DocketNumber： 3-96-0708
Filed Date： 3/18/1997
Status： Precedential
Modified Date： 4/17/2021
No. 3--96--0708
_________________________________________________________________
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
A.D., 1997
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF: ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
) for the 12th Judicial Circuit,
PEGGY DAVIS N/K/A PEGGY WYLDE ) Will County, Illinois
)
Petitioner-Appellee, )
)
v. ) No. 84 D 187
)
WILLIAM DAVIS ) Honorable
) Ludwig J. Kuhar
Respondent-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding
_________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE BRESLIN delivered the Opinion of the court:
_________________________________________________________________
Respondent William Davis appeals the trial court's
determination that petitioner Peggy Wylde was entitled to a portion
of his disability benefits under the terms of the parties'
dissolution judgment. We hold that the judgment did not give Peggy
any rights to William's disability benefits.
FACTS
When Peggy and William were divorced in 1985, the court
entered an agreed judgment for dissolution of marriage which
incorporated a settlement agreement. The settlement agreement
provided in part:
"14. That PEGGY DAVIS is awarded a present fractional
interest in WILLIAM DAVIS' Retirement Benefit Plan(s)
***. Further,
a) The retirement benefit plan(s) referred to herein is
the SUBURBAN TEAMSTERS OF NORTHERN ILLINOIS PENSION FUND
***.
***
c) The plan herein shall pay benefits to PEGGY DAVIS if,
as and when WILLIAM DAVIS RECEIVES benefits from said
plan, regardless of the form or frequency of said
payments.
d) The plan shall pay benefits to PEGGY DAVIS in
accordance with the following formula:
Plan benefit multiplied by 1/2 and the product
thereof multiplied by a fraction, the
numerator of which is 107 and the denominator
of which is the number of months during which
any contributions were made to the
Participant's account (commonly known as the
"Hunt" formula)."
In 1992, William developed a vision impairment and was unable
to continue working at his job as a truck driver. Accordingly, he
began receiving disability payments pursuant to the Suburban
Teamsters of Northern Illinois Pension Fund (pension plan).
Thereafter, Peggy sought the entry of a qualified domestic
relations order (QDRO) which would require the pension plan to pay
her 33.46% of William's disability benefits. The trial court
entered the QDRO over William's objections, and William appeals.
ANALYSIS
The primary issue on appeal is whether Peggy is entitled to a
portion of William's disability benefits under the dissolution
judgment. Our resolution of this issue requires an interpretation
of the parties' dissolution judgment.
The same rules that apply to construing contracts apply to
interpreting divorce decrees. In re Marriage of Kekstadt, 85 Ill.
App. 3d 952, 407 N.E.2d 746 (1980). The main objective when
construing a marital settlement agreement is to give effect to the
purpose and intent of the parties at the time they entered into the
agreement. In re Marriage of Belk, 239 Ill. App. 3d 806, 605 N.E.2d
86 (1992). Where the language of the judgment is clear and its
meaning is unambiguous, courts must give effect to that language.
In re Marriage of Mateja, 183 Ill. App. 3d 759, 540 N.E.2d 406
(1989). However, if the judgment is ambiguous, the court must
ascertain the intent of the parties by examining the facts and
circumstances surrounding the formation of the agreement. In re
Marriage of Olsen, 229 Ill. App. 3d 107, 593 N.E.2d 859 (1992). A
judgment is ambiguous if it is reasonably susceptible to more than
one meaning. In re Marriage of Druss, 226 Ill. App. 3d 470, 589
N.E.2d 874 (1992). Because the interpretation of a contract is a
question of law, a reviewing court may interpret the contract
independently of the trial court's judgment. In re Marriage of
Kolb, 99 Ill. App. 3d 895, 425 N.E.2d 1301 (1981).
The judgment at issue in the case at bar grants Peggy the
right to receive a fraction of William's retirement benefits.
However, William's pension plan provides disability benefits as
well as retirement benefits, and the judgment does not identify
which benefits Peggy is entitled to receive. It is thus reasonable
to interpret the judgment as granting Peggy the right to receive a
portion of any benefits William receives under the pension plan.
However, it is also reasonable to interpret the judgment as
limiting Peggy's interest in the pension plan to normal, age--
related retirement benefits. Accordingly, the judgment is
ambiguous, and we must examine the facts and circumstances
surrounding the formation of the parties' marital settlement
agreement to determine the parties' intent.
The settlement agreement refers to William's retirement plan,
but it makes no reference to disability benefits. The absence of
any reference to disability or disability benefits suggests that
the parties did not contemplate such benefits at the time they
entered the agreement.
Moreover, under William's pension plan, the normal retirement
age is 60. When a union member becomes disabled, he is entitled to
receive 75% of the retirement benefits he would have received if he
had worked until age 60. Then, when he turns 60, he will receive
the same retirement benefits he would have received upon age--
related retirement. Thus, if William had not become disabled, he
would have continued to receive his earned income until his
retirement at age 60 and Peggy would not receive any benefits under
the pension plan until William retired. However, due to William's
disability, he is now unable to earn any income and must survive on
the reduced income provided from his disability benefits.
To accept Peggy's interpretation of the agreement, we must
find that the parties intended that if William suffered a disabling
injury or illness and had to take a devastating reduction in his
means of support then Peggy would enjoy a concomitant windfall. If
we accept William's proposed interpretation, Peggy will receive the
same benefits she would have received if William had continued
working until age 60, while William will receive disability
benefits as a substitute for his earned income. Because Peggy's
proposed interpretation of the agreement leads to an unfair and
unreasonable result, we cannot conclude that the parties intended
that she receive a portion of William's disability benefits. See
Camp v. Hollis, 332 Ill. App. 60, 74 N.E.2d 31 (1947) (where
contract is susceptible of two constructions, interpretation which
makes a rational and probable agreement is favored).
Our conclusion is bolstered by In re Marriage of Belk, 239
Ill. App. 3d 806, 605 N.E.2d 86 (1992). When faced with an almost
identical fact pattern, the Belk court concluded that a wife was
not entitled to share in her husband's disability benefits. 239
Ill. App. 3d at 812, 605 N.E.2d at 90-91. In that case, the
judgment provided that the wife would receive a portion of the
husband's pension. 239 Ill. App. 3d at 807, 605 N.E.2d at 87. As
in the case at bar, the husband's pension plan provided for
disability benefits, but the judgment did not refer to these
benefits. 239 Ill. App. 3d at 807, 605 N.E.2d at 87. The court
held that the absence of any reference to disability benefits in
the parties settlement agreement was persuasive that such benefits
were not contemplated by the parties. 239 Ill. App. 3d at 809-10,
605 N.E.2d at 88-89. In addition, the court held that it was
unreasonable to conclude that the parties intended to grant the
wife a portion of the husband's reduced income after he became
disabled when she would not have received any benefits if her
husband had continued working. 239 Ill. App. 3d at 810-11, 605
N.E.2d at 89. Because we find the Belk case persuasive, we
similarly hold that Peggy is entitled to receive a fractional share
of William's retirement benefits only when he begins to receive his
normal, age--related retirement benefits. Accordingly, we reverse
the judgment of the trial court and remand for the entry of an
order modifying the QDRO to conform to our holding.
Nonpublishable material omitted under Supreme Court Rule 23.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court
of Will County is reversed and remanded.
Reversed and remanded.
HOMER, and MICHELA, JJ., concur.