Knezovich v. Hallmark Insurance Company

ILLINOIS OFFICIAL REPORTS
Appellate Court
Knezovich v. Hallmark Insurance Co., 2012 IL App (1st) 111677Appellate Court SANDRA KNEZOVICH, Personal Representative of the Estate of
Caption Anthony David Knezovich, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
HALLMARK INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant (William
M. Otto, Personal Representative of the Estate of Ralph E. Otto,
Deceased; Suzanne Lucas and E. Perrine Downey, Coexecutors of the
Estate of C. Michael Downey, Deceased, Defendants-Appellees).
District & No. First District, Sixth Division
Docket No. 1-11-1677
Filed August 3, 2012
Held Defendant insurer had no duty to defend the deceased, a student pilot,
(Note: This syllabus who rented a plane insured by defendant and was operating it at the time
constitutes no part of of a midair collision, since the policy unambiguously excluded coverage
the opinion of the court for renter pilots; therefore, the denial of defendant’s motion for summary
but has been prepared judgment in the declaratory judgment action filed by the representative
by the Reporter of of the deceased renter was reversed.
Decisions for the
convenience of the
reader.)
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 09-CH-28688; the
Review Hon. Leroy K. Martin, Jr., Judge, presiding.
Judgment Reversed and remanded.
Counsel on Tressler LLP, of Chicago (Mark T. Banovetz and Elizabeth M. McGarry,
Appeal of counsel), for appellant.
Clifford Law Offices, P.C. (Kevin P. Durkin and Colin H. Dunn, of
counsel), Canel, King & Jones (Peter King, of counsel), Rapoport Law
Offices, P.C. (David Rapoport and Michael Teich, of counsel), and
Kaplan, Massamillo & Andrews, LLC (Robert A. Braun, of counsel), all
of Chicago, for appellees.
Panel JUSTICE LAMPKIN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Garcia and Palmer concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 In a declaratory judgment action, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment
concerning whether defendant-appellant Hallmark Insurance Company (Hallmark) owed a
duty to defend the estate of a deceased student pilot who had rented an aircraft from
Hallmark’s insured. The trial court found that Hallmark’s policy provisions concerning the
exclusion of coverage for student and renter pilots were ambiguous and Hallmark, therefore,
had a duty to defend and/or indemnify the estate of the student pilot in the underlying
wrongful death lawsuits. Accordingly, the trial court denied Hallmark’s motion for summary
judgment and granted the appellees’ cross-motion for summary judgment.
¶2 Hallmark appeals the trial court’s ruling, arguing the trial court erred in interpreting the
insurance contract. We agree. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the
trial court and remand this cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 This insurance coverage dispute arises out of a midair collision between two aircraft, a
Cessna and a Cirrus, in Wyoming. Both pilots and the sole passenger were killed, and both
planes were destroyed. Hallmark insured the Cessna, which was owned by Franklin Aviation,
Inc., a fixed base operator, and, at the time of the collision, was being operated by Anthony
Knezovich, a student pilot. Ralph Otto was operating the Cirrus, and C. Michael Downey
was his passenger. A number of wrongful death lawsuits were filed as a result of the
collision.
¶5 Plaintiff Sandra Knezovich, as the personal representative of the estate of Anthony
Knezovich, filed a complaint for declaratory judgment seeking a finding that Hallmark had
a duty to defend and indemnify the Knezovich estate in the underlying wrongful death
lawsuits.
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¶6 Hallmark moved for summary judgment, arguing there was no coverage available to
Anthony Knezovich under the policy Hallmark had issued to Franklin Aviation because a
provision of the policy excluded renter pilots from coverage. The affidavit of Raymond
Verheydt, the owner of Franklin Aviation, was attached to the motion. Verheydt averred that
Franklin Aviation operated a flight school and rented aircraft to its customers. It charged its
customers for both the rental of aircraft and instruction services. Verheydt was a certified
flight instructor and provided instruction to customers as requested. Anthony Knezovich held
a student pilot certificate and was a customer of Franklin Aviation, renting aircraft and
receiving flight training. Verheydt informed Mr. Knezovich that he would be charged for the
rental of the airplane on each flight based on an hourly rate. For those flights during which
he flew with a flight instructor, he would be charged both an hourly rental fee for the use of
the aircraft and the hourly rate for the instructor. When he was receiving ground instruction,
he would only be charged for the instructional time. Furthermore, when he was flying
without a flight instructor, he would be charged a rental fee for the use of the aircraft. Mr.
Knezovich acknowledged that he understood and agreed with that arrangement.
¶7 Verheydt averred that after he authorized Mr. Knezovich to make his first solo flight on
April 10, 2008, Mr. Knezovich was authorized to rent the aircraft to fly solo as long as
Verheydt preapproved each solo flight. Aircraft rentals by certified student pilots and other
certified pilots were the same except for Verheydt’s preapproval requirement for student pilot
solo flights and the federal regulation that prohibited a student pilot from operating an
aircraft as a pilot in command while carrying passengers. On August 10, 2008, Mr.
Knezovich rented the aircraft to fly solo. During that flight, the aircraft was involved in a
midair collision, resulting in fatal injuries to Mr. Knezovich and destruction of the aircraft.
¶8 Also attached to Hallmark’s motion for summary judgment was its aircraft insurance
policy issued to Franklin Aviation. The named insured specified on the coverage
identification page of the policy was “Franklin Aviation, Inc. and its individual shareholders
and executive officers.” The definitions section of the policy, provided in pertinent part:
“a. You and your mean the [named insured].
b. Someone we protect means any person or organization we provide coverage to
through this policy other than you.
c. Anyone or others means any person or organization other than you or someone we
protect.
***
j. Passenger means any person who is in the aircraft or getting in or out of it. If more
than one of the aircraft shown in item 5 of you Coverage Identification Page is involved
in one occurrence, every person who is in any of the aircraft is a passenger.
***
n. Occurrence means a sudden event or repeated exposure to conditions, involving
the aircraft during the policy period, neither expected nor intended by you or someone
we protect, that causes bodily injury or property damage to others during the policy
period.
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***
p. Student Pilot means any pilot holding a valid student pilot certificate issued by the
FAA who is receiving flight instruction or operating the aircraft solo under the direct
supervision and flight endorsement of a FAA Certified Flight Instructor.
q. Renter Pilot means any person or organization who is renting the aircraft from
you.
r. Pleasure and Business means use of the aircraft by you or by someone we protect
for personal and business-related purposes where no charge is made for such use. You
or someone we protect may receive reimbursement for expenses incurred in operating the
aircraft provided such reimbursement is limited to expenses allowable, if any, to a Private
Pilot under Part 61 of the FAA regulations.
s. Instruction and/or Rental means use of the aircraft by you for the instruction of,
or rental to, others for their pleasure and business purposes. You or someone we protect
may also use the aircraft for pleasure and business purposes.” (Emphases added.)
¶9 Part 3 of the policy, entitled “Liability to Others,” provided in pertinent part:
“1. What We Cover
We will pay for damage that you, or someone we protect, are legally required to
pay for bodily injury or property damage to others caused by an occurrence during
the policy period.
***
2. Who Is Protected (You and Someone We Protect)
Except for those entitles and persons described in Paragraph 3 below, your
bodily injury and property damage liability coverage protects you and someone we
protect. The term someone we protect means any organization or person you permit
to operate the aircraft. The term someone we protect also includes the following:
a. any person riding in the aircraft and any person or organization legally
responsible for the use of the aircraft provided such use is with your express
permission; and
b. any employee while acting within the scope of his or her employment by
you or someone we protect. ***
If instruction and rental, charter/air taxi or other uses involving a charge
made to others are permitted by your Policy, any person who receives
compensation for providing flight instruction or pilot services *** in the
aircraft for your benefit or on your behalf shall be considered to be your
employee acting within the course and scope of employment with respect to
an occurrence that arises out of such activities, regardless of whether you
deem that person to be your employee or an independent contractor for any
other purposes under any state or federal employment-related ordinance,
statute or regulation.
3. Who Is Not Protected
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Your bodily injury and property damage coverage does not protect:
***
b. Renter Pilots
A renter pilot with respect to any occurrence arising out of the operation of
the aircraft by a renter pilot.
4. What Is Not Covered
We do not cover any:
***
f. Student Pilots
Property damage or bodily injury if the aircraft is being operated in flight
by a Student Pilot with passengers unless a passenger is a pilot acting as pilot
in command [and has a current and proper medical certificate, flight review,
and pilot certificate with necessary ratings, each as required by the FAA].
5. Additional Protection
***
We will:
a. Defend Claims
Defend at our expense with attorneys we choose, any claim or legal action
against you or someone we protect with respect to any claims for bodily
injury or property damages resulting from an occurrence we cover.”
(Emphases added.)
¶ 10 Defendant-appellee Suzanne Lucas and E. Perrine Downey, coexecutors of the estate of
C. Michael Downey, filed a cross-motion for summary judgment seeking a finding that the
Hallmark policy was ambiguous when applied to the facts in this case and, thus, Hallmark
had a duty to defend and indemnify the Knezovich estate in the underlying lawsuits. The
Downey estate argued that flight instruction was a permissive use of the aircraft under the
policy and student pilots, as defined under the policy, fell within the scope of persons insured
under the policy. Although a policy provision excluded coverage for renter pilots, that
provision did not expressly exclude student pilots or mention flight instruction in any way.
The Downey estate asserted that Mr. Knezovich’s dual status as a student pilot and a renter
pilot raised an ambiguity in Hallmark’s exclusionary language that must be construed in
favor of coverage in this case. Defendant-appellee William Otto, personal representative of
the estate of Ralph Otto, and the Knezovich estate joined the Downey estate’s cross-motion.
¶ 11 The trial court denied Hallmark’s motion for summary judgment and granted Downey’s
cross-motion for summary judgment, concluding that the policy was ambiguous due to Mr.
Knezovich’s status as a student pilot. The trial court stated that it could not determine
whether Mr. Knezovich was a renter pilot as defined by the policy and therefore should be
excluded as an insured. Consequently, the trial court held that Hallmark had a duty to defend
and/or indemnify the Knezovich estate in the underlying lawsuits.
¶ 12 Hallmark timely appealed.
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¶ 13 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 14 Before addressing the merits of this appeal, we address the appellees’ argument that
Hallmark has forfeited its ability to rely upon the renter pilot policy exclusion because it
breached its duty to defend the Knezovich estate and is now estopped from raising policy
defenses. The appellees, however, failed to raise this argument as part of their summary
judgment motion and argument before the trial court.
¶ 15 Such forfeiture notwithstanding, the appellees’ estoppel argument lacks merit. Under
Illinois law, if an insurer contends that a complaint does not allege a covered claim and the
insurer neither defends the lawsuit under a reservation of rights nor seeks a declaratory
judgment that there is no coverage, then the insurer may be estopped from raising policy
defenses to coverage if the insurer is later found to have wrongfully denied coverage.
Employers Insurance of Wausau v. Ehlco Liquidating Trust, 186 Ill. 2d 127, 151 (1999)
(“estoppel doctrine applies only where an insurer has breached its duty to defend”). First, the
record establishes that Hallmark sought a declaration of noncoverage by filing a declaratory
judgment action in Wyoming, but that case was ultimately dismissed after the Knezovich
estate filed the instant coverage action in Illinois. Furthermore, Hallmark is not raising a
policy defense to coverage but, rather, is asserting that Mr. Knezovich is not even an insured
under the policy. Finally, as discussed below, we conclude that Hallmark has no duty to
defend and/or indemnify the Knezovich estate in the underlying lawsuit. See Steadfast
Insurance Co. v. Caremark Rx, Inc., 373 Ill. App. 3d 895, 900 (2007) (where the only basis
for an insurer’s alleged duty to defend is a trial court’s erroneous ruling, the purported
insured is not entitled to the payment of defense costs).
¶ 16 The purpose of summary judgment is to determine whether a genuine issue of material
fact exists. Bagent v. Blessing Care Corp., 224 Ill. 2d 154, 162 (2007). Summary judgment
is appropriate only where “the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West
2010). An appellate court reviews de novo an appeal from a summary judgment ruling.
Horwitz v. Holabird & Root, 212 Ill. 2d 1, 8 (2004). Specifically, the construction of an
insurance policy is a question of law, which is reviewed de novo. Central Illinois Light Co.
v. Home Insurance Co., 213 Ill. 2d 141, 153 (2004).
¶ 17 Hallmark contends the trial court erroneously granted summary judgment in favor of the
appellees because the unambiguous terms of the policy issued to Franklin Aviation exclude
renter pilots from protection and Mr. Knezovich was a renter pilot.
¶ 18 Appellees respond that the policy’s definition of a renter pilot is circular and, thus,
indisputably ambiguous and subject to a court’s narrow construction because the
inadequately defined term is contained in a provision that excludes coverage. Appellees
argue that Mr. Knezovich was not at Franklin Aviation to rent aircraft but, rather, was there
to receive flight training, and Franklin Aviation’s accounting methods should not determine
whether he was a student or a renter pilot.
¶ 19 Specifically, the appellees argue that the policy intended to provide coverage for student
pilots because: the policy recognizes that flight instruction and rental are distinct and
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permissible uses of the covered aircraft; the policy broadly defines who is covered as “any
person you [the insured] permit to operate the aircraft”; a distinction is made between renter
and student pilots because the term renter pilot is defined in the policy separate and apart
from the term student pilot, and the definition of a renter pilot makes no mention of student
pilots; and the only coverage exclusion for student pilots is for flights in which a student pilot
is operating the aircraft and carrying passengers but no passenger is a pilot acting as the pilot
in command. Appellees argue that if Hallmark intended to deny coverage to students pilots,
it could have said so explicitly.
¶ 20 When construing the language of an insurance policy, a court’s primary objective is to
ascertain and give effect to the intentions of the parties as expressed by the words of the
policy. Hobbs v. Hartford Insurance Co. of the Midwest, 214 Ill. 2d 11, 17 (2005). Because
the court must assume that every provision was intended to serve a purpose, an insurance
policy is to be construed as a whole, giving effect to every provision (Central Illinois Light
Co., 213 Ill. 2d at 153), and taking into account the type of insurance provided, the nature of
the risks involved, and the overall purpose of the contract (American States Insurance Co.
v. Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d 473, 479 (1997)). If the words used in the policy are clear and
unambiguous, they must be given their plain, ordinary, and popular meaning, and the policy
will be applied as written, unless it contravenes public policy. Hobbs, 214 Ill. 2d at 17.
“Although policy terms that limit an insurer’s liability will be liberally construed in favor of
coverage, this rule of construction only comes into play when the policy is ambiguous.” Id.¶ 21 With respect to the nature of the risk insured against, Hallmark’s policy makes a critical
distinction between who is protected under Franklin Aviation’s liability coverage and what
types of uses and risks are covered under the policy. See Rusk Aviation, Inc. v. Northcott, 151
Ill. App. 3d 126, 129 (1986) (holding that the insurer of the aircraft did not owe a duty to
defend the student pilot who rented the plane, and there was no inconsistency between a
declaration permitting use by renter or student pilots and a clause excluding renter pilots
from coverage). In addition to covering Franklin Aviation as the named insured, the policy
also provides coverage to “someone we[, i.e., Hallmark] protect.” Persons included within
that someone we protect category are determined by looking under the provisions entitled
“Who Is Protected” and “Who Is Not Protected.” The clear language of the policy protects
any person riding in the aircraft with Franklin Aviation’s express permission and any
employee of Franklin Aviation acting within the scope of his employment, but renter pilots
are specifically excluded from protection under the policy. A renter pilot is simply any
person or organization who rents the aircraft from Franklin Aviation. Furthermore, the policy
defines instruction and rental as Franklin Aviation’s use of the aircraft for the instruction of,
or rental to, others for their pleasure and business purposes.
¶ 22 Here, the affidavit of Mr. Verheydt established that Mr. Knezovich paid money to
Franklin Aviation to rent its aircraft for a solo flight. The fact that Mr. Knezovich was
operating the aircraft as a student pilot in no way negated the fact that he was renting the
aircraft from Franklin Aviation while he was furthering his training as a pilot. Renter pilot
and student pilot are not mutually exclusive designations. We conclude that Mr. Knezovich
is specifically excluded from being an insured because he was a person who was renting the
aircraft from Franklin Aviation.
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¶ 23 A court must not strain to find an ambiguity where none exists (Rich v. Principal Life
Insurance Co., 226 Ill. 2d 359, 372 (2007)), and the appellees’ attempt to read some
ambiguity into the provisions concerning policy coverage and the renter pilot exclusion is
unavailing. Specifically, the appellees rely upon the policy provisions concerning the
permitted use of the aircraft for instruction and rental, the definition of someone we protect,
and the discussion of student pilots under part 3, paragraph 4(f), of the policy to suggest that
student pilots fit within the someone we protect category under the policy. The appellees’
interpretation of the policy, however, ignores the very clear provisions in part 3, paragraphs
2 and 3(b), of the policy, which establish that renter pilots are excluded from the someone
we protect category and, thus, have no coverage under the policy. See Hermitage Insurance
Co. v. Action Marine, Inc., 816 F. Supp. 1280, 1284 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (a policy will not be
deemed ambiguous merely because it initially states a broad coverage and then excludes
coverage for specific hazards).
¶ 24 The appellees also misconstrue the unambiguous provision in part 3, paragraph 4(f), of
the policy, which simply restricts Franklin Aviation’s coverage by the use made of its rented
aircraft and does not extend liability coverage to persons not defined as an insured. Each
section of the policy serves a different purpose and must be construed accordingly (Rusk
Aviation, Inc., 151 Ill. App. 3d at 128), and part 3, paragraph 4(f), addresses what is covered
by the policy, not who is covered. Specifically, paragraph 4(f) provides that Franklin
Aviation will lose its protection if it allows a student pilot to operate the aircraft while
carrying passengers, unless one of the passengers is a properly certified pilot and is acting
as the pilot in command. The plain language of paragraph 4(f) decreases Franklin Aviation’s
coverage under certain conditions; it does not create coverage, increase the scope of
coverage, or operate to add new insureds to the policy beyond those enumerated by that part
of the policy that identifies who is insured. See Continental Casualty Co. v. Pittsburgh
Corning Corp., 917 F.2d 297, 300 (7th Cir. 1990) (applying the principle that an exclusion
from insurance coverage does not create coverage). Paragraph 4(f), simply by referring to and
using the term student pilot, does not negate the purpose and effect of the provision of the
policy that clearly states that renter pilots are not protected persons.
¶ 25 Because Mr. Knezovich, as a renter pilot, is not an insured under the terms of the policy,
other provisions concerning the scope of Franklin Aviation’s coverage are not implicated and
are not taken into consideration to determine the identity of who is insured under the terms
of the policy. Finally, there was no need for Hallmark to expressly exclude coverage for
student pilots because any student pilot renting a covered aircraft falls within the definition
of renter pilots and does not constitute a protected person under the policy. Nothing in the
provisions relied upon by appellees establishes that Mr. Knezovich was entitled to liability
protection under the policy Hallmark issued to Franklin Aviation.
¶ 26 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 27 Because Mr. Knezovich was not a protected person under the policy, Hallmark does not
owe a duty to defend the Knezovich estate. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the
circuit court that denied Hallmark’s motion for summary judgment and granted the appellees’
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cross-motion for summary judgment. We remand this cause for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
¶ 28 Reversed and remanded.
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