People v. Gullens

2017 IL App (3d) 160668
Opinion filed October 24, 2017
_____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
2017
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
ILLINOIS, ) of the 13th Judicial Circuit,
) La Salle County, Illinois.
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
) Appeal No. 3-16-0668
v. ) Circuit No. 15-CF-331
)
KEITH R. GULLENS, )
) Honorable H. Chris Ryan Jr.,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.
_____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE SCHMIDT delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Presiding Justice Holdridge and Justice Lytton concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 This case exemplifies the adage: “No good deed goes unpunished.” Defendant, Keith R.
Gullens, argues that the circuit court erred in revoking his conditional discharge for committing
the offense of being a felon in possession of a weapon. The evidence at the revocation hearing
showed that defendant possessed a firearm, which either his younger brother or a friend (the
record is unclear which) had stolen, for approximately 10 minutes for the purpose of returning
the firearm to the store. Defendant argues that the affirmative defense of necessity applied to him
or, alternatively, fundamental fairness required that the court deny the State’s petition to revoke
defendant’s conditional discharge. We agree.
¶2 FACTS
¶3 Previously, defendant pled guilty to theft (720 ILCS 5/16-1(a)(1)(A) (West 2014)) in
exchange for a sentence of 30 months’ conditional discharge. As terms of his conditional
discharge, the court ordered defendant not to violate any criminal statutes and to refrain from
possessing a firearm or dangerous weapon. Approximately one month later, the State filed a
petition to revoke conditional discharge. The petition alleged that defendant violated his
conditional discharge by committing the offense of possession of a weapon by a felon (720 ILCS
5/24-1.1 (West 2016)).
¶4 The court held a hearing on the State’s petition to revoke conditional discharge. The State
submitted a certified copy of conviction showing that defendant had been convicted of criminal
damage to property, a Class 4 felony, in 2012.
¶5 The State called Michael Centko as its first witness. Centko testified that he was
employed by South Post Guns, a store that sold firearms and related items. On June 20, 2016,
defendant came to the store. Centko could not remember if defendant had purchased anything,
but said defendant might have purchased some ammunition. Later that day, defendant returned to
the store with a Glock 42 and gave it to Centko. Defendant told Centko that his younger brother
had stolen the gun. Centko reviewed the store’s surveillance footage from earlier that day. The
video recording revealed that a man who entered the store with defendant stole the Glock 42
while Centko was in a different area of the store talking to defendant about magazines or
cleaning brushes. Centko said he had no reason to believe defendant saw the man take the gun.
The State played the video footage from the security camera in court.
¶6 Detective Brad Demoss testified that he learned that a burglary occurred at South Post
Guns on June 22, 2016. While investigating this incident, Demoss learned of an incident that
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occurred two days prior in which defendant had returned a stolen gun to the store. Demoss
reviewed footage from the store’s security cameras from June 20. Demoss determined that
Gerald Bumper had stolen the gun. After Bumper grabbed the gun, he handed it to Rashad
Anchondo. Defendant and Darrell Gullens were in the store when Bumper stole the gun. When
defendant returned the gun later that day, Anchondo and Shane Rexroad were with him. Demoss
did not speak to Bumper about the incident because Bumper was murdered shortly after the
incident. Demoss spoke to defendant about the incident. A video of the interview was played in
court.
¶7 Demoss opined that as soon as defendant grabbed the gun from Anchondo, he violated
the law. The following exchange occurred between defense counsel and Demoss on cross-
examination:
“Q. Okay. I guess if [defendant] had called the police and said
—he still would have been in violation of the law as soon as he
grabbed the gun; is that right?
A. If he would have called the police, in my opinion, when he
found out that [Anchondo] and [Bumper] had stolen the gun and said
this is what happened, this is where the gun is, at that point I would
consider him to be a witness as opposed to a suspect.
Q. And you’re saying had he never possessed—
A. Had he never possessed the weapon.
Q. Okay. And if he doesn’t, if he doesn’t—it’s all safe to say if
he doesn’t possess the weapon, he doesn’t have control over that item;
is that right?
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A. That’s right.
Q. So, he can’t be sure that that item is going to be there when
the police show up? The guy could leave; is that right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And it’s also fair to say that it takes a certain type of
criminal to actually steal a gun. That’s a serious crime; right?
A. I believe so, yes.
Q. And the type of person that is willing to reach behind the
counter and take a Glock, that’s the type of person that could also be
capable of violence?
A. Potentially, yes, sir.
Q. Okay. And it’s fair to say that reporting to the police that
that happened could have potentially, from his perspective,
[defendant’s] perspective, subjected him to violence; isn’t that right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And I guess overall, overall arching, arching thing that we
are dealing with here, it’s certainly better that the gun was returned to
the person that owned it than staying out on the street. Can we all
agree to that?
A. I can agree to that.”
¶8 The State rested.
¶9 Defendant moved for a directed verdict, arguing that the State’s evidence supported a
necessity defense. Defendant contended that he took the gun from Anchondo in order to return it
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to the store because he did not want it in the public. Defendant argued that by possessing the gun
for a few minutes, he avoided a public harm significantly greater than him possessing a firearm.
The State argued that the necessity defense did not apply because defendant failed to establish
that an actual real harm was going to occur if he did not return the gun to the store. The court
denied the motion for a directed verdict.
¶ 10 Defendant called Damires DeLeon, the mother of his children, as his first witness.
DeLeon testified that on the day of the incident, she asked defendant to go out and compare the
costs of guns. DeLeon’s father had recently obtained a firearms owner’s identification (FOID)
card, and DeLeon wanted to give him the money to buy a gun as a gift.
¶ 11 Rexroad testified he attended a party with defendant and Anchondo on the date of the
incident. Anchondo pulled out a gun and showed it to Rexroad and defendant. Defendant became
upset and asked Anchondo where he obtained the gun. Anchondo told defendant he had taken it
from the store. Defendant said he would take it back. Defendant immediately returned the gun to
the store. Anchondo and Rexroad went with defendant to return the gun. The drive to the store
took approximately 5 to 10 minutes.
¶ 12 Defendant testified that he went to South Post Guns on the date of the incident because
DeLeon had asked him to determine the approximate cost of a gun. DeLeon wanted to purchase
a gun for her father. Anchondo went with defendant because he wanted to apply for a FOID card.
Bumper also went with them. Defendant testified that Anchondo was not a felon, but Bumper
might have been a felon. Defendant believed that he purchased a cleaning kit for DeLeon’s father
at the store. Defendant did not purchase any ammunition. When defendant left the store, he went
to Anchondo’s girlfriend’s house to drop off Anchondo and get high. Anchondo showed
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defendant a gun and said he had stolen it from South Post Guns. Defendant took the gun from
Anchondo. Defendant returned the gun to the store approximately 5 to 10 minutes later.
¶ 13 Defendant explained that he returned the gun because he did not want to get into trouble.
Defendant returned the gun himself because he did not believe Anchondo would return it, and
everyone he knew with a valid FOID card was at work. Defendant said the gun could have been
sold in Chicago and used for crime. Defendant explained that his only goal in possessing the gun
was to return it to the store. Defendant said he did not take the gun to the police because he was a
felon and he did not want to get in trouble. Defendant testified that he did not participate in the
burglary that occurred at the store two days later.
¶ 14 During closing argument, defendant argued that the affirmative defense of necessity
applied. The State contended that the defense of necessity did not apply. The State argued that
the necessity defense applied only to “real, actual harm” and not “some potential harm that
maybe falls on someone at some point in time.”
¶ 15 The court found that defendant violated his conditional discharge by being a felon in
possession of a weapon. The court determined that the defense of necessity did not apply. The
court reasoned:
“Whether or not necessity is going to rise to the level, the
accused has to have a reasonable belief such conduct was necessary to
avoid a public or private greater harm.
There is something to be said about this actuality. It has to be
something present, as opposed to potential future—especially in a
Petition to Revoke.
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It doesn’t take much. I mean, it’s a lesser standard. It’s not
beyond a reasonable doubt when the State carries their burden with it.
I appreciate the argument.
Just to point out a few things.
[Defendant] knew that [Anchondo], in his opinion, said
[Anchondo] is not a felon. And [Anchondo] went back to the store
with him, and he’s standing next to him.
Yeah. I’m just, I have some—I think there was other ways that
it could have been dealt with. I understand what he’s putting forth. I
can’t say anything else.”
¶ 16 The court resentenced defendant to three years’ imprisonment.
¶ 17 ANALYSIS
¶ 18 Defendant argues that the circuit court erred in granting the State’s petition to revoke his
conditional discharge because the affirmative defense of necessity applied or, alternatively,
fundamental fairness required that the court deny the petition to revoke because the purposes of
his conditional discharge were served by his continued liberty. We address each argument in
turn.
¶ 19 I. Necessity
¶ 20 First, defendant argues that the circuit court erred in granting the State’s petition to
revoke conditional discharge because, although he committed the offense of being a felon in
possession of a weapon, the affirmative defense of necessity applied to justify his conduct. We
find that the defense of necessity applied to defendant’s conduct in briefly possessing a stolen
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firearm to return it to the store, and the circuit court’s finding to the contrary was against the
manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 21 At a hearing on the State’s petition to revoke conditional discharge, the State has the
burden of proving a violation of a condition of conditional discharge by a preponderance of the
evidence. 730 ILCS 5/5-6-4(c) (West 2016). “[A] revocation of conditional discharge will be
overturned only when it is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.” People v. Smith, 337
Ill. App. 3d 819, 822 (2003). “A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the
opposite conclusion is clearly evident or if the finding itself is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not
based on the evidence presented.” People v. Deleon, 227 Ill. 2d 322, 332 (2008).
¶ 22 In section 7-13 of the Criminal Code of 2012, the affirmative defense of necessity is
defined as follows:
“Conduct which would otherwise be an offense is justifiable by reason
of necessity if the accused was without blame in occasioning or
developing the situation and reasonably believed such conduct was
necessary to avoid a public or private injury greater than the injury
which might reasonably result from his own conduct.” 720 ILCS 5/7-
13 (West 2016).
The defense of necessity “is viewed as involving the choice between two admitted evils where
other optional courses of action are unavailable [citations], and the conduct chosen must promote
some higher value than the value of literal compliance with the law [citation].” People v. Janik,
127 Ill. 2d 390, 399 (1989).
¶ 23 Here, the State does not dispute that defendant was without blame in occasioning or
developing the situation that resulted in the theft of the gun. Defendant testified that he did not
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know that Bumper and Anchondo had stolen the gun until after they left the store. Centko
testified that, after reviewing the video recording from the security camera, he had no reason to
believe defendant saw Bumper take the gun. Additionally, the evidence showed that defendant
reasonably believed that returning the gun was necessary to avoid a greater public or private
injury than committing the offense of being a felon in possession of a weapon. Defendant
explained that he did not want to get into trouble for the theft of the gun, and he believed the gun
could have been sold in Chicago and used for crime. Returning a stolen firearm to its rightful
owner undoubtedly promoted a higher value than refraining from being a felon in possession of a
weapon for the 10 minutes it took to return the gun to the store.
¶ 24 We also find that defendant established that there were no other courses of action
available to him. Defendant testified that he did not believe Anchondo would return the gun on
his own because he had helped steal it. This belief was reasonable. Defendant also said that he
did not know anyone available with a valid FOID card to return the gun. Had defendant called
the police and reported the stolen gun without taking possession of the gun, it is uncertain that
the police would have recovered the gun. We acknowledge that both the circuit court and the
State have taken the position that there were other alternatives available to defendant. However,
beyond suggesting the unlikely scenario that Anchondo would have returned the gun himself
without defendant possessing it, the State gave no explanation as to what other options were
available to defendant.
¶ 25 We note that our supreme court has held that a defendant must show that he faced a
“specific and immediate threat” for the necessity defense to apply. People v. Kite, 153 Ill. 2d 40,
46 (1992). We are inclined to believe that a specific and immediate threat to public safety occurs
any time a stolen firearm is out on the street, as a stolen firearm may never be transferred legally.
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¶ 26 II. Fundamental Fairness
¶ 27 Defendant alternatively argues that fundamental fairness demanded that the court deny
the State’s petition to revoke conditional discharge because the purposes of defendant’s
conditional discharge were served by his continued liberty. While we need not reach this
alternative argument in light of our above holding, we agree with defendant and address the
argument in the interest of clarity.
¶ 28 “The issue in a probation revocation proceeding is two-fold: first, whether a probation
violation actually occurred, and second, whether the purposes of defendant’s probation are being
served by his continued liberty.” People v. Butler, 137 Ill. App. 3d 704, 712 (1985). 1 “[T]he
purpose of probation is to benefit society by restoring a defendant to useful citizenship, rather
than allowing a defendant to become a burden as an habitual offender.” People v. Meyer, 176 Ill.
2d 372, 379 (1997). “Probation simultaneously serves as a form of punishment and as a method
for rehabilitating an offender.” Id. One of the goals of probation is to protect the public from the
sort of conduct that led to a defendant’s conviction. Id.
¶ 29 We note the holding in People v. Clark, 206 Ill. App. 3d 741 (1990). In Clark, the State
filed a motion to revoke the defendant’s Treatment Alternatives to Street Crimes (TASC)
probation. Id. at 742. The State presented evidence showing that the defendant failed to keep a
TASC appointment, and TASC discharged him from the program for having no contact with
TASC for 30 days. Id. at 742-43. The defendant testified that he was unable to attend his TASC
appointment because the police arrested him the day before his appointment, and he remained in
1
We consider cases concerning revocation of probation interchangeably with cases concerning
revocation of conditional discharge, as the statutory requirements are virtually the same in either type of
revocation proceeding. See 730 ILCS 5/5-6-4 (West 2016); People v. Tufte, 165 Ill. 2d 66, 74 (1995)
(“Revocation of a defendant’s conditional discharge is governed by the same statutory requirements that
are applicable where the State seeks to revoke a defendant’s probation.”).
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custody for several weeks until the State dropped the charges. Id. at 743. He made several collect
calls to TASC, but no one would accept the calls. Id. The defendant also asked his public
defender to call TASC, but he refused to do so. Id. After being released from jail, the defendant
called TASC and explained the situation. Id. The circuit court revoked the defendant’s probation.
Id. at 744-45. The Clark court held that the circuit court abused its discretion in revoking the
defendant’s probation. Id. at 745. The court noted that it was undisputed that the defendant had
committed a probation violation but found that the purposes of the defendant’s probation—
namely, to obtain treatment for his drug problem—were being served by his continued liberty.
Id. The court reasoned:
“A revocation of defendant’s probation under these circumstances
thwarts the fundamental objective of restoring him to useful
citizenship, frustrates the purpose of the Act, is contrary to the courts’
tendency to interpret the Act to strongly favor rehabilitation and results
in an unsatisfactory application of the law to the facts of this case.” Id.
at 747.
¶ 30 Defendant violated his conditional discharge. However, as in Clark, given the unique
circumstances of the violation, revoking defendant’s conditional discharged “thwarts the
fundamental objective of restoring him to useful citizenship” and “results in an unsatisfactory
application of the law to the facts of this case.” Id.
¶ 31 Here, defendant possessed the stolen firearm for approximately 10 minutes. Defendant
testified that his only intent in possessing the gun was to return it to its rightful owner, and the
State has presented no evidence to the contrary. Though defendant technically committed the
offense of being a felon in possession of a weapon for the approximately 10 minutes he
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possessed the gun, defendant acted to avoid the greater harm of the stolen firearm being out on
the street where it most likely would have been sold and used for criminal purposes. In this way,
defendant’s possession of the gun actually served to protect the public. We deem this a good
thing. The facts of this case suggest that but for defendant’s presence and actions, another illegal
gun would have been in the hands of criminals. We deem that a bad thing. Due to the unique
extenuating circumstances of this offense, we believe that the purposes of defendant’s
conditional discharge—i.e., defendant’s rehabilitation and protection of the public—are served
by his continued liberty. As such, we find that the circuit court’s revocation of defendant’s
conditional discharge was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Deleon, 227 Ill. 2d at 332.
¶ 32 CONCLUSION
¶ 33 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court of La Salle
County revoking defendant’s conditional discharge. We remand for further proceedings
consistent with this order.
¶ 34 Reversed and remanded.
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