International Association of Firefighters v. City of Springfield

NO. 4-07-0439 Filed 1/29/08
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ) Appeal from
FIREFIGHTERS, LOCAL No. 37, ) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Sangamon County
v. ) No. 06CH395
THE CITY OF SPRINGFIELD, ILLINOIS, )
Defendant-Appellant. ) Honorable
) Patrick W. Kelley,
) Judge Presiding.
_________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the opinion of the court:
In February 2006, plaintiff, the International Associa-
tion of Firefighters, Local No. 37 (hereinafter the Union) and
defendant, the City of Springfield, entered into arbitration to
resolve a dispute regarding the proper application of the Family
and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (29 U.S.C. §§2601 through 2654
(2000)), pursuant to their collective-bargaining agreement.
In June 2006 and August 2006, the Union and the City,
respectively, filed petitions requesting that the trial court
partially vacate and amend the arbitrator's ruling.
The parties later filed cross-motions for summary
judgment, each alleging that certain portions of the arbitrator's
ruling should be vacated. In April 2007, the trial court granted
the Union's motion and partially vacated the arbitrator's ruling.
The City appeals, arguing, in part, that the court lacked author-
ity to determine whether the arbitrator misinterpreted the
Medical Leave Act.
Because we conclude that the trial court lacked author-
ity to reach the merits of the parties’ respective arguments, we
vacate the court's judgment and reinstate the arbitration award
in its entirety.
I. BACKGROUND
Since we explicitly decline to address the merits of
the arguments considered by the trial court, we summarize the
factual issues and discuss them only to the extent necessary to
place them in the proper context.
In February 2005, a City employee was seriously injured
in an off-duty incident. When the City realized the employee was
not able to perform his assigned duties, it placed the employee
in a leave status under the Medical Leave Act. The employee did
not request this action, nor did the City inquire if the employee
desired to be placed in such a status.
In August 2005, the Union initially filed a grievance
with the City contesting the manner and methodology by which the
City administered the parties' collective-bargaining agreement.
Specifically, the Union sought to determine whether (1) the
collective-bargaining agreement gave employees the right to
request or decline being placed in a leave status under the
Medical Leave Act and (2) the Medical Leave Act mandated that the
City place employees in a leave status after meeting specific
qualifying criteria.
In February 2006, after the Union's grievance was
denied by the City, the Union and the City began arbitration
pursuant to the parties' collective-bargaining agreement. In May
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2006, the arbitrator found that (1) the collective bargaining
agreement provided employees the option to request leave under
the Medical Leave Act; (2) based on the parties' collective-
bargaining agreement, the City could not place employees in a
leave status under the Medical Leave Act without their request;
and (3) the Medical Leave Act mandated that an employer place
qualified employees in a leave status. The arbitrator concluded
that the City did not violate the collective-bargaining agreement
by placing employees in a leave status under the Medical Leave
Act involuntarily and subsequently denied the Union’s grievance
in its entirety.
In June 2006 and August 2006, the Union and the City,
respectively, filed petitions requesting the trial court par-
tially vacate and amend the arbitrator's ruling.
The parties later filed cross-motions for summary
judgment, each alleging that certain portions of the arbitrator's
judgment should be vacated. In April 2007, the trial court
granted the Union's motion and partially vacated the arbitrator's
ruling. In particular, the court vacated the arbitrator's
conclusion that the Medical Leave Act mandated that an employer
place qualified employees in a leave status.
This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards
The scope of judicial review of an arbitration award is
nothing like the scope of an appellate court's review of a trial
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court's decision because the Uniform Arbitration Act (710 ILCS
5/12, 13 (West 2006)) provides for limited judicial review of the
arbitrator's award. Hawrelak v. Marine Bank, Springfield, 316
Ill. App. 3d 175, 178, 735 N.E.2d 1066, 1068 (2000). A court
shall vacate an arbitrator's award only under the following
circumstances: (1) if the award was procured by corruption,
fraud, or other undue means; (2) where there was evident partial-
ity or corruption by the arbitrator or misconduct that prejudiced
any party; (3) where the arbitrator exceeded his power; (4) where
the arbitrator refused to postpone a hearing upon sufficient
cause or declined to hear material evidence, so as to prejudice
substantially the rights of a party; or (5) where there was no
arbitration agreement, the issue was not adversely determined,
and the party did not participate in the arbitration hearing.
710 ILCS 5/12 (West 2006); Hawrelak, 316 Ill. App. 3d at 179, 735
N.E.2d at 1069. If the arbitrator acted in good faith, the award
is deemed conclusive upon the parties. Tim Huey Corp. v. Global
Boiler & Mechanical, Inc., 272 Ill. App. 3d 100, 106, 649 N.E.2d
1358, 1362 (1995).
A presumption exists that arbitrators do not exceed
their authority. Hawrelak, 316 Ill. App. 3d at 179, 735 N.E.2d
at 1069. Such deference is accorded because the parties have
chosen by contractual agreement how their dispute is to be
decided, and judicial modification of an arbitrator's decision
deprives the parties of their choice. Huey, 272 Ill. App. 3d at
106, 649 N.E.2d at 1362. Because the parties to an arbitration
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did not bargain for a judicial determination, a reviewing court
cannot set aside an arbitration award because of errors in
judgment or mistakes of law or fact. Rauh v. Rockford Products
Corp., 143 Ill. 2d 377, 393, 574 N.E.2d 636, 644 (1991). "A
party seeking to vacate an arbitration award must provide clear,
strong, and convincing evidence that the award was improper."
Hawrelak, 316 Ill. App. 3d at 179, 735 N.E.2d at 1069, citing
Canteen Corp. v. Former Foods, Inc., 238 Ill. App. 3d 167, 179-
80, 606 N.E.2d 174, 182 (1992).
B. The Arbitrator's Award
The City first argues that the trial court lacked
authority to determine whether the arbitrator misinterpreted the
Medical Leave Act. We agree.
Because the pertinent facts are undisputed and only the
trial court's legal conclusions are at issue, we review de novo
the court's ruling. People v. Lofton, No. 4-06-0382, slip op. at
6 (October 11, 2007), ___ Ill. App. 3d ___, ___, ___ N.E.2d ___,
___, citing People v. Woodrum, 223 Ill. 2d 286, 300, 860 N.E.2d
259, 269 (2006).
In this case, the sole issue before the trial court was
the arbitrator's interpretation of the Medical Leave Act within
the context of the parties' collective-bargaining agreement. We
agree with the City that a mere disagreement about the arbitra-
tor's interpretation of a statute does not fall within the
limited circumstances under which trial and appellate courts are
allowed to review an arbitrator's award. Moreover, our review of
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the record indicates that none of the circumstances that would
allow the trial court or this court to vacate an arbitrator's
award were even remotely present or argued by the parties.
We note that in its brief to this court, the Union
fails to even mention controlling Illinois authority--namely,
this court’s recent decision addressing a court’s proper role in
reviewing arbitration awards. See Hawrelak, 316 Ill. App. 3d at
178, 735 N.E.2d at 1069 (the court's review of an arbitrator's
award is limited to specific circumstances). Instead, the Union
relies on the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Roadmaster Corp. v.
Production & Maintenance Employees’ Local 504, 851 F.2d 886 (7th
Cir. 1988), which is--at most--merely persuasive. However, given
that Roadmaster was decided before this court’s decision in
Hawrelak and could not take into account arbitration award cases
decided since 1988, it is not even persuasive authority.
Absent any evidence that (1) the arbitrator’s award was
made in bad faith, (2) the arbitrator was guilty of fraud or
corruption, (3) the arbitrator exceeded his power, or (4) the
arbitrator deliberately chose not to follow the law, the trial
court should not even have addressed the merits of the parties'
arguments. Thus, the trial court’s partial vacatur of the
arbitration award cannot stand.
To conclude otherwise would put this court on the very
path our supreme court warned about long ago in Garver v. Fergu-
son, 76 Ill. 2d 1, 389 N.E.2d 1181 (1979). In stating that an
arbitrator's award should be upheld whenever possible, the court
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opined that "'[a] contrary course would be a substitution of the
judgment of the [court] in place of the [arbitrator] chosen by
the parties, and would make an award the commencement, not the
end, of litigation.'" Garver, 76 Ill. 2d at 9, 389 N.E.2d at
1184, quoting Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 344, 349, 15
L. Ed. 96, 99 (1854).
We adhere to our decision in Hawrelak and reemphasize
our analysis in that case that the "scope of judicial review of
an arbitration award is nothing like the scope of an appellate
court’s review of a trial court’s decision." Hawrelak, 316 Ill.
App. 3d at 178, 735 N.E.2d at 1068. In addition, "[o]nce parties
bargain to submit their disputes to the arbitration system (a
system essentially structured without due process, rules of
procedure, rules of evidence, or any appellate procedure), we are
disinclined to save them from themselves." Hawrelak, 316 Ill.
App. 3d at 181, 735 N.E.2d at 1070; see also Huey, 272 Ill. App.
3d at 111, 649 N.E.2d at 1366 ("'Parties should be aware that
they get what they bargain for and that arbitration is far
different from adjudication.' [Citation.]").
Because we conclude that the trial court should not
have reached the merits of the parties' arguments, we need not
address the merits of the City's remaining arguments.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we vacate the trial court's
judgment and reinstate the arbitration award in its entirety.
Vacated; arbitrator's award reinstated.
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MYERSCOUGH and KNECHT, JJ., concur.
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