People v. Deng

ILLINOIS OFFICIAL REPORTS
Appellate Court
People v. Deng, 2013 IL App (2d) 111089
Appellate Court THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
Caption GARENG DENG, Defendant-Appellant.
District & No. Second District
Docket No. 2-11-1089
Filed June 14, 2013
Held Defendant’s agreement to plead guilty to first-degree murder in exchange
(Note: This syllabus for a sentence of 35 years’ imprisonment for shooting the victim of a
constitutes no part of residential burglary was void, since he was not admonished about the
the opinion of the court mandatory sentencing enhancement of 25 years to life that applied to his
but has been prepared offense; therefore, the judgment was vacated and the cause was remanded
by the Reporter of to allow defendant to withdraw his plea and proceed to trial.
Decisions for the
convenience of the
reader.)
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kane County, No. 07-CF-2958; the
Review Hon. Allen M. Anderson, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Vacated and remanded.
Counsel on Thomas A. Lilien and Steven E. Wiltgen, both of State Appellate
Appeal Defender’s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.
Joseph H. McMahon, State’s Attorney, of St. Charles (Lawrence M.
Bauer and Aline Dias, both of State’s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s
Office, of counsel), for the People.
Panel JUSTICE ZENOFF delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Hutchinson and Jorgensen concurred in the judgment and
opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Defendant, Gareng Deng, appeals his sentence of 35 years’ incarceration for first-degree
murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(3) (West 2004)). He contends that his sentence and plea
agreement are void because he did not receive, and was not admonished about, a mandatory
sentencing enhancement. We agree. Accordingly, we vacate the sentence and remand to
allow defendant to withdraw his plea.
¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 In November 2007, defendant was charged with multiple counts in connection with
events that occurred in October 2005. He later pleaded guilty to count III, which charged that
defendant, without lawful justification, while committing the forcible felony of residential
burglary, shot Marilyn Bethell with a firearm, causing her death. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(3) (West
2004). Other counts also involved the use of a firearm. In particular, count I alleged that
defendant, without lawful justification and with the intent to kill, shot Bethell with a firearm,
causing her death when he personally discharged the firearm. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West
2004). Count II alleged that defendant, without lawful justification, shot Bethell, knowing
that the act created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm when he personally
discharged the firearm. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2) (West 2004).
¶4 At the preliminary hearing, the State told the court that counts I and II alleged that
defendant personally discharged a firearm, such that a mandatory enhancement of 25 years
to life applied to those counts. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(iii) (West 2004). The court asked
for clarification, inquiring if an enhancement was alleged only in counts I and II, and the
State affirmed this. The court then admonished defendant that counts I and II subjected him
to 20 to 60 years’ incarceration, 3 years of mandatory supervised release, fines of up to
$25,000, and a 25-year-to-life enhancement. Defendant was admonished that count III
subjected him to 20 to 60 years’ incarceration, 3 years of mandatory supervised release, and
fines of up to $25,000. Defendant stated that he understood.
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¶5 On May 9, 2009, defendant pleaded guilty to count III under a negotiated plea agreement.
Defendant stipulated to a factual basis that restated the charge, including that he shot Bethell
during a residential burglary. The factual basis also included that Bethell was found dead
along a path, with a gunshot wound to the head, and that she was shot at the location where
her body was found. Defendant was seen exiting Bethell’s vehicle after an accident and then
entering another vehicle. His DNA was recovered from Bethell’s home and from a bicycle
found near her home. A “CZ caliber” Torkerev weapon was recovered and compared to
bullets recovered from Bethell’s body, but no match could be made. However, a bullet
showed the class characteristics of a Torkerev.
¶6 The State informed the court that, in exchange for the plea, defendant would be sentenced
to 35 years’ incarceration to be served at 100% and the other counts would be dismissed. The
court admonished defendant that the offense carried a penalty of 20 to 60 years’ incarceration
and it accepted the plea.
¶7 Defendant moved to withdraw his plea, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel and
alleging that a person named Robert actually committed the crime. The motion was denied.
Defendant appeals.
¶8 II. ANALYSIS
¶9 Defendant contends that, under People v. White, 2011 IL 109616, his sentence is void
because it was subject to a mandatory enhancement of 25 years to life and the failure to
properly admonish him of the enhancement made the plea agreement void.
¶ 10 Under section 5-8-1 of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1 (West 2004)),
the sentencing range for first-degree murder is 20 to 60 years’ incarceration (730 ILCS 5/5-8-
1(a)(1)(a) (West 2004)). However, section 5-8-1 requires the imposition of an enhanced
sentence where a firearm is used in the offense, providing that “if, during the commission of
the offense, the person personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused *** death
to another person, 25 years or up to a term of natural life shall be added to the term of
imprisonment imposed by the court.” 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(iii) (West 2004).
¶ 11 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402(c) (eff. July 1, 1997) provides that a trial court cannot
enter a final judgment on a plea of guilty without first determining that there is a factual basis
for the plea. White, 2011 IL 109616, ¶ 17. “The factual basis for a guilty plea generally will
consist of an express admission by the defendant that he committed the acts alleged in the
indictment or a recital to the court of the evidence that supports the allegations in the
indictment.” Id. “[T]he factual basis will be established as long as there is a basis anywhere
in the record up to the final judgment from which the judge could reasonably reach the
conclusion that the defendant actually committed the acts with the intent, if any, required to
constitute the offense to which he is pleading guilty.” People v. Brazee, 316 Ill. App. 3d
1230, 1236 (2000).
¶ 12 “Once a trial court accepts a plea of guilty, it is the duty of the court to fix punishment.”
White, 2011 IL 109616, ¶ 20. The supreme court has “ ‘repeatedly recognized that the
legislature has the power to prescribe penalties for defined offenses, and that power
necessarily includes the authority to prescribe mandatory sentences, even if such sentences
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restrict the judiciary’s discretion in imposing sentences.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Huddleston,
212 Ill. 2d 107, 129 (2004)). A court does not have authority to impose a sentence that does
not conform with statutory guidelines and it exceeds its authority when it orders a lesser or
greater sentence than mandated by statute. Id. “In such a case, the defendant’s sentence is
illegal and void.” Id. “Whether a sentence is void is a question of law subject to de novo
review.” People v. Cortez, 2012 IL App (1st) 102184, ¶ 9.
¶ 13 In White, the defendant pleaded guilty to first-degree murder and possession of
contraband in a penal institution, in exchange for consecutive prison sentences of 28 and 4
years. White, 2011 IL 109616, ¶ 4. The factual basis for the plea established that, if the case
proceeded to trial, the evidence would show that the defendant and a codefendant planned
to rob a taxi driver and were both inside the taxi when the driver was shot in the temple with
a handgun. It was further stipulated that, after the driver was shot, the defendant took the
handgun from the codefendant and put it in his back pocket. Id. ¶ 6. The defendant later
moved to withdraw his plea, arguing in part that he was not properly admonished about the
sentencing range because he was subject to a 15-year mandatory enhancement for being
armed with a firearm while committing the offense. Id. ¶ 9; see 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(i)
(West 2004). As a result, the defendant argued, his sentence was void because it was below
the mandatory minimum. White, 2011 IL 109616, ¶ 9. The trial court denied the motion.
¶ 14 Our supreme court held that the defendant’s sentence was void. Id. ¶ 21. The court noted
that a trial court may not impose a sentence inconsistent with the governing statutes even
where the parties and the trial court agree to the sentence. Id. ¶ 23. The court then specifically
rejected an argument that the intent of the parties to agree to a murder conviction without the
sentencing enhancement was controlling, noting that, in enacting section 5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(i),
the legislature took away any discretion the State and the trial court had to fashion a sentence
that did not include the enhancement. Id. ¶ 26. The court concluded that, since the factual
basis for the defendant’s plea established that the victim died of a gunshot wound, the
sentencing enhancement was mandatory and the defendant’s sentence, which did not contain
the enhancement, was void. Id. ¶ 21. Further, because the defendant was not admonished of
the enhancement, the plea agreement was void as well. Id. The court remanded the case to
the trial court with directions to permit the defendant to withdraw his plea. Id. ¶ 31. In a
special concurrence, Justice Theis observed that, had the State wished to negotiate around
the enhancement, it should have presented a factual basis that referred to a dangerous weapon
instead of a firearm. Id. ¶ 41 (Theis, J., specially concurring).
¶ 15 Here, the State presented a factual basis that included the fact that defendant “shot”
Bethell with a firearm, causing her death. Thus, defendant argues, he was subject to the
mandatory enhancement. The State attempts to distinguish White, arguing that the factual
basis did not include the words “personally discharged” or otherwise show that defendant
“personally discharged” a firearm. Instead, the State suggests, the record shows an intent to
plead guilty to an offense based on an accountability theory. In doing so, the State relies on
a case holding that the term “personally discharged” in section 5-8-1 distinguishes cases in
which the defendant actually fired the shot from cases in which the defendant could be held
accountable for a shooting done by another. People v. Rodriguez, 229 Ill. 2d 285, 294-95
(2008). The State then relies on a case in which multiple people fired shots, the defendant
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and another were charged with shooting the victim, and the court held that it was not
necessary to prove that the defendant fired the shot that wounded the victim. People v. Allen,
56 Ill. 2d 536, 540 (1974). But those cases are not applicable here, because an accountability
theory was not presented by the factual basis.
¶ 16 The State asserts that the factual basis, by referring to defendant’s entering another
vehicle, could have implied the involvement of another person. But that reference was not
sufficient to show that defendant was guilty only under an accountability theory. There was
no allegation that any other person shot Bethell or was even present when the shooting
occurred. To the contrary, the charge, which was specifically included in the factual basis,
stated that defendant “shot” Bethell, causing her death, and the additional facts provided
served to place defendant at Bethell’s home. The brief mention of another vehicle does not
transform the matter into one involving accountability.
¶ 17 While it is possible that the State intended to remove the enhancement when it was
negotiating the plea, as evinced by the State’s telling the court at the preliminary hearing that
only counts I and II involved the enhancement, it did nothing to remove the enhancement
from the factual basis for the plea. Had the State wished to negotiate a plea based on an
accountability theory, it could have amended the factual basis to support such a theory. In the
alternative, it could have amended the factual basis to allege that defendant caused the death
with a dangerous weapon, as suggested by Justice Theis specially concurring in White. But
it did not do so. Accordingly, the trial court was left with no sufficient basis to find that
anyone other than defendant personally discharged the firearm that caused Bethell’s death.
It was thus required to sentence defendant with the 25-year-to-life enhancement, making 45
years the minimum possible sentence. Because defendant was sentenced to less than that
amount, and was not admonished of the enhancement, his sentence and the plea agreement
that led to it are void.
¶ 18 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 19 Defendant’s sentence and plea agreement are void. Accordingly, under White, the
judgment of the circuit court of Kane County is vacated and the cause is remanded to the trial
court with directions to allow defendant to withdraw his guilty plea and proceed to trial if he
chooses to do so.
¶ 20 Vacated and remanded.
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