People v. Lamantia

2022 IL App (2d) 210721-UNo. 2-21-0721
Order filed July 21, 2022
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent
except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(l).
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
OF ILLINOIS, ) of Kendall County.
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
v. ) No. 21-DT-83
)
MICHAEL A. LAMANTIA, ) Honorable
) Stephanie P. Klein,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE HUDSON delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Bridges and Justice Birkett concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Denial of defendant’s petition to rescind his driver’s license suspension was proper
where (1) the officer’s approaching and speaking to defendant while his car was
stopped along the road was not a seizure, and (2) the officer had reasonable
suspicion to justify asking defendant to perform field sobriety tests, based on
reports of defendant’s erratic driving and the officer’s own observations of
defendant’s detachment from his surroundings and his slow and confused answers
to the officer’s questions
¶2 Defendant, Michael A. Lamantia, appeals from an order of the circuit court of Kendall
County denying his petition to rescind the summary suspension of his driver’s license. We affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
2022 IL App (2d) 210721-U¶4 On May 15, 2021, defendant was arrested and charged by citation and complaint with
driving under the influence of a drug or combination of drugs to a degree that rendered him
incapable of safely driving (DUI) (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(4) (West 2020)). Because defendant
subsequently refused to submit to, or failed to complete, chemical tests to determine the alcohol
or drug content of his blood, breath, urine, or another bodily substance, his driver’s license was
summarily suspended for three years, effective July 2, 2021. See id. § 11-501.1(d).
¶5 On July 23, 2021, defendant filed a petition to rescind the summary suspension of his
driver’s license.1 Defendant argued that the arresting officer detained him without having
reasonable grounds to believe that he had committed or was committing the offense of DUI.
¶6 At the hearing, Village of Montgomery police officer Jesse Lankard testified that, at about
11:42 p.m. on May 15, 2021, he was advised by “KenCom, the dispatch unit,” of a potential
reckless driver. KenCom identified “several locations in the Village of Montgomery.” KenCom
initially advised Lankard that the driver “came out on Route 31 and Mill, passing Caterpillar Drive
on Route 31 going northbound.” The last location received by Lankard was that the vehicle was
“going on the Route 31 bypass onto Route 30, traveling westbound.” Upon learning that the vehicle
was entering his area of patrol, Lankard began to search Route 30 for the vehicle. Lankard located
a Dodge Ram and a silver Mercedes “near Route 30 and Dixon.” The Dodge Ram was parked on
the side of Route 30. The Mercedes was parked on the shoulder of Dixon across from the Dodge
Ram. Lankard did not make any contact with the occupants of the Dodge Ram at that time; he
contacted them by phone the next day.
1
Defendant also filed a “Motion to Quash Arrest,” which was heard and denied in
conjunction with his petition to rescind. Defendant does not appeal from the denial of this motion.
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2022 IL App (2d) 210721-U¶7 Lankard testified that he pulled his squad car behind the Mercedes. Lankard “activated
[his] rear emergency lights to advise traffic behind [him].” He also “activated [his] spotlight to
illuminate the interior of the vehicle since it was dark outside.” Lankard explained that the spotlight
was “directed at the driver’s side mirror.” At that point, Lankard had not observed the driver of
the Mercedes commit any traffic violations. Lankard “notified other units of [his] location, and
[he] approached the driver’s side also using [his] flashlight to observe the inside of the vehicle for
safety reasons.” According to Lankard, he “was conducting a motorist assist to check on the
vehicle and the occupant to make sure they were okay, based off the statements that were made by
KenCom.” Lankard testified that, at that point, defendant was “free to leave” and that “[t]here was
no traffic stop.” Lankard explained that he activated his vehicle’s rear emergency lights “just to
advise any oncoming traffic of [the] vehicles off the side of the roadway.”
¶8 Lankard testified that, when he approached the Mercedes, he observed defendant “looking
down at his phone.” Lankard could not see the phone’s screen; he could only observe that the
phone was on. Defendant did not notice Lankard until after Lankard tapped on the window.
Lankard testified: “With the spotlight and my flashlight, [defendant] was still looking down at his
phone. When I tapped on the window, he kind of almost jerked up, like looking at me.” Defendant
told Lankard that he was making a phone call. Lankard asked defendant if he was okay, and
defendant told him that he was “fine.” Lankard asked defendant if he had his driver’s license, and
defendant provided it to him. Lankard did not observe any odor of alcohol coming from the vehicle.
Lankard observed that defendant “kind of had a slow, kind of confused speech.” Lankard asked
defendant where he was going, and defendant told him that “he was going to his girlfriend’s house
in Aurora.” When Lankard asked defendant “where he was coming from, [defendant] stated
several times he was going to his girlfriend’s house in Aurora.” When Lankard was asked whether
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2022 IL App (2d) 210721-Uhe “[got] the hint that maybe [defendant] didn’t want to tell [him] where he was coming from,”
Lankard responded: “He seemed more like he was confused on what I was asking. And at one
point he asked, he asked me what, as in what I had just asked him.” After asking defendant
“approximately four times” where he was coming from, defendant told Lankard that “he was
coming from his sister’s house in Yorkville.”
¶9 Lankard testified that he asked defendant to step out of the vehicle to perform field sobriety
testing. When Lankard was asked his reasons for doing so, he stated: “So those reasons were based
off of the statements provided by the caller to KenCom and my own observations of [defendant’s]
confused speech, his orientation of where he was going and coming from, his inability to answer
my questions correctly.” He reiterated: “It was based off of the statements made by the caller,
[defendant’s] confused mannerisms, confusion when asking [defendant] the questions, and sort of
slow, you know, speaking mannerisms.” When Lankard asked defendant to step out of his vehicle,
defendant was not free to leave, due to Lankard’s “reasonable suspicion *** that [defendant] was
under the influence of an intoxicating substance.”
¶ 10 On cross-examination, Lankard testified that KenCom not only advised him that there were
“calls coming in about somebody driving all over the road,” but also provided him the color and
make of the vehicle (a silver Mercedes), its license plate number, and its location. Lankard was
advised that the Mercedes (1) “was actually driving off of the roadway,” (2) “almost struck a
guardrail and a mailbox and was going into oncoming traffic,” and (3) “came to a stop off of the
roadway on Route 31, and then pulled back onto Route 31 going in a northbound direction.”
Lankard learned that the person in the Dodge Ram, which he saw parked on the side of the road,
was the person who had called 911.
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2022 IL App (2d) 210721-U¶ 11 Lankard testified further on cross-examination that he located the Mercedes “on the west
side shoulder of Dixon facing southbound.” It was a two-lane highway and there was no “artificial
lighting.” Lankard did not activate his siren or overhead lighting when he parked behind the
Mercedes and he did not block the Mercedes in. Lankard activated his rear emergency lights for
safety purposes. He used his vehicle’s spotlight so that he could see what was in front of him.
There were no other officers present when he first approached the Mercedes and his weapon was
not drawn. Defendant rolled his window down after Lankard knocked on it. Lankard did not say
“ ‘show me your hands’ ” or raise his voice. Lankard did not pull out his weapon or put his hands
on defendant. Lankard asked defendant where he was coming from, and defendant was not able to
answer that question immediately. Defendant continued to look at his phone, and his responses to
Lankard’s questions were slow. When Lankard was asked what other observations he made about
defendant, he testified:
“As far as the slow and confused speech, just general confusion on where he
appeared to be going in relation to where his vehicle was actually positioned. Him stating
that he was going to Aurora, but he was positioned southbound on Dixon, which would be
closer towards if he were driving back to Yorkville or the Bristol area.”
When Lankard was speaking with defendant, he believed him to be under the influence. Lankard
returned to his vehicle to “run the defendant’s information.” While doing so, Officer Lauren
Buzzard arrived on the scene and parked behind him. When she did so, Lankard turned off his rear
emergency lights.
¶ 12 Continuing on cross-examination, Lankard testified that, when he re-approached
defendant’s vehicle, now joined by Buzzard, he told defendant that someone had called about his
driving. Defendant “became agitated and stated that [Lankard] was making it up.” Lankard asked
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2022 IL App (2d) 210721-Udefendant to exit his vehicle and perform field sobriety tests. Defendant agreed to do so. Lankard
testified extensively about the field sobriety tests that he conducted, defendant’s behavior during
the tests, and defendant’s performance on the tests. Defendant failed some tests and refused to
perform others. Ultimately, Lankard arrested defendant for DUI.
¶ 13 On redirect examination, Lankard testified that, when Buzzard arrived, the emergency
lights were activated on her squad car. Before administering the field sobriety tests, Lankard asked
defendant if he had any conditions that would make the tests difficult for him, and defendant
responded no. Lankard agreed that it would be fair to say that defendant was “uncooperative”
throughout his contact with him. Lankard testified that he did not perceive defendant’s responses
to Lankard’s question about where defendant was coming from as a sign that defendant did not
want to provide the information. Rather, Lankard testified: “It seemed more that [defendant] was
confused by the question, as he also asked me to clarify what I was asking him.” Lankard agreed
that he was not familiar with defendant’s normal rate of speech or demeanor. Lankard testified that
he arrested defendant “based off the call, the statements and observations made by [defendant]
before asking him to exit the vehicle, and the observations during the field sobriety and non-field
sobriety tests.” Lankard kept investigating defendant after defendant told him that he was okay
because he wanted to make sure that defendant was okay to drive. Lankard had been told that
defendant was “[g]oing in and out of his lane into oncoming traffic, almost striking guardrails,
other vehicles.” Asked why he did not “let [defendant] go when [he] asked [defendant] three times,
‘are you okay,’ and he indicated he was,” Lankard replied, “I didn’t advise him that he wasn’t free
to go. He didn’t ask me if he was.”
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2022 IL App (2d) 210721-U¶ 14 On recross examination, Lankard confirmed that the license plate on the Mercedes matched
the number provided on the KenCom call, that the driver matched the description provided, and
that the individuals in the Dodge Ram were the individuals who called 911.
¶ 15 Following Lankard’s testimony, defendant rested.
¶ 16 The State moved for a directed finding, arguing that a seizure did not occur until after
Lankard noticed signs of impairment and asked defendant to step out of the car. At that time,
Lankard had reasonable suspicion that defendant was under the influence. Further, the State argued
that defendant showed signs of impairment during the field sobriety tests.
¶ 17 In response, defendant argued that he was seized when Lankard first approached his
vehicle, because, at that point, he was not free to leave. Defendant also argued that Lankard did
not have a reason to ask defendant to perform field sobriety tests, where there was no odor of
alcohol or anything observed in the vehicle.
¶ 18 The trial court granted the State’s motion. The court found that Lankard was “acting in a
community caretaking function” when he stopped behind defendant’s vehicle after learning of a
911 call reporting reckless driving over a significant distance. The court noted that the report was
not made anonymously and that Lankard located a vehicle matching the caller’s description in the
area described. The court also found that defendant was not seized at this time, stating that
Lankard’s use of his lights was reasonable and necessary for his safety. The court then found that
Lankard’s administration of the field sobriety tests was justified. The court emphasized
defendant’s initial unawareness of Lankard despite the lights he was shining into the Mercedes,
and defendant’s slow and confused responses to Lankard’s questions. The court concluded:
“I think that [Lankard’s] observations of the defendant, combined with the
information from the 911 caller, gave him reasonable suspicion of a DUI sufficient to
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2022 IL App (2d) 210721-Ujustify the administration of field sobriety tests. The defendant’s performance on those field
sobriety tests, which [Lankard] credibly testified regarding, combined with his previous
observations, led to probable cause for the defendant’s arrest for DUI.
The defendant’s petition to rescind and motion to quash are denied at this time. I’ll
grant the State’s motion for a directed finding.”
¶ 19 On October 19, 2021, defendant filed a motion to reconsider the denial of his petition to
rescind. On November 8, 2021, following arguments, the trial court denied the motion.
¶ 20 Defendant timely appealed from the denial of his petition to rescind and from the denial of
his motion to reconsider.
¶ 21 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 22 Defendant contends that the trial court should have granted his petition to rescind the
summary suspension of his driver’s license because he was improperly seized either when Lankard
pulled behind him on the side of the road or when Lankard directed him out of his vehicle to
perform field sobriety testing. The State responds that defendant was not seized until Lankard
directed him out of his vehicle to perform field sobriety testing and that, by that point, Lankard
had developed reasonable suspicion that defendant had driven under the influence. The State
further argues that, even if defendant had been seized when Lankard first approached defendant’s
vehicle, the seizure was (1) reasonable under the community-caretaking doctrine or (2) supported
by reasonable suspicion based on the 911 call. We agree with the State that defendant was not
seized until Lankard directed defendant out of his vehicle to perform field sobriety testing and that,
by that point, Lankard had developed reasonable suspicion that defendant had driven under the
influence. (Accordingly, we need not address whether Lankard had reasonable suspicion of
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2022 IL App (2d) 210721-Ucriminal activity when he first approached defendant’s vehicle or whether any seizure at that time
was justified under the community-caretaking doctrine.)
¶ 23 Section 11-501.1(d) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Code) (625 ILCS 5/11-501.1(d) (West
2020)) provides that if a motorist arrested for DUI refuses to undergo testing, or submits to testing
that reveals a blood alcohol level of 0.08 or more, their driving privileges will be summarily
suspended. A motorist may request a judicial hearing for the rescission of a statutory summary
suspension. Id. § 2-118.1(a). The rescission hearing is a civil proceeding. Id. In addition to the
statutory grounds for rescinding a summary suspension (see id. § 2-118.1(b)), a suspension may
be rescinded if it resulted from an unconstitutional seizure of the motorist. See People v. Paige,
385 Ill. App. 3d 486, 489 (2008); People v. Wood, 379 Ill. App. 3d 705, 707 (2008); People v.
Crocker, 267 Ill. App. 3d 343, 345 (1994).
¶ 24 The motorist bears the burden of proof at the hearing on the petition. People v. Relwani,
2019 IL 123385, ¶ 28. If the motorist establishes a prima facie case for rescission of the
suspension, the burden shifts to the State to present evidence sufficient to maintain the suspension.
Id. ¶ 17. “In making a prima facie case, [the defendant] ‘has the primary responsibility for
establishing the factual and legal bases’ for the requested action.” Id. (quoting People v. Brooks,
2017 IL 121413, ¶ 22). On review of the trial court’s ruling, the trial court’s findings of fact will
not be disturbed unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Relwani, 2019 IL
123385 ¶ 18; People v. Gocmen, 2018 IL 122388, ¶ 21. However, the trial court’s ultimate
conclusion as to rescission is reviewed de novo. Relwani, 2019 IL 123385, ¶ 18; Gocmen, 2018 IL
122388, ¶ 21.
¶ 25 The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution protects people against
unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const., amend. IV. “Not every police-citizen encounter
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2022 IL App (2d) 210721-Uresults in a seizure.” People v. Smith, 2016 IL App (3d) 140648, ¶ 28. Our supreme court has
recognized “three theoretical tiers of police-citizen encounters”:
“The first tier involves an arrest of a citizen, which must be supported by probable cause.
[Citations.] The second tier involves a temporary investigative seizure conducted pursuant
to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 *** (1968). In a ‘Terry stop,’ an officer may conduct a brief,
investigatory stop of a citizen when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion of
criminal activity and such suspicion amounts to more than a mere ‘hunch.’ [Citations.] The
third tier of police-citizen encounters involves those encounters that are consensual. An
encounter in this tier involves no coercion or detention and, therefore, does not implicate
any fourth amendment interests. [Citations.]” People v. McDonough, 239 Ill. 2d 260, 268
(2010).
¶ 26 “[T]he police may approach and question a person seated in a parked vehicle without that
encounter being labeled a seizure.” People v. Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d 530, 552 (2006). “The
encounter becomes a seizure only if the officer, through physical force or show of authority,
restrains the liberty of the vehicle’s occupant.” Id. at 552-53; see Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429,
434 (1991). In determining whether a person seated in a parked vehicle is “seized” when a police
officer approaches their vehicle and questions them, the appropriate test is whether a reasonable
innocent person in the defendant’s position would have believed that they were free to decline to
answer the officer’s questions or otherwise terminate the encounter. Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d at
550-51. “The analysis requires an objective evaluation of the police conduct in question and does
not hinge upon the subjective perception of the person involved.” Id. at 551.
¶ 27 Courts have identified four factors—known as the Mendenhall factors—which may
indicate the seizure of a person by the police: “(1) the threatening presence of several officers;
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2022 IL App (2d) 210721-U(2) the display of a weapon by an officer; (3) some physical touching of the person of the citizen;
and (4) the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer’s request
might be compelled.” Id. at 553 (citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)).
“The factors illustrate what type of police conduct would give a reasonable person an objective
reason to believe that he or she was not free to leave or was not free to decline an officer’s
requests.” Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d at 555. The Luedemann court stated as follows about the
Mendenhall factors:
“From the very minute the Mendenhall factors were created, courts have used their absence
to determine that seizures had not occurred.
*** [I]t would seem self-evident that the absence of Mendenhall factors, while not
necessarily conclusive, is highly instructive. If those factors are absent, that means that
only one or two officers approached the defendant, they displayed no weapons, they did
not touch the defendant, and they did not use any language or tone of voice indicating that
compliance with their requests was compelled. Obviously, a seizure is much less likely to
be found when officers approach a person in such an inoffensive manner.” Id. at 554.
The Luedemann court recognized that “[the Mendenhall] factors are not exhaustive and that a
seizure can be found on the basis of other coercive police behavior that is similar to the Mendenhall
factors.” Id. at 557. Other factors “indicative of a seizure of a parked vehicle are ‘boxing the car
in, approaching it on all sides by many officers, pointing a gun at the suspect and ordering him to
place his hands on the steering wheel, or use of flashing lights as a show of authority.’ ” Id.(quoting 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.4(a), at 434-35 (4th ed. 2004)).
¶ 28 Here, the evidence presented did not indicate that a seizure occurred before Lankard asked
defendant to exit his vehicle and perform field sobriety tests. Lankard initially approached
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2022 IL App (2d) 210721-Udefendant’s vehicle alone. Lankard did not display a weapon or physically touch defendant. There
was no evidence that Lankard spoke to defendant in anything other than a conversational tone. In
addition, Lankard parked behind defendant’s vehicle, and there was no evidence that, by doing so,
Lankard boxed the car in. There was also no indication that Lankard instructed defendant to place
his hands on the steering wheel. Given the absence of any coercive behavior by Lankard, his initial
encounter with defendant was consensual.
¶ 29 Nevertheless, relying on People v. Laake, 348 Ill. App. 3d 346 (2004), and People v. Cash,
396 Ill. App. 3d 931 (2009), defendant argues that he was seized when Lankard pulled behind his
vehicle, because “Lankard had activated his rear emergency lights and shined his spotlight into
*** defendant’s vehicle,” which, according to defendant, was “a significant show of authority that
restrained [his] liberty.” We disagree.
¶ 30 In Laake, the police received a tip at about 3 a.m. concerning a possible intoxicated driver.
Laake, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 347. About 16 minutes later, an officer observed a vehicle parked on the
shoulder. Id. at 348. The officer pulled his squad car behind the vehicle and turned on the overhead
emergency lights. Id. The officer’s squad car was also “equipped with flashing hazard or warning
lights.” Id. The officer testified that he activated his overhead emergency lights to alert other
motorists, as the location was isolated and not well lit. Id. In considering whether the defendant
was seized when the officer approached his vehicle, the court stated that it was well settled “that a
police officer’s use of overhead emergency lights, when directed at a particular person, would be
interpreted by that person as a command to stay put.” Id. at 350. The court held that the defendant,
at whom the overhead emergency lights were directed, “would have felt compelled to stay put for
[the officer’s] inquires.” Id. at 350.
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2022 IL App (2d) 210721-U¶ 31 In Cash, the police were following a vehicle as part of an ongoing investigation. Cash, 396
Ill. App. 3d at 934. They did not have an arrest warrant for the driver or a warrant to search the
vehicle. Id. At some point, the driver parked the vehicle and the defendant entered. Id. Without
having observed any traffic, parking, or other violations, an officer pulled behind the vehicle and
“ ‘hit the lights and siren [on his squad car] real quick.’ ” Id. Relying on Laake, the court held that
an improper seizure occurred when the officer “activated his lights and siren and directed them at
[the] parked car.” Id. at 939-942.
¶ 32 Here, unlike in Laake and Cash, Lankard did not activate his overhead emergency lights
or his siren. Instead, he activated his squad car’s rear emergency lights to “advise any oncoming
traffic of [the] vehicles off the side of the road.” We cannot say that the use of rear emergency
lights constitutes a “significant show of authority” as defendant argues.
¶ 33 In addition, although Lankard used a spotlight to illuminate the area in front of his vehicle
and carried a flashlight as he approached, it is well settled that this type of conduct is not coercive.
See Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d at 561-63 (finding that the officer’s act of shining a flashlight on the
vehicle as he approached was not “coercive, but *** merely incident to a police officer’s
performance of his job after dark”). Here, Lankard testified that defendant’s vehicle was on the
shoulder of a two-lane highway in the late evening hours and that there was no “artificial lighting.”
Standing alone, Lankard’s use of his own lighting—essential to perform his job after dark—did
not transform his encounter with defendant into a seizure.
¶ 34 Defendant next contends that, even if his initial encounter with Lankard did not violate his
fourth amendment rights, he was improperly seized when Lankard asked him to exit the vehicle
and perform field sobriety tests. We disagree.
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2022 IL App (2d) 210721-U¶ 35 First, the parties do not dispute that defendant was seized when Lankard asked him to exit
his vehicle and perform field sobriety tests. See People v. Village of Lincolnshire v. Kelly, 389 Ill.
App. 3d 881, 886 (2009) (“There appears to be ample authority to support a holding that
submission to field sobriety testing is a seizure under the fourth amendment.”). Thus, defendant’s
seizure had to be supported by reasonable suspicion. People v. Walter, 374 Ill. App. 3d 763, 773
(2007). “The test for reasonable suspicion is less exacting than that for probable cause [citation],
and even probable cause does not demand a showing that the belief that a suspect has committed
a crime be more likely true than false [citation].” Id. at 774. “[A]lthough reasonable suspicion
demands more than a mere hunch [citation], the standard requires only that ‘a police officer must
be able to point to specific, articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from
those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion’ [citation].” Village of Lincolnshire v. Kelly, 389 Ill.
App. 3d 881, 887 (2009).
¶ 36 Here, Lankard possessed specific, articulable facts to justify the seizure of defendant for
field sobriety testing, based on the information he obtained from KenCom concerning defendant’s
reckless driving as well as his own observations of defendant when interacting with him.
¶ 37 First, Lankard was entitled to rely on the information obtained from KenCom concerning
defendant’s reckless driving. As the trial court found, the caller was not anonymous. See People
v. Smulik, 2012 IL App (2d) 110110, ¶ 7 (recognizing that a tip provided via 911 is not truly
anonymous even if the caller does not identify themselves); see also Navarette v. California, 572
U.S. 393, 401 (2014) (“The caller’s use of the 911 system is therefore one of the relevant
circumstances that, taken together, justified the officer’s reliance on the information reported in
the 911 call.”). Lankard was provided with the last known location for a vehicle reported to have
been driving recklessly as well as the vehicle’s registration number. Shortly after the dispatch,
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2022 IL App (2d) 210721-ULankard located a vehicle, a silver Mercedes, matching the description provided and saw the
person who had called 911 in a Dodge Ram parked across from the Mercedes. Thus, when Lankard
first approached the vehicle, he had been advised that the vehicle (1) “was actually driving off of
the roadway,” (2) “almost struck a guardrail and a mailbox and was going into oncoming traffic,”
and (3) “came to a stop off of the roadway on Route 31, and then pulled back onto Route 31 going
in a northbound direction.”
¶ 38 In addition to the information obtained concerning defendant’s reckless driving, Lankard
made his own observations of defendant after approaching defendant’s vehicle. Despite Lankard
parking his squad car behind defendant on a dark two-way road, illuminating the area with a
spotlight directed at defendant’s driver’s side mirror, and approaching defendant’s vehicle carrying
a flashlight, defendant was unaware of Lankard standing next to his door until Lankard tapped on
his window. When Lankard tapped on the window, “[defendant] kind of almost jerked up.” Even
if defendant was looking at his phone, either texting or calling someone, the fact that he did not
notice Lankard until Lankard tapped on the window provides additional support for the officer’s
belief that defendant was driving under the influence. Lankard also testified that defendant had
“slow and confused speech.” When asked where he was going, defendant told Lankard that “he
was going to his girlfriend’s house in Aurora.” However, when Lankard asked defendant “where
he was coming from, [defendant] stated several times he was going to his girlfriend’s house in
Aurora.” Lankard testified that defendant “seemed *** like he was confused on what [he] was
asking [him].” Lankard had to ask defendant “approximately four times” where he was coming
from before defendant told him that “he was coming from his sister’s house in Yorkville.” Lankard
also testified that the direction of defendant’s vehicle, facing south, did not correspond with
defendant’s stated destination of Aurora.
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2022 IL App (2d) 210721-U¶ 39 Based on the foregoing, Lankard’s request that defendant perform field sobriety testing
was supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion that defendant had driven under the influence.
¶ 40 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 41 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Kendall County
denying defendant’s petition to rescind the summary suspension of his driver’s license
¶ 42 Affirmed.
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