People v. Jones

2022 IL App (1st) 200569-UNo. 1-20-0569
Second Division
September 30, 2022
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
____________________________________________________________________________
) Appeal from the
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Circuit Court of
ILLINOIS, ) Cook County.
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
) No. 02 CR 6507
v. )
)
GIOVANN JONES, ) Honorable
) Michele M. Pitman,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE COBBS delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Howse and Ellis concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The circuit court’s judgment denying defendant leave to file a successive
postconviction petition alleging that his sentence violated the eighth amendment of
the United States Constitution and the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois
Constitution is affirmed where defendant could not establish the requisite cause.
¶2 Following a jury trial, defendant-appellant, Giovann Jones, was found guilty of home
invasion and criminal sexual assault and sentenced to 60 years’ imprisonment. Defendant now
appeals from the circuit court’s denial of his motion for leave to file a successive petition for relief
No. 1-20-0569
pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2018)). On
appeal, defendant, who was 20 years old at the time of the underlying offenses, argues that he
established both cause and prejudice for his claims that his 40-year sentence violates the eighth
amendment of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend VIII) and the proportionate
penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11) as applied to him. For
the reasons that follow, we affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 In February 2002, defendant was charged by indictment with aggravated criminal sexual
assault, home invasion, criminal sexual assault, attempted robbery, and unlawful restraint.
¶5 At trial, the evidence established that defendant broke into the home of the victim, E.R.,
through her basement window in the middle of the night on October 17, 2001. E.R. awoke to find
defendant laying on top of her. Defendant told her to keep quiet or he would kill her. E.R. began
to scream, and defendant punched her in the face and held a pillow over her mouth. When E.R.
stopped screaming, defendant pulled down her pajamas and inserted his penis into her vagina.
Defendant withdrew his penis after E.R. started to bleed “heavily.” He then called E.R. “fat” and
took money from her purse before leaving. E.R. told her sister, who lived with her at the time, to
call 9-1-1. E.R. was taken to the hospital, where she received stitches to repair the vaginal tearing
that she sustained during the attack. Swabs from E.R.’s rape kit revealed the presence of
defendant’s semen, and, although defendant maintained his innocence in his trial testimony, the
State also introduced his signed confession into evidence.
¶6 The jury found defendant guilty of home invasion and aggravated criminal sexual assault.
¶7 Following a sentencing hearing, the court sentenced defendant to consecutive sentences of
30 years in prison for home invasion and 30 years in prison for aggravated criminal sexual assault.
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The court also found that defendant caused great bodily harm and would therefore be required to
serve at least 85% of his home invasion sentence pursuant to truth-in-sentencing.
¶8 On direct appeal, defendant argued that his sentence was excessive, and the trial court
abused its discretion in sentencing him to two consecutive terms of 30 years. On March 23, 2007,
this court affirmed his convictions and sentence. People v. Jones, 371 Ill. App. 3d 1204 (2007)
(unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23). Our supreme court denied defendant’s
petition for leave to appeal. People v. Jones, No. 104525 (Sept. 26, 2007).
¶9 On March 25, 2008, defendant filed an initial pro se postconviction petition, followed by
four supplemental pro se petitions under the Act, which collectively alleged various theories of
ineffective assistance of both trial counsel and appellate counsel. Attached to the first supplement
petition were affidavits from the character witnesses referenced in the petition. The pro se
pleadings were docketed and advanced to the second stage, where postconviction counsel was
appointed.
¶ 10 Postconviction counsel filed an amended postconviction petition consolidating defendant’s
many pro se claims. The State moved to dismiss the amended petition, and defendant filed a
response. Following a hearing, the circuit court granted the State’s motion to dismiss. On appeal,
this court affirmed the circuit court’s dismissal. People v. Jones, 2020 IL App (1st) 151946-U.
¶ 11 On January 31, 2018, defendant filed the pro se motion for leave to file a successive
postconviction petition at issue here. Therein, he argues that his two consecutive 30-year terms of
imprisonment violate both the eighth amendment and the proportionate penalties clause. In
particular, he argued that his 60-year sentence for offenses committed when he was 20 years old
constitutes an unconstitutional de facto life sentence as applied to him, where it was imposed
without consideration of the mitigating characteristics of youth, as set forth in Miller v. Alabama,
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567 U.S. 460 (2012). He asserted that he had established the requisite cause because Miller was
not issued until 2012, several years after defendant’s trial and the filing of his initial postconviction
petition. As such, “his claims were not reasonably available in his prior petition.” As to prejudice,
he argues that “he did not have the opportunity, as Miller now requires, to present mitigating
evidence” and the sentencing court did not consider his age and its attendant characteristics.
¶ 12 On August 30, 2019, the circuit court denied defendant’s leave to file his successive
postconviction petition, finding that the Miller principles did not apply to defendant because he
was not a juvenile at the time of the offense.
¶ 13 This appeal followed.
¶ 14 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 15 On appeal to this court, defendant asserts the trial court erred in denying leave to file his
successive post-conviction petition. It is his contention that he established the requisite cause and
prejudice because, as applied to him, his 60-year sentence for offenses committed when he was 20
years of age constitutes an unconstitutional de facto life sentence in violation of the U.S.
Constitution’s eighth amendment and the Illinois Constitution’s proportionate penalties clause.
¶ 16 The State responds that, even accepting that defendant satisfied the cause requirement,
defendant has failed to set forth with the sufficient specificity facts which render his conduct
similar or more like that of a juvenile. We note initially that no case yet decided by our supreme
court sets forth the modicum of support necessary to defeat dismissal of a successive
postconviction petition based on the emerging brain science research. We acknowledge that more
is needed than a mere citation to available studies on the evolving brain science in juveniles.
Nevertheless, because we ultimately dispose of defendant’s claims based on other grounds, we
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need not determine either whether the facts alleged in the petition were sufficient or his sentencing
hearing was Miller-compliant.
¶ 17 A. Standard of Review
¶ 18 The Act provides a method for a defendant to collaterally attack a conviction by asserting
that it resulted from a “substantial denial” of his constitutional rights. 725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West
2018); People v. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1, 9 (2009). The Act contemplates the filing of only one
petition without leave of court. People v. Lusby, 2020 IL 124046, ¶ 27. Because successive
postconviction petitions undermine the finality of criminal proceedings, the hurdles for these
petitions “are lowered in very limited circumstances.” People v. Tenner, 206 Ill. 2d 381, 392
(2002).
¶ 19 To satisfy section 122-1 of the Act, the petitioner must demonstrate both cause for his
failure to raise the claim in the initial petition and prejudice from that failure. People v. Smith,
2014 IL 115946, ¶ 33; see also People v. Guerrero, 2012 IL 112020, ¶ 15 (both prongs must be
satisfied for leave of court to be granted). The cause-and-prejudice test is a more stringent standard
to satisfy than what is required at the first stage for an initial postconviction petition. Smith, 2014
IL 115946, ¶ 35. To show cause, the petitioner must identify an objective factor that impeded his
ability to raise a specific claim during his initial postconviction proceedings. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f)
(West 2018). To show prejudice, the petitioner must demonstrate that the claim not raised during
his initial postconviction proceedings so infected the resulting conviction or sentence that it
violated due process. Id. The burden to establish prima facie showing of cause and prejudice rests
with the petitioner and must be shown before any further proceedings on his claims can occur.
People v. Bailey, 2017 IL 121450, ¶ 24; Smith, 2014 IL 115946, ¶ 30.
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¶ 20 Finally, “leave of court to file a successive postconviction petition should be denied when
it is clear, from a review of the successive petition and the documentation submitted by the
petitioner, that the claims alleged by the petitioner fail as a matter of law or where the successive
petition with supporting documentation is insufficient to justify further proceedings.” Smith, 2014
IL 115946, ¶ 35. Whether the denial of defendant’s motion for leave to file a successive
postconviction petition was proper is an issue that we review de novo. People v. Edgelston, 396
Ill. App. 3d 514, 518 (2009).
¶ 21 Defendant puts forth two major claims of error here on appeal. His first claim is that the
trial court erred in denying leave to file because he raised a viable claim that his de facto life
sentence violates the eighth amendment and proportionate penalties clause where the court failed
to account for his youth at the time of the offense and the fact that his brain was still developing.
His second claim is that the trial court erred in denying leave to file because his “pro se petition
made prima facie showing that his eighth amendment and proportionate penalties claims satisfy
the cause-and-prejudice test.
¶ 22 As we have set forth above, whether a defendant has satisfied the cause-and-prejudice test
is the procedural prerequisite to a successive postconviction petition. Thus, we elect to address
defendant’s second contention first. Additionally, although defendant has elected to combine
discussion of his eighth amendment and proportionate penalties claims within a single contention,
because the provisions flow from separate sources and have been construed to apply to different
classifications of defendants, we treat each separately, beginning with defendant’s eighth
amendment claim. First, however, for purposes of context, we set for the Miller-based
jurisprudence, the law upon which the whole of defendant’s claims are based.
¶ 23 B. Miller-Based Jurisprudence
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¶ 24 Defendant’s as-applied constitutional challenge is rooted in a line of cases holding that the
eighth amendment of the United States Constitution, which prohibits cruel and unusual
punishment, affords heightened sentencing protections for juvenile defendants. See Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574-75 (2005) (eighth amendment prohibits the death penalty for juveniles
who commit murder); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010) (eighth amendment prohibits
mandatory life sentences without parole for juveniles who commit nonhomicide offense); Miller
v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012) (eighth amendment prohibits mandatory life without parole
sentences for juvenile offenders convicted of homicide). These cases illustrate the Court’s concern
with the most severe forms of punishment allowed under the Constitution, the death penalty and
life without parole, particularly against children who are “constitutionally different from adults for
purposes of sentencing” as they are less mature, and more impulsive and vulnerable to peer
pressure than adults. Miller, 460 U.S. at 471-74.
¶ 25 Specifically in Miller, the seminal case, the Court explained that a mandatory sentence
precludes the sentencer from considering mitigating circumstances specific to youth and its
attendant characteristics. Id. at 477-78. Pursuant to Miller, a juvenile defendant may be sentenced
to life imprisonment without parole only if the trial court first determines that the juvenile
defendant’s conduct demonstrated “irretrievable depravity, permanent incorrigibility, or
irreparable corruption beyond the possibility of rehabilitation.”1 People v. Holman, 2017 IL
1
In Jones v. Mississippi, the United States Supreme Court held that sentencing courts are not
constitutionally mandated under the eighth amendment to make a finding of “permanent incorrigibility prior
to sentencing a juvenile defendant to life without parole. 593 U.S. ____, ____, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 1318 (2021).
The high court left intact the states’ discretion to impose any sentencing mechanisms deemed appropriate
in cases involving juvenile defendants convicted of murder, such as, inter alia, prohibiting sentences of life
without parole for juveniles. Id. at ____, 141 S. Ct. at 1323. In People v. Dorsey, our supreme court
addressed Jones only in passing, suggesting, without more, that in light of Jones the holding in Holman is
“questionable.” Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶ 41.
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120655, ¶ 46. Miller’s holding is comprised of both a substantive and procedural component. See
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 206-211 (2016). The substantive component proscribes
mandatory sentences of life without parole for juvenile offenders. Miller, 567 U.S. at 465. Miller’s
procedural component requires that a sentencer consider certain factors relevant to a juvenile’s
youth and its attendant characteristics prior to imposing a sentence of life imprisonment without
parole, among them, the juvenile defendant’s chronological age at the time of the offense and any
evidence of his particular immaturity, impetuosity, or failure to appreciate risks and consequences.
Id. at 465, 469-70; see also Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 46 (citing Miller, 567 U.S. at 477-78).
Finally, we note that both the United States Supreme Court and our supreme court have held that
Miller applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 212; People v.
Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 34.
¶ 26 The decisional law as it relates to juvenile sentencing continues to evolve. Significantly,
our supreme court has expanded Miller’s protections beyond mandatory life sentences. First, in
People v. Holman, the high court held that “[l]ife sentences, whether mandatory or discretionary,
for juvenile defendants are disproportionate and violate the eighth amendment, unless the trial
court considers youth and its attendant characteristics.” 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 40. Thus, a life sentence
need not be mandatory for Miller protections to apply; a discretionary life sentence may also run
afoul of Miller if the sentencer does not consider youth and its attendant characteristics.
¶ 27 Additionally, our supreme court expanded the import of Miller’s reach to apply to juvenile
offenders who receive, not only natural life sentences, but also de facto life sentences (People v.
Reyes, 2016 IL 119271, ¶ 9), which the court later defined as a prison term of more than 40 years
(People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 40). Specifically, the court in Buffer stated that a prison
sentence of 40 years or less “provides some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on
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demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation” in accordance with Miller. (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 41 (citing Miller, 567 U.S. at 479). Against this backdrop, we turn
our attention, first, to defendant’s eighth amendment claim.
¶ 28 1. Eighth Amendment Challenge
¶ 29 Defendant contends that his “60-year de facto life sentence” violates the eighth
amendment’s prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S. Const. Amend. VIII.
Citing People v. Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 42, he maintains that his petition satisfies the cause-
and-prejudice test because his claim is based upon recent, substantive developments in the law and
could not have been raised in an earlier proceeding. He argues that because this area of the law has
only recently evolved, he lacked adequate legal grounds to raise the present argument when he
filed his first postconviction petition in 2008. Thus, he maintains that he has shown that an
“objective factor external to the defense” impeded his ability to raise this claim in an earlier
proceeding. Again, relying on Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 14, defendant posits that he has
demonstrated prejudice because the alleged constitutional errors “so infected the entire trial that
the resulting conviction or sentence violates due process.” The State responds that defendant’s
eighth amendment challenge must fail because he was not a juvenile at the time that he committed
the charged offenses.
¶ 30 Without question, defendant was 20 years of age at the time he committed the offenses
which resulted in his conviction and sentence. Although we cannot dispute the unavailability of
Miller at the time defendant filed his first postconviction petition in 2008, even had he done so,
Miller would not support his claim. We believe it safe to say that federal caselaw has long-since
and unambiguously drawn the line for Miller-based claims under the eighth amendment at age 18
See Roper, 543 U.S. at 574. This age cutoff of 18 years old has also been reaffirmed by our supreme
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court in Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶¶ 54-61. As such, defendant’s challenge to his sentence under
the eighth amendment and Miller is foreclosed because he was 20 years old at the time of the
murder. See People v. Franklin, 2020 IL App (1st) 171628, ¶ 49 (“It is well established that
offenders who are 18 years and older cannot raise a facial challenge to their sentences under the
eighth amendment and the Miller line of cases.”).
¶ 31 Further, to the extent that defendant relies on language in Harris to support his “as-applied”
eighth amendment claim, we would assert that his reliance is misplaced. We are aware of the
court’s comment in Harris regarding the availability of an as-applied challenge for young adult
defendants. 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 53 (“To the extent that defendant may have intended to raise an as-
applied challenge under the eighth amendment, that claim would fail for the same reason as his
challenge under the Illinois Constitution failed, because no evidentiary hearing was held, and no
findings of fact were entered on how Miller applies to him as a young adult.”). However, we do
not read Harris as relaxing the established rule first announced in Miller. The clear import of the
discussion in Harris is that an as-applied challenge requires an evidentiary hearing, and nothing
more. See People v. Savage, 2020 IL App (1st) 173135, ¶ 61 (“Although defendant raises an as-
applied challenge rather than a facial challenge, Illinois courts typically consider the sentencing
claims of young adults under the proportionate penalties clause rather than the eighth
amendment.”).
¶ 32 Defendant’s age serves as a barrier to his Miller-based claim. Thus, his challenge to his
sentence pursuant to the eighth amendment fails as a matter of law. Accordingly, as he is unable
to satisfy the requisite cause and prejudice to proceed, we find no error in the court’s denial of
leave to file a successive postconviction petition on that basis.
¶ 33 2. Proportionate Penalties Challenge
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¶ 34 Defendant fares no better with his proportionate penalties claim. Combined with his eighth
amendment claim, defendant argues that he has satisfied cause and prejudice due to the
unavailability of the Miller line of cases at the time of his 2008 postconviction petition. Here, other
than his Miller age-related claims, defendant makes no additional argument regarding his claimed
violation of Illinois’s proportionate penalties clause. 2 Nevertheless, prior to addressing the merits
of his claim, we deem it appropriate to set out the applicable law.
¶ 35 Article I, section 11 of our constitution provides that “[a]ll penalties shall be determined
both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to
useful citizenship.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11. This clause, commonly referred to as the
proportionate penalties clause, requires balancing the goals of retribution and rehabilitation, which
necessitates a careful consideration of all the factors in aggravation and mitigation. People v.
Quintana, 332 Ill. App. 3d 96, 109 (2002). We have held that Illinois’s proportionate penalties
clause provides greater protections against excessive punishment than does the federal
constitution’s eighth amendment. People v. Fernandez, 2014 IL App (1st) 120508, ¶¶ 46, 63;
People v. Minniefield, 2020 IL App (1st) 170541, ¶ 35 (“The purpose of the *** clause is to add a
limitation on penalties beyond those provided by the eighth amendment.”); see also People v.
Clemons, 2012 IL 107821, ¶ 40 (The proportionate penalties clause “which focuses on the
2
We note that in his 2008 postconviction petition, defendant asserted claims regarding his
rehabilitative potential. Those claims, which implicate proportionate penalties concerns, were framed as
violations of his sixth amendment right to effective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. In the petition
now before us, defendant’s proportionate penalties claim is expressly couched in the rationale underpinning
Miller and the decisional law following. We note that “a constitutional challenge raised under one theory
cannot be supported by decisional law based purely on another provision.” People v. Patterson, 2014 IL
115102, ¶ 97 (citing United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7, 117 S. Ct. 1219 (1997)). However, we
deem defendant’s 2008 ineffective assistance claims and his 2018 Miller-based claims sufficiently distinct
so as not to run afoul of Patterson.
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objective of rehabilitation, went beyond the framers’ understanding of the eighth amendment and
is not synonymous with that provision.”); but see Patterson, 2014 IL 115102, ¶ 106 (stating that
the proportionate penalties clause is “co-extensive with the eighth amendment’s cruel and unusual
punishment clause”).
¶ 36 In two cases, one involving a direct appeal and the other a section 2-1401 petition, our
supreme court has recognized that young adult offenders may rely on the evolving neuroscience
regarding brain development in juveniles and its correlation to maturity underpinning the Miller
decision to support an as-applied challenge pursuant to the proportionate penalties clause of the
Illinois Constitution. See People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶¶ 43-44 (19-year-old defendant
sentenced to a term of natural life in prison); Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 48 (18-year-old defendant
sentenced to 76 years in prison). In Thompson and Harris, the court forged a path for young adult
defendants to demonstrate that their own specific characteristics and circumstances were so like
those of a juvenile that the imposition of a life sentence, absent a Miller-compliant sentencing
hearing, would violate the proportionate penalties clause. Additionally, Thompson and Harris
stated that, such claims would best be pursued through postconviction proceedings. Thompson,
2015 IL 118151, ¶¶ 43-44; Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 48.3 Accordingly, we proceed to consider
whether defendant’s successive postconviction petition comports with the dictates under the Act.
¶ 37 A. Cause
3
In his brief, defendant states that “the Illinois Supreme Court has made clear that a successive
post-conviction petition is a proper vehicle for youthful defendants 18 and over to litigate an as-applied
Miller-type challenge under the eighth amendment or Illinois proportionate penalties clause.” Defendant’s
statement misstates the law and conflates eighth amendment claims and proportionate penalties claims. The
two claims are separate and distinct. Defendant cites to no supreme court case for this broad proposition,
and we admonish defendant to exercise due care in the future.
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¶ 38 Pursuant to section 122-1(f) of the Act, leave of court to file a successive postconviction
petition may only be granted if the petitioner first “shows cause by identifying an objective factor
that impeded his or her ability to raise a specific claim during his or her initial post-conviction
proceedings[.]” 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2018). “ ‘[A] showing that the factual or legal basis
for a claim was not reasonably available to counsel *** would constitute cause under this
standard.’ ” Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d at 460 (quoting Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 283 n. 24
(2009)).
¶ 39 Here, defendant argues that he established cause because his claims are based on recent,
substantive developments in the law and could not have been raised in his first postconviction
petition. He continues that the landmark decision of Miller as well as subsequent Illinois cases
interpreting Miller were not available when he filed his initial petition. The State concedes the
issue of cause and devotes the lion’s share of its proportionate penalties argument to the issue of
prejudice.
¶ 40 We acknowledge that our supreme court in Davis explicitly stated that Miller’s substantive
component constitutes cause because it was not available earlier to counsel. 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 42.
Notably, defendant filed his initial postconviction petition in 2008, several years prior to the
issuance of those cases. However, Miller’s substantive rule is only applicable in the context of a
juvenile defendant’s eighth amendment sentencing challenge. See Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 206-
211. In contrast, here, defendant is not a juvenile and we are now considering the propriety of his
sentence in the context of a proportionate penalties clause challenge.
¶ 41 Defendant argues that, since the denial of leave to file his successive postconviction
petition, the law has continued to develop in his favor. He cites in support, People v. Johnson,
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2020 IL App (1st) 171362, People v. Minniefield, 2020 IL App. (1st) 170541, and People v. Ross,
2020 IL App (1st) 171202.
¶ 42 Notably, the cases cited by defendant precede our supreme court’s decision in People v.
Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, which is dispositive. In Dorsey, the juvenile defendant, who was
convicted for one count of first degree murder and two counts of attempted first degree murder
committed when he was 14 years old, sought leave to file a successive postconviction petition.
2021 IL 123010, ¶¶ 4, 5, 19. In the petition, he argued that his 76-year aggregate sentence violated
the eighth amendment and proportionate penalties clause. Id. ¶ 24. Before our supreme court, the
defendant additionally argued in the alternative, that his sentence nonetheless violated the
proportionate penalties clause pursuant to Miller and Illinois’s longstanding recognition of the
special status of children. Id. ¶ 68. The court rejected the defendant’s claim for multiple reasons.
The court first determined that the claim was forfeited where it was not included in his petition
and barred by res judicata because he previously raised a proportionate penalties argument on
direct appeal. Id. ¶¶ 70-73. Notwithstanding that determinative ruling, the court additionally held
the defendant could not establish cause for his failure to raise the claim in his initial postconviction
petition. Id. ¶ 74. Citing People v. LaPointe, 2018 IL App (2d) 160903, the court stated that
“Miller’s unavailability prior to 2012 at best deprived [the] defendant of ‘some helpful support’
for his state constitutional claim, which is insufficient to establish ‘cause.’ ” Id.¶ 43 Following Dorsey, in nearly every appellate court district, we have consistently rejected
successive postconviction petitions for lack of cause where the young adult defendant’s claim is
based on the proportionate penalties clause. See People v. Caballero, 2022 IL App (1st) 181747-
U, ¶¶ 31-38; People v. Hemphill, 2022 IL App (1st) 201112, ¶¶ 30-31; People v. Knight, 2022 IL
App (1st) 210026-U, ¶¶ 15-17; People v. Knox, 2022 IL App (2d) 200757-U, ¶¶ 19, 22; People v.
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Torres, 2022 IL App (1st) 201014-U, ¶¶ 18-19; People v. Harris, 2022 IL App (1st) 200697-U, ¶¶
33-34; People v. Shaw, 2022 IL App (3d) 200003-U, ¶¶ 32-35; People v. Ruddock, 2022 IL App
(1st) 173023, ¶ 72; People v. Winters, 2021 IL App (1st) 191625-U, ¶¶ 44-51; People v. Howard,
2021 IL App (2d) 190695, ¶ 39; People v. Thompson, 2021 IL App (4th) 200237-U, ¶¶ 35-37;
People v. Haines, 2021 IL App (4th) 190612, ¶¶ 44-47; People v. Summers, 2021 IL App (4th)
190891-U, ¶¶ 24-25. Although we are not bound to follow the holdings of our sister jurisdictions
(see also O’Casek v. Children’s Home & Aid Society of Illinois, 229 Ill. 2d 421, 440 (2008), we
enjoy no such discretion regarding decisions rendered by our supreme court (see People v. Artis,
232 Ill. 2d 156, 164 (2009).
¶ 44 Accordingly, pursuant to Dorsey, we hold that defendant cannot establish cause for his
Miller-based proportionate penalties claim.
¶ 45 B. Prejudice
¶ 46 Under the Act, a defendant shows prejudice for his successive postconviction petition
where he has demonstrated “that the claim not raised during his or her initial post-conviction
proceedings so infected the trial that the resulting conviction or sentence violated due process.”
722 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2018). Having determined that defendant cannot satisfy the cause
prong of the cause-and-prejudice test, we need not consider prejudice.
¶ 47 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 48 Because defendant’s petition does not adequately allege facts demonstrating cause and
prejudice, the trial court’s denial of defendant's motion for leave to file a successive postconviction
petition was proper. See Smith, 2014 IL 115946, ¶ 35. Having determined that defendant failed to
satisfy that procedural prerequisite, we need not address his first contention that the trial court
erred in failing to consider his youth and brain development.
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¶ 49 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
¶ 50 Affirmed.
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