Illinois Department of Juvenile Justice v. Illinois Civil Service Commission

Filed 11/1/10 NO. 4-09-0971
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE ) Appeal from
JUSTICE, ) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Sangamon County
v. ) No. 09MR434
THE ILLINOIS CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION; )
CHRIS KOLKER, in His Official Capacity )
as Chairman of the Illinois Civil )
Service Commission; RAYMOND W. EWELL, )
BARBARA J. PETERSON, ARES G. DALIANIS, )
and BETTY BUKRABA, in Their Official )
Capacities as Commissioners of the )
Illinois Civil Service Commission; and ) Honorable
JOSIE DAY, ) Patrick W. Kelley,
Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge Presiding.
_________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the opinion of the court:
In May 2009, an administrative law judge (ALJ) recom-
mended that codefendant, Josie Day, be discharged from her
employment based on Day's admission that she tape-recorded her
coworkers' conversations without their knowledge. Two weeks
later, codefendants, the Illinois Civil Service Commission, Chris
Kolker, Raymond W. Ewell, Barbara J. Peterson, Ares G. Dalianis,
and Betty Bukraba (collectively, the Commission), adopted the
ALJ's factual findings but concluded that discharge of Day was
not warranted. Instead the Commission determined that a 90-day
suspension constituted an appropriate sanction.
In June 2009, plaintiff, the Illinois Department of
Juvenile Justice (Department), filed a complaint for administra-
tive review pursuant to section 3-108 of the Code of Civil
Procedure (Civil Code) (735 ILCS 5/3-108 (West 2008)), requesting
reversal of the Commission's decision to suspend Day instead of
terminating her employment. Following a November 2009 hearing,
the circuit court affirmed the Commission's decision.
The Department appeals, arguing that the Commission's
conclusion that cause to discharge Day did not exist was arbi-
trary and unreasonable. We disagree and affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Circumstances Surrounding the Department's
Decision To Terminate Day's Employment
In December 1986, Day began working for the Illinois
Department of Public Aid as an entry-level administrative clerk.
In early 1990, Day transferred to the Department of Corrections
(DOC), where she worked various clerical positions. In November
1997, Day tendered her written resignation, citing her "medical
condition to smoke." In particular, Day noted that because she
"found an ash tray on [her] desk with a cigarette butt and
numerous ashes in it," she "would no longer expose [herself] to
unnecessary smoke and stress." (At her termination hearing in
this matter, Day testified that she resigned because of her
husband's death.) In May 2004, DOC rehired Day as an Executive
Secretary II for the (1) school superintendent of its school
district and (2) chief of its medical services division.
On July 1, 2006, the legislature transferred control of
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(1) juvenile offenders and (2) school district employees, includ-
ing Day, from DOC to the newly created Department. Two weeks
before the transfer, the Department's acting director, who was
later appointed Department Director (hereinafter Director),
scheduled a two-day executive staff conference to coordinate the
transition. Because the Director knew that Day was apprehensive
about the transition, he invited her to attend the conference to
meet the Department's executive staff and assuage her concerns.
Following the transition, Day worked at the Department's execu-
tive offices with three other employees.
In spring 2007, Day complained to a union steward about
the disruptive noise level in her workplace, which she claimed
was caused by her coworkers' discussions concerning weekend
plans, birthdays, and "office chatter." The union did not act on
Day's claim because it did not want to stifle social interaction
among employees. In May 2007, Day again complained to the union
steward about the noise level. The steward promptly scheduled a
meeting with the Department's acting deputy director for opera-
tions (deputy). Following a June 2007 meeting, the deputy stated
that he would address Day's noise complaint. Day later told the
union steward in casual conversation that the executive office
noise continued to be a problem. In December 2007, Day again
complained to the union steward but stated that the "office
chatter" was now "personal." The steward referred Day to the
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Department's equal-opportunity representative because he consid-
ered Day's claim similar to a hostile-work-environment complaint.
In March 2008, Day contacted the union steward, re-
questing to file a grievance regarding "excessive noise level,"
which she claimed was dangerous to her health. One week later,
Day, the union steward, and the deputy met to discuss Day's
concerns. At the meeting, Day provided the deputy with a typed
log, chronicling, in explicit detail, her coworkers' conversa-
tions and activities over 11 business days (March 6, 2008,
through March 21, 2008). After the meeting, the deputy read the
following entry from Day's log, dated March 18, 2008:
"1:55 Billie returned from lunch and
she and Lisa entered the back door chattering
and laughing loudly. The atmosphere was
[sic] now again very noisy. I turned on the
tape recorder to caught [sic] some of it."
(Emphasis added.)
Thereafter, the deputy (1) informed the Director about
Day's log entry and (2) scheduled another meeting with Day and
the union steward. At the meeting, Day admitted that she had
tape-recorded her coworkers' conversations. The deputy asked Day
to (1) file an incident report regarding the recording and (2)
provide him the tape and Department-issued tape recorder she used
to make the recordings. Thereafter, the deputy gave the tape
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recording to the Director. The Director later listened to the
recording and discovered that along with recording her coworkers'
conversations during March 2008, Day had also recorded about 60
to 90 minutes of the June 2006 transition conference.
In July 2008, the Department referred Day to an
employee-review hearing for violating Department standard-of-
conduct rules regarding (1) employee actions that reflect poorly
on the Department and (2) compliance with federal, state, and
local laws. After a hearing held later that month, the hearing
officer provided the Director his written report in which he (1)
found that Day's conduct was not criminal but, instead, employee
misconduct and (2) recommended a 60-day suspension.
The Director rejected the hearing officer's suspension
recommendation, opting instead for suspension pending discharge.
The Director noted that the alleged rule violations had been
substantiated based, in part, on Day's admission that she tape-
recorded her coworkers without their knowledge. In August 2008,
the State of Illinois Central Management Services (CMS) approved
the Department's discharge recommendation. Day later timely
filed a written request for hearing pursuant to section 11 of the
Personnel Code (20 ILCS 415/11 (West 2008)).
B. The Evidence Presented to the ALJ
Over a seven-month period (September 2008 through March
2009), the following evidence, which included the aforementioned
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background, was presented by the parties to the ALJ.
1. The June 2006 Recording of the Transition Conference
Day explained that prior to her transition to the
Department, her clerical duties with DOC included typing minutes
of school board and medical service meetings. Day initially
tape-recorded the school board meetings but later transcribed
them by hand prior to typing them. Day continued to tape-record
subsequent medical services meetings because the attendees
frequently used medical terms that she wanted to accurately
reflect in her typed minutes. Day estimated that she had tape-
recorded six medical services meetings--five of which she re-
corded and transcribed at the request of DOC's chief of medical
services.
On June 15, 2006, Day attended the transitional meet-
ing, which was already in progress. Day entered, found a seat at
the conference table, and retrieved her planner and Department-
issued tape recorder from her purse. Day placed her purse on the
floor, turned on the tape recorder, and placed it on the confer-
ence table. Day then placed her planner on the conference table
and began taking notes.
Day stated that because she did not know what her
duties would be within the new Department, she wanted to tran-
scribe the transitional information related to the school dis-
trict accurately. Day later listened to, typed, and filed the
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minutes of the conference based on the tape recording, which she
planned to disseminate to the new school district superintendent
when that position was filled. (The record shows that during
Day's employment with the Department, the school district super-
intendent position remained vacant.) Day surmised that because
DOC's school district superintendent and medical services chief
had previously given her permission to tape-record their respec-
tive meetings, she could also tape the transitional conference.
Day later turned off the tape recorder after she determined that
the information being conveyed at the conference no longer
pertained to the school district.
Day admitted that at the June 2006 transitional confer-
ence (1) she did not (a) announce to the attendees that she would
be recording or (b) obtain permission to record the conference,
(2) no one asked her to make the recording, and (3) she did not
see anyone else recording the conference.
The Director and one of Day's coworkers who attended
the transitional conference both noted that after Day entered the
conference, she placed her purse on the conference table. Day
then sat back in her chair approximately two feet away from the
conference table, taking notes on a pad of paper that she placed
on her lap. The Director and coworker both stated that (1) Day
did not ask for permission to tape the conference and (2) they
did not see a tape recorder on the conference room table. The
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deputy testified that when he listened to the recording of the
conference, he did not hear the participants discuss any school-
board-district issues.
The DOC medical services chief testified that Day was
her part-time clerical assistant for less than a year prior to
Day's transition to the Department. During that time, the chief
asked Day to attend one quarterly medical services meeting for
the sole purpose of transcribing and preparing minutes of that
meeting for her review. The chief (1) could not recall whether
Day had (a) tape-recorded that meeting or (b) attended other
quarterly meetings and (2) did not believe that Day took notes at
any other medical services meetings because she only disseminated
minutes Day prepared from that quarterly meeting.
Another of Day's coworkers stated that after an exhaus-
tive search of Day's paper and computer files, she could not find
the June 2006 transition-conference minutes Day claimed to have
prepared and filed. The coworker acknowledged that she was not
trained in computer forensics and had not previously performed a
computer search for electronic media. In rebuttal, Day testified
that the Department had issued her a new computer in late 2007
but also admitted that the computer technicians had transferred
her old computer files to her new computer.
2. The March 2008 Recording of Day's Coworkers
After the transition, Day shared office space with
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three other women in the Department's executive offices, where
they each had their own office cubicle. Day described her work
environment as "stressful" and that it was "extremely difficult
to perform some of [her] functions" because the office was
"extremely loud" and her coworkers were "out of control." Day
recounted that in November 2007, the office noise was so exces-
sive that she felt as if she was having a "panic attack." Day
stated that she sought medical care for that particular incident
but acknowledged that she neither filed a Department report
documenting that event, nor mentioned it in her grievance.
Day stated that the purpose of constructing the daily
log of her coworkers' activities was to document her work envi-
ronment, which she reiterated consisted of yelling, hollering,
and chatter. Day admitted that she recorded her coworkers
without their knowledge but that (1) she did so because she
wanted to determine whether the tape recorder would capture the
office noise and (2) no one ever informed her that recording
personal conversations was prohibited. Day estimated that she
taped her coworkers for a few minutes and that the recorder was
in plain view on her office desk.
Two coworkers who worked regularly with Day, the union
steward, and several other employees who would routinely travel
through the executive offices testified that they did not notice
any excessive office noise. Day's coworkers further described
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the executive office as a standard office environment, noting
that the noise volume never rose to a level that interfered with
their respective job performances. Another Department supervisor
who worked in another building testified that he would come to
the Department's executive offices "when he needed to get away
from the distractions." The supervisor explained that the
executive offices were "significantly" quieter than his work
environment.
C. The Administrative Law Judge's Recommendation
In May 2009, the ALJ issued, in pertinent part, the
following written recommendations:
"[T]he preponderance of the evidence
indicates that on two different occasions
(June 15, 2006 and March 18, 2008)[,] Day
intentionally and secretly tape[-]recorded
her co[]workers[] without their consent. Day
made the recordings intentionally and volun-
tarily and she did so without permission
and/or authorization from a superior. ***
Despite 15 years of service ***, positive
performance evaluations, and no prior disci-
plinary history, Day's violations of the
eavesdropping statute not only offend basic
notions of workplace decency[,] but [also]
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fall precisely into the definition of a 'sub-
stantial shortcoming' rendering Day's contin-
uance in her position 'detrimental to the
discipline and efficiency of the service and
which the law and sound public opinion recog-
nize as good cause for the employee no longer
holding the position.' For these reasons,
discharge is the appropriate discipline."
D. The Commission's Findings and Decision
Two weeks after the ALJ provided its recommendation,
the Commission issued the following decision:
"The [Commission], having read the rec-
ommended decision of the [ALJ] ***, hereby
amend[s] and adopt[s] said decision and [cer-
tifies] it to [CMS] for enforcement.
FINDING[S]: It is hereby determined
that the written charges for discharge ap-
proved by the director of [CMS] have been
proven, but do not warrant discharge due to
Day's 15 years of continuous service with no
prior discipline. Furthermore, there is no
evidence that Day's action in tape recording
her co-workers was premeditated or done with
the requisite level of malicious intent.
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DECISION: The [Commission] recommend[s]
a 90-day suspension in lieu of discharge."
E. The Circuit Court's Judgment
In June 2009, the Department filed a complaint for
administrative review pursuant to section 3-108 of the Civil Code
(735 ILCS 5/3-108 (West 2008)), seeking to reinstate the ALJ's
discharge determination. Following a November 2009 hearing, the
circuit court affirmed the Commission's decision to suspend Day
for 90 days in lieu of discharge.
This appeal followed.
II. THE COMMISSION'S DISCHARGE DECISION
A. The Standard of Review
We first note that the appellate court’s role is to
review the administrative conclusion, not the circuit court's
decision. Metro Developers, LLC v. City of Chicago Department of
Revenue, 377 Ill. App. 3d 395, 397, 877 N.E.2d 785, 788 (2007).
"In discharge cases, '[t]he scope of review of an administrative
agency's decision regarding discharge is generally a two-step
process involving first, a manifest-weight standard, and second,
a determination of whether the findings of fact provide a suffi-
cient basis for the agency's conclusion that cause for discharge
does or does not exist.'" Department of Human Services v.
Porter, 396 Ill. App. 3d 701, 718, 921 N.E.2d 367, 380 (2009),
quoting Brown v. Civil Service Comm'n, 133 Ill. App. 3d 35, 39,
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478 N.E.2d 541, 544 (1985).
Initially, an administrative agency's findings and
conclusions on questions of fact shall be held to be prima facie
true and correct. 735 ILCS 5/3-110 (West 2006); American Federa-
tion of State, County & Municipal Employees, Council 31 v.
Illinois State Labor Relations Board, State Panel, 216 Ill. 2d
569, 577, 839 N.E.2d 479, 485 (2005). In examining an adminis-
trative agency's factual findings, this court will not weigh the
evidence or substitute its judgment for that of an administrative
agency. City of Belvidere v. Illinois State Labor Relations
Board, 181 Ill. 2d 191, 204, 692 N.E.2d 295, 302 (1998). In-
stead, this court is limited to ascertaining whether such find-
ings of fact are against the manifest weight of the evidence.
City of Belvidere, 181 Ill. 2d at 204, 692 N.E.2d at 302.
An administrative agency's discharge determination is
subject to judicial review and "'will not be reversed unless it
is arbitrary, unreasonable, or unrelated to the requirements of
service.' [Citation.]" Porter, 396 Ill. App. 3d at 726, 921
N.E.2d at 386. A reviewing court may reverse a sanction imposed
by an administrative agency when that agency, in opting for a
particular sanction, acted unreasonably. Brown, 133 Ill. App. 3d
at 39, 478 N.E.2d at 544.
B. The Department's Claim That the Commission's Decision
Was Arbitrary and Unreasonable
The Department argues that the Commission's conclusion
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that cause to discharge Day did not exist was arbitrary and
unreasonable. Specifically, the Department contends that the
Commission's decision to reduce the ALJ's discharge recommenda-
tion to a 90-day suspension was "wholly conclusory" in that it
provided "little analysis why it chose to reduce Day's discipline
from discharge to a mere 90-day suspension." We disagree.
1. The Applicable Civil Service Commission Rule
Section 1.170 of Title 80 of the Administrative Code--
pertaining to cause for discharge--provides as follows:
"a) Cause for discharge consists of some
substantial shortcoming which renders the
employee's continuance in his position in
some way detrimental to the discipline and
efficiency of the service and which the law
and sound public opinion recognize as good
cause for the employee no longer holding the
position.
b) In determining the appropriate pen-
alty for an offense of which the employee is
found guilty, the Commission shall consider
the employee's performance record and the
employee's length of continuous service un-
less the offense would warrant immediate
discharge." 80 Ill. Adm. Code §1.170, as
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amended by 19 Ill. Reg. 12451, 12464-65 (eff.
August 21, 1995).
2. The Basis of the Department's Contention That the
Commission's Decisions Was "Wholly Conclusory"
In support of its contention that the Commission's
suspension decision was "wholly conclusory" and, thus, arbitrary
and unreasonable, the Department cites Austin v. Civil Service
Comm'n, 247 Ill. App. 3d 399, 617 N.E.2d 349 (1993), and Bell v.
Civil Service Comm'n, 161 Ill. App. 3d 644, 515 N.E.2d 248(1987), for the proposition that when the Commission fails to (1)
reject the ALJ's findings of fact or (2) make findings of fact
inconsistent with those of the ALJ, its decision is arbitrary and
unreasonable. However, under the facts of this case, Austin and
Bell do not offer the Department any support. As we explain
later, this case is distinguishable.
a. The Bell Decision
In Bell, 161 Ill. App. 3d at 645, 515 N.E.2d at 249, an
administrative agency sought to discharge Bell after an audit
revealed that Bell, who was a real-estate investigator, credited
time she spent on general administrative matters to specific
real-estate cases. The evidence presented at a subsequent
hearing showed that (1) the agency had recently implemented new
time-reporting procedures, (2) Bell and other agency employees
received training on the new reporting procedures, (3) Bell's
supervisor (a) informed her that she should credit her adminis-
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trative time to specific cases and (b) approved each of her time
sheets, and (4) several other agency employees had difficulties
with the new time-reporting procedures. Bell, 161 Ill. App. 3d
at 646-47, 515 N.E.2d at 249-50. Based on this evidence, the
hearing officer recommended (1) reversal of the agency's dis-
charge decision and (2) that Bell receive a 30-day suspension.
Bell, 161 Ill. App. 3d at 648, 515 N.E.2d at 250.
The Commission adopted the hearing officer's recommen-
dation "'to the extent not inconsistent with their comments.'"
Bell, 161 Ill. App. 3d at 648, 515 N.E.2d at 250. The Commission
then stated that Bell's discharge was "'warranted because of the
serious consequences of the failure to properly account.'" Bell,
161 Ill. App. 3d at 648, 515 N.E.2d at 250. After the circuit
court affirmed the Commission's decision, Bell appealed. Bell,
161 Ill. App. 3d at 648, 515 N.E.2d at 251.
The First District Appellate Court reversed, concluding
that the "Commission's findings were *** merely conclusory and
insufficient" because it failed to "set forth specific findings
of fact or conclusions of law in support of [its] decision not to
follow the hearing officer's recommendation." Bell, 161 Ill.
App. 3d at 649-50, 515 N.E.2d at 251-52.
b. The Austin Decision
In Austin, 247 Ill. App. 3d at 401, 617 N.E.2d at 351,
DOC charged Austin, a corrections officer, with negligence and
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improper handling of a contraband incident. DOC suspended Austin
pending discharge, which CMS later approved. Austin, 247 Ill.
App. 3d at 401-02, 617 N.E.2d at 351. After Austin filed a
request for a hearing, the hearing officer concluded that al-
though Austin's initial actions were not negligent, he used poor
judgment during the incident, which resulted in a dangerous
situation. Austin, 247 Ill. App. 3d at 402, 617 N.E.2d at 351.
The hearing officer (1) recommended Austin's suspension for 90
days in addition to the period of suspension DOC imposed pending
his discharge and (2) found that Austin's actions did not warrant
discharge. Austin, 247 Ill. App. 3d at 402, 617 N.E.2d at 351.
As in Bell, the Commission adopted the hearing offi-
cer's decision "'to the extent not inconsistent with the comments
set forth.'" Austin, 247 Ill. App. 3d at 402, 617 N.E.2d at 351-
52. The Commission then rejected the hearing officer's "'analy-
sis of the incident,'" finding that the "'seriousness of the
incident,'" viewed in its totality, warranted Austin's discharge.
Austin, 247 Ill. App. 3d at 403, 617 N.E.2d at 352. On appeal,
the circuit court reversed the Commission's sanction as too harsh
and remanded for the determination of an appropriate penalty.
Austin, 247 Ill. App. 3d at 403, 617 N.E.2d at 352. On remand,
the Commission ordered Austin suspended from duty for 90 days in
addition to its original suspension-pending-discharge decision.
Austin, 247 Ill. App. 3d at 403, 617 N.E.2d at 352.
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On appeal from the circuit court's final order, the
First District Appellate Court concluded that the Commission's
initial discharge decision was conclusory and, thus, arbitrary
and unreasonable because it failed to support its findings that
the seriousness of the incident warranted Austin's discharge.
Austin, 247 Ill. App. 3d at 404-05, 617 N.E.2d at 353. Specifi-
cally, the appellate court noted that "[a] reader of the commis-
sion's decision is left to divine which portion of the hearing
officer's decision it found to be inconsistent with its conclu-
sion." Austin, 247 Ill. App. 3d at 404, 617 N.E.2d at 353. The
court also noted that the Commission neither rejected nor made
any finding inconsistent with those of the hearing officer.
Austin, 247 Ill. App. 3d at 404, 617 N.E.2d at 353.
3. The Commission's Decisions in This Case
We first note that as framed by the Department's
argument, our review involves the Commission's determination to
impose a 90-day suspension in lieu of discharge because the
Commission determined that cause to discharge Day did not exist.
The question before us is not whether this court would have
imposed a harsher or more lenient penalty. Instead, the question
before us is whether, in opting for a suspension in lieu of
discharge--in contradiction to the ALJ's recommendation--the
Commission substantiated its decision or whether its departure
was arbitrary, unreasonable, or unrelated to the requirements of
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service.
In this case, although the Commission's written deci-
sion (1) adopted the ALJ's decision and thus, by default, its
findings of fact and (2) agreed with the ALJ that Day had vio-
lated the Department's standards of conduct by recording her co-
workers, it also amended the ALJ's decision with regard to the
appropriate penalty that should be imposed based on Day's actions
and admissions. Specifically, the Commission disagreed with the
ALJ's determination that Day's violation was a "substantial
shortcoming," which was "detrimental to the discipline and
efficiency" of the Department, requiring her immediate discharge
for cause pursuant to section 1.170(a) of Title 80 of the Admin-
istrative Code. 80 Ill. Adm. Code §1.170(a), as amended by 19
Ill. Reg. 12451, 12464 (eff. August 21, 1995).
However, unlike Bell and Austin, the cases previously
discussed and upon which the Department relied in support of its
contention that the Commission's determination was "wholly
conclusory," the Commission here explained why its decision that
a 90-day suspension in lieu of discharge was the appropriate
level of discipline by specifically placing greater emphasis than
did the ALJ on Day's 15 years of service without any disciplinary
infractions. See Davis v. City of Evanston, 257 Ill. App. 3d
549, 557, 629 N.E.2d 125, 131 (1993) (an employee's disciplinary
records has a bearing on the issue of cause for discharge); see
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also Brown, 133 Ill. App. 3d at 41, 478 N.E.2d at 546 (employment
history has a bearing on the issue of cause for discharge).
We note that in opting for suspension in lieu of
discharge, the Commission's consideration of Day's years of
service and disciplinary record was (1) mandated by section
1.170(b) of Title 80 of the Administrative Code (80 Ill. Adm.
Code §1.170(b), as amended by 19 Ill. Reg. 12451, 12465 (eff.
August 21, 1995)) and (2) supported by the record. In addition,
without reaching the merits of the propriety of its decision
(because that issue is not before us), the Commission further
explained its departure from the ALJ's recommendation by conclud-
ing that even though Day had violated the Department's standards
of conduct when she recorded her coworkers' conversations--an
issue neither party disputes--the evidence presented did not show
that her conduct was "premeditated or done with the requisite
level of malicious intent."
Therefore, because the Commission sufficiently substan-
tiated its determination to depart from the ALJ's discharge
recommendation, we reject the Department's contention that the
Commission's decision was "wholly conclusory." Accordingly, we
conclude that the Commission's determination to suspend Day in
lieu of discharge was not arbitrary, unreasonable, or unrelated
to the requirements of service.
III. EPILOGUE
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In closing, we note that since its creation in 1905,
the Commission's role has changed from that of a central person-
nel agency responsible for examining and appointing applicants to
state government positions to its self-proclaimed "watchdog"
status, ensuring "that the employees and citizens of the State of
Illinois are afforded the rights and protections set forth in the
Personnel Code [(20 ILCS 415/1 through 25 (West 2008))]."
http://www.icsc.il.gov/History.htm (visited October 14, 2010)
(Illinois Civil Service Commission Web site). Given the consti-
tutional and legal protections now available to all employees of
this state, we question whether public policy is furthered by the
Commission's continued expenditure of scarce state resources in
cases like this one.
In Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373, 49 L. Ed. 2d 547,
565, 96 S. Ct. 2673, 2689 (1976), and Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S.
507, 519, 63 L. Ed. 2d 574, 584, 100 S Ct. 1287, 1295 (1980), the
United States Supreme Court held that the first amendment to the
United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. I) prohibits
governmental officials from discharging public employees solely
on the basis of political party affiliation. In Rutan v. Repub-
lican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62, 79, 111 L. Ed. 2d 52, 69,
110 S. Ct. 2729, 2739 (1990), the Supreme Court extended its
holding in Burns and Branti to "promotion, transfer, recall, and
hiring decisions based on party affiliation."
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Similarly, although Illinois courts have adhered to the
proposition that an employer may discharge an at-will employee
for any reason or for no reason, such an action is prohibited
when the discharge violates various antidiscrimination laws. We
note that none of these laws nor the aforementioned Supreme Court
decisions attaching constitutional protections to employment
decisions existed 105 years ago when the General Assembly created
civil-service protections for state employees.
Here, we earlier concluded--based on our standard of
review--that the Commission's determination to suspend Day in
contravention of the ALJ's recommendation was not arbitrary or
unreasonable. Nonetheless, we cannot imagine a private-sector
employer continuing to employ Day based upon her misconduct,
which the record before us makes abundantly clear. A private-
sector employer would not tolerate the inevitably toxic office
environment that her continued presence would create.
Although we note the Commission's valid responsibili-
ties with regard to classification, merit, pay, and enforcement
of its other personnel rules, perhaps the time has come for the
General Assembly to reconsider whether the Commission should also
duplicate the constitutional and statutory protections all state
employees currently enjoy from being the victims of invidious
discrimination, particularly when viewed in light of the costs
imposed, as this case amply demonstrates.
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IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we affirm the Commission's
judgment.
Affirmed.
KNECHT and McCULLOUGH, JJ., concur.
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