Andrews v. Gonzalez

2014 IL App (1st) 140342
SECOND DIVISION
September 30, 2014
No. 1-14-0342
WILLIAM T. ANDREWS, )
) Appeal from the
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Circuit Court of
) Cook County.
v. )
)
DAGOBERTO GONZALEZ, as Surviving Partner of )
G and G Cement Contractors, an Illinois Partnership ) No. 13 L 8116
)
Defendant-Appellee )
) Honorable
(Century National Insurance Company, ) Kathy M. Flanagan,
) Judge Presiding.
Defendant). )
JUSTICE LIU delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Neville and Pierce concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Plaintiff, William T. Andrews, filed suit against defendant, Dagoberto Gonzalez
(Dagoberto), to recover an outstanding judgment awarded in a personal injury lawsuit against
G & G Cement Contractors (G&G), a partnership of which Dagoberto was the sole surviving
partner. The circuit court granted Dagoberto's motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619(a)(4)
of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(4) (West 2012)), finding that
plaintiff's claim was barred by res judicata because Dagoberto was a named defendant in the
prior underlying action and was found not liable for negligence. On appeal, plaintiff contends
that the circuit court erred in dismissing his claim against Dagoberto because various provisions
of the Uniform Partnership Act (1997) (Act) (805 ILCS 206/100 et seq. (West 2012)) and
sections 2-410 and 2-411 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-410, 2-411 (West 2012)) demonstrate that
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res judicata does not bar a judgment creditor of a partnership from enforcing an outstanding
judgment against a partner who was named individually in the underlying lawsuit. For the
reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County and remand the
cause for further proceedings.
¶2 BACKGROUND
¶3 A. Personal Injury Lawsuit
¶4 On February 11, 2007, plaintiff was involved in an automobile accident with an
employee of G&G, an Illinois general partnership owned by two brothers, Dagoberto and Jose
Gonzalez, the latter of whom is now deceased. He subsequently filed suit against G&G,
Dagoberto, the estate of Jose Gonzalez, and Luis Chavez, the driver of the vehicle, alleging
negligence in the causing of the accident. 1 As pertinent here, Dagoberto was named as a
defendant based solely on a theory of respondeat superior. In his third amended complaint,
plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that Dagoberto owned the Ford truck driven by Chavez; that
Dagoberto employed Chavez and allowed him to use the truck; that Dagoberto breached his duty
to plaintiff through the negligent acts of Chavez; and that as a direct and proximate result of this
breach, Chavez drove the Ford truck into plaintiff's car, causing him serious injury.
¶5 Following a trial, the jury returned a verdict against G&G and Chavez, but in favor of
Dagoberto and the estate of Jose Gonzalez. In its response to special interrogatories, the jury
specifically found that, at the time of the accident, Chavez was an employee of G&G, but not of
Dagoberto or Jose, individually. The jury ultimately awarded plaintiff $3,092,000 in damages
and judgment was subsequently entered on the verdict. No posttrial motions were filed and no
appeal was ever taken.
1
Jose Gonzalez, Dagoberto's brother and the other partner of G&G, died during the pendency of the
negligence action. John Grob, as special administrator of the estate of Jose Gonzalez, was substituted as the
defendant in the suit.
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¶6 B. The Instant Lawsuit and Bad-Faith Claims
¶7 At the time of the accident, G&G was insured under a business auto policy issued by
Century National Insurance Company (CNIC). After trial, CNIC refused to pay its policy limit
of $300,000 unless plaintiff would execute a full release of the entire judgment. Plaintiff filed
citations to discover assets against both CNIC and Dagoberto. On April 25, 2013, the circuit
court entered an agreed order requiring CNIC to pay the policy limit of $300,000 plus interest
and costs. Thereafter, in May of 2013, the court also ordered Dagoberto to assign to plaintiff "all
rights and choses of action that G&G has against CNIC." Dagoberto executed the assignment,
"under protest," in both English and Spanish versions.
¶8 On July 17, 2013, plaintiff filed the instant action against CNIC and Dagoberto. Plaintiff
brought various claims against CNIC for alleged bad faith in initially refusing to tender the
policy limit on behalf of G&G, its insured. As pertinent here, plaintiff also sought to recover
from Dagoberto, individually, the unsatisfied judgment amount he was awarded against G&G in
the prior 2007 personal injury suit.
¶9 Dagoberto filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619(a)(4) of the Code, asserting
that plaintiff's claim was barred by the doctrine of res judicata because Dagoberto had already
obtained a judgment in his favor in the personal injury lawsuit. He characterized plaintiff's new
claim against him as merely "an attempt to get a second bite of the apple," noting that plaintiff
previously, but unsuccessfully, sought to enforce the judgment against him in a supplementary
proceeding.
¶ 10 Plaintiff responded by pointing out that sections 2-410 and 2-411 of the Code (735 ILCS
5/2-410, 2-411 (West 2012)), read together, create an exception to the res judicata doctrine.
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Specifically, he argued that sections 2-410 and 2-411 of the Code allow a separate action to
enforce a partner's individual liability for a partnership obligation.
¶ 11 On January 13, 2014, the circuit court entered an order granting Dagoberto's motion to
dismiss. The court agreed that plaintiff's claim was barred by res judicata, noting:
"Here *** Dagoberto was named a defendant in the underlying
action and a verdict was entered finding him not liable for the
judgment. The Plaintiff did not appeal this verdict and filed a
citation to discover assets. In that proceeding, the court limited the
Plaintiff to an assignment of Dagoberto's chose in action against
the insurance company. The Plaintiff cannot now seek to re-
litigate Dagoberto's liability and the claim against him *** is
barred by res judicata."
¶ 12 The court included a finding pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (eff. Feb. 26,
2010) that there was no just reason to delay the enforcement or appeal of the lawsuit. We
therefore have jurisdiction over this appeal.
¶ 13 ANALYSIS
¶ 14 On appeal, plaintiff contends that the circuit court erred in dismissing his claim against
Dagoberto, which sought to recover the unsatisfied portion of the judgment against G&G, on the
ground that it was barred by res judicata. He argues that sections 306 and 307 of the Act create
a "secondary liability" for partners for the unsatisfied obligations of their partnerships. Further,
he argues that sections 2-410 and 2-411 of the Code "expressly authorize a separate action to
enforce a partnership obligation and provide the procedural means by which a separate judgment
against the individual partner may be obtained." He asserts that, in light of this statutory scheme,
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this court should follow other jurisdictions and hold that res judicata does not bar a claim against
a partner to enforce a partnership judgment where the partner was previously sued and found not
liable for the underlying personal injury.
¶ 15 Dagoberto, meanwhile, responds that plaintiff is merely "attempt[ing] to re-litigate [his]
liability in this second suit." He argues that plaintiff's claim is barred under the doctrine of res
judicata because plaintiff had a prior opportunity to obtain a judgment against him for the
partnership's obligation during the underlying personal injury action. He further maintains that
neither the Act nor sections 2-410 and 2-411 of the Code create an exception to res judicata.
¶ 16 A section 2-619 motion to dismiss admits the legal sufficiency of the complaint, but
asserts affirmative matter that defeats the plaintiff's claim. King v. First Capital Financial
Services Corp., 215 Ill. 2d 1, 12 (2005). We review de novo the circuit court's order granting a
section 2-619 motion to dismiss. Id.
¶ 17 We begin by examining the statutory provisions at issue: namely, sections 306 and 307 of
the Act and sections 2-410 and 2-411 of the Code. Our primary objective in interpreting a statute
is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent. Citizens Opposing Pollution v.
ExxonMobil Coal U.S.A., 2012 IL 111286, ¶ 23. The best indication of such intent is the
language of the statute itself given its plain and ordinary meaning. Id. "Words and phrases
should not be construed in isolation, but interpreted in light of other relevant portions of the
statute so that, if possible, no term is rendered superfluous or meaningless." Land v. Board of
Education of the City of Chicago, 202 Ill. 2d 414, 422 (2002). Ultimately, "we presume that the
legislature, when it enacted the statute, did not intend absurdity, inconvenience, or injustice." Id.
¶ 18 Consistent with this approach, we choose to follow the doctrine of in pari materia, and
agree that two legislative acts addressing the same subject should be considered together so that
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they may be given harmonious effect. Citizens Opposing Pollution, 2012 IL 111286, ¶ 24.
"[Such] doctrine is also applicable to different sections of the same statute and is consonant with
one of our fundamental rules of statutory construction—'to view all of the provisions of a statute
as a whole.' " Collinsville Community Unit School District No. 10 v. Regional Board of School
Trustees, 218 Ill. 2d 175, 185-86 (2006) (quoting Land, 202 Ill. 2d at 422).
¶ 19 Here, sections 306 and 307 of the Act and sections 2-410 and 2-411 of the Code can be
read together as establishing a comprehensive procedure for obtaining and enforcing judgments
against partnerships and their individual partners. Section 307(b) of the Act initially authorizes a
plaintiff to bring "[a]n action *** against the partnership and *** any or all of the partners in the
same action or in separate actions." 805 ILCS 206/307(b) (West 2012). In bringing an action
against the partnership, the plaintiff may sue "in the names of the partners as individuals doing
business as the partnership, or in the firm name, or both." 735 ILCS 5/2-411(a) (West 2012); see
also 805 ILCS 206/307(a) (West 2012) ("A partnership may sue and be sued in the name of the
partnership."). Section 307(c) of the Act cautions, however, that "[a] judgment against a
partnership is not by itself a judgment against a partner." 805 ILCS 206/307(c) (West 2012).
The general rule is that all partners are jointly and severally liable for any obligation of the
partnership. 805 ILCS 206/306(a) (West 2012). Insofar as the plaintiff seeks to recover from the
partners, however, "[a] judgment against a partnership may not be satisfied from a partner's
assets unless there is also a judgment against the partner." 805 ILCS 206/307(c) (West 2012).
¶ 20 The question presented here is what recourse is available when a plaintiff cannot satisfy a
judgment against a partnership. Section 2-411(b) of the Code provides that "[a]n unsatisfied
judgment against a partnership in its firm name does not bar an action to enforce the individual
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liability of any partner." 735 ILCS 5/2-411(b) (West 2012). Section 2-410 of the Code, entitled
"Actions against joint debtors or partners," specifically provides for such an action, stating:
"All parties to a joint obligation, including a partnership obligation,
may be sued jointly, or separate actions may be brought against
one or more of them. A judgment against fewer than all the parties
to a joint or partnership obligation does not bar an action against
those not included in the judgment or not sued." 735 ILCS 5/2-410
(West 2012).
Section 307(d) of the Act, meanwhile, limits the partner's individual liability for a partnership
debt to certain circumstances. Specifically:
"A judgment creditor of a partner may not levy execution against the assets of the partner
to satisfy a judgment based on a claim against the partnership unless the partner is
personally liable for the claim under Section 306 and:
(1) a judgment based on the same claim has been obtained against the partnership
and a writ of execution on the judgment has been returned unsatisfied in whole or in
part;
(2) the partnership is a debtor in bankruptcy;
(3) the partner has agreed that the creditor need not exhaust partnership assets;
(4) a court grants permission to the judgment creditor to levy execution against
the assets of a partner based on a finding that partnership assets subject to execution
are clearly insufficient to satisfy the judgment, that exhaustion of partnership assets is
excessively burdensome, or that the grant of permission is an appropriate exercise of
the court's equitable powers; or
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(5) liability is imposed on the partner by law or contract independent of the
existence of the partnership." 805 ILCS 206/307(d) (West 2012).
¶ 21 The parties here interpret the foregoing provisions in fundamentally different ways.
Plaintiff reads the foregoing provisions as creating two distinct types of liability: (1) "direct"
liability, where a judgment is obtained based on a partner's "direct" liability in law or contract,
independent of the existence of the partnership; and (2) "secondary" liability, where a
"partnership obligation remains unsatisfied and *** the partnership assets have been exhausted."
In the case of "direct" liability, plaintiff argues that a creditor of the partnership may immediately
execute against the assets of a partner to satisfy a judgment against the partnership. 805 ILCS
206/307(d)(5) (West 2012). When it comes to "secondary" liability, however, plaintiff argues
that a separate, subsequent action against an individual partner is required. The reason, he
claims, is that a judgment against the partner may only be obtained once the partnership assets
have been exhausted. Plaintiff argues that sections 2-410 and 2-411 of the Code, which
specifically authorize an action against an individual partner to enforce an unsatisfied judgment
against a partnership, "operate as an exception to res judicata" in the case of secondary liability.
¶ 22 Dagoberto, on the other hand, reads the foregoing provisions slightly differently.
Dagoberto maintains that there are two different ways by which a judgment can be obtained
against a partner under section 306 of the Act: (1) a plaintiff can bring an action against both the
individual partner and the partnership and obtain a judgment as to both; or (2) a plaintiff can
bring suit against the partnership and obtain a judgment, then bring a second suit to hold the
partner liable for the partnership's judgment. He argues that, in the case at bar, plaintiff chose the
first method, failed to obtain a judgment against him, and is now "attempting to sue [him] a
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second time for the partnership obligation as though he had not been named in the first suit as
directly liable or 'doing business as' G&G Cement Contractors."
¶ 23 Surprisingly, there appear to be no Illinois decisions that directly address the present
issue, i.e., whether a judgment creditor of a partnership may sue an individual partner to enforce
the partnership's obligation when the partner was named in the underlying action and found not
liable. Plaintiff has nonetheless cited three cases from foreign jurisdictions that he claims
support the view that res judicata should not bar his claim against Dagoberto: Wayne Smith
Construction Co. v. Wolman, Duberstein & Thompson, 604 N.E.2d 157 (Ohio 1992) (Wayne
Smith I); Thompson v. Wayne Smith Construction Co., 640 N.E.2d 408 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994)
(Wayne Smith II); and Travelers Insurance Co. v. St. Jude Hospital of Kenner, Louisiana, Inc.,
37 F.3d 193 (5th Cir. 1994). These cases are not binding on this court; however, "comparable
court decisions of other jurisdictions 'are persuasive authority and entitled to respect.' " Kostal v.
Pinkus Dermatopathology Laboratory, P.C., 357 Ill. App. 3d 381, 395 (2005) (quoting In re
Marriage of Raski, 64 Ill. App. 3d 629, 633 (1978)). Given the lack of Illinois case law on point,
we choose to examine the cited cases. See id.
¶ 24 Wayne Smith I and Wayne Smith II are collection actions arising out of the same breach
of contract action in South Carolina. Wayne Smith I, 604 N.E.2d at 158; Wayne Smith II, 640
N.E.2d at 410. The common plaintiff in those cases obtained a judgment against a partnership
and its individual partners in the amount of $107,381.65. Wayne Smith I, 604 N.E.2d at 158;
Wayne Smith II, 640 N.E.2d at 410. The South Carolina appellate court, however, vacated the
judgment against the individual partners, finding that the plaintiff had "contracted only with the
partnership as an entity and not with the partners individually." Wayne Smith I, 604 N.E.2d at
158; Wayne Smith II, 640 N.E.2d at 410.
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¶ 25 Wayne Smith I was an Ohio action brought by the plaintiff against the individual partners
to collect the outstanding judgment against the partnership. Wayne Smith I, 604 N.E.2d at 159.
The individual partners agreed in that case that the partnership's assets were insufficient to
satisfy the outstanding judgment. Id. They maintained, however, that they were not personally
liable for the outstanding judgment based on the South Carolina Court of Appeals opinion, which
they alleged had overturned the judgment with respect to their liability. Id. The trial court
ultimately ruled in favor of the plaintiff, and the individual partners appealed to the Supreme
Court of Ohio. Id.
¶ 26 On appeal, the individual partners argued that res judicata barred the plaintiff from
executing on their personal assets to satisfy the outstanding judgment against the partnership. Id.
The Supreme Court of Ohio, looking to the South Carolina Court of Appeals' opinion, initially
found that the court used ambiguous language in referring to the liability of the partners "as
individuals." Id. The court questioned:
"[D]id the South Carolina court determine that since the partners
had not contracted in their individual capacities, [the plaintiff]
could not obtain satisfaction of the entire debt from any one
partner (i.e., no several liability)? Or did that court hold that the
partners' personal assets were not available to satisfy any portion
of the outstanding debt (i.e., no joint liability)?" Id. at 159-60.
¶ 27 The Supreme Court of Ohio resolved this question by looking to South Carolina law.
The court noted that "South Carolina common law *** requires that a partnership judgment
creditor first exhaust partnership assets before proceeding against the individual property of the
partners." Id. at 160. The court explained that "[o]nly after satisfying this condition precedent
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may the judgment creditor then proceed against the property of the individual partners who, at
the time of the South Carolina judgment rendered herein, would have been jointly liable for their
proportionate share of the partnership debt." (Emphasis in original) Id. The Supreme Court of
Ohio ultimately determined that, in light of South Carolina case law and legislation, the South
Carolina Court of Appeals "held that actions could not be maintained and judgments rendered
against the individual partners upon the entire debt, thereby vacating the lower court's decision as
to 'several' liability only." Id. It concluded that "[t]he partners' proportionate share of
responsibility for the contractual debt of their partnership remains, leaving to [the plaintiff] the
power of execution." Id.
¶ 28 Wayne Smith II, meanwhile, was a separate action brought by the plaintiff to collect the
partnership debt from a single partner, Kenneth Thompson, who resided in the State of Indiana.
Wayne Smith II, 640 N.E.2d at 410. The trial court in that case entered judgment against
Thompson for the partnership's entire outstanding judgment. Id. Thompson then appealed,
arguing that res judicata prevented Ohio and Indiana from reaching the partners' assets in light of
the South Carolina Court of Appeals' decision vacating the judgment against the individual
partners. Id. at 411. Thompson specifically claimed that "South Carolina conclusively
established the lack of individual liability on the part of the partners." Id. The Indiana Court of
Appeals noted, however, that Thompson's argument "presuppose[d] that the only way to reach a
partner's individual assets is to show that the partner, in his individual capacity, entered into a
separate contract with the creditor." Id. The court noted that in South Carolina and most other
states that impose joint liability for partnership obligations, there are, in fact, two ways to
establish the individual liability of a partner: (1) by proving a separate contract, and (2) by
proving that partnership assets have been exhausted. Id. The court noted that there was a
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distinction in South Carolina law that "a partnership creditor must try to satisfy his judgment
from partnership property before reaching individual property; whereas an individual creditor
may attach any property the partner owns at any time." Id. The court found that "[b]y vacating
the judgment against the individual partners, the South Carolina appellate court merely
established that, at the time judgment was entered, [the plaintiff] was still a creditor of the
partnership and not of each partner individually." Id. at 412. It ultimately concluded:
"The South Carolina decision established that neither of the
two circumstances giving rise to individual liability existed. The
existence of a separate contract would have to be raised in the
original action, thus the court's finding on that issue is res judicata
and binding upon this court through the Full Faith and Credit
Clause. However, it is impossible for a creditor to prove that
partnership assets have been exhausted until a judgment had been
procured against the partnership and returned unsatisfied. The
court based its finding of non-liability upon separate-contract
grounds. It did not state that both methods of proving individual
liability had been foreclosed. Thompson concedes that the
partnership assets have been exhausted. Accordingly, [the
plaintiff] is now on the level of other unsecured creditors of all the
individual partners." Id.
¶ 29 The final case cited by plaintiff comes from the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit. In Travelers Insurance Co., the plaintiff filed a multicount complaint against a
partnership and its general partner, seeking, inter alia, a judgment against the partnership on a
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promissory note of which the plaintiff was the payee. Travelers Insurance Co., 37 F.3d at 194.
The plaintiff made no reference in its complaint to the general partner's "secondary liability for
any judgment rendered against the Partnership," and a judgment was ultimately entered against
the partnership alone. Id. The plaintiff attempted to collect the judgment from the partnership,
but was unable to do so and filed a second suit against the general partner. Id. The parties both
moved for summary judgment, and the general partner asserted that the plaintiff's claim was
barred by res judicata. Id. at 194-95. The general partner argued that "because it was a
defendant in the Partnership Litigation, [the plaintiff] was required to assert all claims against it
in that litigation, including any for secondary liability on a judgment against the Partnership."
Id. at 195. The district court, however, granted summary judgment to the plaintiff. Id.
¶ 30 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit noted that federal res judicata rules applied and that the only
factor at issue was "whether both cases involve[d] the same cause of action." Id. Applying a
transactional test to address this factor, the court turned to its prior decision in Federal Deposit
Insurance Corp. v. Mmahat, 960 F.2d 1325 (5th Cir. 1992), which "held implicitly that, under
Louisiana law, a judgment creditor's claim against a partner for his virile share of a judgment
against the partnership does not arise out of the same nucleus of operative facts as the
partnership's debt." Travelers Insurance Co., 37 F.3d at 196. While the court observed that the
general partner was a party in the underlying litigation, unlike the partner in Mmahat, it found
this to be "a distinction without a difference." Id. Specifically, it found:
"[B]ecause we are dealing with the transactional test aspect (fourth
factor), [the general partner's] presence in the Partnership
Litigation is immaterial in determining whether this action *** is
barred. The issue, in its simplest terms, is whether [the plaintiff's]
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claim against [the general partner] in this action arises from the
same nucleus of operative facts as in the Partnership Litigation. As
stated, pursuant to the holding in Mmahat, it does not." Id. at 196-
97.
¶ 31 The case at bar is similar to the preceding cases in that plaintiff is seeking to collect an
outstanding judgment against a partnership from an individual partner despite the fact that the
individual partner was named in the underlying lawsuit. It is further similar in that the individual
partner, Dagoberto, claims that such an action is barred by res judicata. We find, similar to
Travelers Insurance Co., that res judicata does not bar plaintiff's claims in this case.
¶ 32 "Res judicata is an equitable principle intended to prevent multiple lawsuits between the
same parties involving the same facts and issues." Langone v. Schad, Diamond & Shedden,
P.C., 406 Ill. App. 3d 820, 832 (2010). "Res judicata bars any subsequent actions when a final
judgment was reached on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction between their same
parties or privies on the same cause of action." Id. " 'Res judicata is conclusive as to any matter
that was offered to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, as well as any other matter that might
have been offered for that purpose.' " Id. (quoting Dalan/Jupiter, Inc. v. Draper & Kramer, Inc.,
372 Ill. App. 3d 362, 367 (2007)). "Therefore, the moving party must demonstrate (1) an
identity of the parties or their privies in the two lawsuits; (2) an identity to the causes of action;
and (3) a final judgment on the merits of the first lawsuit." Id.
¶ 33 In this case, as in Travelers Insurance Co., the only factor at issue between the parties is
whether there is an identity to the causes of action in the instant lawsuit and the previous
litigation. We apply a transactional test to make this determination. River Park, Inc. v. City of
Highland Park, 184 Ill. 2d 290, 310 (1998). Under this test, "separate claims will be considered
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the same cause of action for purposes of res judicata if they arise from a single group of
operative facts, regardless of whether they assert different theories of relief." Id. at 311.
¶ 34 Here, plaintiff's third amended complaint filed in the previous litigation alleged that
Dagoberto was negligent for the car accident which led to his injuries. The instant complaint, on
the other hand, seeks to recover from Dagoberto, individually, an unsatisfied judgment against
G&G, the firm of which Dagoberto was a partner. There is no question that these two cases arise
from different groups of operative facts: the prior litigation arose from a car accident involving
an employee of G&G; the latter arose out of the failure of G&G to satisfy its partnership debts.
We therefore find that res judicata does not bar plaintiff from bringing a second action against
Dagoberto to enforce the obligations of the partnership. 2
¶ 35 We agree with plaintiff, and the court in Wayne Smith II, that there are two distinct ways
of establishing the liability of an individual partner: (1) through "direct" liability by showing that
an individual partner was liable, personally or vicariously, for an injury "independent of the
existence of the partnership"; and (2) through "secondary" liability by showing that the
individual partner is liable for an unsatisfied judgment against the partnership. Today, we hold
that plaintiff is not barred from seeking to establish Dagoberto's secondary liability, through his
status as a general partner of G&G, for an unsatisfied judgment against the partnership merely
because plaintiff has previously sought to hold him vicariously liable for the underlying
negligence caused by an employee of the partnership.
¶ 36 In reaching our conclusion, we have considered the text of sections 306 and 307 of the
Act and sections 2-410 and 2-411 of the Code and find nothing to suggest that a plaintiff is
barred from maintaining separate actions against an individual partner for his direct and
2
We note that plaintiff's filing of a citation to discover assets against Dagoberto was not an "action" under
section 2-411(b) of the Code. Johnson v. St. Therese Medical Center, 296 Ill. App. 3d 341, 347 (1998).
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secondary liability. On the contrary, we find that sections 2-410 and 2-411(b) of the Code
broadly authorize creditors of partnerships to bring suit against individual partners to collect on
unsatisfied judgments of the partnership. See 735 ILCS 5/2-410, 2-411(b) (West 2012).
¶ 37 Dagoberto argues that this court's holding would lead to absurd and unfair results because
it would "allow a second suit for the same obligation." His argument fails. This is not a
situation in which a claimant seeks two bites at "the" apple; instead, this situation involves two
separate and distinct apples. As indicated above, our holding does not allow a second suit for the
same obligation; rather, it allows separate suits for separate obligations, i.e., one suit to
determine Dagoberto's liability—under respondeat superior—for an employee's negligence, and
another suit to determine Dagoberto's liability—as a general partner of G&G—for the
partnership's unsatisfied judgments. We therefore find Dagoberto's claim to be without merit
and conclude that the circuit court erred in dismissing plaintiff's claim against Dagoberto on the
grounds of res judicata.
¶ 38 CONCLUSION
¶ 39 For the reasons stated, we reverse the order of the circuit court and remand the cause for
further proceedings.
¶ 40 Reversed and remanded.
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