In re C.C.

Illinois Official Reports
Appellate Court
In re C.C., 2015 IL App (1st) 142306
Appellate Court In re C.C., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-
Caption Appellee, v. C.C., a Minor, Respondent-Appellant).
District & No. First District, Fourth Division
Docket No. 1-14-2306
Filed January 6, 2015
Held Where respondent, a 14-year-old minor who was convicted of
(Note: This syllabus first-degree murder in the shooting death of another minor was
constitutes no part of the sentenced to imprisonment in the Department of Juvenile Justice until
opinion of the court but his twenty-first birthday and he also was given a mandatory minimum
has been prepared by the 45-year adult criminal sentence, which was stayed under the extended
Reporter of Decisions jurisdiction juvenile statute and will be vacated if he completes his
for the convenience of juvenile sentence without any new offenses or violations of the
the reader.) juvenile sentence, the appellate court held that since the stay on
respondent’s adult criminal sentence has not been revoked, the State
has not sought its revocation and the sentence may never be imposed,
respondent lacks standing to challenge the severity of that sentence at
this time and the judgment of the trial court was affirmed.
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 12-JD-3853; the
Review Hon. Lori Wolfson, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Affirmed.
Counsel on Michael J. Pelletier, Alan D. Goldberg, and Heidi Linn Lambros, all of
Appeal State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.
Anita M. Alvarez, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg,
Kathleen Warnick, and Adam Meczyk, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of
counsel), for the People.
Panel JUSTICE ELLIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Howse and Epstein concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Respondent C.C. was convicted of first-degree murder for the shooting death of
17-year-old Dejuan Jackson. Respondent was 14 years old at the time of the shooting. He
was sentenced to imprisonment in the Department of Juvenile Justice until his twenty-first
birthday and also given a mandatory minimum 45-year adult criminal sentence. Under the
extended jurisdiction juvenile (EJJ) statute, the adult portion of his sentence is stayed, and if
respondent completes his juvenile sentence without committing a new offense or violating
the conditions of his juvenile sentence, that adult sentence will be vacated on completion of
that juvenile sentence. 705 ILCS 405/5-810(6), (7) (West 2012).
¶2 Respondent appeals, arguing that his 45-year mandatory minimum adult-stayed sentence
violates both the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution and the proportional
penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution.
¶3 The preliminary and ultimately dispositive issue in this case is whether a
minor-respondent sentenced under the EJJ statute, who receives a juvenile sentence plus a
stayed adult criminal sentence, has standing to challenge the severity of his adult sentence
when it has not yet been imposed and when the State has not petitioned for its imposition. On
at least two occasions, this court has expressed doubts about a minor-respondent’s standing
in this context, but in neither of those cases was the standing issue raised by the State. In this
case, the State has challenged respondent’s standing to assert his constitutional claims,
presenting the issue squarely for our review.
¶4 We hold that, because the stay on respondent’s adult criminal sentence has not been
revoked, the State has not sought its revocation, and the sentence may never be imposed,
respondent lacks standing to challenge the severity of his sentence at this time. We therefore
affirm the judgment below.
¶5 I. BACKGROUND
¶6 Respondent was charged with the first-degree murder of Jackson and the attempted
first-degree murders of Robert Thompson and Andre Cribbs. On July 17, 2013, the trial court
granted the State’s motion to designate respondent’s case as an EJJ prosecution under section
-2-
5-810 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/5-810 (West 2012)). On March 20,
2014, the State filed a notice of intent to seek an extended-term sentence under section
5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(iii) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(iii) (West
2012)), which provides for a sentencing enhancement of 25 years to natural life
imprisonment for a defendant who discharged a firearm that caused death to another person.
¶7 The case proceeded to a jury trial. Since respondent is not raising any substantive
challenges related to his proceedings, we will briefly summarize the facts adduced at trial.
Thompson and Cribbs both testified for the State. They testified that, on September 26, 2012,
they were walking to their friend Willie’s house with Jackson. A black sport utility vehicle
(SUV) approached them, and they saw respondent leaning out the passenger’s side window
with a revolver. Respondent fired several shots and Thompson and Cribbs ran. When they
returned to the scene, they saw Jackson lying in a pool of blood. Jackson died from a gunshot
wound to the back of his head. Both Thompson and Cribbs identified respondent as the
shooter in a police lineup.
¶8 Respondent was acquitted of both counts of attempted murder but found guilty of the
first-degree murder of Jackson. The trial court sentenced respondent to imprisonment in the
Department of Juvenile Justice until his twenty-first birthday. Additionally, the trial court
imposed an adult-stayed sentence of 45 years’ imprisonment in the Illinois Department of
Corrections, the mandatory minimum for first-degree murder with a firearm. 730 ILCS
5/5-4.5-20(a), 5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(iii) (West 2012).
¶9 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 10 On appeal, respondent raises no challenge to his conviction, but he contends that his adult
criminal sentence is unconstitutional. Specifically, he argues that the mandatory minimum
adult-stayed sentence of 45 years violates both the eighth amendment of the United States
Constitution and the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. He asks this
court to vacate that sentence and remand for a new sentencing hearing at which the juvenile
court may impose a stayed sentence below the mandatory minimum.
¶ 11 Here, as noted earlier, respondent’s case was designated as an EJJ prosecution under
section 5-810 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/5-810 (West 2012)). The EJJ
statute provides that, upon a finding of guilt in an EJJ case, the trial court must impose a
juvenile sentence under the Juvenile Court Act as well as a conditional adult criminal
sentence. 705 ILCS 405/5-810(4) (West 2012). If the juvenile successfully completes his
juvenile sentence, then the adult criminal sentence is vacated. 705 ILCS 405/5-810(7) (West
2012). The statute provides two scenarios in which the stay on the adult sentence may be
revoked, and the adult criminal sentence imposed, during the pendency of the juvenile
sentence: first, if the juvenile commits a new offense, the stay “shall” be revoked; and
second, if the juvenile violates the conditions of his juvenile sentence in some way other than
by committing a new offense, the court may, in its discretion, revoke the stay. 705 ILCS
405/5-810(6) (West 2012).
¶ 12 Respondent’s adult criminal sentence is currently stayed. The State has not petitioned to
revoke his stay for committing a new offense, and respondent has not been accused of
violating the conditions of his juvenile sentence, which would subject him to discretionary
-3-
revocation. The State argues that, under these facts, respondent lacks standing to challenge
the constitutionality of his adult sentence. Unless and until the stay on that sentence is
revoked, the State claims, respondent has not suffered a sufficient injury to confer standing.
¶ 13 The doctrine of standing precludes courts from ruling upon mere abstract propositions of
law, rendering advisory opinions, or giving legal advice as to future events. Underground
Contractors Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 66 Ill. 2d 371, 375 (1977). “A party may question the
constitutional validity of a statutory provision only if he or she has sustained or is in
immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of enforcement of the statute.”
People v. Esposito, 121 Ill. 2d 491, 512 (1988).
¶ 14 We first note that, in two decisions where the State did not challenge defendant’s
standing, this court has questioned minor-respondents’ standing to challenge the length of
their stayed adult sentences before those sentences are imposed. E.g., In re Vincent K., 2013
IL App (1st) 112915, ¶ 43 (questioning the minor’s standing to challenge his stayed adult
sentence because “respondent has not violated the provisions of his juvenile sentence and,
accordingly, his adult sentence has not kicked in”); In re Phillip C., 364 Ill. App. 3d 822, 832
(2006) (though State failed to object to defendant’s standing, questioning the minor’s
standing to challenge his stayed adult sentence because he “ha[d] it within his own power to
determine whether the adult sentence will kick in”). Because the State failed to raise the issue
in those cases, however, this court did not decide the standing question. In this case, the State
has challenged respondent’s standing.
¶ 15 We agree with the State that respondent lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality
of this adult criminal sentence at this juncture. Respondent has not committed a new offense
that would trigger the imposition of his adult offense and, of course, may never do so.
Likewise, he may never violate the terms of his juvenile sentence–and even if he does, the
trial court may decide, in its discretion, not to order the execution of that adult sentence. 705
ILCS 405/5-810(6) (West 2012). Thus, there is at least one, if not two, intervening events
that must occur before this 45-year sentence will kick in–that is, before defendant will suffer
any direct injury. The record before us reveals that none of these events have transpired, nor
are they about to transpire.
¶ 16 In In re M.I., 2013 IL 113776, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the respondent lacked
standing to assert a due process challenge to the revocation provision of the EJJ statute after
the State, alleging that the respondent had committed a new offense, petitioned the court to
revoke the stay on his adult sentence. Id. ¶ 34. The supreme court held that the respondent
lacked standing because the language that he challenged as vague pertained to revocations
based, not on the commission of a new offense, but on violations of the conditions of his
juvenile sentence. Id. ¶ 36. Because the language he challenged was not the basis for his
possible revocation, he could show no injury caused by that language. Id.
¶ 17 Similarly, in In re Omar M., 2014 IL App (1st) 100866-B, ¶ 1, the respondent alleged
that the revocation provision of the EJJ statute was unconstitutionally vague. At the time, the
State had not filed a petition to revoke the stay on respondent’s adult sentence. Id. ¶ 10.
Applying M.I., the court stated that the “vague fear” of the imposition of an adult sentence
under the EJJ statute was insufficient to confer standing. Id. ¶ 11.
-4-
¶ 18 Finally, in In re J.W., 346 Ill. App. 3d 1, 3 (2004), the respondent was subjected to EJJ
prosecution and given a stayed adult sentence. On appeal, the respondent claimed that the
statutory provision providing for revocation of the stay on her adult sentence was
unconstitutionally vague, even though her adult sentence had not been imposed. Id. at 14.
The court found that the respondent lacked standing to challenge the revocation provision
because her “claim [was] premature until a petition to revoke the stay [was] filed in
accordance with the EJJ statute.” Id. at 15.
¶ 19 Like M.I., Omar M., and J.W., this case involves a challenge to a statute that has not yet
affected respondent and may never affect him. The stay on respondent’s adult sentence has
not been revoked and he has not been required to serve his adult sentence. Like Omar M. and
J.W., the State in this case has not even filed a petition to revoke the stay on respondent’s
adult sentence. At this stage, respondent has not been directly or materially affected by the
statute that provides for a mandatory minimum sentence of 45 years, and he is in no
immediate danger of being affected by it. If a constitutional challenge to the procedure for
revoking the stay is premature unless and until that procedure is instigated, it follows that the
imposition of the adult-stayed sentence–which is one step further removed in time–is
likewise premature.
¶ 20 Respondent claims that Omar M. and J.W. support his contention that he has standing in
this case, because, while those cases found that respondents lacked standing to challenge the
EJJ revocation procedure, those decisions did consider the respondents’ challenges to their
adult sentences based on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). Respondent misreads
those cases. The Apprendi challenges in those cases did not concern the adult sentence
imposed; respondents challenged the fact that their cases were designated as EJJ
prosecutions, which they claimed subjected them to enhanced penalties based on facts that
should have been tried before a jury under a reasonable-doubt standard. In re J.W., 346 Ill.
App. 3d at 10-11; Omar M., 2014 IL App (1st) 100866-B, ¶¶ 18-21. It does not even appear
that the State challenged the respondents’ standing to raise those claims, nor did the court
question it, and for good reason–the respondents clearly had standing to challenge the
constitutionality of the proceedings in which they had been engaged at the time of their
appeals. The Apprendi challenges were not directed at something that had not happened and
might never happen–the revocation of the stay on the adult sentences or the sentences
themselves–but rather at something that had already happened, the designation of their cases
as EJJ prosecutions. There was nothing remote or speculative about that injury; the
respondents had already suffered it.
¶ 21 For this same reason, respondent’s reliance on In re Matthew M., 335 Ill. App. 3d 276
(2002), is misplaced. See id. at 286-87 (respondent raised Apprendi challenges directed at
EJJ designation, after respondent’s case had been designated as an EJJ prosecution and
respondent had been tried and convicted). Matthew M. is also distinguishable because it
concerned ripeness, an admittedly related doctrine that often overlaps with standing (see
Lebron v. Gottlieb Memorial Hospital, 237 Ill. 2d 217, 252 (2010)), but a distinct doctrine
nevertheless, and not one raised in this case by the State.
¶ 22 People v. P.H., 145 Ill. 2d 209 (1991), cited by respondent, likewise does not support his
position. In P.H., the defendant was in the midst of a hearing in which the State sought to
-5-
transfer him to adult criminal court. Id. at 217. Part of the defendant’s argument at the
transfer hearing was that the adult-transfer provision, itself, was unconstitutional. Id. The
defendant unquestionably had standing to challenge that provision, as he was in immediate
danger of being injured–the injury there being a transfer to adult court, which the State
sought both below and on appeal. Id. at 220.
¶ 23 In contrast, in this case, the injury respondent asserts is a cruel and unusual sentence–but
he is not serving that sentence, nor is he in immediate danger of serving it. He very well
might never serve it. His asserted injury, at this stage, is too remote to confer standing.
¶ 24 By no means should our opinion be construed as limiting respondent’s ability to
challenge his adult sentence if he is required to serve it or if he is in imminent danger of
serving it. We express no opinion on respondent’s standing should those circumstances arise.
We simply hold that, because the stay on his adult sentence has not been revoked and it is
currently in no jeopardy of being revoked, respondent lacks standing at this time to challenge
the severity of his sentence. In light of our decision, we express no opinion on the merits of
defendant’s constitutional challenges to his adult sentence.
¶ 25 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 26 For the foregoing reason, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
¶ 27 Affirmed.
-6-