People v. Hammonds

SIXTH DIVISION
February 11, 2010
No. 1-08-0194
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County.
)
v. ) No. 06 CR 26796
)
TERRELL HAMMONDS, ) Honorable
) Marcus R. Salone
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding
JUSTICE ROBERT E. GORDON delivered the opinion of the court:
On August 29, 2007, defendant Terrell Hammonds was convicted by a jury
of delivering a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/401(d) (West 2006)). On
December 10, 2007, the trial court sentenced defendant to seven years
imprisonment and denied defendant’s posttrial motion. On this direct appeal,
defendant seeks a reversal of his conviction and a new trial, due to five alleged
errors. Defendant claims that the trial court erred : (1) by giving the third
paragraph of Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 17.05A (4th ed.)
(hereinafter IPI Criminal 4th) which specified that a drug “delivery”did not require
a transfer of money or consideration; (2) by allowing police officers to testify,
over defendant’s hearsay objection, about radio messages received from other
officers, who were also trial witnesses; (3) by failing to ask potential jurors
1
No. 1-08-0194
whether they understood and accepted certain principles of law listed in Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 431(b) (Official Reports Advance Sheet No. 8 (April 11,
2007), R. 431(b), eff. May 1, 2007); (4) by refusing to rule, until after defendant
testified, on defendant’s motion in limine concerning the admissibility of
defendant’s prior convictions for impeachment purposes. Defendant also claims
that (5) prosecutorial misconduct during the State’s rebuttal closing denied
defendant a fair trial. After considering carefully each of defendant’s claimed
errors, we find that a new trial is not warranted.
BACKGROUND
Defendant’s two-day trial commenced on August 28, 2007 with jury
selection, and culminated in a guilty verdict on August 29, 2007.
Voir Dire
Following the swearing-in of the pool of potential jurors, the trial court
informed the venire of certain principles of law, namely: (1) that a defendant is
presumed innocent; (2) that he is not required to offer any evidence in his own
behalf; and (3) that he must be proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
However, the trial court did not inform the potential jurors of a fourth principle of
law, namely (4) that a defendant’s failure to testify in his own behalf cannot be
2
No. 1-08-0194
held against him. The trial court also failed to ask the prospective jurors whether
they understood and accepted these four principles of law.
With respect to these principles of law, the trial court stated, in pertinent
part:
“Under the law, a defendant is presumed to be innocent of the
charge against him. This presumption remains with him throughout
every stage of the trial and during the deliberation on a verdict. It is
not overcome from [sic] unless from all of the evidence in this you are
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty.
The State has the burden of proving the guilty of the defendant
beyond a reasonable doubt. And this burden remains on the State
throughout the case. The defendant is not required to prove his
innocence nor is he required to present any evidence on his own
behalf. He may rely on the presumption of innocence. You are the
judges of the facts in this case ***.”
The trial court did later inform the jury of all four principles of law during
the jury instructions after the close of evidence.
Evidence at Trial
3
No. 1-08-0194
After jury selection and opening statements, the State presented its
evidence. Defendant did not testify or call witnesses. On this appeal, defendant
did not claim that the evidence at trial was insufficient to convict him.
Nonetheless, we will still describe in detail the State’s evidence at trial, since we
will need to decide whether this evidence was overwhelming and whether the
effect of any alleged error was rendered harmless by overwhelming evidence.
At trial, the State called four witnesses in its case-in-chief. Three
witnesses were Chicago police officers, Marco DiFranco, Boonserm Srisuth, and
Detective William Smith, who were members of the undercover narcotics
investigation team that arrested defendant. The remaining witness was Paula
Bosco Szum, a chemist with the Illinois State Police Crime Laboratory, who
analyzed the evidence recovered after defendant’s arrest.
The first officer to testify, Officer Srisuth, stated that he was part of a nine-
person narcotics investigation team. In the late morning of November 11, 2006,
he and other members of his team arrived in the neighborhood of Lamon Avenue
and Thomas Street in Chicago, Illinois. Srisuth explained that, when his team
anticipates making a controlled buy, the duties of the officers are divided among
an “enforcement officer, [a] surveillance officer and [a] buy officer.” On this
4
No. 1-08-0194
particular day, Srisuth was the buy officer; and thus he wore civilian clothes and
drove an unmarked vehicle. The second witness, Officer DiFranco, was the
surveillance officer; and Detective Smith, one of the enforcement officers, was
the fourth witness to testify at trial.
Officer Srisuth testified that he responded to a radio transmission from the
surveillance officer, Officer DiFranco.. At that point in the testimony, defendant
objected on hearsay grounds. Over defendant’s hearsay objection, Srisuth
testified that he heard DiFranco state over the radio that “a male black wearing a
black skull cap, black jacket, black sweatpants with a white stripe and white gym
shoes *** was selling drugs” in the vicinity of 1057 North Lamon Avenue.
Officer Srisuth testified that, at approximately 11:14 a.m., he drove
northbound on Lamon Avenue toward 105 North Lamon Avenue and observed
defendant, who was the only person present in the area matching DiFranco’s
description. Srisuth parked his unmarked vehicle on Lamon Avenue, and
defendant approached Srisuth’s passenger window. Srisuth asked defendant if he
had any “rocks,” which Srisuth testified was “street terminology for crack
cocaine.” Srisuth testified that defendant asked him how many he wanted, to
which Srisuth responded that he wanted only one. Srisuth testified that defendant
5
No. 1-08-0194
removed a small, green-tinted zip-lock bag from his mouth. Srisuth testified that
the bag contained a white, rock-like substance. Defendant gave Srisuth the bag,
and Srisuth gave defendant a pre-recorded ten dollar bill.
Officer Srisuth testified that, after the transaction was complete, he left the
area and radioed the other officers that “a positive narcotics transaction” had
occurred. He also provided the other officers with a physical description of
defendant, including defendant’s clothing and location. Srisuth testified that the
surveillance officer later instructed him to drive by the vicinity of 1031 North
Lamon. At that location, Srisuth observed defendant “being detained by the
enforcement officer” and Srisuth identified defendant as “the individual that sold
[Srisuth] the narcotics.”
The State’s second witness was Officer DiFranco, the surveillance officer.
He testified that, at approximately 11:10 a.m. on November 11, 2006, he
established a surveillance position on North Lamon Avenue where he had
observed defendant loitering on the corner. DiFranco explained that as a
surveillance officer, it was his responsibility to “monitor” the location and to keep
the team informed. DiFranco testified that, on the day in question, he had
“converted [himself] into a utility worker” and that he was driving an undercover
6
No. 1-08-0194
vehicle. From his surveillance position, which was approximately “two-and-a-
half car lengths” from defendant, he observed an unknown male approach
defendant and hold a brief conversation with him. Defendant then pulled a small
item from his mouth and gave it to the unknown male. DiFranco observed the
unknown male hand defendant money and leave the area. Based on his
experience, DiFranco suspected that a narcotics sale had just occurred.
Officer DiFranco testified that he radioed the other officers on his team
and informed them of what he had observed. Specifically, DiFranco testified that
in his radio transmission, he described defendant as “a male black wearing a
black skull cap, a black jacket, black sweatpants with a white stripe, and white
gym shoes” and he informed the team of defendant’s location. DiFranco testified
that, in response to this radio call, Officer Srisuth arrived in “less than a minute.”
DiFranco observed Srisuth approach in an unmarked vehicle, which Srisuth
“curbed” near 1057 Lamon Avenue. At that moment, DiFranco was positioned
approximately “two-and-a-half car lengths” behind Srisuth’s vehicle, and there
were no other vehicles between his and Srisuth’s vehicle. He testified that
nothing blocked his view of either Officer Srisuth or defendant.
Officer DiFranco testified that, after Srisuth stopped his vehicle, DiFranco
7
No. 1-08-0194
observed defendant approach the passenger side of the undercover vehicle.
DiFranco observed defendant and Srisuth hold a brief conversation, after which
defendant retrieved a small item from his mouth and handed it to the buy officer.
DiFranco testified that, during the exchange, a “late model Grand Am *** curbed
right in front of [DiFranco] and behind the [buy] officer.” DiFranco then
observed Srisuth’s vehicle drive away, and he informed his team by radio that a
narcotics transaction had occurred.
Officer DiFranco testified that he “stayed in constant surveillance” of
defendant after Srisuth’s vehicle departed. Defendant next approached the
driver’s side of the white Grand Am. DiFranco observed defendant and the driver
of the
Grand Am hold a brief conversation, after which defendant pulled a small item
from his mouth and handed it to the driver. DiFranco testified that defendant
reached into his left pants pocket and “pulled out an unknown amount of United
States currency which he was holding.” Defendant was “flipping them back, and
he then pull[ed] out an unknown amount of denomination, USC [sc] currency,
and he tender[ed[ it to the white male driver.” DiFranco testified that the driver
then handed defendant “an unknown amount” of United States currency, and that
8
No. 1-08-0194
the Grand Am departed.
Officer DiFranco testifed that, after the Grand Am’s departure, defendant
started walking south on Lamon Avenue. DiFranco informed his team by radio of
defendant’s location while maintaining constant surveillance of defendant.
DiFranco then observed the enforcement officers, Detective Smith and Officer
Pentimone, arrive and exit their vehicle. After the enforcement officers detained
defendant, DiFranco informed the rest of the team by radio of the detention.
DiFranco also instructed “the buy officer to drive around the immediate area” in
order “to see if that was the actual seller.” Officer DiFranco observed Officer
Srisuth drive by four or five minutes later, and DiFranco heard Srisuth inform the
team by radio that defendant was the person who had sold drugs to Srisuth.
Immediately after DiFranco testified about Srisuth’s radio confirmation, the
defense objected1 and the objection was overruled.
Officer DiFranco testified that the enforcement officers arrested defendant
and conducted a search of defendant. DiFranco observed that the officers reached
into defendant’s left pants pocket and retrieved a bundle of United States
1
The trial court stated “overruled” immediately after defense counsel stated
“objection.” Thus, defense counsel did not state the basis for the objection.
However, we presume from the context of the record that the basis was hearsay.
9
No. 1-08-0194
currency. The State’s third witness was Paula Bosco Szum, a chemist with the
Illinois State Police Crime Laboratory. The chemist was qualified as an expert in
“the field of forensic chemistry and the analysis of narcotics” without objection
from the defense. She testified that she analyzed evidence recovered in the case at
bar2 and that the item tested positive for the presence of cocaine and weighed
one-tenth of a gram.
The State’s fourth witness was Detective Smith, one of the enforcement
officers who participated in defendant’s arrest. Smith testified that, as an
enforcement officer in an undercover operation, he was dressed in civilian clothes
and drove an unmarked vehicle. Smith explained that, after the buy officer
completes a narcotics purchase, the enforcement officer is notified and provided
with a description of the seller. It is the role of the enforcement officer to detain
the seller and place him into custody.
Detective Smith testified that, on November 11, 2006, he was working with
his partner, Officer Jerry Pentimone, when he received a radio transmission from
the buy officer, Officer Srisuth. At this point in the testimony, the defense made a
2
This opinion omitted descriptions of the chain of custody since the defense
raised no challenge to it, either at trial or on this appeal.
10
No. 1-08-0194
hearsay objection, which was overruled. Over the defense’s objection, Smith
testified to the contents of the radio transmission. Smith testified that Srisuth
stated that he had completed a controlled purchase of narcotics and that Srisuth
provided a description of the seller’s physical appearance and clothing.
Detective Smith next testified that he received a radio transmission from
the surveillance officer, Officer DiFranco. The defense objected again on hearsay
grounds, and the objection was overruled. Detective Smith testified that, in the
radio transmission, DiFranco confirmed that the buy officer had completed a
transaction, and that DiFranco further stated that the seller had completed a
second transaction and had started to walk southbound on Lamon.
Detective Smith testified that, after receiving a description by radio from
both the buy officer and the surveillance officer, he proceeded to the area of
North Lamon and observed a person matching this description. Officer
Pentimone, who was driving, stopped their vehicle; and both officers exited and
approached. Detective Smith then announced that they were police officers, and
they detained defendant. After detaining defendant, Smith testified that he
received a radio transmission from the surveillance officer, Officer DiFranco. At
11
No. 1-08-0194
this point in the testimony, the defense objected,3 and the objection was
overruled. Smith then testified to the contents of the radio transmission, which
was a confirmation from DiFranco that they had detained the “right” individual.
Detective Smith further testified that he observed the buy officer, Officer
Srisuth, drive by. Without defense objection, Smith testified that Srisuth radioed
“confirming that [they did] have the right gentleman stopped.” Smith’s partner,
Officer Pentimone, then performed a search of defendant and recovered $140 in
United States currency from defendant’s left front pants pocket. The money was
in “different denominations, twenties, tens, fives and some singles.” The officers
looked for, but did not recover, the recorded ten dollar bill that was used in the
undercover purchase. They also did not find any drugs present on defendant’s
person.
Jury Instructions
After the detective’s testimony, the jury was excused from the courtroom
3
The witness had begun to answer the question when the defense counsel
stated “objection.” After the objection, the witness continued answering. Then the
trial court interrupted the witness’s answer to say “overruled,” and the witness
finished his answer. As a result, defense counsel did not have an opportunity to
state the basis for his objection; however, we presume from the context of the
record that the basis was hearsay.
12
No. 1-08-0194
and the trial court held a conference on jury instructions. Defense counsel stated
that there was only one jury instruction in dispute. The prosecutor requested the
first and third paragraphs of IPI Criminal 4th No. 17.05A; and the defense
objected.
IPI Criminal 4th No. 17.05A provides in its entirety:
“17.05A Definition of Deliver
(1) The word ‘deliver’ means to transfer
possession or to attempt to transfer possession.
(2) The word ‘deliver’ includes a constructive
transfer of possession which occurs without an actual
physical transfer. When the conduct or declarations of
the person who has the right to exercise control over a
thing is such as to effectively relinquish the right of
control to another person so that the other person is then
in constructive possession, there has been a delivery.
(3) A delivery may occur with or without the
transfer or exchange of money, or with or without the
transfer or exchange of other considertation.”
13
No. 1-08-0194
The prosecutor explained to the trial court that she did not ask for paragraph 2,
“because this [was] not a constructive transfer situation.”
In his objection, the defense relied on the committee note accompanying
the instruction. This note stated that “[g]enerally” when “the delivery in question
was an actual physical transfer of possession, no definition of the term need be
given to the jury, “ since “[t]he term, in this sense, is commonly understood by the
jury.” IPI Criminal 4th No. 17.05A, Committee Note. However, the note also
stated that “[p]aragraph (3) may be given when the Court believes it would help
the jury understand the issue.” IPI Criminal 4th No. 17.05A, Committee Note.
Relying on the committee note, defense counsel explained her objection,
as follows:
“DEFENSE COUNSEL: If you look at the committee
notes, your Honor, for 17.05A, it states that when an offense
involves a delivery and the evidence indicates that the delivery
in question was an actual, physical transfer of possession, no
definition of the term may be given to the jury. The term in
this sense is commonly understood by the layman. That would
be the basis of our objection to the entire instruction.”
14
No. 1-08-0194
After listening to defense counsel, the trial court then ruled in defendant’s favor,
stating:
“TRIAL COURT: Okay.
It’s out. It’s out. Subject to the jury asking for a
definition of delivery.”
Even though the trial court had just ruled, the prosecutor interjected:
“PROSECUTOR: But, Judge, if I can just say this?
The committee notes say it need not, which to me
is not – my understanding of that is that it is not
necessary if it’s not being asked for. I’m asking for it
for a couple of reasons.
First, I think the term deliver can be subject – I
think it’s a little confusing, the term deliver, where this
just simplifies it. It just means a transfer of possession.
Additionally, Paragraph 3, the State is asking for
it because it is entirely relevant in this case because the
[pre-recorded ten dollar bill was] not recovered. What
this tells the jury, we don’t need the [pre-recorded ten
15
No. 1-08-0194
dollar bill] because a delivery takes place regardless of
an exchange of consideration, regardless of any money
being exchanged or recovered. And I think that is
absolutely relevant in this case.
They can ask for this as a clarification, but there
is – there has been – this entire trial has been replete.
Every single witness was questioned about [this pre-
recorded ten dollar bill], making it as though it’s
entirely necessary for the delivery to take place and
that’s why we are asking for this instruction.”
In response, the trial court reviewed the committee note, particularly the
section that provided the court with discretion about whether to give paragraph 3,
and the trial court held, with respect to paragraph 3, “[t]hat’s all that needs [sic]
be given.” To clarify, the prosecutor asked if she should “take out [paragraphs]
one and two and just do [paragraph] three” and the trial court agreed. Thus, the
trial court reversed its prior ruling, and stated that paragraph 3 will be “given over
defendant’s objection.”
Closing Argument
16
No. 1-08-0194
After the jury instruction conference, the State moved its exhibits into
evidence, and both the State and the defense rested. The parties then proceeded
to closing arguments.
In her closing argument, defense counsel challenged the police
investigation, noting that the recorded ten dollar bill was not recovered and that
the police chose not to submit the drug evidence for fingerprint or DNA testing.
Defense counsel discussed the missing ten dollar bill at length, stating:
“You don’t have any [recorded] money. You
heard us talk extensively all day about [recorded]
money. [Recorded] money helps corroborate that they
have the right individual in custody, the individual that
supposedly was involved in that transaction.
You do not have any [recorded] money recovered off [defendant], and you
have a lame hypothesis or excuse, I’m not sure what it is, of where that may have
gone, in that he gave money to someone in a car.
Now, that is preposterous. He gave money to
someone in a car before that person ever gave any
money. That doesn’t make any sense. He gave money
17
No. 1-08-0194
to someone in a car who easily could have been stopped
by the Chicago Police Department.
This person wasn’t even stopped. You don’t
know whether this person had [recorded] money on
them.”
In its rebuttal argument, the State responded:
“Counsel has talked to you about that. There are
no [recorded funds] recovered in this case. You’re going
to receive the law from the judge. What he’s going to
tell you speaks directly to these [recorded funds].
For the offense of delivery to occur, you will
receive an instruction that says a delivery may occur with
or without the transfer or exchange of money, or with or
without the transfer or exchange of other consideration.
You’re not going to get an instruction that says
you can’t find this defendant guilty because there
weren’t [recorded funds] recovered, or there wasn’t
money recovered. It’s not necessary.
18
No. 1-08-0194
Our law does not even require that the money be
given or that money be taken or recovered. That’s not
the law. It doesn’t matter. It doesn’t matter.”
Following closing arguments and jury deliberations, the jury found
defendant guilty of delivery of a controlled substance, in violation of the Illinois
Controlled Substances Act. 720 ILCS 570/401(d) (West 2006).
Post-Trial Motion and Sentencing
On September 27, 2007, defendant filed a motion for acquittal
notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, for a new trial. The motion
alleged general grounds such as lack of due process and failure to prove guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. The one specific allegation was that the trial court
erred by giving a jury instruction requested by the State, over defense objection.
On December 10, 2007, defendant filed an amended posttrial motion,
which added the allegation that “[t]he Court erred by allowing Chicago police
officers to testify to the content of their radio transmissions, thereby allowing the
jury to hear impermissible hearsay evidence, and the state to bolster their case.”
The trial court denied defendant’s motion for a new trial. After arguments
in aggravation and mitigation, the trial court sentenced defendant to seven years
19
No. 1-08-0194
in the Illinois Department of Corrections with a credit of 395 days. The trial
court denied defendant’s posttrial motion. This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
On appeal, defendant claims that the trial court erred: (1) by giving the
third paragraph of IPI Criminal 4th No. 17.05A which specified that a drug
“delivery” did not require a transfer of money or consideration; (2) by allowing
police officers to testify, over the defense’s hearsay objection, about radio
messages received from other officers, who were also trial witnesses; (3) by
failing to ask potential jurors whether they understood and accepted the principles
listed in Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b) (Official Reports Advance Sheet No.
8 (April 11, 2007), R. 431(b), eff. May 1, 2007); (4) by refusing to rule, until after
defendant testified, on defendant’s motion in limine concerning the admissibility
of defendant’s prior convictions for impeachment purposes. Defendant also
claims that (5) prosecutorial misconduct in the State’s rebuttal closing denied
defendant a fair trial.(1) Jury Instruction Defining “Delivery”
On appeal, defendant claims that the trial court erred by giving the third
paragraph of IPI Criminal 4th 17.05A which specifies that a drug “delivery” does
not require a transfer of money or consideration.
20
No. 1-08-0194
The User’s Guide to the Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions explains that
“[e]ach offense has at least two instructions: (1) a definitional instruction; and (2)
a corresponding issues instruction.” IPI Criminal 4th, User’s Guide. In addition,
the IPI Criminal 4th provides other types of instructions, such as those that “define
a particular word or term.” IPI Criminal 4th, User’s Guide. It is this latter type of
instruction, that defines a particular word or term, that is at issue in the case at
bar.
The instruction at issue, IPI Criminal 4th 17.05A, provides a three-
paragraph definition of the word “deliver.” In the case at bar, the trial court gave
only the third paragraph of the three-paragraph instruction. Both the State and
the defense agree on appeal that the trial court was correct in not providing
paragraphs one and two. However, the defense argues that the trial court erred in
providing even paragraph three.
IPI Criminal 4th 17.05A is already quoted above, in its entirety, in the
Background section of this opinion. As quoted earlier, the third paragraph states:
“A delivery may occur with or without the transfer or exchange of money or with
or without the transfer or exchange of other consideration.”
Generally, a reviewing court will review jury instructions only for an abuse
21
No. 1-08-0194
of discretion. People v. Mohr, 228 Ill. 2d 59, 66 (2008). Although there must be
some evidence in the record to justify giving a particular instruction, the decision
whether or not to give it is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Mohr,
228 Ill. 2d at 65. The trial court has the discretion to decide whether the evidence
in the record raises a particular issue and whether an instruction on that issue
should be given. Mohr, 228 Ill. 2d at 65. “Although jury instructions are
generally reviewed for an abuse of discretion, our standard of review is de novo
when the question is whether the applicable law was accurately conveyed.” Barth
v. State Farm & Casualty Co., 228 Ill. 2d 163, 170 (2008).
The defense claims, first, that this instruction was inapplicable to the
evidence since, as the committee note states, “the delivery in question was an
actual physical transfer of possession, no definition of the term need be given to
the jury.” The defense claims, second, that even if the committee note provided
the trial court with the discretion to give paragraph 3, providing the paragraph
minimized the State’s burden of proof, by giving the jury the impression that the
State did not have to prove a purchase.
The defense does not cite any case law to support its first argument that the
committee note prohibited the trial court from providing paragraph three. Rosier
22
No. 1-08-0194
v. Cascade Mountain, Inc., 367 Ill. App. 3d. 559, 568 (2006) (by failing to offer
supporting legal authority or “any reasoned argument,” plaintiffs waived
consideration of their argument); People v. Ward, 215 Ill. 2d 317, 332 (2005)
(“point raised in a brief but not supported by citation to relevant authority ... is
therefore forfeited.”); In re Marriage of Bates, 212 Ill. 2d 489, 517 (2004) (“A
reviewing court is entitled to have issues clearly defined with relevant authority
cited.”); Ferguson v. Berger, 302 Ill. App. 3d 61 (1998) (“it is not necessary to
decide this question since the defendant has waived the issue” by failing to offer
case citation or other support as Supreme Court Rule 341 requires); 210 Ill. 2d R.
341 (h)(7) (argument in appellate brief must be supported by citation to legal
authority and factual record).
This is not surprising, since the defense’s argument misreads the note. The
note states that, in the case of an “actual physical transfer,” no definition “need be
given.” The American Heritage Dictionary states that, as a verb, the word “need”
means “to be under the necessity of or the obligation to.” American Heritage
Dictionary, Second College Edition 835 (1985) (hereinafter American Heritage).
In its detailed “Usage” section following the word “need,” the dictionary explains
that “‘you needn’t come’ means ‘you are under no obligation to come.’ ”
23
No. 1-08-0194
American Heritage 835. Thus, the negative form, which is used in the note,
means that, while the trial court was under “no obligation” to give the instruction,
it was not prohibited either. American Heritage 835.
If there was any doubt that the committee note provided the trial court with
the discretion to give paragraph three, that doubt was erased by the note’s
subsequent comment that “[p]aragraph (3) may be given when the Court believes
it would help the jury understand the issue.” IPI Criminal 4th No. 17.05A,
Committee Note. Thus, the decision of whether to provide paragraph 3 was left
to the sound discretion of the trial court, as are most decisions regarding whether
to provide certain jury instructions. E.g. Mohr, 228 Ill. 2d at 65.
The defense’s second argument misconstrues the law, and almost
underscores the need for the instruction. The defense argues that the issue for the
jury to resolve was whether a drug purchase took place, and thus the instruction
minimized the state’s burden of proof.
However, the State did not have to prove that a purchase took place. The
indictment accused defendant of “unlawfully and knowingly possess[ing] with
intent to deliver *** less than 1 gram of a substance” containing cocaine, “in
violation of Chapter 720, Act 570, Section 401(D).” To prove a charge of
24
No. 1-08-0194
possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, the State must prove
three elements: (1) the defendant’s knowledge of the presence of narcotics; (2)
the defendant’s immediate possession or control of the narcotics; and (3) the
defendant’s intent to deliver the narcotics. People v. Sanchez, 388 Ill. App. 3d
467, 473 (2009); People v. Rivas, 302 Ill. App. 3d 421, 429 (1998). Section
401of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act provides that “it is unlawful for any
person knowingly to manufacture or deliver, or possess with intent to
manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance.” 720 ILCS 570/401 (West 2006).
In contrast to what the defense argues, the statute does not require a sale or
purchase as an element of the offense.
The Act defines the words “deliver” and “delivery” as follows:
“ ‘ Deliver’ or ‘delivery’ means the actual,
constructive or attempted transfer of possession of a
controlled substance, with or without consideration,
whether or not there is an agency relationship.” ILCS
570/102(h) (West 2006).
The words “with or without consideration” in the above definition make clear that
a sale or purchase is not required for a “delivery.” ILCS 570/102(h) (West 2006).
25
No. 1-08-0194
Thus, the words of the Act that define both the offense and the word “delivery”
leave no doubt that a sale or purchase was not part of the State’s burden of proof.
The defense claims in its appellate brief that the purpose of paragraph 3 is
“to clarify that a delivery can occur between friends, as a gift, or in other non-
traditional transfers of contraband.” The defense makes this argument without
any case support or other authority. The State could have just as easily argued
that the purpose of this paragraph is to clarify that a delivery can occur, with or
without recovery of the transferred consideration. The purpose of paragraph 3, of
course, is to track the language of the Act which provides that a delivery occurs
upon “the actual, constructive or attempted transfer of possession of a controlled
substance, with or without consideration.” ILCS 570/102(h) (West 2006). Thus,
the State is not required to prove a transfer of consideration in any case, whether
the delivery occurs between best friends or complete strangers.
For these reasons, we hold that the trial court was not prohibited from
providing paragraph 3 of the jury instruction, in a case of actual physical transfer;
and that the instruction’s accurate statement of the law did not minimize the
26
No. 1-08-0194
state’s burden of proof.4 Thus, we find that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by providing paragraph 3.
(2) Police Radio Messages
On appeal, the defense claims that the trial court erred by allowing police
officers to testify, over the defense’s hearsay objection, about the contents of
radio messages received from other officers.
The officers, who were the declarants of the radio messages, were all
witnesses at trial; they testified about the content of their own statements, and
were subject to cross-examination about them. Thus, the defendant has not raised
on appeal any claims concerning his Sixth Amendment right to confront and
cross-examine the witnesses against him. U.S. Const., amend. VI; People v.
Spicer, 379 Ill. App. 3d 441, 449 (2008) (discussing the differences between
“[h]earsay analysis and sixth amendment analysis”).
Defendant’s claim on appeal concerns solely an alleged violation of the
rule against hearsay. Hearsay is a statement that is offered to prove the truth of
4
In his appellate reply brief, the defendant states that he “has never
challenged that this [paragraph 3] was an incorrect statement of law.”
27
No. 1-08-0194
the matter asserted, made by the declarant at a time when he or she was not
testifying at trial. People v. Dunmore, 389 Ill. App. 3d 1095, 1106 (2009);
Spicer, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 449; Federal Rules of Evidence 801(c). The rule
against hearsay generally prevents the admission of hearsay statements in
evidence at trial. Spicer, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 449. However, the rule has many
exceptions. Spicer, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 449. In considering a hearsay objection, a
court must decide, first, whether the statement is, in fact, hearsay. E.g. Dunmore,
389 Ill. App. 3d at 1106. If the statement is hearsay, the court must decide,
second, if it is still admissible under one of the many exceptions. E.g. Spicer, 379
Ill. App. 3d at 449-50.
An appellate court will apply an abuse-of-discretion standard of review, to
these two decisions by the trial court. The trial court has discretion in deciding
whether statements were, in fact, hearsay; and if they were, whether they were
still admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule. Dunmore, 389 Ill. App.
3d at 1106 (applying an abuse-of-discretion standard to a trial court’s ruling that a
statement was hearsay and that it did not qualify under an exception); Spicer, 379
Ill. App. 3d at 450 (applying an abuse-of-discretion standard to a trial court’s
ruling that a hearsay statement was admissible as an exception). Hearsay rulings
28
No. 1-08-0194
by a trial court are similar to other evidentiary rulings, which are generally
reversed only for an abuse of discretion. Dunmore, 389 Ill. App. 3d at 1105. A
trial court’s decision is considered an abuse of discretion only when the decision
is arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable; or where no reasonable person would take
the view adopted by the trial court. Dunmore, 389 Ill. App. 3d at 1105.
Defendant’s objection is not to the admission of the information contained
in the radio messages, but to the recounting of the messages by the officers who
heard them. On appeal, defendant does not object to the testimony by police
officers concerning the content of the radio messages that they voiced, but rather
objects only to the corroborating testimony by the officers who heard the
messages.
On appeal, defendant notes seven places in the trial testimony where
receiving officers testified about the content of radio message that they had heard.
The seven messages are summarized in the following chart. In the chart, Officer
Srisuth is identified as the “Buy Officer,” Officer Di Franco is identified as the
“Surveillance Officer,” and Detective Smith is identified as the “Enforcement
Officer.”
29
No. 1-08-0194
Summary of Radio Messages:
Testifying Timing of
Witness Declarant Message Substance of Radio Message
1. Buy Surveillance Prior to Description & location
Officer Offficer controlled of seller.
buy.
2. Enforcement Buy After Confirmation of controlled
buy;
Officer Officer controlled description & location of
buy. seller.
3. Surveillance Buy After Confirmation of
controlled buy.
Officer Officer controlled
buy.
4. Enforcement Surveillance After Confirmation of
controlled buy;
Officer Officer controlled observation of a subsequent
buy. transaction; location of seller.
30
No. 1-08-0194
5. Enforcement Surveillance After Confirmation that
correct
Officer Officer detention. individual detained.
6. Enforcement Buy After Confirmation that
correct
Officer Officer detention individual detained.
7. Surveillance Buy After Confirmation that
correct
Officer Officer detention. individual detained.
For two of the seven statements listed above, defense counsel failed to
object at trial. The statements that occurred without objection were statements (3)
and (6), above. The Illinois Supreme Court has held that a “defendant must both
specifically object at trial and raise the specific issue again in a posttrial motion to
preserve any alleged error for review.” People v. Woods, 214 Ill. 2d 455, 470
(2005); People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 564 (2007). When a defendant has
failed to preserve an error for review, we may still review for plain error.
Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 562-63; 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a) (“Plain errors or defects
affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the
attention of the trial court.”). Since the defendant did raise this issue in his
postrial motion, the plain error doctrine applies only to statements (3) and (6), but
not to the other statements.
31
No. 1-08-0194
“[T]he plain-error doctrine allows a reviewing court to consider
unpreserved error when (1) a clear or obvious error occurs and the evidence is so
closely balanced that the error alone threaten[s] to tip the scales of justice against
the defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error, or (2) a clear or obvious
error occurs and that error is so serious that it affected the fairness of the
defendant’s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of
the closeness of the evidence.” Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 565; Woods, 214 Ill. 2d
at 471. However, before we reach the issue of plain error, we must first
determine whether any error occurred at all. People v. Walker, 392 Ill. App. 3d
277, 294 (2009) (“[i]n a plain error analysis, ‘the first step’ for a reviewing court
is to determine whether any error at all occurred”). Since we find, for the reasons
discussed below, that no error occurred, we do not need to perform a plain error
analysis.
In the case at bar, the trial court overruled defendant’s hearsay objections
without identifying the basis of its ruling. Thus the trial court did not specifically
find whether the testimony was hearsay, or, if it was, what exception applied.
Since we may affirm a trial court’s ruling on any basis supported in the record, we
will examine first whether the testimony was, in fact, hearsay. People v. Dinelli,
32
No. 1-08-0194
207 Ill. 2d 387, 403 (2005) (“we may affirm the circuit court on any basis
supported by the record”).
A statement offered for some reason, other than for the truth of the matter
asserted, is generally admissible because it is not hearsay. Dunmore, 389 Ill. App.
3d at 1106. For example, if a statement is offered to prove its effect on the
listener’s state of mind, or to show why the listener subsequently acted as he or
she did, then the statement is not hearsay. Dunmore, 389 Ill. App. 3d at 1106.
Therefore, if a statement is offered, not for the truth of the matter asserted in its
contents, but to explain the actions or steps that a police officer subsequently took
during the course of an investigation, than the statement is not hearsay. People v.
Jura, 352 Ill. App. 3d 1080, 1086 (2004); People v. Edgecomb, 317 Ill. App. 3d
615, 627 (2000); People v. Warlick, 302 Ill. App. 3d 595, 598-99 (1998).
Defendant cites several successful hearsay challenges to police radio
messages, where this court held that the trial court had erred by admitting the
messages. For example, in Jura, the trial court erred by admitting testimony by
three officers, in a gun possession case, that a police radio broadcast had provided
the location and description of a person with a gun, and that defendant’s location
and description matched it. Jura, 352 Ill. App. 3d at 1086-87 (1st Dist.) (we
33
No. 1-08-0194
reversed on grounds of both hearsay and ineffective assistance of counsel). In
Edgecomb, the trial court erred in admitting an officer’s testimony about a radio
call that a vehicle’s occupants had fled after a vehicle stop; that the police
apprehended one occupant (who later became the defendant); and that the vehicle
matched the description of the getaway vehicle in an armed robbery. Edgecomb,
317 Ill. App. 3d at 627 (1st Dist.) (we reversed and remanded on other grounds).
In Warlick, the trial court erred in admitting an officer’s testimony that he had
received a radio call about “a burglary in progress,” when the sole defense at trial
was that defendant had been seeking shelter, not to burglarize. Warlick, 302 Ill.
App. 3d at 600-01 (1st Dist.) (however, we held that the error was harmless).
Compare with People v. Townsend, 275 Ill. App. 3d 200, 203, 206 (1st Dist.
1995) (a police radio dispatch about an “armed robbery in progress” was
admissible, where the issue at trial was whether defendant had committed the
robbery, not whether a robbery had occurred.).
However Jura, Edgecomb, and Warlick differ from the case at bar because,
in these cases, (1) the declarant did not testify; (2) the only evidence of the
contents of the message was the testimony of the receiving officer; and (3) the
testimony thus affected defendant’s sixth amendment right to confront the
34
No. 1-08-0194
witnesses against him. By contrast, in the case at bar, (1) the declarant did testify
and was subject to cross-examination; (2) the events described in the radio
messages were received into evidence from the officers who had witnessed the
events first-hand; and (3) the sixth amendment is not at issue.
Despite these differences, defendant’s cited cases are close enough in
substance to shed some light on our issue. In all three cases, we found that the
State was using the investigative procedure as a means to place substantive
information in front of the jury. Edgecombe, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 627 (“[t]he State
may not use the limited investigatory exception to place into evidence the
substance of any out-of-court statement”); Jura, 352 Ill. App. 3d at 1088-89 (the
hearsay was used as substantive evidence to prove “the very essence of the
dispute: whether the defendant was the man who possessed the gun”); Warlick,
302 Ill. App. 3d at 600-01 (“a serious issue in the case was whether a burglary in
fact was taking place” and the unidentified declarant in the radio call stated that a
“burglary [was] in progress”).
By contrast, in the case at bar, the State was not using the investigative
procedure as a means to place substantive information in front of the jury. The
State used the declarants themselves as the means of placing in front of the jury
35
No. 1-08-0194
what they had personally done and observed. The purpose of having other
officers recount what they heard over the radio was to explain why the receiving
officers then took the actions that they did. For example, the buy officer needed
to explain that he was prompted to approach this individual at this location, by
information received from the surveillance officer. The enforcement officer
needed to explain that it was the confirmation of a controlled buy from both the
buy and surveillance officers that led to his detention of the individual described.
The three officers and trial witnesses were acting in unison, almost like the arm
and legs of one organism, linked at its nerve center by the radio calls. Their
actions and reactions only make sense, when viewed in relation to one another.
Thus, the radio calls had the non-hearsay purpose of establishing their effect on
the listener, rather than being admitted for the truth of the matter asserted. The
matters asserted were admitted for their truth through the individuals who were
showing what they had actually observed or how they acted in the manner that
they did.
The case at bar is more factually similar to Rivas than the cases cited by
defendant. Rivas, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 430-31. The Rivas case, like the case at bar,
involved a controlled buy where defendant was subsequently charged with drug
36
No. 1-08-0194
delivery. Rivas, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 424, 427. The Rivas case, like the case at bar,
concerned testimony by an enforcement officer about the contents of a radio call
from a surveillance officer, which led the enforcement officer to arrest the
defendant. Rivas, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 431. In Rivas, we held that the trial court
did not err by admitting the enforcement officer’s testimony that he made the
arrest after receiving a radio call from the surveillance officer that the suspect had
driven to a location, carried a package into an office, and was driving away.
Rivas, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 430-31 (1st Dist.). In Rivas, as in the case at bar, the
surveillance officer testified at trial, and the statement was needed to explain why
the enforcement officer subsequently acted to arrest the suspect. Rivas, 302 Ill.
App. 3d at 427, 431. In Rivas, as in the case at bar, we found no error. Rivas,
302 Ill. App. 3d at 431. See also Townsend, 275 Ill. App. 3d at 203, 206 (a police
radio dispatch about an “armed robbery in progress” was admissible to explain
“the reason and manner in which the police conducted their investigation”).
For these reasons, we find that, under the circumstances of this case, the
statements were not hearsay; and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
admitting them. Even if we found an abuse of discretion, any error was harmless,
for the reasons explained below, in section 3(g) of this opinion.
37
No. 1-08-0194
(3) Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b)
Defendant seeks a new trial, because the trial court failed to question
potential jurors about their understanding and acceptance of certain principles of
law, as required by the amended Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b). Official
Reports Advance Sheet No. 8 (April 11, 2007), R. 431(b), eff. May 1, 2007)
(2007 version).
Although supreme court rules are not statutes, they have “the force of law,
and the presumption must be that they will be obeyed and enforced as written.”
Robidoux v. Oliphant, 201 Ill. 2d 324, 332 (2002), quoting Bright v. Dicke, 166
Ill. 2d 204, 210 (1995). When we review issues concerning the interpretation of a
supreme court rule, we apply a de novo standard of review. People v. Reed, 376
Ill. App. 3d 121, 125 (2007).
(a) History of Rule 431(b): The Four Questions
The rule at issue, Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b), is a codification of
the Illinois Supreme Court’s holding in People v. Zehr, 103 Ill. 2d 472, 477
(1984). In Zehr, our supreme court held that a trial court erred during voir dire,
when it refused the defense counsel’s request to ask potential jurors about four
fundamental principles of law. Zehr, 103 Ill. 2d at 476-78. In Zehr, our supreme
38
No. 1-08-0194
court held that it is “essential to the qualification of jurors in a criminal case ...
that they know” these four fundamental principles: “[(1)] that defendant is
presumed innocent; [(2)] that defendant was not required to produce any evidence
on his own; [(3)] that defendant must be proved guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt; and [(4)] that defendant’s failure to testify on his own behalf could not be
held against him.” Zehr, 103 Ill. 2d at 477. These four principles are now
commonly known as the “Zehr principles.” People v. Jocko, 389 Ill. App. 3d 247,
259 (2009); People v. Martinez, 386 Ill. Ap. 3d 153, 158 (2008); People v.
Gilbert, 379 Ill. App. 3d 106, 109 (2008); People v. Yarbor, 383 Ill. App. 3d 676,
681 (2008).
To ensure compliance with its 1984 Zehr decision, our supreme court
amended Rule 431 twice, first in 1997 and then again ten years later in 2007. In
1997, the supreme court amended Rule 431to provide that, if requested by
defendant, the trial court must ask potential jurors whether they understood and
accepted the Zehr principles. 177 Ill. 2d R. 431, Committee Comments, at 1xxix.
According to the accompanying committee notes, the 1997 amendment sought to
“end the practice where the judge makes a broad statement of the applicable law
followed by a general question concerning the juror’s willingness to follow the
39
No. 1-08-0194
law.” 177 Ill. 2d R. 431, Committee Comments, at 1xxix.
The 1997 version of Supreme Court Rule 431(b)stated, in full:
“(b) If requested by the defendant, the court shall
ask each potential juror, individually or in a group,
whether that juror understands and accepts the
following principles: (1) that the defendant is presumed
innocent of the charge(s) against him or her; (2) that
before a defendant can be convicted the State must
prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt;
(3) that the defendant is not required to offer any
evidence on his or her own behalf; and (4) that the
defendant’s failure to testify cannot be held against him
or her; however, no inquiry of a prospective juror shall
be made into the defendant’s failure to testify when the
defendant objects.
The court’s method of inquiry shall provide each
juror an opportunity to respond to specific questions
concerning the principles set out in this section.”
40
No. 1-08-0194
(Emphasis added) 177 Ill. 2d R. 431(b) (1997 version).
This court has held that the 1997 version of Rule 431(b), as quoted above, did not
require the trial court to ask about the Zehr principles, unless defense counsel
asked the trial court to do so. Jocko, 389 Ill. App. 3d at 260; Gilbert, 379 Ill.
App. 3d at 109-10, citing People v. Williams, 368 Ill. App. 3d 616, 623 (2006)
and People v. Foreman, 361 Ill. App. 3d 136, 146 (2005); Martinez, 386 Ill. App.
3d at 160-61.
In 2007, our supreme court amended the rule again. The 2007 amendment
deleted the first five words: “If requested by the defendant.” Official Reports
Advance Sheet No. 8 (April 11, 2007), R. 431 (b), eff. May 1, 2007). This
deletion had the effect of requiring the trial court to ask about the four Zehr
principles, whether or not the defendant had made the request.
The 2007 version of Rule 431(b), which is still in effect, states:
“The court shall ask each potential juror, individually or in a
group, whether that juror understands and accepts the following
principles: (1) that the defendant is presumed innocent of the
charge(s) against him or her; (2) that before a defendant can be
convicted, the State must prove the defendant guilty beyond a
41
No. 1-08-0194
reasonable doubt; (3) that the defendant is not required to offer any
evidence on his or her own behalf; and (4) that the defendant’s failure
to testify cannot be held against him or her, however no inquiry of a
prospective juror shall be made into the defendant’s failure to testify
when the defendant objects.
The court’s method of inquiry shall provide each juror an
opportunity to respond to specific questions concerning the principles
set out in this section.” Official Reports Advance Sheet No. 8 (April
11, 2007), R. 431(b), eff. May 1, 2007 (2007 version).
(b) The Trial Court’s Error
There is no question that, in the case at bar, the trial court erred. The 2007
version applied to the case at bar, and the trial court failed to implement the
changed version. Since defendant’s trial began on August 28, 2007, and since the
2007 version of Rule 431(b) took effect several months earlier on May 1, 2007,
the 2007 version applied to the case at bar. Although the new version applied,
the trial court failed to ask potential jurors during voir dire whether they
understood and accepted the Zehr principles, as the 2007 version required.
There is no dispute between the parties that the trial court erred when it
42
No. 1-08-0194
failed to question the potential jurors about the four Zehr principles listed in Rule
431(b). The dispute between the parties is: whether this error was so
fundamental to the integrity of the justice system that it requires automatic
reversal; or whether we may affirm if we find that the error was harmless, in the
context of defendant’s trial and the evidence presented against him.
(c) Plain Error Doctrine
Since defendant did not object at trial or raise this issue in his posttrial
motion, we review the issue under the plain-error doctrine.
As noted above, the Illinois Supreme Court has held that a “defendant must
both specifically object at trial and raise the specific issue again in a posttrial
motion to preserve any alleged error for review.” Woods, 214 Ill. 2d at 470;
Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 564. When a defendant has failed to preserve an error
for review, we may still review for plain error. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 562-63;
134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a) (“Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be
noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the trial court.”). In the
case at bar, defendant did not object at trial or raise this issue in his posttrial
43
No. 1-08-0194
motion.5 Defendant’s appellate brief conceded that “defense counsel did not
object to the defendant’s failure to comply with Rule 431(b).”
However, defendant claims that he did not waive the issue for appeal,
because: (1) requiring defense counsel to object would negate the effect of the
2007 amendment which obligated the trial court to ask the four questions sua
sponte; and (2) the waiver rules are relaxed when the objection is directed to the
trial judge’s conduct. The Illinois Supreme Court has held that “[a]pplication of
the waiver rule *** is less rigid where the basis for the objection is the circuit
court’s conduct.” People v. Davis, 185 Ill. 2d 317, 343 (1998); People v.
Williams, 173 Ill. 2d 48, 85 (1996).
First, requiring defense counsel to object to preserve the error for appeal
would not negate the mandatory nature of the 2007 amendment. Trial judges are
presumed to follow the law, and we assume that the mandatory nature of the 2007
amendment will be followed. In addition, we apply the plain error doctrine to
5
In his posttrial motion, defendant raised boilerplate claims such as a denial
of due process and equal protection, and the state’s failure to prove guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. The claims specific to defendant’s case were that the trial court
“erred in giving instructions on behalf of the State over the Defendant’s objection”
and “erred by allowing Chicago Police Officers to testify to the content of their
radio transmissions, thereby allowing the jury to hear impermissible hearsay
evidence.”
44
No. 1-08-0194
other situations where actions are mandatory, and we have not been presented
with a reason to carve out an exception for this issue alone. E.g. People v. Lewis,
234 Ill. 2d 32, 39-42 (2009) (absent “exceptional circumstances,” the plain error
doctrine will be applied even though the trial court failed to follow a statutorily-
mandated procedure).
Second, the typical reason for relaxing the waiver rule does not apply to
this case. “The reason for relaxing the waiver rule is that the objection would
have fallen on deaf ears.” People v. Davis, 378 Ill. App. 3d 1, 10 (2007). For
example, our supreme court relaxed the waiver rule when the trial judge refused
to consider mitigating evidence at the defendant’s death penalty hearing (Davis,
185 Ill. 2d at 343) or refused to allow defense counsel to participate in
formulating a response to a jury’s note (Williams, 173 Ill. 2d at 85) or
spontaneously informed the venire at defendant’s second death penalty hearing
that a prior jury had imposed the death penalty (People v. Woolley, 205 Ill. 2d
296, 301-02 (2002)). Similarly, we relaxed the waiver rule when the trial judge
interrupted the defendant’s testimony to offer unsolicited advice about his
decision to testify. People v. Vaughn, 354 Ill. App. 3d 917, 920-21 (1st Dist.
2004).
45
No. 1-08-0194
In the case at bar, there was no reason to find that an objection would have
fallen on deaf ears. Quite the contrary is true, considering that the questions were
mandatory. Defendant’s failure to object at trial robbed the trial court of the
opportunity to correct the error; and defendant’s failure to object in a posttrial
motion deprived a reviewing court of any factual findings which the trial court
might have made concerning the credibility of the witnesses and their
contribution to the weight of the evidence against defendant, and thus the
possible harmlessness of the error. Davis, 378 Ill. App. 3d at 10-11. “Since
there is no reason to think that a request from counsel would have fallen on deaf
ears, the relaxed waiver rule does not apply in this case. As a result, this court
will review for plain error only.” Davis, 378 Ill. App. 3d at 10-11.
Recently, the Third District of this court considered this same waiver issue
and reached the same conclusion that we do, holding: “[a]lthough our supreme
court elected to place the duty squarely on the shoulders of the court to comply
with the directive command in the current Supreme Court Rule 431(b), the
amended rule does not alleviate *** counsel of the defense of an obligation to
object when a trial judge inadvertently overlooks the applicability of Rule
431(b).” People v. Russell, No. 3-08-0051, slip op. at 16 (November 18, 2009).
46
No. 1-08-0194
Thus, we now proceed with plain-error review.
As noted above, “the plain-error doctrine allows a reviewing court to
consider unpreserved error when (1) a clear or obvious error occurs and the
evidence is so closely balanced that the error alone threaten[s] to tip the scales of
justice against the defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error, or (2) a
clear or obvious error occurs and that error is so serious that it affected the
fairness of the defendant’s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial
process, regardless of the closeness of the evidence.” Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at
565; Woods, 214 Ill. 2d at 471. With a plain error analysis, “it is the defendant
who bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice.” Woods, 214 Ill.
2d at 471.
In the case at bar, defendant claims that the error was so serious that it
“challenged the integrity of the judicial process” and thus reversal is required
under the second prong; and that reversal is also required under the first prong
due to the closeness of the evidence. The State claims that the error was not
fundamental, and thus reversal is not required under the second prong; and that
reversal is also not required under the first prong, since the evidence against
defendant was overwhelming. For the reasons discussed below, we find that the
47
No. 1-08-0194
error was not so fundamental as to require reversal under the first prong of the
plain error analysis.
(d) Prior Appellate Court Opinions
A number of appellate panels before us have already ruled on the question
of whether the failure to ask the four Zehr questions rises to the level of a
fundamental error.6 There were four opinions filed between approximately
Thanksgiving and Christmas 2009, alone. According to the Shepard’s service,
one opinion was “submitted” on May 6, 2009, “filed” on November 24, 2009,
“amended” on December 4, 2009, and “filed” again on December 7, 2009. The
6
Several appellate court opinions that cite Rule 431(b) are not included in
our summary because they concern different questions. People v. Belknap, No. 3-
08-0692 (November 18, 2009); People v. Vargas, No. 1-08-0383 (November 20,
2009). First, although Belknap was decided on the basis of Rule 431(b), it did not
consider whether the failure to ask the four Zehr questions was a fundamental or
structural error, requiring automatic reversal. Instead, the Belknap court reversed
under the first prong of the plain error doctrine, after finding that the trial court’s
failure to ask was error, and that the evidence was closely balanced. The Belknap
court did not discuss the second prong of the plain error doctrine, and thus it never
considered whether the failure to inquire about the four Zehr principles challenged
the integrity of the judicial process. Second, Vargas did not concern a failure to
inquire, but rather concerned the form that a proper inquiry should take. Third,
our summary also does not include appellate court opinions that discussed either
the prior version of Rule 431(b) or whether the 2007 amendment has retroactive
application. E.g. People v. Schmidt. 392 Ill. App. 3d 689, 710 (2009); People v.
Braboy, 393 Ill. App. 3d 101, 109 (2009).
48
No. 1-08-0194
following summary is complete only as of Christmas 2009.7
On September 30, 2009, our supreme court vacated four of the appellate
opinions.8 People v. Alexander, 233 Ill. 2d 565 (2009); People v. Anderson, 283
Ill. 2d 565 (2009); People v. Stump, 233 Ill. 2d 592 (2009); and People v.
Matchem, 233 Ill. 2d 583 (2009). One of the four vacated opinions had found
that the error was fundamental; and the remaining three had found that it was not.
Compare People v. Anderson, 389 Ill. App. 3d 1, 5, 9 (1st Dist. 2009) (error was
so “fundamental,” that reversal was required under the second prong of the plain
error analysis), with People v. Stump, 385 Ill. App. 3d 515, 522 (4th Dist. 2008)
(“the error was harmless because (1) all four Zehr principles were addressed to
each juror at some point during voir dire, and (2) the evidence presented at trial
against defendant was overwhelming.”) and People v. Alexander, 391 Ill. App. 3d
The concurrence and dissent in People v. Moore, decided two days before
7
Christmas 2009, discuss Glasper, but not on a Zehr-related topic. For this reason,
the Moore opinion is not included in our summary. People v. Moore, Docket No.
1-07-0410 (December 23, 2009).
8
In addition to vacating the four opinions on September 30, 2009, our
supreme court also vacated six orders from the Fourth District that were not
published pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 23. People v. Bui, No. 4-07-0651
(February 23, 2009); People v. Dillard, No. 4-07-0977 (January 21, 2009); People
v. Harris, No. 4-07-0821 (February 3, 2009); People v. Roberson, No. 4-07-0864
(February 18, 2009); People v. Williams, No. 4-07-0894 (September 26, 2008);
People v. Wright, No. 4-07-0894 (September 26, 2008).
49
No. 1-08-0194
419, 433 (3d Dist. 2009) (“We cannot hold that the failure to follow a supreme
court rule standing alone becomes a per se plain error.”). See also People v.
Matchem, No. 4-08-0554 (April 9, 2009) (simply followed Stump). Thus, our
supreme court vacated opinions on both sides of the issue.
Although several opinions on this issue were not vacated, most of the intact
opinions were based on the First District’s opinion in Anderson, which was
vacated. The intact opinions include, in chronological order: (1) People v.
Graham, 393 Ill. App. 3d 268 (1st Dist., 1st Div., July 20, 2009); (2) People v.
Wilmington, 394 Ill. App. 3d 567 (1st Dist., 4th Div. September 24, 2009); (3)
People v. Blair, No. 2-07-0862 (2d Dist. September 29, 2009); (4) People v.
Arredondo, 394 Ill. App. 3d 944 (1st Dist. October 8, 2009); (5) People v. Madrid,
No. 1-08-0324 (1st Dist. October 8, 2009); (6) People v. Blanton, No. 4-08-0120
(4th Dist. November 10, 2009); and (7) People v. Russell, No. 3-08-0051 (3d Dist.
November 18, 2009); (8) People v. Alexander, No. 3-07-0915 (3d Dist.
November 30, 2007) (new opinion entered after the original opinion was vacated
by the Illinois Supreme Court) (Alexander II); (9) People v. Ammerman, No. 3-
08-0071 (3d Dist. December 7, 2009); and (10) People v. Magallanes, No. 1-07-
50
No. 1-08-0194
2826 (1st Dist. December 23, 2009). 9
For the first six opinions, their foundation is the now vacated Anderson.
Graham’s three-justice panel included two of the same panel members as the
vacated Anderson, including Anderson’s authoring justice. Not surprisingly,
Graham simply adopted Anderson, holding: “Our supreme court has yet to
construe the 2007 version of Rule 431(b) at issue in this case. Until that time, we
shall continue to follow Anderson ***.” Graham, 393 Ill. App. 3d at 276. In
Wilmington, the First District’s next opinion on the subject, we found our prior
opinions in Anderson and Graham “more soundly reasoned” than the decisions by
other districts in Stump and Alexander, also now vacated. Wilmington, 394 Ill.
App. 3d at 575. In Blair, the Second District decided to join “the trend of
authority” established by us in cases such as Anderson and Graham. Blair, No. 2-
07-0862, slip op. at 22. In Arredondo and Madrid, two First District cases
decided on the same day, we held that we “continue[d] to adhere to the well-
reasoned decisions in Anderson and Graham.” Arredondo, 394 Ill. App. 3d at
955; Madrid, No. 1-08-0324, slip op. at 15 (same quote in both opinions).
For the reasons discussed in footnote 10, People v. Owen, 394 Ill. App. 3d
9
147 (2009) is not included in our list.
51
No. 1-08-0194
The sixth opinion, Blanton, was first filed on June 17, 2009, and then
withdrawn, and then refiled on November 10, 2009 without reference to the
vacated opinions, but with the same result. Although the refiled Blanton opinion
eliminated all explicit citations to Anderson, it still relied on opinions that were
built on Anderson, namely the five opinions discussed above: (1) Graham, 393
Ill. App. 3d at 276; (2) Wilmington, 394 Ill. App. 3d at 575; (3) Blair, No. 2-07-
0862; (4) Arredondo, 394 Ill. App. 3d at 955; (5) Madrid, No. 1-08-0324. See
Blanton, No. 4-08-0120. Thus, even seemingly intact appellate opinions fell like
a house of cards, after our supreme court removed the bottom one:, namely
Anderson.
Of the ten intact appellate opinions listed above, only the most recent ones,
which are the last four listed, are not based on Anderson. Russell, No. 3-08-0051.
For example, in reaching its holding, the Third District in Russell did not cite
Anderson, or any of the opinions based on Anderson, or any of the other vacated
opinions. Russell, No. 3-08-0051. Relying almost exclusively on Glasper, the
Third District in Russell held that the error was not a per se violation requiring
“automatic reversal.” Russell, No. 3-08-0051, slip op. at 18.
The other three most recent appellate opinions, analyzing Glasper, also
52
No. 1-08-0194
agree with Russell that this type of error is not a per se violation. Accord
Magallanes, No. 1-07-2826, slip op. at 37 (1st Dist. December 23, 2009) ( “The
holding in Glasper also compels us to reject defendant’s argument that Rule
403(b)(4) errors are automatically reversible.”); Ammerman, No. 3-08-0071, slip
op. at 13 (3d Dist. December 7, 2009) (“considering Glasper, we hold that the
trial court in this case did not commit plain error under either prong of the rule”);
Alexander II, No. 3-07-0915, slip op. at 20 (3d Dist. November 30, 2009) (based
upon Glasper, appellate court found that the trial court’s failure to question the
venire about the Zehr principles “did not render the defendant’s trial
fundamentally unfair”).
The supreme court’s September 30 order had the effect of leaving us with
only a few points of intact authority: (1) our supreme court’s recent decision in
People v. Glasper; 234 Ill. 2d 173 (June 18, 2009); (2) the 2007 amendment itself;
and (3) the four most recent appellate decisions discussing Glasper,10 which have
10
We do not include Owens in our list because, even though it was decided
months after Glasper, it did not discuss, or make any reference at all, to this
controlling supreme court opinion. Owens, 384 Ill. App. 3d, 148-155 (not a single
cite to Glasper). In addition, the Fourth District in Owens took a hybrid approach.
It affirmed its prior opinion in Stump (later vacated) that had applied a harmless
error analysis. However, it held that, on “the record here,” the failure to inquire
about the four Zehr principles challenged the integrity of the judicial process.
53
No. 1-08-0194
all held that this type of error is not a per se violation. Magallanes, No. 1-07-
2826, slip op. at 28-29 (1st Dist. December 23, 2009); Ammerman, No. 3-08-
0071, slip op. at 13 (3d Dist. December 7, 2009); Alexander II, No. 3-07-0915,
slip op. at 20 (3d Dist. November 30, 2009); Russell, No. 3-08-0051, slip op. at
17-19 (3d Dist. November 18, 2009).
When our supreme court vacated four of the appellate opinions on this
issue, it directed the appellate court “to reconsider its judgement in light of
People v. Glasper” and we will do just that. E.g. People v. Alexander, No.
108562 (September 30, 2009) (“The appellate court is directed to reconsider its
judgment in light of People v. Glasper *** to determine if a different result is
warranted.”).
(e) Supreme Court’s Decision in Glasper
In Glasper, the Illinois Supreme Court was faced with an issue which is
almost identical to the issue that we face here: what to do with a trial court’s
failure to ask a question required by Supreme Court Rule 431(b). Glasper, 234
Ill. 2d at 189. In Glasper, our supreme court answered that question by holding
Thus, Owens did not hold either (1) that the failure to inquire was a per se
violation requiring automatic reversal or (2) that harmless error analysis always
applied. Owens, 384 Ill. App. 3d at 152-54.
54
No. 1-08-0194
that the failure was not a fundamental error, and that a harmless error analysis
applied. Glasper, 234 Ill.. 2d at 199-200. Following the precedent set by our
supreme court, we reach the same holding.
In Glasper, the rule at issue was the 1997 version of Rule 431(b), which
required the trial court to ask about the Zehr principles, only if the defense
counsel requested an inquiry. Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d at 187. In Glasper, the defense
counsel did make the request, making the result the same as it is in the case at bar,
namely that the trial court was required to ask. Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d at 189 (“once a
defendant ma[de] a request, the decision to question the venire” became “ a
requirement”).
Faced with the failure to ask a required question, our supreme court held
that this error did “not rise to the level of structural error.” Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d at
199. Our supreme court “decline[d] to find that a violation of Rule 431(b) is per
se reversible.” Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d at 200. Instead our supreme court held that
the error did “not require automatic reversal” and that it was “amenable to
harmless error review.” Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d at 200. In support of its holding, our
supreme court observed the questioning set forth in Rule 431(b) was “not
uniformly required in other state and federal jurisdictions. Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d at
55
No. 1-08-0194
198.
Of course, Glasper is not completely identical to our case. Glasper
concerned the 1997 version of the rule, and our supreme court was careful to limit
its holding to the version of the rule at that point in time. Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d at
200. Even with this difference in mind, we find that Glasper dictates the holding
in the case at bar. The 2007 amendment merely increased what fell under the
scope of mandatory; and our supreme court in Glasper already answered what
happens when there is a violation of what is mandatory under the rule, and what
happens is a harmless error analysis. Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d at 199- 200.
This conclusion is consistent not only with Glasper, but also with other
supreme court precedent. As our supreme court stated in Glasper, “[i]t would be
inconsistent for this court to hold that a trial court’s failure to question a venire
regarding a defendant’s decision not to testify in violation of Rule 431(b) requires
automatic reversal, when we have repeatedly held that automatic reversal is not
required when a prosecutor mentions a defendant’s post-Miranda silence and
commits a Doyle violation. Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d at 198, discussing Doyle v. Ohio,
426 U.S. 610, 619, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91, 98, 96 S. Ct. 2240, 2245 (1976) (U.S. Supreme
Court held that the prosecution’s use of a defendant’s post-Miranda silence for
56
No. 1-08-0194
impeachment purposes is generally a due process violation). See People v.
Dameron, 196 Ill. 2d 156, 164-68 (2001) (citing cases where the Illinois Supreme
Court concluded that a Doyle violation amounted to harmless error).
Thus, Glasper and other supreme court precedent compel us to find that the
error was not a fundamental or structural error.
(f) 2007 Amendment
Our conclusion is supported not only by Glasper and by other supreme
court precedent, but also by the 2007 amendment itself.
In Glasper, the dissent claimed that the majority opinion “renders this
court’s 2007 amendment of Rule 431(b) nonsensical.” Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d at
230. In other words, there was no point in changing the rule from discretionary to
mandatory, if its violation will usually found to be harmless error. Since the trial
court will provide the same information to the jury at the end of trial, the jury
instructions will contribute to a harmless error finding. C.f. Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d at
201 (“citizens sworn as jurors” are presumed to follow “the jury instructions
given to them”). In addition, the majority in Glasper held that Rule 431(b)(4)
questioning was not “indispensable to a fair trial.” Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d at 196. If
a failure to ask will be found to be harmless error in most cases, then one could
57
No. 1-08-0194
argue that the change from discretionary to mandatory was without any real
effect. Since we must interpret all rules to have effect, a lack of effect would
render the amendment “nonsensical.” Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d at 230.
First and foremost, the reason why the change has a real or substantive
effect is that trial judges are presumed to follow the law. If we presume that
jurors will follow jury instructions, we must also presume that trial courts will
follow Supreme Court Rules. Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d at 201 (“citizens sworn as
jurors” are presumed to follow “the jury instructions given to them”). The effect
of the 2007 amendment was to change the inquiry from discretionary unless
defense counsel requested it, to mandatory at all times. This change took the
impetus for the questions from defense counsel alone and placed it “squarely on
the shoulders” of all the attorneys in the courtroom: the trial judge, prosecutor,
and defense counsel. Russell, No. 3-08-0051, slip op. at 16 (effect of the 2007
amendment was to “place the duty squarely on the shoulders of the court” to
inquire, and to encourage both counsel to object). Now the trial judge has the
responsibility to ask, and the prosecutor has an incentive to see that the judge
does.
In most of the appellate cases discussed above, the trial court’s error
58
No. 1-08-0194
occurred in the months immediately after the 2007 amendment. For example, in
the now vacated Anderson, we observed that the new rule “went into effect on
May 1, 2007," and jury selection began just “three weeks later, on May 21, 2007.”
Anderson, 389 Ill. App. 3d at 2. In the now vacated Stump, the jury trial began
just six days after the new rule took effect. Stump, 385 Ill. App. 3d at 517 (trial
began on May 7, 2007). See also Blair, No. 2-07-0862, slip op. at 2 (“Jury
selection commenced on June 11, 2007.”); Wilmington, 394 Ill. App. 3d at 570
(“defendant’s trial occurred in July 2007"); Alexander, 391 Ill. App. 3d at 421
(vacated) (“defendant’s trial began on October 1, 2007"); Russell, No. 3-08-0051,
slip op. at 2 (trial began October 2, 2007).11 The rule had stayed the same for a
decade, and these early months marked an adjustment period, which is unlikely to
be repeated.
Second, prosecutors now have an incentive to remind trial judges who may
forget. A prosecution of a crime is the culmination of a lot of hard work. For
example, in the case at bar, three police officers placed themselves at risk on the
Several of the opinions stated the offense date but not the trial date.
11
Arredondo, 394 Ill. App. 3d at 945 (the offense occurred on June 3, 2006);
Graham, 393 Ill. App. 3d at 269 (the offence occurred on September 28, 2006);
Madrid, No. 1-08-0324, slip op. at 2-5 (the offense occurred in 2004).
59
No. 1-08-0194
street to clear a neighborhood of a crack dealer. No prosecutor wants to see an
otherwise valid conviction tossed out because the trial court neglected to ask the
four questions. As the Third District observed in Russell, “all parties and the
judge must take care to insure” that the questions are now asked; and the
incentive for the prosecutors is “equally serious” to the incentive for the defense
counsel. Russell, No. 3-08-0051, slip op. at 16.
Third, a harmless error analysis is not toothless. On appeal, once the
defendant establishes that an error was made, an appellate court is likely to
reverse, unless the appellate record demonstrates that the evidence was
“overwhelming” and the error was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d at 202-03. Previously, if defense counsel neglected to ask at
trial and the issue was appealed, an appellate court would find that there was no
error at all and never even proceed to a harmless-error analysis. The difference is
that, now, an appellate court is likely to reverse the conviction, if the evidence is
not “overwhelming.” Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d at 202-03.
For these reasons, we find that applying harmless error analysis to a
violation of the 2007 amendment does not rob the amendment of its intended
effect.
60
No. 1-08-0194
(g) Harmless Error Analysis
In Glasper, our supreme court concluded that “the trial court’s error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,” because “[t]he evidence of defendant’s
guilt is overwhelming.” Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d at 202-03. We reach the same
conclusion here.
In the case at bar, the jury found defendant guilty of the delivery of a
controlled substance. The evidence supporting the conviction was overwhelming.
An undercover police officer testified that he purchased crack cocaine from
defendant. A surveillance officer witnessed the undercover purchase, as well as
two more additional transactions in the same location, where defendant
exchanged small items for cash. A forensic chemist confirmed that the item
purchased during the undercover buy was cocaine. No witnesses testified for the
defense. Although the recorded ten-dollar bill used in the undercover purchase
was not recovered from defendant, the surveillance officer testified that he
observed defendant pull out an unknown amount of money from a wad of bills
and hand it to a subsequent purchaser, when defendant was apparently making
change.
In his argument against a harmless-error finding, defendant stated in his
61
No. 1-08-0194
appellate brief only that “[t]he evidence in this case turned on the credibility of
the officers, and was thus close.” However, defendant’s brief offered no
explanation of how the police officers’ credibility had been discredited.
Defendant cited in his support two cases: People v. Evans, 369 Ill. App. 3d 366
(4th Dist. 2006); and People v. Wilson, 199 Ill. App. 3d 792 (1st Dist. 1990). In
both cases, the appellate court found the evidence closely balanced, where the
conviction had forced the jurors to pick one competing witness over another. In
Evans, the appellate court found that “the verdict was based primarily on a
credibility determination of the competing theories testified to by the parties’
respective experts.” Evans, 369 Ill. App. 3d at 376. In Wilson, we court found
that the verdict “rested on the jury’s determination of the relative credibility of the
victim” and a witness who had “testified that the victim had a motive to lie about
the assault.” Wilson, 199 Ill. App. 3d at 795. By contrast, in the case at bar, no
competing witnesses testified at trial, and thus the jury was not asked to
determine “relative credibility.” Wilson, 199 Ill. App. 3d at 795. In the case at
bar, the jurors were merely asked to assess the testimony of two police officers,
who fully corroborated each other; and whose testimony was not called into
question by a competing witness, cross-examination or other evidence. The need
62
No. 1-08-0194
for this assessment did not make the evidence “closely balanced.” Evans, 369 Ill.
App. 3d at 376. Wilson, 199 Ill. App. 3d at 795.
For the reasons discussed above, we find that reversal is not required under
either prong of the plain error doctrine. First, the error was not “so closely
balanced that the error alone threaten[ed] to tip the scales of justice against the
defendant.” Piatkoski, 225 Ill. 2d at 565; Woods, 214 Ill. 2d at 471. Second, the
error was “not so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant’s trial and
challenged the integrity of the judicial process.” Piatkoski, 225 Ill. 2d at 565;
Woods, 214 Ill. 2d at 471.
(4) Refusal to Rule on Defendant’s Motion
Fourth, defendant claims that the trial court erred by refusing to rule, until
after defendant testified, on defendant’s motion in limine concerning the
admissibility of his prior convictions for impeachment purposes. For the reasons
discussed below, we find that defendant failed to preserve his objection to the
trial court’s refusal to rule.
Prior to trial, both the State and the defense filed motions concerning the
admission of defendant’s prior convictions if he testified. The trial court stated
that it “would reserve ruling on this matter until the defendant has testified.” On
63
No. 1-08-0194
appeal, defendant claims that, without knowing how the trial court would rule, he
decided not to testify.
Defendant acknowledges on appeal that the Illinois Supreme Court recently
addressed this same issue in People v. Patrick, 233 Ill. 2d 62 (2009) and that in
Patrick, our supreme court held that a defendant, who does not testify, does not
have the “right to appellate review of this issue.” Patrick, 233 Ill. 2d at 79. Our
supreme court clearly stated that “defendants must take the risk and present the
testimony for the issue to be reviewable.” Patrick, 233 Ill. 2d at 79. However,
defendant’s counsel asks us to find that our supreme court’s holding is
“erroneous.” Obviously, defense counsel knows that a holding by our supreme
court is binding on this court. Presumably, the defense presents this argument in
order to preserve it, since our supreme court granted certiorari in a case where a
defendant filed a similar motion but did not testify. People v. Averett, 231 Ill. 2d
671 (2009), granting petition for leave to appeal in People v. Averett, 381 Ill.
App. 3d 1001, 1020 (2008) (holding that “defendant’s failure to testify eliminates
the circuit’s refusal to rule as a reviewable issue”). As the defense is well aware,
we must reject this argument, until and if such time that the supreme court rules
differently.
64
No. 1-08-0194
(5) State’s Rebuttal Closing
Fifth, defendant claims that prosecutorial misconduct during the State’s
rebuttal closing denied defendant a fair trial. For the reasons stated below, we
find that the prosecutor did not commit misconduct in the State’s rebuttal closing
argument, when she responded to remarks made during the defense closing.
(a) Plain Error Review
Defendant failed to object to this issue both at trial and in his posttrial
motion. At trial, defendant did not object once during either the State’s initial
closing argument or the State’s rebuttal closing argument. In defendant’s
posttrial motion, defendant objected both to the jury instruction defining a
delivery and to the admission of the police radio messages on hearsay grounds,
but he did not raise any objections to the State’s closing arguments.
As we already discussed above, to preserve an alleged trial error for
appellate review, a defendant must both: (1) specifically object at trial; and (2)
raise the specific issue again in a posttrial motion. Woods, 214 Ill. 2d at 470;
Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 564. However, even when a defendant failed to
preserve an error for review, an appellate court may still review for plain error.
Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 562-63; 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a). The plain error doctrine
65
No. 1-08-0194
permits an appellate court to reverse on the basis of unpreserved error if either:
(1) the error was “clear or obvious,” and the evidence at trial was so closely
balanced that this error could have tipped the scales against the defendant; or (2)
the unpreserved error was “so serious” that it challenged the integrity of the
judicial process and the fairness of defendant’s trial. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at
565; Woods, 214 Ill. 2d at 471. Before a reviewing court analyzes the two prongs
of the plain error doctrine, our first step is to determine whether any error
occurred at all. Walker, 392 Ill. App. 3d at 294. For the reasons discussed below,
we find that no error occurred.
(b) Standard of Review
It is not clear whether the appropriate standard of review for this issue is de
novo or abuse of discretion. This court has previously made this same
observation in both People v. Phillips, 392 Ill. App. 3d 243, 274-75 (2009) and
People v. Johnson, 385 Ill. App. 3d 585, 603 (2008). The Second District
recently agreed with our observation that the standard of review for closing
remarks is an unsettled issue. People v. Robinson, 391 Ill. App. 3d 822, 839-40
(2009).
The confusion stems from an apparent conflict between two supreme court
66
No. 1-08-0194
cases: People v.Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d 92, 121 (2007), and People v. Blue, 189 Ill.
2d 99, 128, 132 (2000). In Wheeler, our supreme court held: “Whether
statements made by a prosecutor at closing argument were so egregious that they
warrant a new trial is a legal issue this court reviews de novo.” Wheeler, 226 Ill.
2d at 121. However, the supreme court in Wheeler cited with approval Blue, in
which the supreme court had previously applied an abuse of discretion standard.
Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d at 121. In Blue and numerous other cases, our supreme court
had held that the substance and style of closing argument is within the trial
court’s discretion, and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Blue,
189 Ill. 2d at 128, 132 (“we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion” by
permitting certain prosecutorial remarks in closing); People v. Caffey, 205 Ill. 2d
52, 128 (2001); People v. Emerson, 189 Ill. 2d 436, 488 (2000); People v.
Williams, 192 Ill. 2d 548, 583 (2000); People v. Armstrong, 183 Ill. 2d 130, 145
(1998); People v. Byron, 164 Ill. 2d 279, 295 (1995). Our supreme court had
reasoned: “Because the trial court is in a better position than a reviewing court to
determine the prejudicial effect of any remarks, the scope of closing argument is
within the trial court’s discretion.” People v. Hudson, 157 Ill. 2d 401, 441
(1993). Following Blue and other supreme court cases like it, this court had
67
No. 1-08-0194
consistently applied an abuse of discretion standard. People v. Tolliver, 347 Ill.
App. 3d 203, 224 (2004), People v. Abadia, 328 Ill. App. 3d 669, 678 (2001).
Since Wheeler, appellate courts have been divided regarding the
appropriate standard of review. The Second and Third Divisions of the First
District have applied an abuse of discretion standard, while the Third and Fourth
Districts and the Fifth Division of the First District have applied a de novo
standard of review. Compare People v. Love, 377 Ill. App. 3d 306, 313 (1st Dist.
2d Div. 2007) (Wolfson, J.) and People v. Averett, 381 Ill. App. 3d 1001, 1007
(1st Dist. 3d Div. 2008) (Quinn, J.) with People v. McCoy, 378 Ill. App. 3d 954,
964 (3d Dist. 2008), People v. Palmer, 382 Ill. App. 3d 1151, 1160 (4th Dist
2008), People v. Ramos, No. 1-07-3244 (1st Dist. 5th Div. December 4, 2009)
(Toomin, J.) and Poeple v. Vargas, No. 1-08-1383 (1st Dist. 5th Div. November 20,
2009) (Toomin, J.).
However, we do not need to resolve the issue of the appropriate standard of
review at this time, because our holding in this case would be the same under
either standard. This is the same approach that we took in both Phillips and
Johnson, and the same approach taken by the Second District in its recent
Robinson opinion. Phillips, 392 Ill. App. 3d at 275; Johnson, 385 Ill. App. 3d at
68
No. 1-08-0194
585; Robinson,391 Ill. App. 3d at 840 (“In any event, like the Johnson court, we
leave the resolution of this issue to another day, as our conclusion would be the
same applying either standard.”).
(c). Substantial Prejudice
A State’s closing will lead to reversal only if the prosecutor’s remarks
created “substantial prejudice.” Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d at 123, Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d
at 64, People v. Easley, 148 Ill. 2d 281, 332 (1992) (“The remarks by the
prosecutor, while improper, do not amount to substantial prejudice.”). Substantial
prejudice occurs “if the improper remarks constituted a material factor in a
defendant’s conviction.” Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d at 123.
When reviewing claims of prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument, a
reviewing court will consider the entire closing arguments of both the prosecutor
and the defense attorney, in order to place the remarks in context. Wheeler, 226
Ill. 2d at 122, People v. Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d 53, 113 (2003), People v. Tolliver,
347 Ill. App. 3d 203, 224 (2004). A prosecutor has wide latitude during closing
argument. Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d at 123; Blue, 189 Ill. 2d at 127. “In closing, the
prosecutor may comment on the evidence and any fair, reasonable inferences it
yields.” People v. Nicholas, 218 Ill. 2d 104, 121 (2005).
69
No. 1-08-0194
“Statements will not be held improper if they were provoked or invited by
the defense counsel’s argument.” Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d at 204. For example, in
Glasper, defendant argued that the prosecutor had “shifted the burden of proof to
defendant when, in response to defendant’s claim of a coerced confession, the
prosecutor had stated in rebuttal closing: “Where’s the evidence of that?”
Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d at 212. Our supreme court held that the comment “did not
shift the burden of proof to defendant,” but that it merely “pointed out that no
evidence existed in this case to support defendant’s theory” and that it was
“invited by defense counsel’s argument.” Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d at 212.
Similarly, in the case at bar, we find, for the reasons discussed below, that
the prosecutor’s comments in the rebuttal closing did not shift the burden of proof
and were invited by the defense counsel’s argument. Although we have reviewed
the closing arguments in their entirety, we provide in this opinion only the
remarks made by defense counsel to which the prosecutor responded, as well as
the remarks by the prosecutor which defendant claims on appeal were
objectionable.
(d) Contested Remarks
On appeal, defendant complains about three sets of remarks made by the
70
No. 1-08-0194
prosecutor during the State’s rebuttal closing, claiming that: (i) one set shifted
the burden of proof to defendant by implying that he should have requested
scientific testing: (ii) a second set minimized the State’s burden of proof; and (iii)
and a third set bolstered the credibility of the police witnesses by invoking their
authority as police officers.
(i) Scientific Testing
In closing argument, defense counsel discussed, at length, the lack of DNA
and fingerprint testing, stating:
“The Chicago Police Department chose *** not to
request any fingerprint evidence in this case. They
chose not to request DNA evidence in this case, and
they’re the ones who are in custody of the supposed
evidence.
Don’t let the State try and shift that burden on us.
We don’t have custody of that evidence. They have
custody of that evidence. And three days later, the
person in the crime lab has custody of the evidence and
is handling it without gloves because no requests have
71
No. 1-08-0194
been made.
You don’t have to accept that. You don’t have to
say that’s okay. They didn’t do a good enough job as
far as that’s concerned.
And it’s up to you to tell them that that is not
acceptable.”
On appeal, defendant challenges the following remarks which the
prosecutor made in response. The State confirmed that defendant did not have a
burden in this case, but noted that defense counsel had elicited testimony from the
State’s forensic expert that requests for DNA or fingerprint testing may be
submitted by the police, the State, or the defense. Specifically, the prosecutor
stated:
“And you heard from ISP, the Illinois State Police
Crime Lab, Miss Paula Bosco Szum. She as well,
thousands of narcotics she’s personally been given to
analyze and she specified to you in what situations DNA
or fingerprints is [sic] requested of those thousands of
times.
72
No. 1-08-0194
What she said matched exactly what the officer
said. Counsel is correct. The defendant bears
absolutely no burden in this case. But she asked the
question of Miss Szum to describe those circumstances.
What was Ms. Szum’s answer? Sometimes, it’s
from the police of those two or three times, the State or
the Defense.”
After defense counsel argued in its closing “[d]on’t let the State try and
shift that burden on us,” the State was almost forced to respond with a denial.
The State’s response included drawing the jury’s attention to testimony that the
defense had elicited on cross-examination. During direct examination, the State
had asked its forensic expert if both the State and the defense could request DNA
or fingerprint testing. Instead of objecting to the question, the defense made the
strategic decision to explore the topic on cross-examination, eliciting that a
defense request had occurred only once during the career of that witness. On
appeal, the defendant cannot be heard to complain now about either an argument
that he invited or testimony that he elicited. Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d at 205
(“Defendant cannot complain that the State made reference to evidence in closing
73
No. 1-08-0194
which defendant helped elicit.”)
(ii) Burden of Proof
Defense counsel ended her argument by discussing the State’s burden to
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The defense argued:
“Let’s talk about reasonable doubt. No
[recorded] funds. That’s a reasonable doubt. No drugs
recovered on [defendant]. That’s a reasonable doubt.
No video equipment used in this case. That’s a
reasonable doubt. No audio equipment used in this
case. That’s a reasonable doubt.
The circumstances of how this identification was
constructed. That’s a reasonable doubt. No DNA
evidence. That’s a reasonable doubt.”
On appeal, defendant challenges the following remarks which the
prosecutor made in response::
“[The defense] bear[s] no burden and let me say to
you, ladies and gentleman, this burden, it’s not an
impossible burden.
74
No. 1-08-0194
It’s not something made up just for
[defendant]. It is the same burden in every
criminal case across the nation, our nation. People
are convicted and tried everyday under the same
burden. It’s not impossible. It’s not impossible.”
The above remarks were invited by defense’s remarks that the absence of any
possible technological tool (DNA testing, video recording, etc.) created a
reasonable doubt. The reference to convictions occurring “every day” was not a
reference that we condone; however, its impact was lessened by the State’s
immediately following comment that the State’s burden was just short of
“impossible.” Obviously, we on the appellate panel cannot know the tone with
which this remark was delivered. We know only that it was neither objected to by
the defense counsel who heard it, nor cautioned by the trial court who also heard
it. From the cold and silent transcript, we cannot find reversible error from these
words.
(iii) Police Credibility
Concerning the police officers’ credibility, defense counsel argued in
closing:
75
No. 1-08-0194
“Let’s talk about the circumstances of the
undercover police officer.
This person, as he described, he’s talking to for
three to five seconds. Bam, that’s it, and you’re going
to buy that they gave this detailed description of what
this individual looked like?
You know how they know what [defendant[ was
wearing? [Defendant] was arrested. ***
Of course, [defendant] is going to get identified
during this drive by identification because he’s the only
individual that is standing there in the custody of two
Chicago police officers.”
Defense counsel accused the police officers of “a lazy job of doing their police
work.”
In the State’s rebuttal closing, the prosecutor responded:
“We are not hiding anything from you, ladies and
gentlemen. They want you to believe that these officers
are, that they are just lazy and trying to pin cases on this
76
No. 1-08-0194
defendant. But why? That’s what you need to ask
yourself.
They basically want you to believe that these
officers are here risking their careers individually and
collectively. Why? For him? For less than a gram of
cocaine? Does that make any sense to anyone? ”
Without any evidence in the record of police fraud or misconduct, defense
counsel argued in her closing argument that the police misidentified or framed
her client in order to make an arrest. In rebuttal, the State responded: “Why?” In
light of the defense’s remarks, the State’s response was not inappropriate, and
thus no error occurred.
The remarks, quoted above, certainly did not rise to the level of plain error.
Even if the remarks constituted error, they were harmless, in light of the
overwhelming evidence against defendant, which was already discussed in
subsection (3)(g) of this opinion.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm defendant’s conviction. We find,
first, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by giving the jury the third
77
No. 1-08-0194
paragraph of IPI Criminal 4th 17.05A, which clarified that a drug delivery could
occur without the transfer of money or other consideration. Second, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion by allowing police officers to testify about radio
messages received from other police officers, who were also trial witnesses.
Third, the trial court did err by failing to ask potential jurors whether they
understood and accepted the four legal principles listed in Illinois Supreme Court
Rule 431(b); however, the error was harmless. Fourth, defendant failed to
preserve his objection to the trial court’s refusal to rule, until after defendant
testified, on his motion in limine concerning the admissibility of his prior
convictions for impeachment purposes. Fifth, the prosecutor did not commit
misconduct in the State’s rebuttal closing argument,
when she responded to remarks made during the defense closing.
Affirmed.
CAHILL , P.J., and J. GORDON, J., concur.
78