People v. Sanders

2015 IL App (4th) 130881
FILED
June 5, 2015
Carla Bender
NO. 4-13-0881 4th District Appellate
Court, IL
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) McLean County
DERRY SANDERS, ) No. 12CF23
Defendant-Appellant. )
) Honorable
) Robert L. Freitag,
) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Steigmann and Appleton concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 In May 2013, a jury found defendant, Derry "Jay" Sanders, guilty of two counts
of criminal sexual assault. On appeal, defendant asserts the trial court (1) improperly denied his
Batson challenge (Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986)), and (2) erred when it prohibited
defense counsel from introducing the content of text messages the complaining witness, B.J.,
sent another man the night of the offense. We affirm.
¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 In January 2012, the State indicted defendant, a Caucasian male, on two counts of
criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/11-1.20(a)(2) (West 2010)) and one count of unlawful
possession of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/402(c) (West 2010)). Defendant entered an
open plea of guilty to the unlawful possession charge and proceeded to jury trial on the two
criminal sexual assault charges.
¶4 A. Motion in Limine
¶5 In May 2012, the State filed a motion in limine to exclude testimony regarding
B.J.'s sexual history under section 115-7 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (the rape-
shield statute) (725 ILCS 5/115-7 (West 2010)). Specifically, the State sought to prevent
defendant from introducing testimony regarding sexually suggestive text messages B.J. sent to
Nick Lacomba (a bouncer at Fat Jacks bar in Bloomington, Illinois) on the night of the offense.
¶6 At a February 2013 hearing on the motion, the State argued the text messages
were evidence of B.J.'s sexual history under the rape-shield statute and had no relevancy to the
case against defendant. Defendant responded the sexual assault charges against him were
predicated upon defendant knowing B.J. was unable to give knowing consent and the text
messages were relevant because they related to B.J.'s cognitive abilities. Defendant further
argued the text messages were not covered by the rape-shield statute because they were only
statements relating to sex—not actual prior sexual activity.
¶7 Following the hearing, the trial court granted the State's motion in part and denied
the motion in part. The court explained:
"[I]n this court's opinion, the evidence does touch on the
complainant's prior sexual history and/or reputation.
After having given this a lot of thought, probably much
more thought than the parties ever thought the court would, I think
that a balance can be struck in this situation, and that's what my
ruling is going to be. The court is going to allow the witness to
testify that he had personal contact with the victim at the bar
between two and 4:30 a.m. He may testify to his observations of
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her physical condition and his ability to converse with her and she
with him. He can also testify that he received a series of text
messages and had a phone conversation with her up until
somewhere around 4:30 a.m. However, the court will bar the
witness from disclosing any sexual suggestions or the actual
content of the conversation as far as it goes to sexual suggestions,
and I will not allow the content of the text messages themselves to
be admitted because of their sexual content.
I think this strikes a balance between giving the defendant
an opportunity to present evidence of the victim's alleged abilities
while also protecting her reputation and her from being harassed
based upon the content of some of those conversations. So, in
essence, the motion is allowed in part and denied in part."
¶8 In April 2013, defendant filed a motion to reconsider the trial court's ruling on the
State's motion in limine, which the court denied. The court found its ruling struck the proper
balance because it allowed defendant to pursue the issue of whether B.J. had the cognitive ability
to consent based upon her ability to communicate both electronically and in person with
Lacomba, while protecting her from embarrassment and harassment. It noted, "the substance of
those [text messages,] they're—if they're offered will serve only to demonstrate a level of
promiscuity *** to suggest, even if not overtly, *** if she was promiscuous with one individual
then she obviously must have been promiscuous with the defendant. And I think that's what the
statute is meant to avoid."
¶9 B. Voir Dire
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¶ 10 The jury venire in this case consisted of 32 potential jurors. The precise racial
makeup of the venire is unknown. What is known is the State exercised its third and sixth
peremptory challenges on African-American venire members. Following the State's sixth
challenge, the following colloquy took place:
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge, I would ask the court to
note that two challenges have been made to the only two African
Americans that we've reached at this point in time, that being
[Juror 100 and Juror 14].
THE COURT: All right. The court will note that those two
jurors indicated by counsel appear to be African American.
[THE STATE]: I'll just ask because we think we need to at
this point in time, is there a Batson challenge?
THE COURT: I'm not sure what you're asking, [defense
counsel].
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I first wanted the court to make
that foundationary [sic] finding, and yes, I am making a Batson
challenge.
THE COURT: As indicated, the court would agree that
[Juror 100 and Juror 14] both appear to be African American in
descent. The State has asked to excuse both of those jurors, along
with several others. The court is required to make a finding that
there is a pattern of excusing jurors based upon race before the
court is to call upon the party challenged to offer some race neutral
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reason for why they've excused those jurors. It's always somewhat
difficult to do when the numbers of those who are of an apparent
minority are small. In this particular panel, I believe there are
three individuals of African American descent, although one we
have not reached yet is later on down the road here. There have
only been two thus far. I think it's almost virtually impossible to
create a pattern with one, perhaps with two, certainly with three.
I'm not convinced at this point that a pattern has been established.
There are two jurors who have been excused, but there are
certainly a lot of other jurors the State has excused, five other
jurors, or four other jurors, rather, who are not of minority, so I
don't—I'm not at the point yet where I think that there is a pattern
of exclusion based upon race that is obvious or evident. So at this
point I'm not going to require the State to provide a race neutral
explanation. ***
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge, I'm sorry, I'm not arguing
with, just for record keeping purposes, the State dismissed [Juror
14], and who was the other one out of there?
THE COURT: [Juror 100].
[THE STATE]: [Juror 100].
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: She was in our last panel then.
THE COURT: Correct.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Thank you."
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¶ 11 C. Trial and Posttrial Proceedings
¶ 12 In May 2013, defendant's case proceeded to jury trial. Although the sufficiency
of the evidence is not at issue, we find the following brief summary of the evidence presented at
trial helpful to a full understanding of the issues on appeal.
¶ 13 B.J. testified she knew defendant as the bartender at Fat Jacks in Bloomington,
Illinois. On the night of the offense, B.J. went to Fat Jacks around 11:45 p.m., where defendant
gave her free alcohol all night. B.J. had maybe 12 drinks—five or six beers and several shots of
Grey Goose vodka. When the bar closed at 2 a.m., she stayed and continued talking to defendant
because she was upset. She asked defendant if he wanted to go back to her apartment to
continue drinking, and they called a cab. Instead of going to B.J.'s apartment, the cab driver took
them to defendant's apartment because defendant told B.J. he had to grab some things. When
they arrived at defendant's apartment, they went inside and continued drinking. B.J. explained
she had two more beers and was sitting on the couch drinking and sending text messages until
she told defendant she needed to go to bed. Defendant took her downstairs to his bedroom and
she took off all of her clothes except for a tank top and underwear. As soon as she lay down in
defendant's bed, her head began spinning and she told defendant she was going to get sick. She
ran upstairs to the bathroom, where she vomited and dry heaved. When she came out of the
bathroom, defendant handed her some water and she went back to bed.
¶ 14 The next thing B.J. remembered was waking up to defendant having sex with her.
She explained she did not understand what was happening to her, and she "just froze." At one
point, she heard defendant spit and felt his fingers inside of her. She stated she kept her head
under the covers and did not say a word during the entire incident. After defendant finished
having sex with her, B.J.'s "brain told [her]" she just needed to wait until 7 a.m.—until defendant
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fell asleep— and then she could leave. However, she could not wait any longer, and woke
defendant up to tell him she needed to get home to take care of her dog. Defendant called B.J. a
cab, and B.J. sent a text message to her mother telling her to meet her at her apartment.
¶ 15 B.J.'s parents took her to the hospital, where she talked to the Bloomington police
about the incident. Police officers then went to defendant's house, where they found defendant
under a blanket in a utility room next to his bedroom. Defendant was taken into custody and
interviewed regarding the incident. During the interview, defendant's version of events mirrored
B.J.'s version, until the time of the alleged sexual assault. Defendant explained he and B.J. took
a cab to his apartment, where they continued drinking. B.J. told him she wanted to go to bed and
took off her clothes. B.J. had to throw up, so defendant showed her where the bathroom was.
Defendant explained he could hear her vomiting and asked her if she needed any water. B.J.
then went back to bed.
¶ 16 Defendant later joined her in bed and fell asleep, but B.J. woke him up when she
started to rub his penis. Defendant stated he could not believe it was happening, but B.J. pulled
him closer, grabbed his crotch, and they began having intercourse. He told the police officers
B.J. did not say anything during the incident—"she just laid there"—but he could hear her
moaning and her hips were gyrating. He admitted to the police officers B.J. had never flirted
with him or given him any indication beforehand that she wanted to begin an intimate
relationship. When asked whether he thought she was intoxicated, defendant replied, "On one
level yeah. I mean, yeah," and when asked whether he would have let her drive home from the
bar, he responded, "absolutely not."
¶ 17 Several witnesses testified regarding B.J.'s cognitive abilities near the time of the
incident. Roger Coyne, the taxi driver who picked defendant and B.J. up from Fat Jacks,
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explained both defendant and B.J. appeared normal to him and stated they "weren't walking ***
like they were drunk." Defendant's roommate, Nick Bargmann, testified B.J. appeared to be
sober while she was at the apartment.
¶ 18 Pursuant to the trial court's ruling on the State's motion in limine, Lacomba
testified he had been texting B.J. until after 4 a.m. and had talked to her on the phone for around
15 to 20 minutes. He stated, "Based on the conversation [they] had, the consistency of the
conversation, and [B.J.'s] body language before leaving the bar," he did not believe B.J. was
intoxicated. On cross-examination, the State asked Lacomba whether B.J.'s text messages made
it clear she did not want to be at defendant's house. Lacomba responded, "I wouldn't say that
was very clear." The State rephrased its question: "It was clear that she didn't want to stay at the
Defendant's house. In fact, she asked you for a ride?" Lacomba responded, "Yes."
¶ 19 Following presentation of the evidence, the jury found defendant guilty on both
counts of criminal sexual assault. In July 2013, the trial court sentenced defendant to
consecutive eight-year terms of imprisonment on the criminal sexual assault convictions and a
consecutive three-year term of imprisonment on the unlawful possession conviction. Later that
month, defendant filed a motion to reconsider his sentence and a motion to withdraw his guilty
plea on the unlawful possession charge. In August 2013, the court denied both motions.
¶ 20 This appeal followed.
¶ 21 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 22 On appeal, defendant argues the trial court (1) improperly denied his Batson
challenge following the State's peremptory challenge of Juror 14, and (2) erred when it
prohibited defense counsel from introducing testimony regarding the content of text messages
B.J. sent to Lacomba on the night of the offense.
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¶ 23 A. The Batson Challenge
¶ 24 Defendant first argues the trial court erred in denying his Batson challenge
because it never gave defense counsel an opportunity to establish a prima facie case of
purposeful discrimination against African-American members of the venire. In the alternative,
defendant argues (1) the trial court's ruling on his challenge was incorrect as a matter of law, and
(2) the record supports a prima facie finding of purposeful racial discrimination. The State
contends defendant forfeited the issue of whether the trial court erred by denying his Batson
challenge because he failed to raise the issue in a posttrial motion.
¶ 25 Generally, to preserve a claim of error for appeal, a party must raise an objection
both at trial and in a posttrial motion. People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186, 522 N.E.2d 1124,
1129 (1988). However, our supreme court has relaxed the forfeiture rules with regard to
"constitutional issues which have properly been raised at trial and which can be raised later in a
post-conviction hearing petition." Id. at 190, 522 N.E.2d at 1131-32. Thus, because a Batson
claim involves a constitutional issue and defendant properly objected at trial, we will address the
merits of his appeal. See People v. Mitchell, 152 Ill. 2d 274, 285, 604 N.E.2d 877, 884 (1992).
¶ 26 1. Batson Procedure
¶ 27 In Batson, the United States Supreme Court established a three-step process for
evaluating claims of alleged racial discrimination in the jury selection process. First, "the
defendant must make a prima facie showing that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory
challenges on the basis of race." People v. Williams, 209 Ill. 2d 227, 244, 807 N.E.2d 448, 459
(2004). During the second step, once the trial court determines defendant has established a
prima facie case, the burden shifts to the State to provide a race-neutral explanation for
excluding the potential jury members. Id. Defendant may then rebut the proffered reason as
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pretextual. Id. Finally, during the third step of the Batson hearing, the trial court must determine
whether the defendant has met his burden of showing purposeful discrimination in light of the
parties' submissions. Id.
¶ 28 The issues in this case involve the first step of the Batson process—i.e., whether
defendant established a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination. To establish a prima facie
case under Batson, a defendant must demonstrate that relevant circumstances give rise to an
inference of purposeful discrimination on behalf of the State. People v. Davis, 231 Ill. 2d 349,
360, 899 N.E.2d 238, 245 (2008). In determining whether a defendant has met this burden, the
trial court "must consider 'the totality of the relevant facts' and 'all relevant circumstances'
surrounding the peremptory strike to see if they give rise to a discriminatory purpose." Id.
(quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 94, 96-97). Relevant factors the court should consider include the
following:
"(1) racial identity between the [party exercising the peremptory
challenge] and the excluded venirepersons; (2) a pattern of strikes
against African-American venirepersons; (3) a disproportionate use
of peremptory challenges against African-American venirepersons;
(4) the level of African-American representation in the venire as
compared to the jury; (5) the prosecutor's questions and statements
[of the challenging party] during voir dire examination and while
exercising peremptory challenges; (6) whether the excluded
African-American venirepersons were a heterogenous group
sharing race as their only common characteristic; and (7) the race
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of the defendant, victim, and witnesses." People v. Williams, 173
Ill. 2d 48, 71, 670 N.E.2d 638, 650 (1996).
See also People v. Rivera, 221 Ill. 2d 481, 501, 852 N.E.2d 771, 783-84 (2006). A trial court's
ruling on the sufficiency of a prima facie case is a finding of fact that will not be disturbed unless
it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. at 502, 852 N.E.2d at 784.
¶ 29 2. Defendant's Argument on Appeal
¶ 30 Defendant first argues the trial court erred in denying his Batson challenge
because it never gave defense counsel an opportunity to establish a prima facie case. We
disagree.
¶ 31 After the State exercised its sixth peremptory challenge against Juror 14, defense
counsel asked the trial court to note "two challenges ha[d] been made to the only two African
Americans" the court had reached at that point in time. When prompted by the State, the court
asked defense counsel whether he was making a Batson challenge. Defense counsel responded,
his statements were a "foundationary [sic] finding" for the record, and "yes, [he was] making a
Batson challenge." The court then concluded defendant's proffered evidence was insufficient to
establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination, finding no need to elicit a race-neutral
explanation from the State.
¶ 32 Nothing about this exchange leads us to believe defendant was not given an
opportunity to establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination. The trial court asked
defense counsel to clarify his statements regarding the challenged African-American jurors and
defense counsel responded by stating he was making a "foundationary [sic] finding" to support
his Batson challenge. Defendant was not interrupted or prevented from making any additional
arguments. Moreover, at no point did defense counsel interject or request the court to consider
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anything other than his initial assertion the State had peremptorily challenged both
African-American venire members. Rather, following the trial court's pronouncement, defense
counsel thanked the court, and jury selection continued. We find defendant was given a full
opportunity to establish a prima facie case, and the record contains the extent of the evidence
defense counsel sought to offer.
¶ 33 We note, in making this initial argument, defendant impliedly admits the evidence
he set forth at trial was insufficient to establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination.
He claims, had he been given the opportunity, he could have set forth evidence sufficient for the
trial court to draw an inference of purposeful discrimination. He then attempts to establish a
prima facie case on appeal by addressing the seven factors laid out in both Williams and Rivera
and argues the record produced evidence sufficient to permit the trial court to draw an inference
of discrimination in the State's use of peremptory strikes. We remind defendant, he had the
burden of establishing a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination before the trial court—not
on appeal. See id. at 512, 852 N.E.2d at 789.
¶ 34 Defendant relies on this court's decision People v. Shaw, 2014 IL App (4th)
121157, 21 N.E.3d 802, and argues the trial court has the burden of guiding the parties through
the Batson process and asking questions based upon the seven relevant factors to determine
whether defendant has set out a prima facie case. We disagree with defendant's interpretation of
our decision in Shaw.
¶ 35 In Shaw, defense counsel raised a Batson challenge after the State excused the
first African-American venire member. Id. ¶ 8, 21 N.E.3d 802. In support of his challenge,
counsel alleged the challenged juror was the only African-American in the panel thus far, and
there were " 'no facts or other relevant circumstances that would raise an inference that [the
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challenge] was anything other than for race.' " Id. Before the trial court could respond, however,
the State argued defense counsel was not following correct procedure; counsel had to establish a
pattern with regard to challenges based on race. Id. The court then ruled on the challenge,
stating only, " 'Defendant has not established a pattern under Batson.' " Id.
¶ 36 On appeal, we held it was "unclear whether the trial court found defendant
established a prima facie case of discrimination" because the court did not follow the well-
established three-step procedure for addressing Batson claims. Id. ¶ 26, 21 N.E.3d 802. We
specifically ruled, "[The three-step] procedure was not followed here and, as a result, the record
is insufficient for us to conduct a meaningful review of defendant's Batson challenges." Id. ¶ 30,
21 N.E.3d 802. In so holding, we noted a pattern is only one of several factors a trial court
should consider in determining whether a defendant has established a prima facie case of
purposeful discrimination. Id. ¶ 26, 21 N.E.3d 802. Our point in Shaw was simply to emphasize
the importance of the three-step process and to remind the trial court to consider all relevant
factors—not to transfer the burden of establishing a prima facie case from the defendant to the
trial court. The three-step process was properly followed in the present case, and thus, we must
determine whether the trial court erred in finding defendant's evidence insufficient to support a
prima facie finding. We conclude it did not.
¶ 37 Although the threshold for making out a prima facie case is not high, a defendant
must still produce evidence "sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that
discrimination has occurred." Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 170 (2005). The "mere
number of [minority] venirepersons peremptorily challenged, without more, will not establish a
prima facie case of discrimination." Davis, 231 Ill. 2d at 361, 899 N.E.2d at 245; see also
Rivera, 221 Ill. 2d at 512, 852 N.E.2d at 789-90 ("The number of persons struck takes on
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meaning only when coupled with other information such as the racial composition of the venire,
the race of others struck, or the voir dire answers of those who were struck compared to the
answers of those who were not struck.").
¶ 38 Defense counsel's Batson objection below relied solely on the fact the State used
peremptory challenges to exclude the first two African-American venire members—i.e., there
was a pattern of strikes against African-Americans. In responding to defendant's allegations, the
court noted the difficulty of establishing a pattern with so few minority venire members and
noted the State had exercised four other peremptory challenges against nonminority venire
members. Based on the evidence before it, the court found no reason to require the State to
provide a race-neutral explanation.
¶ 39 On appeal, defendant does not argue his proffered evidence was sufficient to
establish a prima facie case; he argues the trial court's ruling was incorrect as a matter of law.
He quotes a portion of the court's ruling, which states, "I think it's almost virtually impossible to
create a pattern with one, perhaps two, certainly with three." He contends this statement directly
contradicts the United States Supreme Court rule stating the "Constitution forbids striking even a
single prospective juror for a discriminatory purpose." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 478 (2008). Defendant's reliance on this rule is misplaced
because, as mentioned earlier, the existence of a pattern is only one of many factors a defendant
has in his arsenal to support a claim of purposeful discrimination in the selection of a jury.
¶ 40 Where evidence of a pattern is an irrelevant factor, such as when there has only
been one African-American challenged, a defendant must set forth other evidence which gives
rise to an inference of discrimination. See People v. Davis, 345 Ill. App. 3d 901, 910, 803
N.E.2d 514, 522 (2004) (holding a "pattern of strikes" is an irrelevant factor in determining
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whether the defendant established a prima facie case of discrimination under Batson where there
is only one African-American in the venire). Moreover, "requiring a trial court to find a
defendant has established a prima facie case based solely upon the fact that the State has
peremptorily excused all of the black jurors from the venire *** would effectively negate
consideration of all the other relevant circumstances *** and would be inconsistent with
Batson." People v. Jones, 177 Ill. App. 3d 663, 668-69, 532 N.E.2d 543, 546 (1988).
¶ 41 In this case the existence of a pattern of discrimination was the extent of
defendant's argument in support of his Batson claim. Looking to the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the State's challenges, the trial court found no pattern had been
established. Yet, defendant would have us conclude the court erred because it did not sua sponte
address other factors, which he claims were potentially in his favor. We decline to do so. As
stated above, the trial court is not tasked with establishing defendant's prima facie case for him.
Further, as the party making the Batson objection, defendant was responsible for preserving the
record, and any ambiguities must be construed against him. Rivera, 221 Ill. 2d at 512, 852
N.E.2d at 789. From the record, we know (1) defendant is Caucasian, (2) the court "believed"
there were only three African-Americans in the venire pool, (3) the State exercised four
peremptory strikes against Caucasians, and (4) Juror 100 shared several characteristics with other
excluded venire members and Juror 14 had not spoken at all. Thus, we are left only to speculate
as to (1) the actual racial makeup of the venire, (2) the race of the complaining witness, and (3)
whether any African-American venire members served on the jury. Given the substance of
defendant's Batson challenge and the content of the record on appeal, we conclude the trial
court's ruling was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 42 B. The Rape-Shield Statute
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¶ 43 Defendant next argues the trial court erred when it prohibited defense counsel
from introducing the content of various text messages between B.J. and Lacomba on the night of
the offense. He specifically argues (1) the communications were not covered by the rape-shield
statute and (2) even if the communications were covered by the rape-shield statute, their
admission was "constitutionally required" to show B.J.'s state of mind and ability to consent to
sexual relations with defendant.
¶ 44 Nevertheless, because we conclude the content of the text messages should have
been excluded as irrelevant, we need not determine whether sexually based text messages, in the
proper case, are considered "prior sexual activity" or "reputation" pursuant to the rape-shield
statute. See People v. Schuldt, 217 Ill. App. 3d 534, 541, 577 N.E.2d 870, 876 (1991) (holding
evidence not properly barred by the rape-shield statute "remain[s] subject to standards of
relevancy"); see also Bell v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 106 Ill. 2d 135, 148, 478 N.E.2d
384, 389 (1985) (holding a reviewing court "can sustain the decision of the circuit court on any
grounds which are called for by the record regardless of whether the circuit court relied on the
grounds and regardless of whether the circuit court's reasoning was correct").
¶ 45 The State charged defendant with criminal sexual assault pursuant to section
11-1.20(a)(2) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/11-1.20(a)(2) (West 2010)), which
states, in relevant part, "A person commits criminal sexual assault if [he] commits an act of
sexual penetration and *** knows that the victim *** is unable to give knowing consent[.]"
Defendant argues the content of the text messages was relevant because it goes directly to B.J.'s
state of mind, ability to consent, and, "more important," a third person's (Lacomba's) perception
of her ability to consent. Because nothing in the record indicates defendant had any knowledge
of what B.J. was saying to Lacomba, we fail to see how the content of B.J.'s text messages to
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Lacomba adds anything of value to the fact-finding enterprise. To sustain defendant's
conviction, the State was required to prove defendant knew B.J. was unable to give knowing
consent—not Lacomba. 720 ILCS 5/11-1.20(a)(2) (West 2010).
¶ 46 Even if we were to look solely at whether the evidence had a tendency to show
B.J. had the ability to consent—irrespective of what defendant knew—the trial court's ruling on
the State's motion in limine allowed Lacomba to testify regarding B.J.'s cognitive abilities during
their conversation. At trial, Lacomba explained he had conversed with B.J. between the hours of
2:30 a.m. and 4:30 a.m. and believed she was not intoxicated. He further testified the text
messages they exchanged were understandable and legible, and B.J. did not appear to have any
difficulty communicating during their 15- to 20-minute phone call.
¶ 47 We recognize a portion of defendant's argument relates to his ability to cross-
examine B.J. pursuant to the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment. See U.S. Const.,
amend. VI. However, not even the confrontation clause requires the admission of evidence
which poses an undue risk of harassment, prejudice, or confusion of the issues. Delaware v. Van
Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986). Rather, "[t]he true question is always one of relevancy."
People v. Hill, 289 Ill. App. 3d 859, 864, 683 N.E.2d 188, 191 (1997). As our sister court
explained in People v. Cornes, 80 Ill. App. 3d 166, 175, 399 N.E.2d 1346, 1352 (1980),
"Defendant's right of confrontation necessarily includes the right to cross-examine witnesses, but
that right does not extend to matters which are irrelevant and have little or no probative value.
Complainant's past sexual conduct has no bearing on whether she has consented to sexual
relations with defendant." Accordingly, we disagree that disclosure of the content of the text
messages was required to show B.J.'s "state of mind." Even if consent were at issue, B.J.'s
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willingness to engage in sexual conduct with Lacomba has absolutely no bearing on her
willingness to engage in sexual conduct with defendant.
¶ 48 Last, defendant argues the court's order allowed the State to mislead the jury into
believing B.J. was desperate to get away from defendant when, in reality, she wanted to have
consensual sexual relations with Lacomba. However, when the State asked Lacomba whether it
was clear B.J. wanted to "get away from" defendant, Lacomba stated, "I wouldn't say it was
clear." The only thing Lacomba positively testified to was that B.J. had asked him for a ride.
Again, we fail to see how B.J. wanting a ride from Lacomba has anything to do with whether she
had the ability to consent to sexual relations with defendant or whether defendant had knowledge
of that fact.
¶ 49 Defendant was given considerable latitude regarding the text messages exchanged
between B.J. and Lacomba. Revealing the sexual nature of those text messages would have
added no relevant information and would have served only to harass and embarrass B.J. on a
collateral matter. We find no error in the trial court's exclusion of the content of the
communications.
¶ 50 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 51 We affirm the trial court's judgment. As part of our judgment, we award the State
its $75 statutory assessment against defendant as costs of this appeal. 55 ILCS 5/4-2002(a)
(West 2012).
¶ 52 Affirmed.
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