Village of Lake in the Hills v. Niklaus

Illinois Official Reports
Appellate Court
Village of Lake in the Hills v. Niklaus, 2014 IL App (2d) 130654Appellate Court THE VILLAGE OF LAKE IN THE HILLS, an Illinois Municipal
Caption Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DENNIS NIKLAUS, Defendant-
Appellee.
District & No. Second District
Docket No. 2-13-0654
Filed May 15, 2014
Held A hearing officer’s assessment of fines against defendant, based on
(Note: This syllabus findings pursuant to the administrative adjudication hearing system
constitutes no part of the adopted by the village under division 2.1 of the Illinois Municipal
opinion of the court but Code that defendant violated ordinances of plaintiff village, was
has been prepared by the enforceable in the circuit court; therefore, the trial court’s judgment
Reporter of Decisions finding that no statutory authority existed to allow the village to enroll
for the convenience of and enforce the hearing officer’s orders was reversed and the cause
the reader.)
was remanded for further proceedings, especially when the village’s
procedure of filing exemplified copies of the hearing officer’s orders
in the circuit court of the county in which the village was located was
appropriate.
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of McHenry County, Nos. 12-SC-2558,
Review 12-SC-2559, 12-SC-2560, 13-LM-26, 13-LM-27; the Hon. John D.
Bolger, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Reversed and remanded.
Counsel on Jennifer J. Gibson, of Zukowski, Rogers, Flood & McArdle, of Crystal
Appeal Lake, for appellant.
No brief filed for appellee.
Brian D. Day and Roger Huebner, both of Illinois Municipal League,
of Springfield, amicus curiae.
Panel JUSTICE HUDSON delivered the judgment of the court, with
opinion.
Presiding Justice Burke and Justice McLaren concurred in the
judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Division 2.1 of the Illinois Municipal Code (Municipal Code) (65 ILCS 5/1-2.1-1 et seq.
(West 2012)) permits a home-rule municipality to establish an administrative adjudication
hearing system to adjudicate the violation of certain municipal ordinances. In the present
case, an administrative adjudication hearing officer for the Village of Lake in the Hills
(Village) found defendant, Dennis Niklaus, liable for various municipal ordinance violations
and assessed fines against defendant. Thereafter, the Village sought to enforce the hearing
officer’s orders in the circuit court of McHenry County pursuant to division 2.1 of the
Municipal Code. The court denied the Village’s petitions, finding that there is no statutory
authority that would allow the Village to enroll and enforce the hearing officer’s orders in the
circuit court. Thereafter, the Village initiated the present appeal. For the reasons set forth
below, we disagree with the trial court and hold that an order rendered following an
administrative adjudication proceeding held pursuant to division 2.1 of the Municipal Code is
enforceable in the circuit court. We further hold that the method attempted by the Village to
initiate enforcement in this case–filing exemplified copies of the hearing officer’s orders in
the circuit court of the county in which the municipality is located–is appropriate under
division 2.1 of the Municipal Code.
¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 The facts relevant to this appeal are not disputed. The Village is a home-rule municipality
located in McHenry County, Illinois. Defendant is a resident of the Village. The Village
operates an administrative adjudication hearing system pursuant to division 2.1 of the
Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/1-2.1-1 et seq. (West 2012)) and section 15 of the Lake in the
Hills Municipal Code (Village Code) (Lake in the Hills Municipal Code § 15 (amended May
22, 2008)).
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¶4 Between May 3, 2012, and July 2, 2012, the Village charged defendant by complaint on
an almost daily basis with violations of sections 6.04(A) and 6.06 of the Village Code (Lake
in the Hills Municipal Code §§ 6.04(A), 6.06 (amended Dec. 13, 2007)). Section 6.04(A) of
the Village Code provides in relevant part that “no person shall erect or maintain any
structure or thing on, over or under any street, alley, sidewalk, or public right-of-way except
by permit from the Board of Trustees.” Lake in the Hills Municipal Code § 6.04(A)
(amended Dec. 13, 2007). Section 6.06 of the Village Code provides in relevant part that
“[n]o person shall place any materials on or over any street, sidewalk, or public place without
a permit from the Public Works Director.” Lake in the Hills Municipal Code § 6.06
(amended Dec. 13, 2007). The various notices commanded defendant to appear before the
Village’s administrative adjudication hearing officer at certain dates and times to respond to
the charges alleged in the complaints.
¶5 On June 13, June 27, July 11, July 25, and August 8, 2012, the hearing officer presiding
over the adjudicatory hearings entered orders finding defendant liable for the violations and
assessing fines of $5,000, $5,000, $6,250, $13,750, and $17,500, respectively, plus costs of
hearing. The orders entered on June 13, June 27, July 25, and August 8, 2012, were entered
by default after defendant failed to appear on the required dates and at the required times.
The order entered on July 11, 2012, was entered following a hearing.
¶6 Thereafter, the Village sought to enforce the administrative adjudication orders in the
circuit court of McHenry County. To this end, on July 23, 2012, the Village filed with the
McHenry County recorder a memorandum of judgment with respect to each of the
administrative adjudication orders entered on June 13, June 27, and July 11, 2012. On August
6, 2012, the Village filed with the McHenry County circuit clerk copies of the June 13, June
27, and July 11, 2012, administrative adjudication orders and a copy of the memorandum of
judgment for each order. Each pleading was preceded by a “Foreign/Intrastate Judgment
Cover Sheet” form provided by the McHenry County circuit clerk. The cover sheet instructed
the filer to check one of two boxes to indicate the type of case, either “Transcript of
Judgment” or “Petition to Register Foreign Judgment.” See 735 ILCS 5/12-106 (West 2012)
(providing for the enforcement of a judgment entered in any Illinois county upon the filing of
a transcript of judgment in any other Illinois county); 735 ILCS 5/12-650 et seq. (West 2012)
(pertaining to the registration of a foreign judgment). The Village checked the box labeled
“Petition to Register Foreign Judgment” on the cover sheet for each case. The pleading
related to the June 13, 2012, administrative adjudication order was docketed in the trial court
as case No. 12-SC-2558, the pleading related to the June 27, 2012, administrative
adjudication order was docketed as case No. 12-SC-2560, and the pleading related to the July
11, 2012, administrative adjudication order was docketed as case No. 12-SC-2559.
¶7 On August 21, 2012, the Village filed supplementary proceedings in case Nos.
12-SC-2558, 12-SC-2559, and 12-SC-2560. See 735 ILCS 5/2-1402 (West 2012). On
September 19, 2012, the trial court dismissed the supplementary proceedings and denied
enforcement, finding that the administrative adjudication orders were not “certified or
exemplified.” The trial court also ordered the Village to submit a brief as to the Village’s
authority to enforce an administrative adjudication order in the circuit court.
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¶8 On September 21, 2012, the Village filed certified copies of the June 13, June 27, and
July 11, 2012, administrative adjudication orders. On October 4, 2012, the Village submitted
a memorandum of law in support of its request to enforce the administrative adjudication
orders in the circuit court. Among other things, the Village argued that it has the authority to
enforce the orders entered by its administrative adjudication hearing officer against defendant
in the circuit court pursuant to section 1-2.1-8(b) of the Municipal Code (65 ILCS
5/1-2.1-8(b) (West 2012)), which provides in relevant part that “the findings, decision, and
order of the hearing officer may be enforced in the same manner as a judgment entered by a
court of competent jurisdiction.” On October 11, 2012, the Village filed exemplified copies
of the June 13, June 27, and July 11, 2012, administrative adjudication orders. On December
17, 2012, following brief argument, the court dismissed the proceedings without prejudice,
reasoning that the box checked on each cover sheet filed on August 6, 2012, was the box for
foreign judgments, which was the wrong box. The trial court granted the Village 30 days to
file “an amended petition/registration action to enforce” the administrative adjudication
orders.
¶9 On January 15, 2013, the Village filed in case Nos. 12-SC-2558, 12-SC-2559, and
12-SC-2560 three pleadings styled “Amended Petition to Enforce Administrative
Adjudication Judgment in Home Rule Municipality,” seeking once again to enforce the June
13, June 27, and July 11, 2012, administrative adjudication orders. Also on January 15, 2013,
the Village filed two pleadings styled “Petition to Enforce Administrative Adjudication
Judgment in Home Rule Municipality,” seeking to enforce the July 25 and August 8, 2012,
administrative adjudication orders. The pleading related to the July 25 order was docketed as
case No. 13-LM-26, and the pleading related to the August 8 order was docketed as case No.
13-LM-27. All five petitions were accompanied by exemplified copies of the relevant
administrative adjudication orders.
¶ 10 On March 28, 2013, defendant responded to the Village’s amended petition in case No.
12-SC-2559, which related to the July 11, 2012, administrative adjudication order. In his
response, defendant argued that the July 11 administrative adjudication order was not a final
determination, because it lacked specific findings. Defendant argued that, because the July 11
administrative adjudication order was not final, the time for administrative review had not
passed and, therefore, the July 11 order could not yet be enforced. On June 7, 2013, the trial
court held a hearing on the Village’s amended petition in case No. 12-SC-2559. Following
the hearing, the trial court denied the Village’s amended petition. In so ruling, the trial court
stated:
“The only relevant question before the court then becomes what subject matter
jurisdiction in the enforcement of the administrative hearing order is conferred [to]
the Illinois Circuit Court by the Illinois Municipal Code, section 65 ILCS 5/1-2.1-8.
(Unintelligible) the language of the Act remained silent as to the Circuit Court’s
involvement in the enforcement of these hearing officer’s orders. that, at most, the
language of section 65 ILCS 5/1-2.1-8 fails to define what, if any, role the Illinois
Circuit Courts have in the enforcement of the administrative order. It remains unclear
whether or not the Illinois Courts even have a role in the enforcement of the hearing
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officer’s orders. The act itself can be read to grant enforcement authority to the
administrative adjudicatory officer themselves [sic].
Finally, even if the Act could be construed to grant subject matter jurisdiction of
the Circuit Court [sic], the Act remains completely silent as to the mechanism of an
(unintelligible) or filing or serving or any necessary procedural process for the court
to consider such a request for enforcement.
Again, this court is unaware of any other statutes. For example, in Illinois,
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act or the enrollment of a judgment from another
county, which would provide for a procedure to enforce these, quote, orders, unquote,
in the Circuit Court.
My finding is that the statute itself is unclear concerning of the procedure [sic], if
any, the Circuit Court could take to enroll the enforcement of an administrative order.
Secondly, there is no statutory authority in the court of civil procedure [sic] to
enroll such an order of an administrative hearing officer.
The court finds that the petition filed by the Village of Lake in the Hills is not a
judgment and cannot be enforced as a judgment in the Circuit Court.”
¶ 11 After entering its ruling, the trial court granted defendant’s previously filed motion to
consolidate case Nos. 12-SC-2558, 12-SC-2560, 13-LM-26, and 13-LM-27 with case No.
12-SC-2559 and likewise denied those petitions to enforce related to the June 13, June 27,
July 25, and August 8, 2012, administrative adjudication orders. The Village filed a notice of
appeal on June 21, 2013.
¶ 12 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 13 On appeal, the Village argues that the trial court erred in denying its petitions to enforce
the administrative adjudication orders entered by its hearing officer. According to the
Village, the unambiguous language of section 1-2.1-8 of the Municipal Code (65 ILCS
5/1-2.1-8 (West 2012)) expressly permits a home-rule municipality to enforce its
administrative adjudication orders in the circuit court. The Village further asserts that such an
administrative adjudication order may be enforced in the same manner as an out-of-county,
intrastate judgment, that is by filing a transcript of the order in the circuit court (see 735
ILCS 5/12-106 (West 2012)) and then commencing supplementary proceedings. As such, the
Village urges this court to reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand this cause for further
proceedings.1
¶ 14 Prior to addressing the Village’s argument, we note that defendant has not filed a brief
with this court. In First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d
128, 133 (1976), the supreme court explained the options available to a reviewing court when
an appellee does not file a brief:
“We do not feel that a court of review should be compelled to serve as an
advocate for the appellee or that it should be required to search the record for the
1
We allowed the Illinois Municipal League to file an amicus curiae brief in support of the Village.
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purpose of sustaining the judgment of the trial court. It may, however, if justice
requires, do so. Also, it seems that if the record is simple and the claimed errors are
such that the court can easily decide them without the aid of an appellee’s brief, the
court of review should decide the merits of the appeal. In other cases if the appellant’s
brief demonstrates prima facie reversible error and the contentions of the brief find
support in the record the judgment of the trial court may be reversed.”
Thus, in the absence of an appellee’s brief, a reviewing court has three options: (1) the court
may serve as an advocate for the appellee and decide the case when the court determines that
justice so requires; (2) the court may decide the merits of the case if the record is simple and
the issues can be easily decided without the aid of an appellee’s brief; or (3) the court may
reverse the trial court when the appellant’s brief demonstrates prima facie reversible error
that is supported by the record. First Capitol Mortgage Corp., 63 Ill. 2d at 133; see also
Thomas v. Koe, 395 Ill. App. 3d 570, 577 (2009) (discussing the three discretionary options
an appellate court may exercise in the absence of an appellee’s brief). For the reasons set
forth below, we find that the Village’s brief and the record demonstrate prima facie
reversible error. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the cause for
further proceedings.
¶ 15 The issues presented in this case are whether an administrative adjudication order entered
by an administrative adjudication hearing officer of a home-rule municipality may be
enforced in the circuit courts of this state, and, if so, what mechanism is available for
enforcement. Resolution of these matters requires us to engage in statutory construction. The
cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the
legislature. Ferris, Thompson, & Zweig, Ltd. v. Esposito, 2014 IL App (2d) 130129, ¶ 12. The
most reliable indicator of legislative intent is the language of the statute itself, which should
be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Edwards v. Addison Fire Protection District
Firefighters’ Pension Fund, 2013 IL App (2d) 121262, ¶ 40. Where the language of the
statute is clear and unambiguous, it must be applied as written, without resort to other tools
of statutory construction. Raintree Homes, Inc. v. Village of Long Grove, 209 Ill. 2d 248, 255
(2004). Further, a court should not depart from a statute’s plain language by reading into it
exceptions, limitations, or conditions that the legislature did not express or that render any
part of the statute meaningless or superfluous. Solon v. Midwest Medical Records Ass’n, 236
Ill. 2d 433, 440-41 (2010). We may also consider the consequences that would result from
construing the statute one way or another, and, in doing so, we presume that the legislature
did not intend to create absurd, inconvenient, or unjust results. People v. Marshall, 242 Ill. 2d
285, 293 (2011). Statutory construction is a question of law, subject to de novo review. Lucas
v. Prisoner Review Board, 2013 IL App (2d) 110698, ¶ 15.
¶ 16 We begin by briefly reviewing division 2.1 of the Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/1-2.1-1
et seq. (West 2012)). Division 2.1 is entitled “Administrative Adjudications” and allows a
home-rule municipality to establish by ordinance “a system of administrative adjudication of
municipal code violations to the extent permitted by the Illinois Constitution.” 65 ILCS
5/1-2.1-2 (West 2012). Under the statute, an administrative adjudication proceeding is
instituted upon the filing of a written pleading by an authorized official of the municipality.
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65 ILCS 5/1-2.1-4(d) (West 2012). Parties to the administrative adjudication proceeding are
entitled to due process of law, including notice and an opportunity to be heard. 65 ILCS
5/1-2.1-5 (West 2012). The administrative adjudication proceeding is presided over by a
hearing officer, who must be an attorney licensed to practice law in Illinois for at least three
years. 65 ILCS 5/1-2.1-4(b), (c) (West 2012). The powers and duties of the hearing officer
are set forth in the statute. 65 ILCS 5/1-2.1-4(b) (West 2012). Any final decision by the
hearing officer that a code violation does or does not exist constitutes “a final determination
for purposes of judicial review and shall be subject to review under the Illinois
Administrative Review Law [(735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq. (West 2012))].” 65 ILCS 5/1-2.1-7
(West 2012).
¶ 17 Central to our analysis in this case is section 1-2.1-8 of the Municipal Code (65 ILCS
5/1-2.1-8 (West 2012)). Section 1-2.1-8 is entitled “Enforcement of judgment” and contains
five separate subsections. Subsection (a) provides:
“(a) Any fine, other sanction, or costs imposed, or part of any fine, other sanction,
or costs imposed, remaining unpaid after the exhaustion of or the failure to exhaust
judicial review procedures under the Illinois Administrative Review Law are a debt
due and owing the municipality and may be collected in accordance with applicable
law.” 65 ILCS 5/1-2.1-8(a) (West 2012).
Subsection (b) reads:
“(b) After expiration of the period in which judicial review under the Illinois
Administrative Review Law may be sought for a final determination of a code
violation, unless stayed by a court of competent jurisdiction, the findings, decision,
and order of the hearing officer may be enforced in the same manner as a judgment
entered by a court of competent jurisdiction.” 65 ILCS 5/1-2.1-8(b) (West 2012).
Section 1-2.1-8 also provides a mechanism for a municipality to recoup certain expenses,
including attorney fees and court costs (65 ILCS 5/1-2.1-8(c) (West 2012)), permits a
municipality to record a lien against property and enforce the lien (65 ILCS 5/1-2.1-8(d)
(West 2012)), and allows an administrative adjudication hearing officer to vacate orders
entered by default within 21 days of their issuance (65 ILCS 5/1-2.1-8(e) (West 2012)).
¶ 18 Based on the foregoing, we conclude that a plain reading of section 1-2.1-8 of the
Municipal Code demonstrates that the legislature clearly intended orders entered by an
administrative adjudication hearing officer pursuant to division 2.1 of the Municipal Code to
be enforceable. Section 1-2.1-8 is labeled “Enforcement of judgment” (see Gallaher v.
Hasbrouk, 2013 IL App (1st) 122969, ¶ 31 (considering statutory heading in interpreting
plain language of statute)), and subsection (b) (65 ILCS 5/1-2.1-8(b) (West 2012)) expressly
provides that “the findings, decision, and order of the hearing officer may be enforced in the
same manner as a judgment entered by a court of competent jurisdiction.” (Emphasis added.)
That the legislature contemplated the enforcement of a home-rule municipality’s
administrative adjudication orders is made even clearer when section 1-2.1-8 is examined in
conjunction with provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/1-101 et seq. (West
2012)).
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¶ 19 In this regard, as noted earlier, subsection 1-2.1-8(a) of the Municipal Code (65 ILCS
5/1-2.1-8(a) (West 2012)) provides that “[a]ny fine, other sanction, or costs imposed, or part
of any fine, other sanction, or costs imposed, remaining unpaid after the exhaustion of or the
failure to exhaust judicial review procedures under the Illinois Administrative Review Law
are a debt due and owing the municipality and may be collected in accordance with
applicable law.” (Emphasis added.) In Illinois, “applicable law” relating to collections
includes supplementary proceedings under the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1402
(West 2012)), nonwage garnishments (735 ILCS 5/12-701 et seq. (West 2012)), and wage
garnishments (735 ILCS 5/12-801 et seq. (West 2012)). Relevant to our discussion here,
section 2-1402 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1402 (West 2012)) provides a
mechanism by which a judgment creditor may initiate supplementary proceedings against a
judgment debtor or a third party to discover the assets of a judgment debtor and apply those
assets to satisfy an underlying judgment. Importantly, section 2-1402 places certain
restrictions on the procedures applicable to a citation to discover assets when related to “the
enforcement of any order or judgment resulting from an adjudication of a municipal
ordinance violation that is subject to Supreme Court Rules 570 through 579, or from an
administrative adjudication of such an ordinance violation.” (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS
5/2-1402(o) (West 2012); see also 735 ILCS 5/12-107.5 (West 2012) (restricting use of body
attachments when related to the enforcement of an order or judgment resulting from an
administrative adjudication of a municipal ordinance violation). These provisions of the Code
of Civil Procedure clearly show that the legislature anticipated judicial enforcement of
administrative adjudications of municipal ordinance violations.
¶ 20 Nevertheless, the trial court concluded that the Municipal Code was unclear regarding the
role of a circuit court in the enforcement of an order of an administrative adjudication
hearing officer. We disagree. As noted above, section 1-2.1-8(b) (65 ILCS 5/1-2.1-8(b)
(West 2012)) instructs that an order of an administrative adjudication hearing officer “may be
enforced in the same manner as a judgment entered by a court of competent jurisdiction.”
(Emphasis added.) In this case, the Village equates the order entered by its administrative
adjudication hearing officer with a judgment entered in another county. Accordingly, the
Village urges application of the enforcement mechanism set forth in section 12-106 of the
Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/12-106 (West 2012) (“Upon the filing in the office of
the clerk of any circuit court in any county in this State of a transcript of a judgment entered
in any other county of this State, enforcement may be had thereon in that county, in like
manner as in the county where originally entered.”)). However, we are not dealing with an
out-of-county judgment here. Thus, we do not find section 12-106 applicable. Instead, we are
presented with an order entered by a hearing officer for a home-rule municipality located in
McHenry County–the same county in which the Village is seeking enforcement. Since
section 1-2.1-8(b) of the Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/1-2.1-8(b) (West 2012)) instructs that
an order of a hearing officer of a home-rule municipality may be enforced in the “same
manner” as a judgment entered by a court of competent jurisdiction, we conclude that the
hearing officer’s order is to be treated as the equivalent of a judgment rendered in the circuit
court of the county in which the municipality is located. As such, the hearing officer’s order
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is enforced as if it had been entered by the circuit court itself. In other words, upon the
exhaustion of (or failure to exhaust) judicial review, the hearing officer’s order becomes a
judgment capable of enforcement. At that point, the municipality may simply file a copy of
the hearing officer’s order in the circuit court and then commence collection proceedings as
authorized by Illinois law. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 277(a) (eff. Jan. 4, 2013) (“A supplementary
proceeding authorized by section 2-1402 of the Code of Civil Procedure may be commenced
at any time with respect to a judgment which is subject to enforcement ***.”); Bianchi v.
Savino Del Bene International Freight Forwarders, Inc., 329 Ill. App. 3d 908, 920 (2002)
(noting that citation proceedings are not available to a creditor until after a judgment capable
of enforcement has been entered in the creditor’s favor).
¶ 21 In so holding, we find that the trial court’s interpretation renders meaningless division 2.1
of the Municipal Code. One of the purposes of the statute is to provide a home-rule
municipality with an alternate method of prosecuting certain municipal ordinance violations.
See 65 ILCS 5/1-2.1-3 (West 2012) (noting that the adoption by a municipality of a system
of administrative adjudication does not preclude the municipality from using other methods
to enforce municipal ordinances). The use of an administrative adjudication system reduces
the caseload of the circuit court and presumably allows for a speedier resolution of ordinance
violation cases and a reduction in litigation costs. However, without an enforcement
mechanism, a municipality would have to commence another action in the circuit court,
thereby vitiating the incentive to use an administrative adjudication system. The trial court
also suggested that division 2.1 of the Municipal Code “can be read to grant enforcement
authority to the administrative adjudication [hearing] officer themselves [sic].” We disagree.
Section 1-2.1-4(b) of the Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/1-2.1-4(b) (West 2012)) provides that
the powers and duties of a hearing officer “shall include”: (1) hearing testimony and
accepting evidence; (2) issuing subpoenas; (3) preserving and authenticating the record of the
hearing; (4) issuing a determination; and (5) imposing penalties. Notably absent from the
plain language of the statute is any indication that the legislature intended to empower the
hearing officer with enforcement authority. Indeed, by application of the maxim “expressio
unius est exclusio alterius,” meaning that the expression of one thing implies the exclusion of
the other, we presume that the legislature did not intend a hearing officer to have any powers
or duties beyond those expressed in the statute. See Schultz v. Performance Lighting, Inc.,
2013 IL App (2d) 120405, ¶ 16; Meyer v. Buckman, 7 Ill. App. 2d 385, 396 (1955).
¶ 22 In short, when division 2.1 of the Municipal Code is read in its entirety, it is clear that the
legislature intended a home-rule municipality to enforce an order entered by its
administrative adjudication hearing officer. Turning to the facts in the present case, the
record establishes that on December 17, 2012, the trial court dismissed the Village’s actions
without prejudice and granted it 30 days to file “an amended petition/registration action to
enforce” the administrative adjudication orders. Within the time frame provided by the court,
the Village filed amended petitions to enforce the administrative adjudication orders entered
on June 13, June 27, and July 11, 2012. It then filed petitions to enforce the administrative
adjudication orders entered on July 25 and August 8, 2012. All five petitions were
accompanied by exemplified copies of the relevant administrative adjudication orders. We
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hold that the method attempted by the Village to seek enforcement in this case was
appropriate under division 2.1 of the Municipal Code and that once the orders were properly
enrolled the Village could commence collection proceedings “in accordance with applicable
law.” 65 ILCS 5/1-2.1-8(a) (West 2012).
¶ 23 Before concluding, we note that the Village asks us to address several other issues
regarding whether it complied with the procedural prerequisites for seeking enforcement of
the administrative adjudication orders at issue. For instance, the Village notes that a
municipality may not seek enforcement of an administrative adjudication order until after the
expiration of the period in which judicial review under the Illinois Administrative Review
Law may be sought. See 65 ILCS 5/1-2.1-8(b) (West 2012). It asks us to determine whether
the time for administrative review had expired. These issues are beyond the scope of this
appeal, as the trial court’s decision was premised solely on a determination that it did not
have the authority to enforce an administrative adjudication order. Accordingly, we voice no
opinion whether the Village complied with the procedural prerequisites for seeking
enforcement.
¶ 24 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 25 For the reasons set forth above, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court of McHenry
County and remand this cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
¶ 26 Reversed and remanded.
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