People v. Ingram

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Date: 2018.10.10
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People v. Ingram, 2018 IL App (4th) 160099Appellate Court THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
Caption DUSTIN INGRAM, Defendant-Appellant.
District & No. Fourth District
Docket No. 4-16-0099
Filed July 19, 2018
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Douglas County, No. 06-CF-23; the
Review Hon. Daniel L. Flannell, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Affirmed.
Counsel on James E. Chadd, Patricia Mysza, and Sean Collins-Stapleton, of State
Appeal Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.
Katherine D. Watson, State’s Attorney, of Tuscola (Patrick Delfino,
David J. Robinson, and Allison Paige Brooks, of State’s Attorneys
Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.
Panel JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the judgment of the court, with
opinion.
Presiding Justice Harris and Justice Holder White concurred in the
judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 In March 2006, the State charged defendant, Dustin Ingram, with one count of armed
robbery with a firearm. 720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(4) (West 2006). At the time of the alleged crime,
defendant was 16 years old. The armed robbery with a firearm count excluded defendant from
juvenile court. 705 ILCS 405/5-130(1)(a) (West 2006).
¶2 In May 2006, the parties asked the trial court to approve a negotiated plea agreement. In
exchange for his guilty plea and a sentence of 18 years in prison, the State agreed to amend the
charge to armed robbery with a dangerous weapon. 720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(1) (West 2006).
Standing alone, armed robbery with a dangerous weapon could have been adjudicated in
juvenile court. See 705 ILCS 405/5-130(1)(a) (West 2006). The trial court accepted the plea
agreement.
¶3 In August 2015, defendant filed a petition for relief from judgment and a motion to vacate
a void judgment, arguing that the trial court did not have jurisdiction because the State (1)
dismissed the armed robbery with a firearm count and (2) failed to request a hearing to
sentence him as an adult. In September 2015, the State filed a motion to dismiss. In March
2016, the trial court granted the State’s motion to dismiss.
¶4 Defendant appeals, arguing his “adult conviction and sentence are void because the
amendment of the charging instrument from *** armed robbery with a firearm to armed
robbery with a dangerous weapon extinguished criminal court jurisdiction and effectively
transferred [the] case to juvenile court.” Likewise, defendant argues his sentence is void
because the State did not request a hearing to sentence him as an adult. We disagree,
concluding that (1) the trial court had jurisdiction and (2) the State was not required to request
a hearing to sentence defendant as an adult.
¶5 I. BACKGROUND
¶6 A. The Original Information
¶7 In March 2006 the State charged defendant with one count of armed robbery with a
firearm. 720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(4) (West 2006). At the time of the alleged crime, defendant was
16 years old. The armed robbery with a firearm count excluded defendant from juvenile court.
705 ILCS 405/5-130(1)(a) (West 2006). The original information stated as follows:
“That on March 13, 2006, *** [defendant] committed the offense of ARMED
ROBBERY in that the said defendant, while armed with a firearm, knowingly took
property *** from the presence of [the victim] by use of force; further, said defendant,
during the course of this offense, personally discharged a firearm, proximately causing
great bodily harm to [the victim].”
¶8 B. The Guilty Plea
¶9 1. The Amended Information
¶ 10 In May 2006, the parties asked the trial court to approve a negotiated plea agreement. In
exchange for his guilty plea, the State agreed to reduce the charge to armed robbery with a
dangerous weapon. 720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(1) (West 2006). Standing alone, armed robbery with a
dangerous weapon could have been adjudicated in juvenile court. See 705 ILCS
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405/5-130(1)(a) (West 2006). Pursuant to the plea agreement, defendant agreed to be
sentenced to 18 years in prison.
¶ 11 The State, by oral motion, asked to amend the information. Defense counsel stated on the
record that he had no objection. The State did not add an additional count or file a new
information. Instead, the prosecutor modified the original information by crossing out and
adding new terms. The amended information is below. Italicized words represent the State’s
handwritten modifications. Words with strikethrough typeface represent words that the State
physically crossed out.
“That on March 13, 2006, *** [defendant] committed the offense of ARMED
ROBBERY in that the said defendant, while armed with a firearm dangerous weapon,
knowingly took property *** from the presence of [the victim] by use of force; further,
said defendant, during the course of this offense, personally discharged a firearm,
proximately causing great bodily harm to [the victim].”
¶ 12 2. The Factual Basis for the Plea
¶ 13 The State asserted that if the matter were to proceed to trial, the victim would testify that
defendant and another man, both of whom were armed with dangerous weapons, entered a gas
station on March 13, 2006. The victim would testify that defendant used the weapon to injure
his leg and that the men took money from the cash register.
¶ 14 3. The Trial Court’s Actions
¶ 15 The trial court found that a factual basis existed for the guilty plea. The court appropriately
admonished defendant and accepted his guilty plea to armed robbery with a dangerous
weapon. The court sentenced defendant pursuant to the terms of his plea agreement. Defendant
did not timely file a motion to withdraw his plea nor directly appeal his plea or sentence.
¶ 16 C. The Defendant’s First Appeal
¶ 17 In August 2012, defendant, who was then over the age of 21, filed a petition for
habeas corpus relief. Defendant argued that, as an adult, he was entitled to immediate release
because (1) he was a minor when he committed the offense, (2) the juvenile court had
exclusive jurisdiction over his case, and (3) he should have been sentenced as a juvenile. The
State filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that defendant failed to show that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction or that a postconviction occurrence entitled him to immediate release. The trial
court granted the State’s motion to dismiss, and this court affirmed. Ingram v. Pfister, 2014 IL
App (4th) 130518-U, ¶¶ 23, 29.
¶ 18 D. This Appeal
¶ 19 In August 2015, defendant filed a petition for relief from judgment and a motion to vacate
a void judgment. Defendant argued that the trial court did not have jurisdiction because the
State (1) dismissed the armed robbery with a firearm count and (2) failed to request a hearing
to sentence him as an adult.
¶ 20 In September 2015, the State filed a motion to dismiss, arguing (1) the petitions were
untimely, (2) the claims were barred by res judicata, and (3) the conviction and sentence were
proper. In March 2016, the trial court granted the State’s motion to dismiss.
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¶ 21 This appeal followed.
¶ 22 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 23 Defendant appeals, arguing his “adult conviction and sentence are void because the
amendment of the charging instrument from *** armed robbery with a firearm to armed
robbery with a dangerous weapon extinguished criminal court jurisdiction and effectively
transferred [the] case to juvenile court.” Likewise, defendant argues his sentence is void
because the State did not request a hearing to sentence him as an adult. We address these issues
in turn.
¶ 24 A. The Standard of Review and the Juvenile Court Act of 1987
¶ 25 The dispositive issues on appeal involve statutory construction, which is a question of law
reviewed de novo. People v. King, 241 Ill. 2d 374, 378, 948 N.E.2d 1035, 1037 (2011). Our
primary objective when interpreting a statute is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the
legislature. Id. The best indicator of such intent is the plain language of the statute. Id. In
determining the plain language of the statute, we consider the statute in its entirety, the subject
the statute addresses, and the apparent intent of the legislature in enacting the statute. Id.¶ 26 As it existed at the time of defendant’s offense, the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) stated
as follows:
Ҥ 5-120. Exclusive jurisdiction. Proceedings may be instituted under the
provisions of this Article concerning any minor who prior to the minor’s 17th birthday
has violated or attempted to violate *** any federal or State law or municipal or county
ordinance. Except as provided in Sections 5-125, 5-130, 5-805, and 5-810 of this
Article, no minor who was under 17 years of age at the time of the alleged offense may
be prosecuted under the criminal laws of this State.” 705 ILCS 405/5-120 (West 2006).
Ҥ 5-130. Excluded jurisdiction.
(1)(a) The definition of delinquent minor under Section 5-120 of this Article shall
not apply to any minor who at the time of an offense was at least 15 years of age and
who is charged with: (i) first degree murder, (ii) aggravated criminal sexual assault,
(iii) aggravated battery with a firearm where the minor personally discharged a firearm
as defined in Section 2-15.5 of the Criminal Code of 1961, (iv) armed robbery when the
armed robbery was committed with a firearm, or (v) aggravated vehicular hijacking
when the hijacking was committed with a firearm.
These charges and all other charges arising out of the same incident shall be
prosecuted under the criminal laws of this State.” (Emphasis added.) Id. § 5-130(1)(a).
¶ 27 B. The Trial Court’s Jurisdiction
¶ 28 Defendant argues his sentence is void because the trial court did not have jurisdiction. He
argues the trial court did not have jurisdiction because “the amendment of the charging
instrument from *** armed robbery with a firearm to armed robbery with a dangerous weapon
extinguished criminal court jurisdiction and effectively transferred [the] case to juvenile
court.” We disagree.
¶ 29 The Act states that armed robbery with a firearm and all other charges arising out of the
same incident “shall be prosecuted under the criminal laws of this State.” Id. The Act explicitly
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divests the juvenile court of jurisdiction over such criminal matters. Id.; see Megan M. Sulok,
Comment, Extended Jurisdiction Juvenile Prosecutions: To Revoke or Not to Revoke, 39 Loy.
U. Chi. L.J. 215, 234-35 (2007).
¶ 30 The record clearly demonstrates, and defendant concedes, that the State originally charged
defendant with armed robbery with a firearm. 720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(4) (West 2006). This
charge, under the plain language of the statute, divested the juvenile court of jurisdiction and
gave exclusive jurisdiction to the trial court. 705 ILCS 405/5-130(1)(a) (West 2006).
¶ 31 Likewise, the subsequent modification of the information did not “divest” the trial court of
jurisdiction. The amended charge of armed robbery with a dangerous weapon arose out of the
same incident from which defendant was originally charged with armed robbery with a
firearm. See King, 241 Ill. 2d at 386. The State’s subsequent modification of the information
had no legal effect on the trial court’s jurisdiction. Id. Accordingly, we reject defendant’s
argument that the trial court lacked jurisdiction merely because the State amended the
information pursuant to their plea agreement.
¶ 32 C. The Defendant’s Adult Sentence
¶ 33 Assuming that his adult conviction was proper, defendant argues his sentence is void
because the State was required to request a hearing to sentence him as an adult. See 705 ILCS
405/5-130(1)(c)(ii) (West 2006). We disagree.
¶ 34 The Act, in pertinent part, reads as follows:
“(ii) If after trial or plea the court finds that the minor committed an offense not
covered by paragraph (a) of this subsection (1), that finding shall not invalidate the
verdict or the prosecution of the minor under the criminal laws of the State; however,
unless the State requests a hearing for the purpose of sentencing the minor [as an adult],
the Court must proceed under Sections 5-705 and 5-710 of this Article. To request a
hearing, the State must file a written motion within 10 days following the entry of a
finding or the return of a verdict.” Id.¶ 35 In King, 241 Ill. 2d at 376, the defendant was a minor charged with five counts of first
degree murder. The juvenile court did not have jurisdiction over first degree murder. See 705
ILCS 405/5-130(1)(a) (West 2000). Later, the State filed an additional count of attempt (first
degree murder). 720 ILCS 5/8-4(a), 9-1(a) (West 2000). Standing alone, attempt (first degree
murder) could have been adjudicated in juvenile court. See 705 ILCS 405/5-120 (West 2000);
see also id. § 5-130(1)(a). In exchange for dropping the five counts of first degree murder, the
defendant pleaded guilty to attempt (first degree murder) and agreed to be sentenced to 15
years in prison. King, 241 Ill. 2d at 376. On appeal, the defendant argued that his sentence was
void because the State failed to request a hearing under section 5-130(1)(c)(ii) to determine
whether he should be sentenced as an adult. Id. at 376-77. The Illinois Supreme Court rejected
this argument, reasoning that the “defendant was properly sentenced without a hearing”
because he accepted a plea agreement with a predetermined sentence. See id. at 376, 386-87.
¶ 36 In this case, defendant pleaded guilty to armed robbery with a dangerous weapon in
exchange for dismissing the charge of armed robbery with a firearm. Likewise, pursuant to the
plea agreement, defendant agreed to be sentenced to 18 years in prison. Similar to King, we
conclude that the State was not required to request a hearing for adult sentencing when both
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parties already agreed upon the exact sentence to be imposed. See id. at 378.
¶ 37 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 38 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 39 Affirmed.
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