State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. McFadden

ILLINOIS OFFICIAL REPORTS
Appellate Court
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. McFadden, 2012 IL App (2d) 120272
Appellate Court STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Caption Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DIANA McFADDEN and TODD McFADDEN,
Defendants-Appellants.
District & No. Second District
Docket No. 2-12-0272
Filed October 31, 2012
Held The antistacking clauses in each of defendants’ five insurance policies
(Note: This syllabus capping the underinsured motorist coverage at $100,000 effectively
constitutes no part of limited their underinsured motorist coverage to $100,000 for the accident
the opinion of the court in which one of the insureds was struck by another motorist while riding
but has been prepared one of defendants’ insured motorcycles, and based on the payment of
by the Reporter of $250,000 pursuant to the other motorist’s insurer, no underinsured
Decisions for the motorist coverage applied.
convenience of the
reader.)
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Du Page County, No. 11-MR-841; the
Review Hon. Bonnie M. Wheaton, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Affirmed.
Counsel on Lulay Law Offices, of Naperville (Michael B. Lulay, of counsel), for
Appeal appellants.
Taylor Miller LLC, of Chicago (Frank C. Stevens, of counsel), for
appellee.
Panel PRESIDING JUSTICE JORGENSEN delivered the judgment of the
court, with opinion.
Justices Hudson and Birkett concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Defendant Dianna McFadden was injured in an auto crash. She and her husband,
defendant Todd McFadden, sought to collect underinsured motorist coverage from plaintiff,
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. The McFaddens claimed that, because
they had five separate policies with State Farm, each with a $100,000 limit of liability for
underinsured motorist coverage, their total limit was $500,000, and it was this amount that
should be offset against the tortfeasor’s liability limit to determine whether the tortfeasor was
underinsured.
¶2 State Farm filed a complaint for declaratory judgement, presenting two bases by which
the McFaddens were unable to accumulate more than $100,000 in underinsured motorist
coverage to be offset against the tortfeasor’s $250,000 policy, resulting in no underinsured
coverage. For the reasons that follow, we agree with State Farm’s primary basis for denying
coverage: as a matter of law, express “antistacking” language in the policies prohibits the
aggregation, or “stacking,” of said policies to provide total underinsured coverage in excess
of the amount set forth in the single policy providing the highest limit of liability, i.e.,
$100,000. One basis by which to deny coverage is sufficient. Therefore, we need not address
the second basis: in the absence of express antistacking language, default stacking
methodology would not result in coverage that exceeds $100,000. There is antistacking
language, and this antistacking language conflicts with either stacking methodology proposed
by the parties, making a determination on stacking methodology purely advisory. We affirm
the denial of coverage.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 In May 2009, Mark Nies (not a party to this case) negligently crashed into a motorcycle
driven by Dianna McFadden. Nies carried automobile insurance coverage in the amount of
$250,000, and his insurer paid the McFaddens that amount in settlement. However, the
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McFaddens’ damages exceeded $250,000, and they sought to collect an additional $250,000
from their own insurer, State Farm. The McFaddens claimed that Nies was underinsured by
$250,000.
¶5 State Farm had issued to the McFaddens five automobile insurance policies, one for each
of their five vehicles:
Policy No. Named Insured Vehicle Underinsured Limit
***D10-13 Dianna 2004 Harley Davidson (in crash) $100,000
***F03-13B Todd and Dianna 2008 Ford Escape $100,000
***E02-13E Todd 1995 Saturn $100,000
***F09-13 Dianna 1997 Honda $100,000
***C01-13 Todd 1995 Harley Davidson $100,000
Each policy contained its own “declarations sheet,” listing the relevant vehicle, premium
amount, and underinsured coverage amount. The declarations sheet is the first page of each
policy and can be thought of as a summary of the document. Each declarations sheet showed
that its respective policy contained $100,000 in underinsured coverage. The McFaddens
reasoned that, because they owned five policies, each with $100,000 in underinsured
coverage, they carried a total of $500,000 in underinsured coverage. The McFaddens
concluded that Nies was therefore underinsured by $250,000 (i.e., their total $500,000
underinsured coverage minus $250,000 from Nies) and that State Farm should pay them that
difference.
¶6 In June 2011, State Farm filed a complaint for declaratory judgment, arguing that: (1)
express language in each of the McFaddens’ policies, which will be set forth in our analysis,
prohibits the aggregation or “stacking” of said policies to provide total underinsured
coverage in excess of the amount set forth in the single policy providing the highest
coverage, i.e., $100,000 (Hobbs v. Hartford Insurance Co. of the Midwest, 214 Ill. 2d 11, 17
(2005); Grzeszczak v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., 168 Ill. 2d 216, 229-30 (1995)); and,
(2) even if the McFaddens’ policies did not contain said antistacking language, precedent
requires that Nies’s policy be offset one-by-one against each policy’s underinsured coverage
amount before a policy amount may be stacked with the others, and, here, each $100,000
underinsured coverage amount is less than $250,000, so no offset amount ever accumulates
(Jones v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 371 Ill. App. 3d 1096 (2007); Kapinus v. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 317 Ill. App. 3d 185 (2000) (ruling based on the
statutory definition of “underinsured motor vehicle” in section 143a-2(4) of the Illinois
Insurance Code (215 ILCS 5/143a-2(4) (West 2008)))). In other words, State Farm presented
two bases by which the McFaddens were prevented from accumulating more than $100,000
in underinsured coverage to be offset against Nies’s $250,000 policy, resulting in no
underinsured coverage.1
1
Although four of the policies were tied to motor vehicles that were not in the accident, State
Farm did not present this as a basis to deny underinsured coverage in excess of $100,000. As will
be shown, the proration clause at the end of the antistacking provision allows for this possibility.
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¶7 As to the first issue, the McFaddens responded that the policies’ antistacking language,
which limited underinsured coverage to $100,000, was rendered ambiguous by: (1) the
policies’ proration clauses; and (2) the policies’ declaration sheets. They argued that, if the
antistacking language was ambiguous, it did not effectively prevent them from accumulating
more than $100,000 in underinsured coverage.
¶8 As to the second issue, the McFaddens conceded that Jones and Kapinus establish an
offset-first, stack-second computation method. They further conceded that, under the offset-
first, stack-second computation method, there is no underinsured coverage. However, the
McFaddens argued that Jones and Kapinus were wrong.
¶9 The trial court recognized that it was compelled to rule in favor of State Farm on the
second issue. Jones and Kapinus, which come from the First and Third Districts,
respectively, stand unrebutted. A decision by an appellate court, while not binding on other
appellate districts, is binding on circuit courts throughout the state. State Farm Fire &
Casualty Co. v. Yapejian, 152 Ill. 2d 533, 539 (1992). Because State Farm need prevail on
only one of its arguments in order to deny coverage, the court did not address the first issue.
This appeal followed.
¶ 10 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 11 The two questions of law presented to the trial court may be thought of as: (1) can we
stack? (whether the policies’ antistacking language effectively limits coverage to the amount
contained in the single policy providing the highest limit); and, (2) if we can, how do we
stack? (whether the methodology is offset first, stack second, or the other way around). From
an analytic perspective, it makes sense to determine if the policies can be aggregated so as
to exceed $100,000 before determining whether such an aggregation must be accomplished
by offsetting first, stacking second, or the other way around. Although the trial court did not
answer the first question, we may. This court may address questions of law presented to, but
not decided by, the trial court. See, e.g., Myers v. Health Specialists, S.C., 225 Ill. App. 3d
68, 75-76 (1992).2
¶ 12 Therefore, we move to the first issue. The McFaddens argue that each policy’s
antistacking provision is ineffective to limit coverage to the highest amount contained in a
single policy, i.e., $100,000, because: (1) it is internally inconsistent (the antistacking
provision is rendered ambiguous by its own proration clause); and, (2) even if it would have
been effective on its own, it is rendered ambiguous when read in conjunction with each
policy’s declarations sheet. We reject each of these arguments.
¶ 13 A. Antistacking Provision Is Internally Consistent
¶ 14 An insurance provision that limits the total liability from all policies to that of the single
2
The parties fully briefed the first issue before the trial court, and these briefs are in the
record. The appellate briefs were less detailed. In advance of oral argument, this court ordered the
parties to be prepared to present the first issue.
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policy providing the highest limit is referred to as an “antistacking provision.” However, this
is in some ways a misnomer, because an underinsured coverage antistacking provision does
not necessarily preclude aggregation of portions of multiple policies. Rather, an antistacking
provision limits the total coverage to that set forth in the single policy with the highest limit.
See, e.g., Armstrong v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 229 Ill. App. 3d 971,
974-76 (1992). This concept is consistent with the section of the Illinois Insurance Code
authorizing antistacking provisions:
“Nothing herein shall prohibit an insurer from setting forth policy terms and conditions
which provide that if the insured has coverage available under this Section under more
than one policy ***, any recovery or benefits may be equal to, but may not exceed, the
higher of applicable limits of the respective coverage ***.” 215 ILCS 5/143a-2(5) (West
2008).
¶ 15 Here, the issue is whether the policies’ antistacking language effectively limits coverage
to the amount contained in the single policy providing the highest limit, i.e., $100,000. Each
of the five policies contains the same antistacking provision. It is comprised of the express
antistacking language (paragraph 1), the proration clause (paragraph 3), and a definition
clause (paragraph 2), which is necessary to understand the proration clause:
“If There is Other Underinsured Motor Vehicle Coverage ***
1. If underinsured motor vehicle coverage for bodily injury is available to an insured
from more than one policy provided by us or any other insurer, the total limit of liability
available from all policies provided by all insurers shall not exceed the limit of liability
of the single policy providing the highest limit of liability. This is the most that will be
paid regardless of the number of policies involved, persons covered, claims made,
vehicles insured, premiums paid[,] or vehicles involved in the accident.
2. Subject to item 1 above, any coverage applicable under this policy shall apply:
a. On a primary basis if the insured sustains bodily injury while occupying your
[3]
car, or while not occupying a motor vehicle or trailer.
b. On an excess basis if the insured sustains bodily injury while occupying a
vehicle other than your car.
3. Subject to items 1 and 2 above, if this policy and one or more other policies
provide coverage for bodily injury:
a. On a primary basis, we are liable only for our share. Our share is that percent
of the damages payable on a primary basis that the limit of liability of this policy
bears to the total of all applicable underinsured motor vehicle coverage provided on
a primary basis. The total damages payable from all policies that apply on a primary
basis shall not exceed the limit of liability of the single policy providing the highest
limit of liability on a primary basis.
b. On an excess basis, we are liable only for our share. Our share is that percent
of the damages payable on an excess basis that the limit of liability of this policy
3
“Your car” is the car described on the declarations page.
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bears to the total of all applicable underinsured motor vehicle coverage provided on
an excess basis. The total damages payable from all policies that apply on an excess
basis shall not exceed the amount by which the limit of liability of the single policy
providing the highest limit of liability on an excess basis exceeds the limit of liability
of the single policy providing the highest limit of liability on a primary basis.”
(Emphases added.)
¶ 16 The McFaddens argue that the antistacking provision is internally inconsistent. They
assert that the antistacking language in the first paragraph conflicts with the definition and
proration clauses in paragraphs 2 and 3 because “[p]aragraph 1 *** expresses a formula that
precludes factoring in all the policies *** as it simply [instructs] to use the [single] highest
policy issued,” whereas “[paragraphs 2 and 3] require[ ] *** that we include all policies ***
in the equation.”
¶ 17 We reject the McFaddens’ reading of the policy. Paragraph 1 merely limits the coverage
amount to that of the single policy providing the highest limit. It does not, as the McFaddens
imply, preclude joint coverage. Paragraphs 2 and 3 then set forth the rules to determine the
coverage share, if any, of each policy. This position is supported by Armstrong, 229 Ill. App.
3d at 976.
¶ 18 In Armstrong, this district was faced with four policies that each had an antistacking
provision and a proration clause similar enough to the instant case to provide a working
illustration. There, the injured insured was covered by four policies:
Vehicle Uninsured Limit
1987 motorcycle (in crash) $25,000
1979 Malibu $25,000
1987 Colt $100,000
1986 Mazda $50,000
The single policy containing the highest limit provided $100,000. Therefore, that was the
total cap. The policy providing coverage on a “primary” basis contributed the first $25,000.
The injured insured was then entitled to an additional $75,000 total, collected pro rata from
those policies providing coverage on an “excess” basis. Id. at 974, 976.
¶ 19 When faced with the question of whether the proration clause rendered ambiguous the
antistacking provision so as to allow for more than $100,000 in coverage, the Armstrong
court answered in the negative:
“The presence of a ‘proration clause’ at the end of the [antistacking] provision does
not introduce ambiguity into the clear language of the ‘antistacking’ provision. The
proration clause is set off from the ‘antistacking’ language. The proration clause is
designed to prevent other insurers, if any, from paying less than their fair share of a
jointly covered loss. [Citation.] The ‘antistacking’ provision and the proration clause
serve separate and important functions. Although the questioned language is somewhat
technical in nature, we conclude that the [antistacking language in the] endorsement
accomplished its intended purpose and limited plaintiff’s recovery of uninsured motorist
coverage to $100,000.” Id. at 976.
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¶ 20 Applying Armstrong to the instant case, we find that the proration clause at the end of the
antistacking provision does not introduce ambiguity. Here, the injured insured was covered
by five policies:
Vehicle Underinsured Limit
2004 Harley (in crash) $100,000
2008 Ford $100,000
1995 Saturn $100,000
1997 Honda $100,000
1995 Harley $100,000
The single policy containing the highest limit provides $100,000. Therefore, under the
antistacking language in paragraph 1, this is the total cap. The 2004 Harley policy provides
coverage on a “primary” basis. It contributes the first $100,000. This meets the total cap, so
no other policies contribute. In other words, because there is only one policy providing
coverage on a primary basis, and that same policy also provides the highest limit, we do not
need to look to the proration clauses’ instruction that “[t]he total damages payable from all
policies that apply on an excess basis shall not exceed the amount by which the limit of
liability of the single policy providing the highest limit of liability on an excess basis exceeds
the limit of liability of the single policy providing the highest limit of liability on a primary
basis.”
¶ 21 We are not persuaded by Jones v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 289 Ill.
App. 3d 903 (1997), upon which the McFaddens rely. That case held that the antistacking
provision was too difficult to be understood by an ordinary person and, therefore, was
ineffective. Id. at 916. However, Jones is inapposite, because its antistacking provision did
not have critical language contained in both Armstrong and the instant case. Jones addressed
what would be analogous to the proration clause here concerning coverage on an excess
basis. Id. at 911. Jones did not quote anything analogous to the antistacking language in
paragraph 1 or the definitions in paragraph 2 in our case, using asterisks to omit paragraphs
1 and 2 and skipping right to paragraph 3. Id. Therefore, Jones did not examine the interplay
between express antistacking language, which sets the limit of liability as the amount
contained in the single policy with the highest limit, and a proration clause, which sets forth
the rules to determine the coverage share, if any, of each policy.
¶ 22 For the reasons set forth above, the proration clause does not render ambiguous the
express antistacking language, which states that “the total limit of liability available from all
policies provided by all insurers shall not exceed the limit of liability of the single policy
providing the highest limit of liability.” The antistacking provision is not internally
inconsistent, and it effectively limits the McFaddens’ underinsured coverage to $100,000.
¶ 23 B. Declarations Sheets Do Not Render
Ambiguous the Antistacking Provision
¶ 24 The McFaddens next argue that, even if the antistacking provision was clearly stated, it
is rendered ambiguous when read in conjunction with each policy’s declarations sheet. As
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a quick review, each policy covers one vehicle. Each policy has a “declarations sheet,” listing
the relevant vehicle, premium amount, and underinsured coverage amount. The declarations
sheet is the first page of each policy, and can be thought of as a summary of the document.
¶ 25 The McFaddens assert that, because each policy’s respective declarations sheet reflects
a separate premium amount for a full $100,000 limit of underinsured coverage without a
single qualifying statement, an insured could reasonably believe that he or she was entitled
to the cumulative amount of all five policies’ coverage. They note that, where a policy is
subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, it is ambiguous, and ambiguities must be
resolved in favor of the insured. Hobbs, 214 Ill. 2d at 17.
¶ 26 We disagree that the declarations sheets render ambiguous the antistacking provision.
Three supreme court cases collectively establish that, when considering whether a
declarations sheet renders ambiguous an antistacking provision, the relevant inquiry is
whether: (1) the declarations sheet merely leaves open the question of stacking, which can
be answered unambiguously in the negative by a clear antistacking provision (id. at 23;
Grzeszczak, 168 Ill. 2d at 229); or (2) the declarations sheet is actually inconsistent with the
antistacking provision, thereby creating an ambiguity on the issue of stacking to be resolved
in favor of the insured (Bruder v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 156 Ill. 2d 179, 192
(1993)).4 As stated by Judge Easterbrook, “even if some other clause suggests the possibility
of stacking” (emphasis omitted), a clear antistacking provision serves as a “disambiguator.”
Grinnell Select Insurance Co. v. Baker, 362 F.3d 1005, 1007 (7th Cir. 2004) (discussing
Illinois law). We first discuss Hobbs and Grzeszczak, which are analogous to the instant case.
We then discuss the hypothetical situation set forth in Bruder, which is not analogous to the
instant case.
¶ 27 In Hobbs, one policy covered two vehicles. The declarations sheet listed the amount of
underinsured coverage only once but listed a separate premium amount for each vehicle.
Therefore, the structure of the declarations sheet read across, like a row:
$100,000 limit of liability Premium A (for Vehicle 1) Premium B (for Vehicle 2)
The declarations sheet then stated that “ ‘COVERAGE IS PROVIDED ONLY WHERE A
PREMIUM IS SHOWN.’ ” Hobbs, 214 Ill. 2d at 23. The insured argued that this statement
made it reasonable for her to believe that she was entitled to a total of $200,000 in coverage
from this policy, i.e., $100,000 for each premium paid.
¶ 28 The Hobbs court acknowledged that the declarations sheet, standing alone, “le[ft] open
the question” of stacking, or aggregating entire policies. Id. However, the court stressed that
this did not necessarily create an ambiguity:
“The declarations page of an insurance policy is but one piece of the insuring agreement.
4
To the extent that Glidden v. Farmers Automobile Insurance Ass’n, 57 Ill. 2d 330 (1974),
and Squire v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co., 69 Ill. 2d 167 (1977), upon which the McFaddens rely,
present a different approach, those cases are outdated. Declarations sheets and antistacking
provisions such as those at issue here are not per se “contrary expressions.” See Hobbs, 214 Ill. 2d
at 23; Grzeszczak, 168 Ill. 2d at 229; Bruder, 156 Ill. 2d at 194 (declarations sheet “consistent with”
antistacking provision).
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[Citation.] Although it contains important information specific to the policyholder, the
declarations page cannot address every conceivable coverage issue. Thus, some
uncertainty could arise if the declarations page is read in isolation from the rest of the
agreement. ***
‘Any provision of a lengthy document is bound to be ambiguous in the sense that it
creates questions that can be answered only with reference to other portions of the
document. That is why all provisions of an insurance policy must be construed
together.’ [Citation.]” Id.
¶ 29 The Hobbs court found that the question of stacking could be unambiguously answered
in the negative by the antistacking provision, which stated:
“ ‘The limit of liability shown in the declarations for each person for Underinsured
Motorist Coverage is our maximum limit of liability for all damages ***. *** This is the
most we will pay regardless of the number of:
(1) Insureds;
(2) Claims made; ***
(3) Vehicles or premiums shown in the Declarations;
or (4) Vehicles involved in the accident.’ ” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 18.
Whatever the insured may have reasonably thought after reading the declarations sheet in
isolation, the antistacking provision clarified that the underinsured coverage could not be
stacked for each vehicle simply because more than one premium had been paid. Id. at 23-24.
¶ 30 In Grzeszczak, the insured purchased two policies, each of which covered a different
vehicle and charged a separate premium for underinsured coverage. Grzeszczak, 168 Ill. 2d
at 219-20. The declarations sheets were not at issue, though we infer that they were similar
in structure to those in the instant case, because each policy covered only one vehicle. The
Grzeszczak court held that the insured’s belief that she was receiving two separate coverages
for the two premiums paid was “rebutted” by the policies’ antistacking provision, which
stated: “ ‘Two or More Cars Insured[:] With respect to any accident *** to which this and
any other *** policy issued to you *** applies, the total limit of liability under all the
policies shall not exceed the highest applicable limit of liability under any one policy.’ ”
(Emphasis added.) Id. at 220-21, 229.
¶ 31 Here, the McFaddens purchased five separate policies for which they paid five separate
premiums. Each policy’s declarations sheet reflected a separate premium amount, thereby
leaving open the question of stacking. However, each policy’s antistacking provision
clarified that, “regardless of the number of policies involved, *** vehicles insured, [or]
premiums paid,” the total limit available from all policies “shall not exceed the limit of
liability of the single policy providing the highest limit of liability.” The payment of multiple
premiums (and the notion that this entitles an insured to separate coverage) is of no
consequence where an antistacking provision’s clear and unambiguous language manifests
the parties’ contrary intent. Id. at 228 (discussing Menke v. Country Mutual Insurance Co.,
78 Ill. 2d 420, 425 (1980)). Per Hobbs and Grzeszczak, any assumption of stacking that the
McFaddens may have had based upon reading the declarations sheets in isolation has been
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unambiguously rebutted by the antistacking provision.
¶ 32 Contrary to the McFaddens’ position, this case is not like the hypothetical scenario set
forth in dicta by Bruder. To better understand the hypothetical (and, therefore, the
McFaddens’ argument), we address Bruder’s actual ruling as well. In Bruder, the court was
confronted with the following antistacking provision: “ ‘The most we will pay for all
damages resulting from bodily injury to any one person caused by any one accident is the
limit of Bodily Injury shown in the declarations for “Each Person.” ’ ” (Emphasis added.)
Bruder, 156 Ill. 2d at 189. The court compared the structure of two declarations sheets, one
actual (id. at 200 (Harrison, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Bilandic,
J.)) and one hypothetical:
Actual
Limit of Liability $100,000
Vehicle 1 Premium A
Vehicle 2 Premium B
Hypothetical
Vehicle 1 Premium A Limit of Liability $100,000
Vehicle 2 Premium B Limit of Liability $100,000
The court found that the structure of the actual declarations sheet, which showed only one
limit of liability in the amount of $100,000, together with the antistacking provision
referencing the limit of liability, did not allow an insured to stack $100,000 for each vehicle
premium. Id. at 193-94 (majority op.). The court stated that the limit of liability set forth on
the declarations sheet was “consistent with” the language in the antistacking provision; the
declarations sheet set forth only one limit amount and the antistacking provision stated that
the insured’s coverage would be limited to the limit amount. Id.
¶ 33 The court stated in dicta, however, that, had the declarations sheet showed two limits of
liability, one after each vehicle, it would render ambiguous the antistacking provision. Id. at
192. The declarations sheet would show two limits but the antistacking provision refers only
to the limit. Therefore, it would be reasonable for an insured to believe that he or she was
entitled to a total limit of $200,000, and the antistacking provision would not unambiguously
rebut that assumption. Id.
¶ 34 The McFaddens argue that their declarations sheets have the same structure as those in
the Bruder hypothetical, and therefore it is reasonable for them to believe they are entitled
to stack coverage. They assert that, as in the Bruder hypothetical, the same underinsured
coverage amount repeats for each insured vehicle, giving the impression of cumulative
coverage.
¶ 35 To point to the obvious, the structures are not the same; the Bruder hypothetical dealt
with a single declarations sheet, whereas our case deals with five declarations sheets. More
critical, however, is that the Bruder hypothetical was not just about the declarations sheet.
It was about the interplay between the declarations sheet and the antistacking provision. The
hypothetical declarations sheet listed two separate limits of liability but the antistacking
provision referred only to the limit, creating an inconsistency and, therefore, an ambiguity.
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Had the antistacking provision in Bruder instead stated that “the most the insurance company
would pay is the highest limit among those set forth,” there would be no inconsistency.
Instead, the antistacking provision would acknowledge that two amounts had been set forth,
but that the insured’s coverage would be limited to the higher of those amounts.
¶ 36 Here, as we have discussed, the declarations sheets are not inconsistent with the
antistacking provision. The antistacking provision acknowledges that an insured may have
other policies, each with a declarations sheet setting forth its own limit. However, the
antistacking provision clarifies that the insured’s total coverage will not exceed “the limit of
liability of the single policy providing the highest limit.” The declarations sheets, read in
isolation, might leave open the question of stacking, but the antistacking provision
unambiguously answers that question in the negative.
¶ 37 One basis by which to deny coverage is sufficient. Therefore, we need not address the
second basis: whether, in the absence of express antistacking language, stacking
methodology results in coverage that exceeds $100,000. Both the offset-first, stack-second
and the stack-first, offset-second methodologies conflict with the antistacking provision.
There is antistacking language, which means that any determination by us on stacking
methodology, as set forth in Jones (2007) and Kapinus, would be purely advisory. In the
interest of judicial economy, we affirm the trial court’s denial of coverage on a question of
law presented to, but not decided by, the trial court.
¶ 38 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 39 For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the trial court’s denial of coverage, albeit on
a different basis.
¶ 40 Affirmed.
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