People v. Strickland

NO. 4-04-0218 Filed: 2/10/06
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) Livingston County
LARRY STRICKLAND, ) No. 03CF248
Defendant-Appellant. )
) Honorable
) Harold J. Frobish,
) Judge Presiding.
______________________________________________________________
PRESIDING JUSTICE TURNER delivered the opinion of the
court:
In September 2003, the State charged defendant, Larry
Strickland, with four counts of aggravated battery (Pub. Act 92-
841, '5, eff. August 22, 2002 (2002 Ill. Laws 3050, 3053) (amend-
ing 720 ILCS 5/12-4(b)(6) (West Supp. 2001))). After a January
2004 trial, a jury found defendant guilty as charged. At a March
2004 sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced defendant to
three concurrent terms of four years' imprisonment to run consec-
utive to defendant's six other prison terms.
Defendant appeals, asserting (1) he was denied a fair
trial because he was handcuffed to a table during his jury trial
and (2) the trial court erred by not inquiring into his pro se
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel contention. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
On January 28, 2004, the trial court held a jury trial
on the charges against defendant. Before the trial and outside
the jury's presence, the following exchange took place:
"THE COURT: All right. Presently, you
have both hands--
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: --handcuffed.
THE COURT: I typically allow, unless
there is a reason not to--are you right-
handed or left-handed[?]
THE DEFENDANT: Left-handed.
THE COURT: Left-handed. All right. I
am going to direct that the correctional
officers free your left hand, but handcuff
your right hand to the table where we have an
eyebolt.
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: So that would allow you some
freedom with your left hand to--you have
papers there, I note, so you will have free-
dom of your left hand to look at your papers.
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. Thank you.
Will I pick a jury today, or what?"
Also before trial, defendant presented a letter he had
written to authorities at the Pontiac Correctional Center (Cen-
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ter) about problems he was experiencing. The trial court allowed
defendant to discuss the letter with his attorney, who then
explained to the court he was unaware of a manner in which to
introduce the letter as evidence at trial. The court allowed the
letter to be put in the record for appeal purposes only. Defen-
dant again insisted he wanted his problems with prison officials
brought out at trial and wanted to testify to those matters. The
court stated it would allow defendant to talk with defense
counsel some more.
The State presented the testimony of Bradley Knight, a
correctional officer at the Center; Gary Kuhse, a sergeant at the
Center; Anthony Harvey, who, at the time of the incident, was a
captain at the Center; Joyce Friel, a nurse at the Center; and
Karl Webber, a correctional officer in the Center's internal
affairs division. Defendant did not present any evidence.
Knight testified that on the morning of October 30,
2002, he was picking up breakfast trays at the Center when he
noticed a liquid substance coming from the cracks of defendant's
cell door. Knight then notified the command staff, and Harvey
and Kuhse responded. Kuhse ordered defendant to turn his back to
them so Kuhse could open the cuffing hatch and handcuff defen-
dant. When Kuhse opened the hatch and attempted to handcuff
defendant, defendant reached out with a toothpaste tube and
squirted an unknown liquid in their direction. The substance,
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which smelled like a mix of feces and urine, hit Knight and
Harvey on their right arms as they turned away. Knight observed
that defendant's pulling away from Kuhse caused Kuhse's left ring
finger to get scratched on the top of the cuffing hatch. Kuhse's
finger was bleeding. After the incident, Knight went to the
Center's health-care unit and saw Friel.
Defense counsel cross-examined Knight about the loca-
tion of the cuffing hatch on the cell door and other aspects of
the door. He also asked questions regarding the cuffing proce-
dure and each officer's position in relationship to the door and
each other. Moreover, defense counsel inquired about how Kuhse's
finger was injured.
Harvey and Kuhse gave testimony similar to Knight's
regarding the October 30, 2002, incident. Kuhse stated his
finger was bleeding after his struggle with defendant in the
cuffing hatch. Harvey indicated some of the substance landed on
his right arm and right shirt sleeve. Defense counsel cross-
examined both witnesses, bringing out the discrepancies in the
officers' testimony about the incident's details and exploring
how defendant was able to squirt the substance out of his cell
directly at the officers.
Friel testified she examined all three officers at the
Center's health-care unit on October 30, 2002. Knight had a
foreign substance on his right arm, and thus she had him wash and
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cleanse his arm. Kuhse had a cut on his wedding-ring finger,
which she cleansed and disinfected, and to which she applied a
triple antibiotic ointment. Harvey did not have any actual
exposure when he arrived at the Center so she just took his
vitals and checked him over.
Webber testified he investigated the October 30, 2002,
incident and talked to defendant on December 24, 2002. Defendant
explained he received a juice carton that was leaking with his
breakfast. He got angry about the leaky carton but did not talk
to an officer about it. Webber also testified he asked defendant
if he squirted the fecal matter on the officers as alleged, and
said defendant replied "yes, he did." Webber then asked defen-
dant what exactly was in the stuff he squirted, and defendant
replied "'it is something bad.'"
After the State's witnesses testified, the trial court
recessed the trial for lunch and allowed defendant to discuss
with defense counsel the matters to which defendant wanted to
testify. When the proceedings resumed, defendant stated he no
longer wanted to testify.
After hearing all of the evidence, the jury found
defendant guilty of all four charges. On March 10, 2004, the
trial court held a sentencing hearing at which defendant made an
oral posttrial motion, asserting an ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel claim. The court denied the motion. It then sentenced
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defendant to three concurrent terms of four years' imprisonment
on the first three counts to run consecutive to defendant's
convictions in the following cases: (1) People v. Strickland,
No. 85-C-13416 (Cir. Ct. Cook Co.); (2) People v. Strickland, No.
92-CF-25 (Cir. Ct. Livingston Co.); (3) People v. Strickland, No.
94-CF-76 (Cir. Ct. Livingston Co.); (4) People v. Strickland, No.
94-CF-146 (Cir. Ct. Livingston Co.); (5) People v. Strickland,
No. 01-CF-250 (Cir. Ct. Livingston Co.); and (6) People v.
Strickland, No. 03-CF-177 (Cir. Ct. Livingston Co.). This appeal
followed.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Fair Trial
Defendant first argues he was denied a fair trial
because the trial court ordered one of his hands to be handcuffed
to the table during his jury trial. Defendant acknowledges he
did not object to being handcuffed at trial but asserts this
court should find the handcuffing resulted in plain error (134
Ill. 2d R. 615(a)). The application of the plain-error doctrine
and what should happen when plain error occurs are sources of
contention among our sister courts. Thus, we will provide a
thorough background of the case law in this area.
In People v. Boose, 66 Ill. 2d 261, 265, 362 N.E.2d
303, 305 (1977), the Supreme Court of Illinois found the shack-
ling of an accused should be avoided if possible because it (1)
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tends to prejudice the jury against the accused, (2) restricts
the accused's ability to assist counsel during trial, and (3)
offends the dignity of the judicial process. However, the Boose
court recognized a defendant may be restrained where the court
reasonably believes (1) the defendant may try to escape, (2) the
defendant may pose a threat to the safety of the people in the
courtroom, or (3) restraint is necessary to maintain order during
the trial. Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 266, 362 N.E.2d at 305. The
determinations of whether to restrain a defendant and what
restraints are most suitable are within the trial court's discre-
tion, and a reviewing court will not overturn those decisions
unless the trial court abused its discretion. Boose, 66 Ill. 2d
at 266-67, 362 N.E.2d at 305-06.
In making the determination whether to restrain a
defendant, Boose directs the trial court to hold proceedings
outside the presence of the jury. During those proceedings, the
defense counsel should have the opportunity to present reasons
why the defendant should not be restrained, and the trial court
should state for the record the reasons for restraining the
defendant in the courtroom. Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 266, 362 N.E.2d
at 305. Additionally, the Boose court provided a nonexclusive
list of 12 factors for the trial court to consider in making its
determination. Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 266-67, 362 N.E.2d at 305-
06.
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That same year, our supreme court applied Boose to a
bench trial, noting the shackling of an accused without clear
cause jeopardizes the presumption of innocence's "value and
protection and demeans our justice." In re Staley, 67 Ill. 2d
33, 37, 364 N.E.2d 72, 73 (1977). In both Boose and Staley, the
supreme court affirmed the appellate courts' reversal of the
trial courts' judgments. Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 269, 362 N.E.2d at
307; Staley, 67 Ill. 2d at 38, 364 N.E.2d at 74.
Two years later, the court addressed a defendant's
contention his conviction should be reversed because he appeared
before the venire in handcuffs, even though he did not object to
the handcuffs at that time. People v. Hyche, 77 Ill. 2d 229,
240-41, 396 N.E.2d 6, 12 (1979). Our supreme court concluded the
defendant had waived any error by failing to object to his
appearance in handcuffs and thus affirmed the trial court's
judgment. Hyche, 77 Ill. 2d at 241, 396 N.E.2d at 12. In
reaching that conclusion, it expressly distinguished Boose and
Staley, noting the defendants in those cases had objected to
appearing in handcuffs. Hyche, 77 Ill. 2d at 241, 396 N.E.2d at
12.
The Hyche court found guidance in the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 48
L. Ed. 2d 126, 96 S. Ct. 1691 (1976). Hyche, 77 Ill. 2d at 241,
396 N.E.2d at 12. There, without objection, the defendant
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appeared before the jury in prison attire. Estelle, 425 U.S. at
502, 48 L. Ed. 2d at 129-30, 96 S. Ct. at 1692. The Estelle
Court began by recognizing the wearing of jail or prison attire
could possibly impair the presumption of innocence and found
compelling an accused to wear such attire violated the fourteenth
amendment. Estelle, 425 U.S. at 503-06, 48 L. Ed. 2d at 130-31,
96 S. Ct. at 1692-94. However, the Court concluded that "al-
though the State cannot, consistently with the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, compel an accused to stand trial before a jury while
dressed in identifiable prison clothes, the failure to make an
objection to the court as to being tried in such clothes, for
whatever reason, is sufficient to negate the presence of compul-
sion necessary to establish a constitutional violation."
Estelle, 425 U.S. at 512-13, 48 L. Ed. 2d at 135, 96 S. Ct. at
1697.
In People v. McCue, 175 Ill. App. 3d 762, 765-66, 530
N.E.2d 271, 273 (1988), the Third District followed Hyche and
concluded that since the defendants failed to object to being
handcuffed, they waived any alleged error that occurred by them
being handcuffed throughout their trial. The McCue court also
found, in the alternative, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in ordering the defendants handcuffed based on the
Boose factors. McCue, 175 Ill. App. 3d at 766, 530 N.E.2d at
273-74.
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Despite its application of Hyche in McCue, the Third
District in People v. Doss, 347 Ill. App. 3d 418, 428, 807 N.E.2d
697, 705 (2004), held the trial court's decision to keep on the
defendant's leg shackles during the trial, to which the defendant
did not object, was plain error since it deprived the defendant
of a fair trial. There, the trial court had only indicated it
believed the jury could not see the shackles, which the Third
District found insufficient under Boose. The Doss court reversed
the defendant's conviction and remanded for further proceedings.
Doss, 347 Ill. App. 3d at 428, 807 N.E.2d at 705; see also
People v. Allen, 354 Ill. App. 3d 442, 446, 821 N.E.2d 335, 339
(2004), appeal allowed, 214 Ill. 2d 537, 830 N.E.2d 4 (2005) (No.
99977) (stun belt); People v. Brown, 356 Ill. App. 3d 1088, 1091,
828 N.E.2d 351, 354 (2005) (shackles).
In other cases where the defendant has failed to object
to the use of a stun belt at trial, the Third District has found
a violation of constitutional rights but concluded the cases
should be remanded to the trial court for a retrospective Boose
hearing. See People v. Johnson, 356 Ill. App. 3d 208, 211-12,
825 N.E.2d 765, 767-68 (2005); People v. Buckner, 358 Ill. App.
3d 529, 532, 534, 831 N.E.2d 676, 679-80 (2005).
In People v. Bennett, 281 Ill. App. 3d 814, 825-26, 666
N.E.2d 899, 906-07 (1996), the First District reversed the
conviction of a defendant, who was tried in shackles, under the
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plain-error doctrine. However, there, the defendant had re-
quested the shackles be removed at trial but had forfeited the
argument on appeal by failing to raise it in a posttrial motion
(see People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186, 522 N.E.2d 1124, 1130
(1988)). Bennett, 281 Ill. App. 3d at 823, 666 N.E.2d at 905.
In People v. Crutchfield, 353 Ill. App. 3d 1014, 1022,
820 N.E.2d 507, 515 (2004), the Fifth District declined to apply
the plain-error doctrine to a defendant's challenge to his
wearing a stun belt during trial because the record clearly
demonstrated the error did not contribute to his conviction.
There, like Bennett, the defendant had objected to the stun belt
at trial but had failed to raise the issue in a posttrial motion.
Crutchfield, 353 Ill. App. 3d at 1021, 820 N.E.2d at 514. The
Fifth District also reached the same conclusion in People v.
DuPree, 353 Ill. App. 3d 1037, 1043-44, 820 N.E.2d 560, 565-66
(2004), where the defendant forfeited his stun-belt challenge by
failing to object at trial.
After considering the aforementioned case law, we
decline to reverse defendant's conviction under the plain-error
doctrine. Unlike the Third District cases that have found plain
error, our supreme court has not applied Boose and Staley when a
defendant has failed to object to appearing before a jury in
restraints. See Hyche, 77 Ill. 2d at 241, 396 N.E.2d at 12. The
Hyche court indicates it is the State's compelling the defendant
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to wear restraints before the jury that creates the constitu-
tional violation. Hyche, 77 Ill. 2d at 241, 396 N.E.2d at 12.
Thus, when a defendant fails to object to wearing restraints, the
presence of compulsion is negated, and a constitutional violation
has not been established. See Hyche, 77 Ill. 2d at 241, 396
N.E.2d at 12.
Moreover, we agree with the State that the United
States Supreme Court's recent decision in Deck v. Missouri, ___
U.S. ___, 161 L. Ed. 2d 953, 125 S. Ct. 2007 (2005), does not
warrant a different result. There, the defendant continuously
objected to wearing the shackles. Deck, ___ U.S. at ___, 161 L.
Ed. 2d at 960, 125 S. Ct. at 2010. Thus, the Deck Court did not
address whether a defendant's constitutional rights are violated
when the defendant does not object to the restraints at trial.
Even if Deck provides a defendant's presence at trial
in shackles without objection is a constitutional violation,
defendant has not established plain error here. First, the Deck
Court expressly states a defendant's due-process rights are
violated by "the use of visible restraints." (Emphasis added.)
Deck, ___ U.S. at ___, 161 L. Ed. 2d at 964, 125 S. Ct. at 2014.
In this case, the trial court noted defendant's left hand was
free and his right hand was handcuffed to an eyebolt attached to
the table. In its brief, the State asserts defendant fails to
argue and the record fails to show the single handcuff was
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visible to the jury. In his reply brief, defendant does not
refute this contention. Under the plain-error doctrine, defen-
dant has the burden of proving an error occurred (see People v.
Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 187, 830 N.E.2d 467, 480 (2005)) and
thus had the burden of demonstrating the handcuff was visible to
the jury.
Second, even if the handcuff was visible to the jury,
the State has proved "'beyond a reasonable doubt that the [shack-
ling] error complained of did not contribute to the verdict
obtained.'" Deck, ___ U.S. at ___, 161 L. Ed. 2d at 966, 125 S.
Ct. at 2015-16, quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24,
17 L. Ed. 2d 705, 710, 87 S. Ct. 824, 828 (1967). Here, the
evidence of defendant's guilt was overwhelming. See People v.
Kennedy, 150 Ill. App. 3d 319, 326, 501 N.E.2d 1004, 1009 (1986)
(finding that even if the defendant had not been wearing leg
irons, the jury would have found him guilty where the evidence
was overwhelming); see also People v. Barney, No. 4-04-0217
(February 10, 2006), ___ Ill. App. 3d ___, ___ N.E.2d ___.
Defendant was upset about a leaky juice carton and admitted to
Webber he had squirted the fecal matter on the officers. Harvey,
Kuhse, and Knight all testified Kuhse's finger was injured when
he struggled with defendant in the cuffing hatch. Friel con-
firmed the injury to Kuhse's finger and the substance on Knight's
arm.
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
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Defendant also contends his case must be remanded
because the trial court failed to make an adequate inquiry into
his pro se ineffective-assistance-of-counsel allegation. Whether
the trial court made an adequate inquiry is a question of law,
and thus our review is de novo. See People v. Savage, 361 Ill.
App. 3d 750, 756, 838 N.E.2d 247, 252 (2005).
When a defendant raises pro se a posttrial ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claim, the trial court may, when warranted,
appoint new counsel to assist the defendant with presenting his
claim. People v. Pope, 284 Ill. App. 3d 330, 333, 672 N.E.2d 65,
67 (1996); People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181, 189, 464 N.E.2d
1045, 1049 (1984). Thus, when a defendant asserts such a claim,
the court must first conduct an "adequate inquiry" to determine
the factual basis for the claim. People v. Johnson, 159 Ill. 2d
97, 125, 636 N.E.2d 485, 497 (1994). If the court concludes the
claim lacks merit or pertains only to matters of trial strategy,
then new counsel is unnecessary. However, if the inquiry indi-
cates trial counsel's possible neglect of the case, then the
court should appoint new counsel. Pope, 284 Ill. App. 3d at 333,
672 N.E.2d at 67.
Therefore, we address "'whether the trial court con-
ducted an adequate inquiry' into the allegations." People v.
Peacock, 359 Ill. App. 3d 326, 339, 833 N.E.2d 396, 407 (2005),
quoting People v. Moore, 207 Ill. 2d 68, 78, 797 N.E.2d 631, 638
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(2003). In conducting an inquiry, the trial court uses one or
more of the following methods: "(1) questioning the trial
counsel, (2) questioning the defendant, and (3) relying on its
own knowledge of the trial counsel's performance in the trial."
Peacock, 359 Ill. App. 3d at 339, 833 N.E.2d at 407.
Defendant's recitation of what occurred at his sentenc-
ing hearing is deficient. The following is a brief summary of
what actually took place. The trial court invited defendant to
talk about why he sought a trial in this case, and defendant
began by stating the following:
"Your Honor, I think it was a grave
misjustice that I was and that I have been
convicted. I don't think I had the represen-
tation. I don't think I had the proper coun-
sel to represent me. My counsel never asked
me anything about the case. We never talked
about any strategies about the case."
Defendant asserted he was being harassed and poisoned by prison
officers. He noted the things he believed he was being denied in
prison and again stated, "I am not being given the proper attor-
ney. I am not being represented properly by counsel."
Defendant later requested a motion for a new trial
based on ineffective assistance of counsel. He asserted his
attorney (1) did not communicate with him, except for asking him
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if he would take three years; (2) failed to present evidence he
had a conflict with Center officials; (3) failed to show Friel
did not have a record on Harvey; and (4) failed to argue the
events could not have happened the way the officers testified
they did. The trial court acknowledged defendant's oral motion
for a new trial and denied it, noting it had recalled the trial.
Defendant contends his case is similar to People v.
Robinson, 157 Ill. 2d 68, 623 N.E.2d 352 (1993). There, the
trial court denied the defendant's motion without any inquiry at
all. Our supreme court stated "the trial court should have
afforded the defendant the opportunity to specify and support his
complaints." Robinson, 157 Ill. 2d at 86, 623 N.E.2d at 361.
Unlike Robinson, the trial court in this case did allow
defendant to explain why he thought his counsel was ineffective.
The court gave defendant ample opportunity to set forth and
support his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. Contrary to
defendant's assertion, the court did not utterly fail to make an
initial inquiry into his claims.
Here, the trial court's inquiry into defendant's
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims was adequate. The court
allowed defendant to present his ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel claim and then relied on its own knowledge of the trial
to deny defendant's posttrial motion that raised the ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claim. The court's reliance on its recol-
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lection was adequate in this case where defendant's allegations
were refuted by the trial record. See People v. Young, 341 Ill.
App. 3d 379, 383, 792 N.E.2d 468, 472 (2003) (finding further
inquiry into the factual basis of defendant's pro se ineffective-
assistance claims was unnecessary where the claims related to
trial matters and the judge hearing the posttrial motion had
presided over the trial).
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's
judgment.
Affirmed.
STEIGMANN and MYERSCOUGH, JJ., concur.
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