Cable America, Inc. v. Pace Electronics, Inc.

FIRST DIVISION
November 16, 2009
No. 1-08-3073
CABLE AMERICA, INC. d/b/a ) Appeal from the
Satellite America ) Circuit Court of
) Cook County.
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
)
v. ) No. 03 CH 12160
)
PACE ELECTRONICS, INC., and )
MINNESOTA DIGITAL UNIVERSE, INC., ) The Honorable
) Dennis J. Burke,
Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE GARCIA delivered the opinion of the court.
The plaintiff, Cable America, appeals from the circuit
court's dismissal of its fifth amended complaint under section 2-
615 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (the Code) (735 ILCS
5/2-615 (West 2006) ("Motions with respect to pleadings")).
Judge Dennis J. Burke ruled the plaintiff's fifth amended
complaint failed to identify a cause of action as required by
section 2-603 of the Code. 735 ILCS 5/2-603 (West 2006).
Section 2-603(a) requires a plaintiff to set out in its complaint
"a plain and concise statement of the pleader's cause of action."
735 ILCS 5/2-603(a) (West 2006). Judge Burke found the
plaintiff's fifth amended complaint failed to identify any cause
No. 1-08-3073
of action, a violation that was present in the plaintiff's third
and fourth amended complaints. In his order dismissing the
complaint with prejudice, Judge Burke noted, he "explicitly
informed Plaintiff how to remedy the defects in the pleadings in
several prior Orders, and Plaintiff has repeatedly failed to
comply." With new counsel, the plaintiff filed its motion to
reconsider the dismissal order under section 2-1203 of the Code,
which Judge Burke denied. 735 ILCS 5/2-1203 (West 2006).
We conclude it was within the circuit court's discretion to
enforce its order requiring the plaintiff to comply with section
2-603 in its fifth amended complaint or face dismissal with
prejudice. We find no abuse of discretion in the circuit court's
denial of the plaintiff's motion to reconsider. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
The plaintiff filed this action on July 22, 2003, seeking
injunctive relief against the defendants pursuant to a written
contract executed between the plaintiff and the defendants’
predecessor in interest, Golden Sky Systems. Under the
agreement, the plaintiff was to receive a commission for
subscribing new customers to DirecTV satellite television
service, with the defendants acting as "Master System Operator"
for the service. The contract’s stipulated termination date was
April 10, 2003. The plaintiff conceded in its initial complaint
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No. 1-08-3073
that the contract had "expired on its face," but contended that
the defendants had "continued with a course of conduct consistent
with the understanding that the parties were doing business
together pursuant to the terms and conditions of the Agreement."
The plaintiff alleged it had obtained new satellite television
subscriptions, but the defendants had refused to supply the
plaintiff with the account numbers necessary to activate those
subscriptions.
Two days after the action was filed, the circuit court
entered an agreed order providing that the defendants were to
supply the plaintiff with the necessary account numbers. The
defendants, however, allegedly did not comply with the agreed
order. On September 20, 2005, the plaintiff filed its first
amended complaint seeking in two counts an accounting and
alleging in a third count breach of contract. The circuit court
dismissed the accounting counts, but ordered the defendants to
answer the breach of contract count, which they did. The parties
proceeded with discovery.
Thereafter, the plaintiff sought and was granted leave to
file a second amended complaint, which the plaintiff did on
December 19, 2006. On January 16, 2007, the defendants moved to
dismiss that complaint pursuant to section 2-615. On May 7,
2007, the court granted the defendants’ motion and dismissed the
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No. 1-08-3073
complaint without prejudice. It found that the complaint
"fail[ed] to set forth sufficient allegations to state a cause of
action for breach of contract."
On June 1, 2007, the plaintiff filed its third amended
complaint without identifying the nature of the cause of action
in the complaint. The defendants again moved to dismiss, this
time alleging a violation of section 2-603 of the Code, in
addition to a violation of section 2-615. On October 2, 2007,
the court dismissed the third amended complaint without
prejudice, directing that the "Plaintiff must specify the type of
cause of action at issue."
On October 29, 2007, the plaintiff filed its fourth amended
complaint, which again did not identify a cause of action. The
defendants moved to dismiss on the same grounds as before. On
February 14, 2008, the court entered an order dismissing the
plaintiff's fourth amended complaint, which reads in pertinent
part:
"[T]he Court finds that Plaintiff must specify the
type of cause of action it is pursuing as required
under 735 ICLS [sic] 5/2-603. From Plaintiff’s
pleadings, it is unclear whether Plaintiff is pursuing
breach of an express contract, breach of an oral
contract, or violation of a prior Court Order. The
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No. 1-08-3073
Court previously instructed Plaintiff to specifically
designate its cause of action in the October 2, 2007
Order, but Plaintiff has failed to comply in the Fourth
Amended Complaint. ***
Plaintiff is granted one final 28 days to replead."
On March 13, 2008, the plaintiff filed its fifth amended
complaint. The complaint alleged that the parties had executed a
written contract, a copy of which the plaintiff attached to the
complaint. The complaint also alleged that the parties continued
to perform their respective obligations under the contract after
its stipulated expiration date. Finally, the complaint alleged
that the defendants had acknowledged in the agreed order the
plaintiff’s right to receive the DirecTV account numbers from the
defendants. The fifth amended complaint did not, however,
identify the plaintiff's cause of action. The complaint also
failed to otherwise separate what appeared to be multiple causes
of action. The defendants once again moved to dismiss the
complaint under sections 2-603 and 2-615.
The circuit court entered an order dismissing the
plaintiff's fifth amended complaint with prejudice. In its
dismissal order, the court noted it had directed the plaintiff to
"clearly identify the exact cause of action it was pursuing as
required by 735 ILCS 5/2-603." The court ruled the fifth amended
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No. 1-08-3073
complaint was insufficient as matter of law under section 2-615
because the "Plaintiff has failed to identify whether the cause
of action is for breach of an oral contract or breach of a
written contract."
With representation by new counsel and within 30 days of the
dismissal with prejudice order, the plaintiff filed a motion to
vacate the dismissal order under "Section 2-1203 of the Illinois
Code of Civil Procedure." 735 ILCS 5/2-1203 (West 2006). The
plaintiff also attached a proposed sixth amended complaint to the
motion to vacate. The motion asserted that the circuit court
erred in dismissing the fifth amended complaint with prejudice.
The circuit court accepted the motion as one for reconsideration.
It denied the motion because the plaintiff made no showing of any
newly discovered evidence, changes in the law, or errors in the
court's application of existing law, citing General Motors
Acceptance Corp. v. Stoval, 374 Ill. App. 3d 1064, 1078, 872
N.E.2d 91 (2007).1
This timely appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
Standard of Review
1
The plaintiff does not contend that the circuit court
should have considered the adequacy of the plaintiff's sixth
amended complaint before issuing its ruling.
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No. 1-08-3073
The parties agree that the circuit court's ruling dismissing
the plaintiff's fifth amended complaint with prejudice is subject
to review under an abuse of discretion standard. The parties
further agree that the circuit court's denial of the plaintiff's
motion to reconsider, with a sixth amended complaint attached, is
subject to the same standard of review. We address the issues
based on the agreed-upon standards of review.
Dismissal of Fifth Amended Complaint
We first address the circuit court's decision to dismiss the
plaintiff's fifth amended complaint based on the complaint's
failure to comply with section 2-603. Section 2-603(a) requires
that a complaint "contain a plain and concise statement of the
pleader’s cause of action." 735 ILCS 5/2-603(a) (West 2006).
Where multiple forms of relief are sought, section 2-603(b)
requires that "[e]ach separate cause of action upon which a
separate recovery might be had shall be stated in a separate
count *** and each count *** shall be separately pleaded,
designated and numbered." 735 ILCS 5/2-603(b) (West 2006).
Below, the plaintiff contended "there is only one cause of
action alleged in Plaintiff's Fifth Amended Complaint." The
plaintiff asserted the cause of action is "Breach of Contract."
However, as the circuit court pointed out in its dismissal order,
in addition to not identifying its cause of action as one for
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No. 1-08-3073
breach of contract, the "Plaintiff has failed to identify whether
the cause of action is for breach of an oral contract or breach
of a written contract."
Before us, the plaintiff contends in its main brief that its
"fifth amended complaint unequivocally identified the cause of
action and it reasonably informed the Defendants that Cable
America was proceeding with an action for breach of an oral
contract."
The purpose of section 2-603 "is to give notice to the court
and to the parties of the claims being presented." Smith v.
Heissinger, 319 Ill. App. 3d 150, 154, 745 N.E.2d 666 (2001),
citing Wong v. Stevens, 216 Ill. App. 3d 299, 301, 576 N.E.2d
1069 (1991). Failure to comply with section 2-603 may be grounds
for dismissal of the complaint. Rubino v. Circuit City Stores,
Inc., 324 Ill. App. 3d 931, 941, 758 N.E.2d 1 (2001) (complaint,
which was "indecipherable" and impossible to adequately respond
to, violated section 2-603 and was ultimately dismissed pursuant
to section 2-619.1 of the Code); Hartshorn v. State Farm
Insurance Co., 361 Ill. App. 3d 731, 735, 838 N.W.2d 211 (2005)
("the trial court properly dismissed the complaint" under section
2-603, but the dismissal should have been without prejudice).
Fundamental to the plaintiff's contention that the circuit
court abused its discretion in dismissing its fifth amended
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No. 1-08-3073
complaint is its claim that the circuit court misread the
complaint. According to the plaintiff, the fifth amended
complaint "unequivocally" identified the cause of action as
breach of an oral contract and therefore dismissal was
unwarranted. We disagree for two reasons.
First, it is incontrovertible that the plaintiff's fifth
amended complaint did not contain "a plain and concise statement
of the pleader's cause of action." 735 ILCS 5/2-603(a) (West
2006). The 6-page, 27-paragraph fifth amended complaint did not
identify a single cause of action.
Second, in the absence of a plain and concise statement of
the plaintiff's cause of action, a reasonable reading of the
fifth amended complaint is that multiple causes of action are
asserted. We agree with the defendants that it is unclear
whether the fifth amended complaint seeks recovery for
noncompliance with the agreed order, breach of an oral contract,
breach of a written contract, or breach of a contract implied in
fact. These claims are, of course, distinct "cause[s] of action
upon which a separate recovery might be had." 735 ILCS
5/2-603(b) (West 2006). Oral and written contracts are both
forms of an express contract. An express contract, in turn, is a
cause of action distinct from a contract implied in fact. Owen
Wagener & Co. v. U.S. Bank, 297 Ill. App. 3d 1045, 1052, 697
9
No. 1-08-3073
N.E.2d 902 (1998) (treating express contract claims and claims
for a contract implied in fact as separate causes of action). A
contract implied in fact goes beyond written words: a contract
implied in fact " 'is arrived at by a consideration of [the
parties'] acts and conduct.' " Wagener, 297 Ill. App. 3d at
1052, quoting Barry Mogul & Associates, Inc. V. Terrestris
Development Co., 267 Ill. App. 3d 742, 750, 643 N.E.2d 245(1994). Finally, an action to enforce an agreed order is yet
another distinct cause of action upon which recovery might be
had. See, e.g., Kandalepas v. Economou, 269 Ill. App. 3d 245,
247 (1994) (entertaining a cause of action for enforcement of an
agreed settlement order).
The plaintiff's fifth amended complaint is not unlike the
plaintiff’s complaint in Rubino, which we found "undecipherable"
because many of its paragraphs incorporated by reference other
paragraphs, which in turn incorporated other paragraphs, and so
on. Rubino, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 941. Based on the multiple
levels of incorporation of various paragraphs in the 14-page, 23-
count second amended complaint, we found it "impossible" for the
defendants to distinguish the different causes of action.
Rubino, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 938-41. We noted that in one
instance, the complaint combined "more than a dozen factual
allegations into a single paragraph." Rubino, 324 Ill. App. 3d
10No. 1-08-3073
at 940. We agreed with the circuit court that the complaint
violated section 2-603. Rubino, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 938.
We acknowledge that in Rubino, the dismissal of the
complaint ultimately was entered "pursuant to section 2-619.1 of
the Code of Civil Procedure," which triggered a de novo review.
Rubino, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 934. However, we find the Rubino
court's declaration that the complaint violated section 2-603
supports the circuit court's determination here that a violation
of that section warrants dismissal of the plaintiff's cause of
action.
Authority for Judge Burke's dismissal of the plaintiff's
fifth amended complaint based on a violation of section 2-603 is
also found in Hartshorn. In Hartshorn, separate causes of action
against different defendants were "mixed together" in violation
of section 2-603(b). Hartshorn, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 735.
"Clearly, plaintiffs’ complaint was deficient in this regard."
Hartshorn, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 735. The complaint being found
deficient, the court determined that "the trial court properly
dismissed the complaint." Hartshorn, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 735.
In this case, it is impossible to decipher whether the
allegations in the plaintiff's fifth amended complaint advance a
single cause of action or multiple causes, including breach of
the agreed order, breach of a written contract, or breach of a
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No. 1-08-3073
contract implied in fact. The confusion stems, at least in part,
from the plaintiff's failure to identify any cause of action in
its pleadings in derogation of section 2-603. While the fifth
amended complaint does not contain a single "cause of action"
heading, the allegations appear to suggest different causes of
action all lumped together. Paragraph 5 of the fifth amended
complaint identifies an express written contract; paragraph 9
suggests a contract implied in fact; and paragraph 10 makes
reference to the agreed order.
To add to the confusion, the plaintiff claims before us
that, in fact, its lone cause of action in its fifth amended
complaint is breach of an oral contract. Ironically, an oral
contract is the one cause of action that is not expressed in the
allegations set out in the fifth amended complaint. Surely, it
would have been a simple matter to add a heading identifying
"breach of an oral contract" to the complaint if that is the
plaintiff's true cause of action. However, the allegations go
far beyond an oral contract cause of action, which may explain
the plaintiff's failure to expressly limit his cause of action.
Thus, we cannot agree that a reasonable reading of the
plaintiff's fifth amended complaint suggests a single cause of
action of breach of oral contract. Much as we declared in
Rubino, the pleadings here, with suggestions of four different
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No. 1-08-3073
causes of action, violated section 2-603, warranting the
complaint's dismissal. Consistent with Hartshorn, a reasonable
reading of the plaintiff's fifth amended complaint is that the
allegations improperly "mixed" different causes of action, which
violated section 2-603. The defendants were not put on notice
that the plaintiff meant to assert in its fifth amended complaint
a single cause of action of breach of an oral contract.
We find that the plaintiff's fifth amended complaint
warranted dismissal under a plain reading of section 2-603(a)
because it failed to contain "a plain and concise statement of
the pleader's cause of action" (735 ILCS 5/2-603(a) (West 2006)).
Dismissal was warranted as well because the allegations in the
fifth amended complaint suggest multiple causes of action, not
identified and segregated as required under section 2-603(b) (735
ILCS 5/2-603(b) (West 2006)). The circuit court did not abuse
its discretion in dismissing the complaint.
"With Prejudice"
We acknowledge that the court in Hartshorn reversed on the
dismissal "with prejudice." Hartshorn, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 735.
In that case, however, the circuit court did not give the
plaintiffs multiple opportunities to amend their complaint.
Hartshorn, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 733. Here, the circumstances
differ drastically. The plaintiff was put on notice that its
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No. 1-08-3073
third and fourth amended complaints failed to comply with section
2-603. In dismissing the fourth amended complaint with leave to
refile, the circuit court directed the plaintiff to comply with
section 2-603(b) by specifying the type of cause of action at
issue in its fifth amended complaint or face dismissal with
prejudice: "Plaintiff is granted one final 28 days to replead."
In spite of the court's patient direction, the plaintiff failed
yet again to comply with section 2-603. This was a direct
violation of the court's order. See Sander v. Dow Chemical Co.,
166 Ill. 2d 48, 67, 651 N.E.2d 1071 (1995) (upholding a circuit
court's dismissal with prejudice of a complaint for the
plaintiff's repeated failure to follow court orders regarding
proper pleading), citing Nicholson v. Chicago Bar Ass'n, 233 Ill.
App. 3d 1040, 599 N.E.2d 1132 (1992), and Fair Automotive Repair,
Inc. v. Car-X Service Systems, Inc., 128 Ill. App. 3d 763, 471
N.E.2d 554 (1984). The circuit court dismissed the plaintiff's
fifth amended complaint with prejudice in the exercise of its
discretion, which the parties agree is the proper standard of
review in the context of this case.
Our supreme court has "acknowledge[d] the inherent authority
of a circuit court to dismiss a cause of action with prejudice
for failure to comply with court orders where the record shows
deliberate and continuing disregard for the court's authority."
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No. 1-08-3073
Sander, 166 Ill. 2d at 67. Such authority is "necessary to
prevent undue delays in the disposition of cases caused by abuses
of procedural rules, and also to empower courts to control their
dockets." Sander, 166 Ill. 2d at 66.
In Sander, the circuit court struck the "punitive damages"
claim in the plaintiffs' original complaint, explicitly
instructing the plaintiffs not to include that claim in their
amended complaint. Sander, 166 Ill. 2d at 52. Over the course
of the litigation, however, the plaintiffs failed to comply with
court orders that the complaint be filed in proper form. Sander,
166 Ill. 2d at 52-58. The plaintiffs also failed to timely file
amended complaints on four separate occasions. Sander, 166 Ill.
2d at 52-58. They were tardy in responding to defense motions,
in responding to requests for discovery, and in appearing at
court hearings. Sander, 166 Ill. 2d at 52-58.
Some defendants filed motions seeking dismissal with
prejudice. Sander, 166 Ill. 2d at 57. Based on the plaintiffs'
repeated violations of court orders and insistence upon including
stricken allegations in their complaint, the court dismissed the
case with prejudice. Sander, 166 Ill. 2d at 58. The court,
however, allowed the plaintiffs 30 days to file a motion to
reconsider, with the warning "that it would not reconsider the
dismissal unless the amended complaint was 'in proper form with
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No. 1-08-3073
no excuses.'" Sander, 166 Ill. 2d at 59.
The plaintiffs filed a motion to vacate the dismissal order
with a request for "leave to file a fourth-amended complaint
instanter." Sander, 166 Ill. 2d at 59. Because the proposed
fourth amended complaint contained many of the same allegations
previously stricken by the court and again "contained a prayer
for punitive damages," the court denied the plaintiffs' motion to
vacate the order dismissing the plaintiffs' cause of action with
prejudice. Sander, 166 Ill. 2d at 59. The court "made it clear"
that it dismissed plaintiffs' complaint for "plaintiffs' repeated
failure to comply with court orders and not for *** failure to
state a cause of action." Sander, 166 Ill. 2d at 59.
The supreme court affirmed the dismissal with prejudice as
both a proper sanction under Supreme Court Rule 219(c) (134 Ill.
2d R. 219(c)) and an exercise of the circuit court's "inherent
authority to dismiss plaintiffs' cause of action with prejudice."
Sander, 166 Ill. 2d at 71.
Much as in Sander, the circuit court here informed the
plaintiff that its third and fourth amended complaints were
fatally deficient. In dismissing the fourth amended complaint,
the court ordered, "Plaintiff must specify the type of cause of
action it is pursuing as required under 735 ILCS 5/2-603." We
find the plaintiff's repeated disregard of the circuit court's
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No. 1-08-3073
order that it identify the cause of action in its amended
complaints is the type of "abuse[] of procedural rules" that the
supreme court found warranted dismissal in the exercise of the
circuit court's inherent authority. Sander, 166 Ill. 2d at 66.
The plaintiff's repeated noncompliance caused the type of "undue
delays in the disposition of cases" that the circuit court has,
in the exercise of its discretion, authority to curtail. Sander,
166 Ill. 2d at 66. Under Sander, the circuit court here was
"empower[ed]" to "control [its] docket[]," and it did so properly
when it dismissed the plaintiff's fifth amended complaint with
prejudice. Sander, 166 Ill. 2d at 66.
Denial of Motion to Reconsider
In the face of the circuit court's inherent authority to
dismiss with prejudice a deficient complaint, the plaintiff
nonetheless contends the circuit court should have favorably
exercised its discretion by granting its motion to vacate the
dismissal with prejudice. " 'Before a trial judge can be deemed
to have abused his discretion, the record must disclose that
reasons or facts were presented to the trial judge as a basis for
requesting the favorable exercise of the trial judge's
discretion.' " City of West Chicago v. Clark, 58 Ill. App. 3d
847, 856, 374 N.E.2d 1277 (1978), quoting Stevenson v. Maston,
107 Ill. App. 2d 65, 70, 246 N.E.2d 38 (1969).
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No. 1-08-3073
Following the court's dismissal, the plaintiff sought
reconsideration of the dismissal order based on its motion to
vacate, which was filed "pursuant to Section 2-1203 of the
Illinois Code of Civil Procedure." Section 2-1203 provides:
"[A]ny party may, within 30 days after the entry
of the judgment or within any further time the court
may allow within the 30 days or any extensions thereof,
file a motion for a rehearing, or a retrial, or
modification of the judgment or to vacate the judgment
or for other relief." 735 ILCS 5/2-1203(a) (West
2006).
A section 2-1203 motion applies to "final orders" as well as to
"judgments." Harchut v. OCE/Bruning, Inc., 289 Ill. App. 3d 790,
793, 682 N.E.2d 432 (1997). The decision to grant or deny a
section 2-1203 motion is within the sound discretion of the
circuit court. Stoval, 374 Ill. App. 3d at 1079. "The intended
purpose of a motion to reconsider is to bring to the court's
attention newly discovered evidence, changes in the law, or
errors in the court's previous application of existing law."
Stoval, 374 Ill. App. 3d at 1078.
Here, the plaintiff asserts that the circuit court erred in
dismissing the fifth amended complaint with prejudice because the
complaint unequivocally "specified a cause of action for breach
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No. 1-08-3073
of an oral agreement." The plaintiff classifies the circuit
court's error as one of law. A circuit court abuses its
discretion when it makes an error of law. See Koon v. United
States, 518 U.S. 81, 100, 135 L. Ed. 2d 392, 414, 116 S. Ct.
2035, 2047 (1996) (where the Supreme Court explained that
"[l]ittle turns *** on whether we label review of this particular
question abuse of discretion or de novo, for an abuse-of-
discretion standard does not mean a mistake of law is beyond
appellate correction").
As we made clear above, the record does not support the
plaintiff's assertion that it unequivocally "specified a cause of
action for breach of an oral agreement." No mention of an oral
contract appears in the fifth amended complaint. We cannot agree
that based on the record before us, the circuit court was
compelled to grant the plaintiff's motion to reconsider as a
favorable exercise of discretion. Stoval, 374 Ill. App. 3d at
1079. In rejecting the plaintiff's motion to reconsider, the
circuit court succinctly stated its ruling: "Plaintiff has failed
to bring to the Court's attention newly discovered evidence,
changes in the law, or errors in the Court's previous application
of existing law." We agree with the circuit court's assessment.
The court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to
reconsider.
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CONCLUSION
The plaintiff's third and fourth amended complaints violated
section 2-603 of the Code by failing to identify, by a plain and
concise statement, the plaintiff's cause of action. The circuit
court acted within its discretion in ordering that the fifth
amended complaint comply with the mandate of section 2-603 or
face dismissal with prejudice. The plaintiff's fifth amended
complaint did not comply with section 2-603. The plaintiff's
cause of action was properly dismissed with prejudice as an
exercise of the circuit court's inherent authority. The circuit
court acted within its discretion in denying the plaintiff's
motion to vacate the dismissal with prejudice order.
Affirmed.
HALL, P.J., and PATTI J., concur.
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REPORTER OF DECISIONS - ILLINOIS APPELLATE COURT
______________________________________________________________________________
CABLE AMERICA, INC. d/b/a
Satellite America,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
PACE ELECTRONICS, INC, and
MINNESOTA DIGITAL UNIVERSE, INC.,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________________________________________________
No. 1-08-3073
Appellate Court of Illinois
First District, First Division
Filed: November 16, 2009
_________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE GARCIA delivered the opinion of the court.
HALL, P.J, and PATTI, J., concur.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County
Honorable Dennis J. Burke, Judge Presiding
_________________________________________________________________
For PLAINTIFF- Joel F. Handler
APPELLANT 55 W. Wacker Drive, Ste. 950
Chicago, IL 60601
For DEFENDANTS- Andrew Szot, Esq.
APPELLEES PATZIK, FRANK & SAMONTNY LTD.
150 S. Wacker Dr., Ste. 1500
Chicago, IL 60606
21