People v. Coleman

Illinois Official Reports
Appellate Court
People v. Coleman, 2013 IL App (1st) 130030Appellate Court THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.
Caption CRAIG COLEMAN, Defendant-Appellee.
District & No. First District, Third Division
Docket No. 1-13-0030
Filed December 18, 2013
Rehearing denied January 15, 2014
Held The trial court’s grant of defendant’s motion to quash his arrest and
(Note: This syllabus suppress the heroin discovered in his car following a warrantless
constitutes no part of the search was upheld, notwithstanding the State’s contentions that
opinion of the court but defendant was on parole at the time and had consented to warrantless
has been prepared by the searches of his person and property, the anonymous tip the officers
Reporter of Decisions were acting on led to probable cause when defendant admitted he did
for the convenience of not have insurance or a driver’s license, and the heroin would have
the reader.) been discovered in an inventory search, since the State forfeited the
latter argument by failing to raise it in the trial court, and the unlawful
search could not be justified by the discovery after the fact that
defendant was a parolee.
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 12-CR-9879; the
Review Hon. Joseph Claps, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Affirmed.
Counsel on Anita M. Alvarez, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg,
Appeal Kathleen Warnick, and Susanna Bucaro, Assistant State’s Attorneys,
of counsel), for the People.
Law Offices of Frank J. Himel, of Chicago (Frank J. Himel, of
counsel), for appellee.
Panel JUSTICE MASON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Presiding Justice Hyman and Justice Neville concurred in the
judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Defendant Craig Coleman was charged with possession of a controlled substance with
intent to deliver. The trial court granted Coleman’s motion to quash arrest and suppress
evidence on the grounds that the search of Coleman’s vehicle was unconstitutional because the
police officers did not know at the time of the search that Coleman was on parole. On appeal,
the State contends that the trial court erred in granting the motion because a person who is on
parole has consented to warrantless searches of his person or property at any time and the
police officers’ knowledge of an individual’s parole status is irrelevant. In the alternative, the
State contends that the search was lawful because the consensual encounter led to probable
cause and the controlled substance would have been inevitably discovered later through an
inventory search. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of
Cook County.
¶2 BACKGROUND
¶3 On May 4, 2012, at approximately 3:40 p.m., Coleman parked a green Infiniti on the east
side of Laflin on the block between 50th and 51st Streets in Chicago. Coleman exited the car,
crossed to the west side of Laflin, and proceeded to walk south toward 51st Street. When
Coleman reached the intersection of Laflin and 51st, a police car pulled directly in front of him.
The police officers took Coleman’s car keys from him and asked him if he had a driver’s
license and insurance. After Coleman told the officers he did not have a license or insurance on
his person, two officers remained with Coleman while a third officer searched the Infiniti. The
police officer found suspected heroin inside the vehicle and Coleman was arrested and
subsequently charged with the offense of possession with intent to deliver between 100 and
400 grams of heroin.
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¶4 On June 25, 2012, Coleman filed a motion to quash his arrest and suppress evidence. At the
hearing on the motion, Coleman testified that after the police officer took the car keys from his
hand, the officer walked up and down the block trying to determine which car the keys
operated. The officer tried the keys on three different cars before finally pressing the alarm to
activate the lights. The officer then went to the green Infiniti and searched the vehicle.
Coleman testified that he did not consent to the officers taking his car keys or searching his car.
¶5 Officer Robert Vahl testified that he and two partners were in a police vehicle and were
traveling north on Laflin toward 51st Street when he observed Coleman exiting a green vehicle
that was parked on the 5000 block of Laflin. Officer Vahl had received a tip from an
anonymous informant that a vehicle matching that description was being used to transport
narcotics to a building at 5102 South Laflin. The officers approached Coleman at the
intersection of 51st and Laflin.
¶6 Officer Vahl asked Coleman who owned the car that he had just exited. Coleman denied
ownership of the vehicle and said he did not drive. Officer Vahl noticed that Coleman was
carrying two sets of car keys and asked Coleman if he had a valid driver’s license or insurance.
When Coleman was unable to produce a driver’s license or proof of insurance, he was taken
into custody. Officer Vahl then approached the green Infiniti and, using the keys he had taken
from Coleman, conducted a search of the vehicle. Underneath the driver’s seat, he found a
black plastic grocery bag containing three separate bags, each containing numerous bags of
suspected heroin. On cross-examination, Officer Vahl acknowledged that he did not learn that
Coleman was on parole until after he searched the vehicle and found the narcotics.
¶7 On August 16, 2012, the circuit court issued its ruling. The court found that there was
insufficient reasonable basis or probable cause to detain Coleman based on the testimony at the
hearing. The court described the basis for the stop as “nothing but a wish and a hope.” After
confirming for the record that the State’s position was that the search of the vehicle was
constitutional because of Coleman’s status as a parolee, the circuit court found that it was
irrelevant whether the police officers knew of Coleman’s status at the time of the search and
denied the motion to suppress.
¶8 Coleman filed a motion to reconsider and the court heard arguments on the motion on
September 27, 2012, and took the matter under advisement. On October 25, 2012, the circuit
court noted that it had reviewed the relevant case law and had determined that its earlier ruling
had been incorrect. Therefore, the court granted the motion to quash the arrest and suppress
evidence on the basis that the search of the vehicle was not allowed where the police officers
were not aware that Coleman was on parole at the time of the search. The State filed a
certificate of substantial impairment and timely filed this appeal.
¶9 ANALYSIS
¶ 10 This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule
604(a)(1) (eff. Feb. 6, 2013), which permits the State to file an interlocutory appeal from an
order quashing an arrest or suppressing evidence. The State contends that the trial court erred
in granting Coleman’s motion to quash his arrest and suppress evidence because Coleman
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prospectively consented to the search of his car when he signed his parole agreement and the
fact that the police officer who conducted the search did not know of his status as a parolee was
irrelevant.
¶ 11 A motion to suppress involves mixed questions of law and fact. People v. Pitman, 211 Ill.
2d 502, 512 (2004). Findings of historical fact made by the circuit court will be upheld unless
they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. However, the ultimate question of
whether suppression is appropriate under a particular set of facts is reviewed de novo. People v.
Moss, 217 Ill. 2d 511, 518 (2005).
¶ 12 Both the fourth amendment and the Illinois Constitution guarantee the right of individuals
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const., amend. IV; Ill. Const. 1970,
art. I, § 6. The fourth amendment generally requires a warrant supported by probable cause for
a search to be considered reasonable but there are a few exceptions to this requirement. Moss,
217 Ill. 2d at 518. One such exception involves probationers or parolees. See id. at 519; People
v. Wilson, 228 Ill. 2d 35, 41 (2008). Both the United States Supreme Court and our supreme
court have held that probationers and parolees enjoy a greatly diminished expectation of
privacy. Wilson, 228 Ill. 2d at 41. Thus, when the search is deemed reasonable, a warrant is not
required in cases involving parolees and probationers. Id. at 40.
¶ 13 In Illinois, parole and mandatory supervised release (MSR) are governed by the same
conditions. 730 ILCS 5/3-3-7 (West 2010). An individual on MSR shall “consent to a search of
his or her person, property, or residence under his or her control.” 730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(10) (West
2010). When Coleman was released, he signed an MSR agreement dated October 17, 2011,
that provided, inter alia: “you shall consent to a search of your person, property or residence
under your control.”
¶ 14 As an initial matter, we address the State’s argument that Coleman “prospectively
consented” to the search of his automobile when he signed the MSR agreement. Our supreme
court has expressly stated that an agreement which mandates that a defendant “shall consent to
a search” does not constitute prospective consent. Wilson, 228 Ill. 2d at 39; see also People v.
Lampitok, 207 Ill. 2d 231, 260-61 (2003). Just as in Wilson, the search here was nonconsensual
because the record clearly indicates that the police officers never sought Coleman’s consent to
search the vehicle.
¶ 15 Therefore, our determination of whether the search of Coleman’s vehicle was reasonable
turns solely on whether the officer conducting the search must know of a person’s status as a
parolee at the time of the search. In making its finding that the search was not reasonable
because the officers did not know of Coleman’s status as a parolee, the circuit court relied on
Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006), and Wilson, 228 Ill. 2d 35. However, neither of
these cases directly addresses whether the officer’s knowledge of parolee status is required.
¶ 16 In Samson, the Supreme Court held that the fourth amendment does not prohibit a police
officer from conducting a search of a parolee in the absence of a reasonable suspicion that the
parolee is engaged in criminal activity. Samson, 547 U.S. at 857. In Wilson, our supreme court
applied the holding of Samson and concluded that a search of a parolee’s residence without
reasonable suspicion is constitutional. Wilson, 228 Ill. 2d at 52.
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¶ 17 The defendant in Samson was on parole in the state of California and, as a condition of
parole, had agreed to be subject to search or seizure with or without a warrant or cause.
Samson, 547 U.S. at 846. A police officer who knew the defendant, knew he was on parole,
and thought he had an outstanding warrant saw him walking down the street and stopped him
to ask about the warrant. Id. Although the officer confirmed by radio that the defendant was on
parole but did not have an outstanding warrant, he searched the defendant based solely on his
status as a parolee and found a controlled substance in the defendant’s pocket. Id. at 846-47.
The Court held that a search based solely on parolee status was constitutional. Id. at 846.
¶ 18 In Wilson, the defendant’s parole officer received an anonymous tip that the defendant was
violating the conditions of his parole agreement and ordered two police officers to search the
defendant’s bedroom without obtaining a warrant or the defendant’s consent. Wilson, 228 Ill.
2d at 36. On these facts, the court held that the search was reasonable, relying on the Supreme
Court’s holding in Samson. Id. at 52.
¶ 19 The distinguishing fact in both Samson and Wilson is that the searches were conducted
with the knowledge that the defendants were on parole. In explaining its rationale for
concluding that a suspicionless search of a parolee was reasonable, the Samson Court
highlighted California’s substantial interest in reducing recidivism by supervising parolees.
Samson, 547 U.S. at 853. However, we note that this interest is not implicated where, as here,
the officer conducting the search has no knowledge that the defendant is on parole.
¶ 20 Moreover, as Coleman points out, in addressing the dissent’s concern that allowing
suspicionless searches gives police officers unbridled discretion to conduct searches, the
Samson Court noted that, under California law, if an officer had no knowledge that a person
stopped was a parolee, a suspicionless search would be unreasonable. Id. at 856 n.5. The State
argues that because the Court made specific reference to California law, it intended to leave the
determination of whether a reasonable search requires knowledge of parole status to each of
the individual states. The State goes on to argue that because our supreme court did not
mention a knowledge requirement in Wilson, such a requirement does not exist and the trial
court erred in granting Coleman’s motion to suppress.
¶ 21 The State offers no authority for the proposition that the failure to mention a knowledge
requirement in Wilson leads to the conclusion that Illinois does not recognize such a
requirement. As previously noted, the search in Wilson was initiated by the defendant’s parole
officer, so there was no need for the court to discuss whether a search would be considered
reasonable if the officer did not know that the defendant was on parole. We agree with the
reasoning of the California Supreme Court and conclude that an unlawful search of a vehicle
cannot subsequently be justified because, unbeknownst to the police, the owner or operator of
the vehicle happened to be on parole. See People v. Sanders, 73 P.3d 496, 505-06 (Cal. 2003).
¶ 22 We now turn to the State’s alternative argument that, apart from Coleman’s parole status,
he was lawfully arrested and the narcotics would have been inevitably discovered through an
inventory search. The State argues that when the officers approached Coleman on the basis of
an anonymous tip, they engaged in a consensual encounter which escalated to probable cause
when Coleman admitted that he did not have a driver’s license or insurance on his person.
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¶ 23 Coleman correctly notes that, by failing to raise this argument in the circuit court, the State
has forfeited this argument on review. See People v. Adams, 131 Ill. 2d 387, 396 (1989).
Indeed, the State abandoned any semblance of this argument at the hearing and expressly
stated, when questioned by the trial court, that its position was that the search was
constitutional because of Coleman’s status as a parolee. Therefore, this argument has been
forfeited and we decline to address it.
¶ 24 For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
¶ 25 Affirmed.
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