,
or the dropping of charges has been identified as one of the
principal factors leading to wrongful convictions). However, the
record contains no evidence Jovawn and Morgan were defendant's
accomplices in the shooting, and Jovawn and Morgan testified as
eyewitnesses. Moreover, Morgan only testified defendant asked
him to provide a statement he was not at Bass Place at the time
of the shooting. Morgan did not testify defendant confessed to
the crime while they were both in the Macon County jail.
We also point out Morgan's and Jovawn's deals with the
State were regarding them providing a statement to the police.
Jovawn and Morgan had both done that and had already received the
benefits of their respective agreements. No evidence was pre-
sented the State had made any promises to them regarding their
trial testimony. Additionally, Morgan's and Jovawn's failure to
cooperate with the police until something was in it for them is
consistent with Spence's actions. Spence was uncooperative on
the stand and appeared reluctant on the videotape to give a
statement to the police. Moreover, no evidence was presented
- 24 -
indicating Morgan and Jovawn conspired to name defendant as the
shooter.
Contrary to defendant's argument, Morgan's testimony is
similar to the testimony of other witnesses. Bass testified
Morgan's distinctive Cadillac was present at Bass Place at the
time of the shooting. Bates also testified Morgan was at Bass
Place that night. Moreover, Bates, Thomas, and Morgan all
testified a fight between Renier and Leo started after Leo had
grabbed Donte. Morgan testified defendant came from around a van
and started shooting. Similarly, Bates testified the shooter
came between the cars and then started shooting. Morgan heard at
least seven shots, and Bates heard six or seven. The fact the
other witnesses did not describe Morgan as being in the fight is
unimportant as all of the State's witnesses agreed the fight was
between Leo and Renier after Leo had grabbed Donte. We note
Bates also did not mention Thomas as being near Renier. More-
over, Thomas testified that, after he saw Renier was shot, he
yelled for help, and "a couple of people [he] was with came
running from out of nowhere." That testimony suggests his
friends were close to the action, and consistent with Morgan's
testimony, he heard Thomas yell for help and then helped get the
victim in the car.
Additionally, Bates's description of the shooter does
not appear inconsistent with defendant's appearance set forth in
the record. Bates testified the shooter was light-skinned and
chubby. Shortly after the incident, Bates had told the police
- 25 -
the shooter was around 5 feet 10 inches tall, weighed 200 to 220
pounds, and had a "very muscular build." When asked about the
discrepancy between chubby and very muscular, Bates explained the
shooter was big, bigger than him. Detective Cline guessed
defendant was 5 feet 10 or 11 inches and testified defendant was
much heavier than he was several years ago. We note it was the
jury's function to evaluate any discrepancies in the witness's
description of the offender and the defendant's appearance, and
we will not overturn that determination "unless it is so contrary
to the evidence as to be unjustified." People v. Bayless, 99
Ill. App. 3d 532, 536, 425 N.E.2d 1192, 1194-95 (1981). Addi-
tionally, contrary to defendant's assertion, Bates's description
of the shooter is inconsistent with Leo's appearance; Thomas
described Leo as 5 feet 10 inches, thin, and dark-skinned with
gold teeth.
Spence did not see the shooter but did see "Magic" lift
up his shirt and display two guns in the waistband of his pants
before the shooting started. Spence described "Magic" as chubby,
shorter than him (6 feet 1 inch), clean shaven, with a bob
haircut. While Spence did not identify defendant as "Magic" in a
photographic lineup, Detective Cline testified the photograph was
old and defendant had put on a lot of weight. Both Jovawn and
Detective Cline testified "Magic" was a nickname of defendant's.
Moreover, Spence's description of Magic is also inconsistent with
Thomas's description of Leo.
Thomas testified he did not see the shooter as he was
- 26 -
attempting to put Renier in the car. He explained the skinny,
dark-skinned man with gold teeth was Leo, the man who he had
witnessed fighting with Renier. While Detective Carlton testi-
fied Thomas told him the morning of the incident the shooter was
the skinny male with gold teeth, Detective Carlton also stated
Thomas was very difficult to interview as he had just learned of
his brother's death.
Additionally, we note this case is distinguishable from
People v. Smith, 185 Ill. 2d 532, 545, 708 N.E.2d 365, 371
(1999), where our supreme court concluded no reasonable trier of
fact could have found the testimony of the only witness linking
the defendant to the crime credible because the testimony had
serious inconsistencies and was repeatedly impeached. Here, at
least Morgan's testimony is relatively consistent with the
testimony of the other witnesses who did not have a motive to
lie. Moreover, at this point, Morgan had nothing to gain from
his testimony against defendant.
The jury, as the trier of fact, possessed the responsi-
bility to determine (1) the witnesses' credibility, (2) the
weight to be given to their testimony, and (3) the reasonable
inferences to be drawn from the evidence. People v. Jimerson,
127 Ill. 2d 12, 43, 535 N.E.2d 889, 903 (1989). The testimony of
Morgan, Bates, Spence, and Detective Cline was sufficient for a
jury to find defendant was the individual that shot Renier.
Accordingly, we do not find the State's evidence was "so unrea-
sonable, improbable[,] or unsatisfactory that it raises a reason-
- 27 -
able doubt of defendant's guilt." Evans, 209 Ill. 2d at 209, 808
N.E.2d at 947.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's
judgment. As part of our judgment, we award the State its $75
statutory assessment against defendant as costs of this appeal.
Affirmed.
MYERSCOUGH, P.J., and STEIGMANN, J., concur.
- 28 -