People v. Manuel

NOTICE FILED
This Order was filed under 2021 IL App (4th) 200265-UDecember 8, 2021
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
Carla Bender
not precedent except in the NO. 4-20-0265 4th District Appellate
limited circumstances allowed Court, IL
under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) McLean County
JAMES RAY MANUEL, ) No. 10CF1156
Defendant-Appellant. )
) Honorable
) Scott D. Drazewski,
) Judge Presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Turner and Steigmann concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, concluding the trial court properly denied
defendant’s motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition where he
failed to demonstrate cause and prejudice.
¶2 Defendant, James Ray Manuel, appeals from the denial of his motion for leave to
file a successive postconviction petition. We affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 This court has set forth the underlying facts of this case several times. See People
v. Manuel, 2021 IL App (4th) 190238-U; People v. Manuel, 2019 IL App (4th) 170651-U;
People v. Manuel, 2013 IL App (4th) 120017-U. Accordingly, we will set forth only those facts
necessary to resolve the issue presented in this case.
¶5 In December 2010, defendant and his codefendant were charged with home
invasion while armed with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/12-11(a)(3) (West 2008)) and armed robbery
(720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(2) (West 2008)). The State alleged the offenses occurred on July 29, 2008,
when defendant was 19 years old.
¶6 In September 2011, a consolidated bench trial was held, and defendant was
convicted of the charged offenses and sentenced to two concurrently imposed terms of 45 years’
imprisonment to be served at 50% with day-for-day good-conduct credit. See 730 ILCS
5/3-6-3(a)(2.1) (West 2008) (“For all offenses, other than those enumerated *** a prisoner who
is serving a term of imprisonment shall receive one day of sentence credit for each day of his or
her sentence of imprisonment.”). On appeal, this court affirmed defendant’s conviction. See
Manuel, 2013 IL App (4th) 120017-U.
¶7 In June 2014, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition alleging
(1) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to conduct a pretrial investigation to obtain
business records from a tattoo parlor to demonstrate the victim described an assailant other than
defendant; (2) he was denied a fair trial when the State failed to provide the defense a written
statement identifying the tattoo on the forearm of the assailant; and (3) ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel for failing to raise trial counsel’s ineffectiveness on direct appeal.
¶8 In August 2014, the trial court dismissed defendant’s pro se petition as frivolous
and patently without merit. Defendant appealed, and this court reversed the trial court’s summary
dismissal and remanded the case for second-stage postconviction proceedings. See Manuel, 2015
IL App (4th) 140744-U.
¶9 In February 2017, appointed counsel filed an amended postconviction petition.
Defendant argued his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to (1) investigate the tattoo on his
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forearm and (2) present evidence it was his codefendant who wore gold-rimmed glasses to rebut
the victim’s testimony the individual with the tattoo wore gold-rimmed glasses. Defendant also
argued his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise trial counsel’s ineffectiveness,
asserting trial counsel failed to (1) “continuously object” to the State’s late disclosure of the
victim’s statement the tattoo was on defendant’s left arm and (2) use the improperly admitted
evidence to impeach the witness’s credibility.
¶ 10 In May 2017, the State filed a motion to dismiss, and following an August 2017
evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied defendant postconviction relief. Defendant appealed,
and this court affirmed. See Manuel, 2019 IL App (4th) 170651-U.
¶ 11 In March 2019, defendant filed a pro se motion for leave to file a successive
postconviction petition. Defendant attached his proposed petition, raising a claim of actual
innocence based on newly discovered evidence in the form of an affidavit from one alibi witness,
Robert Whittier. The trial court denied defendant leave to file his successive postconviction
petition, finding defendant failed to offer any plausible explanation as to how, with due
diligence, he was unable to develop or discover Whittier’s testimony prior to trial. Defendant
appealed, and this court affirmed. See Manuel, 2021 IL App (4th) 190238-U.
¶ 12 In May 2020, while the prior appeal was pending, defendant filed the instant
motion—a second motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition. Defendant
contended his 45-year sentence, a de facto life sentence, violated the proportionate penalties
clause of the Illinois Constitution as applied to him as he was 19 years old when he committed
the offenses. Defendant cited People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, and People v. House, 2019 IL
App (1st) 110580-B, as cause for his omission of the claim in his prior postconviction petitions.
Defendant argued he was prejudiced where “there is a reasonable probability that [defendant]
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would have received a shorter sentence had the trial court correctly applied the sentencing
considerations required by [Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012)] and People v. Buffer, 2019
IL 122327.” Defendant attached to his motion his proposed successive postconviction petition,
further arguing his proportionate penalties claim.
¶ 13 The trial court denied defendant leave to file his successive postconviction
petition, finding defendant had failed to demonstrate cause as, at the time he filed his original
petition, “the proposition that a defendant’s youth is pertinent to sentencing was well
established.” Thus, the argument would have been available to defendant at trial and on direct
appeal. The court found defendant’s reliance on House was misplaced, as defendant “allege[d]
few, if any, facts in support of his claim that his own immaturity or circumstances support his
argument that his sentence violates the proportionate penalties clause.” Finally, the court stated it
“did take into account both [defendant’s] age and rehabilitative potential” at sentencing.
¶ 14 This appeal followed.
¶ 15 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 16 The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2020))
“provides a mechanism for criminal defendants to challenge their convictions or sentences based
on a substantial violation of their rights under the federal or state constitutions.” People v.
Morris, 236 Ill. 2d 345, 354, 925 N.E.2d 1069, 1075 (2010). The Act contemplates the filing of
only a single postconviction petition, and any claim not raised in the original postconviction
petition is forfeited. People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120665, ¶ 25, 91 N.E.3d 849 (citing 725 ILCS
5/122-3 (West 2010)).
¶ 17 The statutory bar against a successive postconviction petition will be relaxed only
where a defendant sets forth a colorable claim of actual innocence or shows cause and prejudice
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for failure to raise an alleged constitutional claim in an earlier petition. Id. ¶ 26. Under the
cause-and-prejudice test, a defendant demonstrates cause by identifying “an objective factor that
impeded his or her ability to raise a specific claim during his or her initial post[ ]conviction
proceedings.” 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f)(1) (West 2020). A defendant demonstrates prejudice by
showing the “claim not raised during his or her initial post[ ]conviction proceedings so infected
the trial that the resulting conviction or sentence violated due process.” Id. § 122-1(f)(2).
¶ 18 On July 29, 2021, two days after the State filed its brief in this case, the Illinois
Supreme Court issued its opinion in People v. Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010. In Dorsey, the defendant
appealed from the First District’s judgment affirming the denial of the defendant’s motion for
leave to file a successive postconviction petition. Id. ¶ 28. As relevant to this case, the defendant
argued his aggregate sentence of 76 years in prison for crimes committed when he was 14 years
old violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution as applied to him. Id.
¶¶ 4, 19, 67. The supreme court determined, in part, eligibility for sentencing credit is relevant to
the determination of whether a juvenile defendant has been sentenced to a de facto life
sentence—i.e., a sentence over 40 years. Id. ¶¶ 46, 64. The supreme court found under the
Illinois good-conduct scheme, “[a] defendant (1) must be awarded day-for-day credit, (2) is
entitled to keep it as long as it is not revoked because he commits a disciplinary offense, (3) is
afforded procedures that protect against arbitrary revocation of credit, and (4) may enforce
constitutional protections through judicial review.” Id. ¶ 60. The day-for-day credit therefore
provides a defendant “some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated
maturity and rehabilitation.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 64. The defendant’s
sentence in Dorsey offered the opportunity for release after he served 38 years and thus was not a
de facto life sentence. Id.
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¶ 19 In his reply brief, defendant acknowledges under the Illinois Supreme Court’s
decision in Dorsey, he no longer has an arguable claim his sentence was a de facto life sentence
subject to an as-applied constitutional challenge. Defendant’s 54-year sentence, with day-for-day
credit, allows defendant a meaningful opportunity for release after serving 27 years. We accept
defendant’s concession and find he cannot demonstrate cause and prejudice in light of the
supreme court’s decision in Dorsey. We therefore affirm the trial court’s dismissal of defendant’s
motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition.
¶ 20 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 21 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 22 Affirmed.
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