Ranjha v. BJBP Properties, Inc.

ILLINOIS OFFICIAL REPORTS
Appellate Court
Ranjha v. BJBP Properties, Inc., 2013 IL App (1st) 122155
Appellate Court ALEXANDER RANJHA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BJBP PROPERTIES,
Caption INC., and Elm II, LLC, Defendants-Appellees.
District & No. First District, Third Division
Docket No. 1-12-2155
Filed March 27, 2013
Held Pursuant to the Chicago Residential Landlord Tenant Ordinance, a tenant
(Note: This syllabus need not terminate his lease and surrender the premises to the landlord in
constitutes no part of order to recover the greater of one month’s rent or actual damages in the
the opinion of the court event the landlord, after statutory written notice, fails to give the tenant
but has been prepared notice of building code violations according to section 5-12-100 of the
by the Reporter of Ordinance.
Decisions for the
convenience of the
reader.)
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 12-CH-1559; the
Review Hon. Moshe Jacobius, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Reversed and remanded.
Counsel on Mark Silverman Law Office, Ltd., of Chicago (Mark Silverman, of
Appeal counsel), for appellant.
Cary G. Schiff & Associates, of Chicago (Cary G. Schiff and Christopher
R. Johnson, of counsel), for appellees.
Panel JUSTICE STERBA delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Presiding Justice Neville and Justice Hyman concurred in the judgment
and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Plaintiff Alexander Ranjha filed a single-count class action complaint alleging that
defendants BJBP Properties, Inc., and Elm II, LLC (hereinafter referred to collectively as
Landlord) violated the Chicago Residential Landlord Tenant Ordinance (RLTO) (Chicago
Municipal Code §§ 5-12-090, 5-12-100, 5-12-110(a) (amended Nov. 6, 1991)) by failing to
disclose to him and the other tenants in his building either before or at the time they executed
their leases City of Chicago Building Code (Code) citations for the 12 months before their
leases were executed relating to their leased apartments and the building’s common areas.
Ranjha appeals the circuit court’s granting of Landlord’s motion to dismiss pursuant to
section 2-615(a) of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615(a) (West 2008)).
On appeal, Ranjha claims that the circuit court erred in its interpretation of the RLTO by
ruling that a tenant must surrender possession of the premises to the landlord as a
prerequisite to receiving the remedy set forth in RLTO section 5-12-090 of one month’s rent
or actual damages, whichever is greater. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the circuit
court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
¶2 BACKGROUND
¶3 When reviewing a circuit court’s ruling on a section 2-615 motion to dismiss, this court
must accept as true all well-pleaded facts. Pooh-Bah Enterprises, Inc. v. County of Cook, 232
Ill. 2d 463, 473 (2009). The following facts are obtained from the pleadings contained in the
record. On April 26, 2011, Ranjha executed a lease for apartment number 507 in a building,
consisting of 140 apartments, located at 18 E. Elm Street in Chicago, Illinois. The lease was
for a term of 12 months commencing on August 1, 2011 through July 31, 2012, and the
monthly rental amount was $1,165. During the 12 months prior to Ranjha’s execution of the
lease, the City of Chicago cited the building for the following Code violations: (1) on January
5, 2011, for the “failure to remove obstruction from exitway that hampers travel and
evacuation,” and “exterior rear, garbage containers blocking rear door” and (2) on November
9, 2010, for pending submission of plans and acquisition of ventilating system permits, and
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the furnace installed in stairwells needs “floor darns drip pan & combustion air.” These Code
violations were not disclosed in writing to Ranjha before or at the time he executed the lease.
¶4 On December 12, 2011, Ranjha sent Landlord the following written correspondence,
which Landlord received on December 13, 2011:
“Hi-as you know we have discussed the various problems here. Can you please send
me any of the code citations from the year before I signed up, in the next couple weeks
after you get this. Or we might have to terminate. Thanks much for your help, and have
a great holiday.
Alex.”
Landlord did not deliver notice of the previously cited Code violations to Ranjha or the other
building inhabitants who executed leases from November 9, 2010 through January 2012.
Because Landlord failed to disclose the Code violations, Ranjha filed a one-count class
action complaint on January 17, 2012, against Landlord. The complaint alleged that Landlord
failed to comply with RLTO section 5-12-100(a) because it did not disclose Code citations
to tenants for the 12-month period prior to the tenants executing their leases either before or
at the time they executed their leases. The complaint sought relief pursuant to RLTO section
5-12-100, which provides each class member exemplary damages equal to one month’s rent
or actual damages, whichever is greater, in addition to costs and reasonable attorney fees
under RLTO section 5-12-180. On January 18, 2012, Ranjha filed a motion for class
certification asserting that the class members were all tenants and former tenants of the
building in the previous two years who did not receive from Landlord the written disclosures
required by RLTO section 5-12-100.
¶5 On April 4, 2012, Landlord filed a section 2-615(a) motion to dismiss Ranjha’s class
action complaint asserting that Ranjha and the other tenants failed to comply with RLTO
section 5-12-110(a)’s requirements because they did not surrender possession of their
apartments. Landlord argued that the complaint failed to state a cause of action due to the
tenants’ failure to surrender possession.
¶6 On July 9, 2012, the circuit court entered a written memorandum opinion and order
granting Landlord’s section 2-615(a) motion to dismiss. The circuit court ruled that a tenant’s
recovery of damages arising from a landlord’s failure to disclose Code violations is
contingent on a tenant satisfying the requirements of RLTO section 5-12-110(a), including
termination of the lease and surrendering possession of the apartment to the landlord. Ranjha
timely filed this appeal.
¶7 ANALYSIS
¶8 Ranjha claims that the circuit court erred in granting Landlord’s section 2-615(a) motion
to dismiss because surrendering possession of the premises is not required as a condition
precedent to the recovery of one month’s rent or actual damages, whichever is greater, under
sections 5-12-100 and 5-12-090.
¶9 A section 2-615 motion to dismiss attacks “the legal sufficiency of a complaint based on
defects apparent on its face.” Pooh-Bah Enterprises, Inc., 232 Ill. 2d at 473. A complaint is
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legally sufficient if it states a recognized claim “ ‘upon which relief can be granted.’ ” Willis
v. NAICO Real Estate Property & Management Corp., 379 Ill. App. 3d 486, 489 (2008)
(quoting Winfrey v. Chicago Park District, 274 Ill. App. 3d 939, 943 (1995)). A complaint
that fails to meet that standard should be dismissed because there is no recourse at law for
the alleged injury. Id. When ruling on a section 2-615 motion to dismiss, a circuit court may
consider only the facts that are apparent from the face of the pleadings, matters of which the
court can take judicial notice and judicial admissions contained in the record. Pooh-Bah
Enterprises, Inc., 232 Ill. 2d at 473. A court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts, as
well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from those facts. Id. Mere conclusions
of law or facts unsupported by specific factual allegations in a complaint are insufficient to
withstand a section 2-615 motion to dismiss. Id. This court reviews the circuit court’s
granting of a section 2-615 motion to dismiss de novo. Id.
¶ 10 In the case sub judice, we must interpret multiple sections of the RLTO to determine
whether Ranjha’s complaint alleges sufficient facts to state a cause of action. The
interpretation of a statute presents a question of law that we review adopting a de novo
standard of review. People v. Smith, 236 Ill. 2d 162, 167 (2010). The cardinal rule in
interpreting a statute is to determine and give effect to the legislature’s intent in enacting the
statute. People ex rel. Department of Public Aid v. Smith, 212 Ill. 2d 389, 397 (2004). When
a statute’s language is clear, it is unambiguous and we must give it effect as written and
enacted without resort to further aids of statutory construction. Alvarez v. Pappas, 229 Ill.
2d 217, 228 (2008). An ambiguous statute is one that is capable of more than one reasonable
interpretation. Smith, 212 Ill. 2d at 397. To interpret an ambiguous statute, we must go
beyond the statute itself and resort to extrinsic aids of statutory construction to determine the
legislature’s intent, which include consideration of the statute’s purpose, necessity for the law
and policy concerns that led to its passage. People v. Collins, 214 Ill. 2d 206, 214 (2005).
“Municipal ordinances are interpreted using the same [fundamental] rules of statutory
interpretation.” Landis v. Marc Realty, L.L.C., 235 Ill. 2d 1, 7 (2009).
¶ 11 RLTO sections 5-12-090, 5-12-100 and 5-12-110(a) are at issue in the instant appeal, and
following is a recitation of each section in relevant part.
“5-12-090 Identification of owner and agents.
***
If the landlord fails to comply with this section, the tenant may terminate the rental
agreement pursuant to the notice provisions of Section 5-12-110(a). If the landlord fails
to comply with the requirements of this section after receipt of written notice pursuant
to Section 5-12-110(a), the tenant shall recover one month’s rent or actual damages,
whichever is greater.” Chicago Municipal Code § 5-12-090 (amended Nov. 6, 1991).
“5-12-100 Notice of conditions affecting habitability.
Before a tenant initially enters into or renews a rental agreement for a dwelling unit,
the landlord or any person authorized to enter into a rental agreement on his behalf shall
disclose to the tenant in writing:
(a) Any code violations which have been cited by the City of Chicago during the
previous 12 months for the dwelling unit and common areas and provide notice of the
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pendency of any code enforcement litigation or compliance board proceeding pursuant
to Section 13-8-070 of the municipal code affecting the dwelling unit or common area.
The notice shall provide the case number of the litigation and/or the identification
number of the compliance board proceeding and a listing of any code violations cited.
(b) *** If a landlord violates this section, the tenant or prospective tenant shall be
entitled to remedies described in Section 5-12-090.” Chicago Municipal Code § 5-12-100
(amended Nov. 6, 1991).
“5-12-110 Tenant Remedies.
***
(a) Noncompliance by Landlord. If there is material noncompliance by the landlord
with a rental agreement or with Section 5-12-070 either of which renders the premises
not reasonably fit and habitable, the tenant under the rental agreement may deliver a
written notice to the landlord specifying the acts and/or omissions constituting the
material noncompliance and specifying that the rental agreement will terminate on a date
not less than 14 days after receipt of the notice by the landlord, unless the material
noncompliance is remedied by the landlord within the time period specified in the notice.
If the material noncompliance is not remedied within the time period so specified in the
notice, the rental agreement shall terminate, and the tenant shall deliver possession of the
dwelling unit to the landlord within 30 days after the expiration of the time period
specified in the notice. If possession shall not be so delivered, then the tenant’s notice
shall be deemed withdrawn and the lease shall remain in full force and effect. If the rental
agreement is terminated, the landlord shall return all prepaid rent, security and interest
recoverable by the tenant under Section 5-12-080.” Chicago Municipal Code § 5-12-110
(amended Nov. 6, 1991).
As a review, section 5-12-100 provides that when a landlord violates that section, the tenant
is entitled to the remedies set forth in section 5-12-090. Section 5-12-090 permits a tenant
to terminate the lease pursuant to the written notice provisions of section 5-12-110(a), and
it also provides that a tenant shall recover the greater of one month’s rent or actual damages
if a landlord fails to comply with its requirements after receiving the written notice provided
for in section 5-12-110(a).
¶ 12 According to the RLTO, the provisions relevant in the case sub judice should be read in
the following sequence: 5-12-100; 5-12-090; and 5-12-110(a) because, based on the language
used, section 5-12-100 expressly incorporates and references section 5-12-090, and section
5-12-090 expressly incorporates and references section 5-12-110(a). We must begin our
reading of the RLTO with section 5-12-100 because that is the section that Ranjha alleges
Landlord violated and forms the basis of his complaint. Because Landlord violated section
5-12-100 by failing to provide Ranjha with notice of Code violations before he signed his
lease, Ranjha seeks the remedy of one month’s rent set forth in section 5-12-090.
¶ 13 Turning to the language of section 5-12-090, we note that the two remedies provided for
in that section of either lease termination or monetary damages in the amount of one month’s
rent or actual damages, whichever is greater, must satisfy the notice requirements set forth
in section 5-12-110(a). According to section 5-12-110(a)’s language, the tenant “may deliver
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a written notice to the landlord specifying the acts and/or omissions constituting the material
noncompliance and specifying that the rental agreement will terminate on a date not less than
14 days after receipt of the notice by the landlord, unless the material noncompliance is
remedied by the landlord within the time period specified in the notice.” Chicago Municipal
Code § 5-12-110(a) (amended Nov. 6, 1991). In his complaint, Ranjha identifies the
following written correspondence sent to Landlord as his statutory notice:
“Hi-as you know we have discussed the various problems here. Can you please send
me any of the code citations from the year before I signed up, in the next couple weeks
after you get this. Or we might have to terminate. Thanks much for your help, and have
a great holiday.
Alex.”
Ranjha’s complaint alleges that the above written correspondence was sent to and received
by the Landlord, and we accept that allegation as true for purposes of reviewing the circuit
court’s ruling on a section 2-615 motion to dismiss. Based on the procedural posture of the
instant case, however, we do not render an opinion regarding the sufficiency of Ranjha’s
written correspondence, but merely acknowledge that he sent written correspondence to and
it was received by Landlord.
¶ 14 Next, we will determine whether the circuit court erred in dismissing Ranjha’s complaint
pursuant to section 2-615 on the basis that he failed to allege facts stating that he delivered
possession of the premises to Landlord. To answer that question, we must first determine
whether a tenant is required to surrender possession of the premises to recover either of the
two different remedies stated in section 5-12-090, which are termination of the lease and
recovery of one month’s rent or actual damages, whichever is greater. The first remedy of
lease termination is not at issue in the case sub judice, and, accordingly, will not be
discussed. Rather, the basis of the instant appeal is on the second remedy stated in section
5-12-090 of one month’s rent and what requirements must be satisfied to recover that remedy
due to a landlord’s failure to provide Code violations to a tenant before he initially enters into
or renews a lease. Ranjha contends that lease termination and delivery of possession are not
required to recover that remedy, whereas Landlord contends that the surrender and delivery
of possession are, in fact, required. Even though both positions are reasonable based on the
language of sections 5-12-090 and 5-12-110(a), we agree with Ranjha.
¶ 15 In interpreting sections 5-12-090 and 5-12-110(a), we first consider the express language
of those sections. We note that section 5-12-090’s express language states in relevant part
the following: “If a landlord fails to comply with the requirements of this section after receipt
of written notice pursuant to Section 5-12-110(a), the tenant shall recover one month’s rent
or actual damages, whichever is greater.” Chicago Municipal Code § 5-12-090 (amended
Nov. 6, 1991). Without dispute, a tenant must provide written notice to the landlord to
recover the remedy of one month’s rent or actual damages, whichever is greater. Regarding
the written notice, section 5-12-090 directs us to section 5-12-110(a). According to section
5-12-110(a), “the tenant under the rental agreement may deliver a written notice to the
landlord specifying the acts and/or omissions constituting the material noncompliance and
specifying that the rental agreement will terminate on a date not less than 14 days after
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receipt of the notice by the landlord, unless the material noncompliance is remedied by the
landlord within the time period specified in the notice.” Chicago Municipal Code § 5-12-
110(a) (amended Nov. 6, 1991).
¶ 16 As written, section 5-12-110(a) only addresses the lease termination remedy that is
provided for in section 5-12-090 and is silent regarding the greater of one month’s rent or
actual damages remedy. This disconnect between sections 5-12-090 and 5-12-110(a) where
a remedy is specified in section 5-12-090 but, yet, not addressed in 5-12-110(a) renders those
provisions ambiguous. Although section 5-12-110(a) is not ambiguous when read in
isolation, when read in conjunction with section 5-12-090, that section becomes ambiguous
because it does not speak of the procedure that a tenant must follow to recover the greater
of one month’s rent or actual damages remedy. We also consider section 5-12-110(a)
ambiguous because both Ranjha and Landlord present equally compelling interpretations of
that section in regard to the one month’s rent remedy. See Smith, 212 Ill. 2d at 397
(acknowledging that a statute is ambiguous if it is capable of more than one reasonable
interpretation).
¶ 17 When interpreting an ambiguous ordinance, we may look beyond the ordinance’s
language and consider extrinsic aids of statutory construction to ascertain legislative intent
in enacting the law. Landis, 235 Ill. 2d at 11. A primary aid of statutory construction is the
well-established rules of statutory construction. Nowak v. City of Country Club Hills, 2011
IL 111838, ¶ 13. According to one such rule, an ambiguous statute must be construed in a
manner to avoid rendering any part of it meaningless or superfluous. Blum v. Koster, 235 Ill.
2d 21, 29 (2009). Another rule provides that a statute should not be interpreted in a manner
that would result in great inconvenience or absurd consequences, unless the legislature
intended that construction. People v. Easley, 119 Ill. 2d 535, 539-40 (1988). With these
principles in mind, we return to the task of interpreting sections 5-12-090 and 5-12-110(a).
¶ 18 We conclude that to reconcile section 5-12-090 with section 5-12-110(a), we must
liberally construe section 5-12-110(a) as requiring a tenant to inform the landlord what the
material noncompliance was and specify the remedy that he is seeking from the two remedies
provided for in section 5-12-090. To ensure that the greater of one month’s rent or actual
damages remedy provision as stated in section 5-12-090 is not rendered superfluous, that
remedy should be substituted for the termination remedy that is currently stated in section
5-12-110(a). In essence, section 5-12-110(a) should then be interpreted as follows: “the
tenant under the rental agreement may deliver a written notice to the landlord specifying the
acts and/or omissions constituting the material noncompliance and specifying that the tenant
shall recover one month’s rent or actual damages, whichever is greater, on a date not less
than 14 days after receipt of the notice by the landlord, unless the material noncompliance
is remedied by the landlord within the time period specified in the notice.” The landlord’s
failure to cure the material noncompliance within the time period specified in the written
notice would entitle the tenant to the remedy specified in that notice. Based on this
interpretation of sections 5-12-090 and 5-12-110(a), if a tenant seeks the remedy of one
month’s rent or actual damages, whichever is greater, and specifies that remedy in the written
notice, then termination of the lease and delivery of premises are not required.
¶ 19 We note that this interpretation of the otherwise ambiguous sections is consistent with
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the legislature’s intent, here the Chicago city council, in enacting the RLTO. American
National Bank v. Powell, 293 Ill. App. 3d 1033, 1041 (1997). Generally, the ordinance’s
language is the best evidence of that intent, but consideration should also be given to the
reasons underlying and the necessity for the ordinance. Id. at 1038. In enacting the RLTO,
the Chicago city council expressly stated the ordinance’s purpose in section 5-12-010, which
states the following, in relevant part:
“It is the purpose of [the RLTO] and the policy of the city, in order to protect and
promote the public health, safety and welfare of its citizens, to establish the rights and
obligations of the landlord and the tenant in the rental of dwelling units, and to encourage
the landlord and tenant to maintain and improve the quality of housing.” Chicago
Municipal Code § 5-12-010 (amended Nov. 6, 1991).
The Chicago city council has also stated that the RLTO’s provisions should “be liberally
construed and applied to promote its purposes and policies,” which include improving rental
housing. Chicago Municipal Code § 5-12-010 (amended Nov. 6, 1991). Our interpretation
of sections 5-12-090 and 5-12-110(a) as requiring a tenant to specify the remedy that he is
seeking in the written notice provided to the landlord and that surrender of the premises is
not required to recover the greater of one month’s rent or actual damages is consistent with
and adheres to the RLTO’s purpose. This interpretation provides the landlord with an
opportunity to cure the material noncompliance while informing the landlord what the
penalty will be for the failure to rectify the material noncompliance, but does not require the
tenant to terminate the lease if he wishes to remain in possession of the premises. The end
result of our interpretation will be an improvement to the rental housing in the City of
Chicago because a material noncompliance will be cured, and, if not, a tenant will be
compensated for the noncompliance without facing the great inconvenience of having to
vacant the premises if he does not wish to or cannot afford to move. In the case sub judice,
forcing a tenant to vacate the premises and surrender possession as a condition precedent to
recovering the greater of one month’s rent or actual damages may lead to absurd results if
the Code violations, if any, are not considered dire enough to the tenant to justify terminating
the lease and finding alternative housing.
¶ 20 In sum, termination of the lease and surrender of the premises to the landlord are not
required to recover the greater of one month’s rent or actual damages when a landlord, after
receiving the required statutory written notice, has failed to provide a tenant with notice of
Code violations in accordance with section 5-12-100. We, however, render no opinion
regarding the merits of Ranjha’s claim, but only conclude that his cause of action survives
a section 2-615 motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the circuit court erred in dismissing Ranjha’s
complaint with prejudice.
¶ 21 CONCLUSION
¶ 22 For the reasons stated, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
¶ 23 Reversed and remanded.
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