People v. Shanklin

SECOND DIVISION
September 5, 2006
No. 1-04-1360
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County.
)
v. )
)
ARTHUR SHANKLIN, ) Honorable
) Colleen McSweeney
) Moore,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE WOLFSON delivered the opinion of the
court:
Ronald Coverson was shot several times as he stood outside
of his car on the early morning of December 20, 2001. The main
evidence presented against the defendant Arthur Shanklin was (1)
the testimony of Coverson's girlfriend, Candice Hibbler, who was
present when the murder occurred and identified the defendant in
a photographic array and a lineup, and (2) a 9-millimeter handgun
used in the murder recovered from the defendant's possession
following his arrest.
Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of the
first degree murder of Coverson. He was sentenced to a prison
term of 35 years and given an additional 20-year sentence for
using a firearm in the murder.
The defendant contends on appeal that: (1) the trial court
erred in denying his motion to suppress the seized handgun; (2)
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the evidence was insufficient to prove his guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt; (3) numerous comments in the prosecution's
closing and rebuttal arguments amounted to misconduct that denied
him a fair trial; (4) the introduction of evidence of his refusal
to participate in a lineup denied him a fair trial; and (5) his
20-year sentencing add-on violates the Illinois Constitution. We
find the handgun should have been suppressed. For that reason,
we reverse the defendant's conviction and sentence, and we remand
for a new trial.
FACTS
Before trial, the defendant filed a motion to suppress the
9-millimeter handgun as a fruit of an unlawful arrest. At the
suppression hearing, Ruby Evans, the defendant's grandmother,
testified that on January 7, 2002, police detectives arrived at
her home at 7221 South Union Street and knocked on her door.
When she answered, the detectives identified themselves and asked
for the defendant. Although Evans told the detectives "wait, let
me see if he is in," the detectives walked past her and to the
second floor of her home without her permission. Evans did not
accompany the detectives upstairs.
A detective returned downstairs 10 minutes later, informed
Evans that the defendant had a gun, and told her that if she
signed a piece of paper he was holding she would not be held
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responsible for it. Evans signed the paper without reading it. 1
Chicago police detective Dean Claeson testified he had been
investigating Coverson's December 20, 2001, shooting death and
had interviewed Hibbler, an eyewitness to the murder, at
approximately 9 a.m. on January 7, 2002, when she identified the
defendant's photograph from an array. Claeson, who knew the
murder weapon had not been recovered, went with four other
officers to 7221 South Union, the defendant's last known address,
at approximately 10:30 a.m. to arrest him. He did not obtain a
search or arrest warrant.
1
A second gun, which was introduced for aggravation purposes at the
defendant's sentencing hearing, was recovered after a consent-to-search form was
signed.
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Claeson spoke to Evans when she opened the door, identified
himself, and informed her he was looking for the defendant.
After Evans let them inside, Claeson asked where the defendant
was. Evans told him the defendant may have been upstairs and
that they could go look if they so desired. Claeson and two
other officers went upstairs where they found the defendant in
bed. When the officers identified themselves, the defendant
began reaching for something. Claeson arrested the defendant and
recovered a 9-millimeter handgun from between the bed and the
wall near where the defendant was reaching. As the defendant was
being taken to the station, Claeson asked Evans to sign a
consent-to-search form. Evans read the form to herself and
signed it. Evans was not told she could be held responsible for
the gun if she refused to sign the form.
The trial court denied the defendant's motion, finding
exigent circumstances permitted his warrantless arrest and the
police had a right to conduct a cursory search for safety
purposes. Therefore, the 9-millimeter gun was properly
recovered. The court specifically found that "Mrs. Evans'
testimony was credible but, actually, not relevant to the issues
before [it], because she was not upstairs."
It was established at trial that Hibbler, a student at
Northern Illinois University, was with Coverson in the early
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morning of December 20, 2001, visiting a house located near 71st
and Green Streets in Chicago. Coverson "cooked" drugs in the
kitchen, an activity Hibbler had seen him do before. Coverson
then gave two bags, a blue Gap bag and a clear sandwich bag, to
Hibbler. Hibbler did not look inside the Gap bag, but recognized
drugs in the sandwich bag. Hibbler and Coverson then left with
Hibbler carrying the bags.
Although Hibbler testified at trial that she had never been
to that house before, her prior testimony to the grand jury
indicated she had been there in June or July of 2001. She told
the jury she had been to the block before, but never inside the
house.
Hibbler followed Coverson out of the house toward Coverson's
car, a four-door silver Jaguar parked on the street. As Hibbler
was about to close the passenger door, she looked to her left and
saw two men standing outside the driver's side of the car. One
man wore a black "puff coat" and pointed a black gun into the
car. The other man wore an orange down coat. Neither man wore
gloves.
Hibbler identified the defendant as the man in the black
coat. She said several times that she was able to see his face.
The man in the orange coat had not been identified as of the
time of the defendant's trial.
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Coverson threw up his hands and said, "I'm getting out."
While Hibbler testified at trial that "someone" then opened the
driver's door and Coverson exited the car, she previously told
the grand jury that "the guy with the black coat opened up
[Coverson's] car door." Hibbler also exited the car. The
defendant then grabbed Coverson from behind. Hibbler could still
see the defendant's face because he was "a little taller" than
Coverson, who was five feet, eight inches tall. The man in the
orange coat came around to the passenger side of the car, grabbed
the Gap bag from Hibbler, and returned to the driver's side. The
defendant tried to pull Coverson toward the back seat of the car
and somebody told Hibbler to get into it.
Hibbler began entering the car when Coverson told her not
to. Coverson then broke loose from the defendant and started to
scream. Hibbler also began to scream. Then she heard gunshots.
After seeing Coverson hit the ground, Hibbler turned around,
closed her eyes, and stopped screaming. Although Hibbler
testified at trial that she saw the shooting, she told the grand
jury that her head was down and her eyes were closed when shots
were fired. When the gunshots ceased, Hibbler turned around and
saw Coverson lying in the street. She also saw the offenders
running north on Green Street. According to Hibbler, the entire
incident took place over three to six minutes.
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Hibbler returned to the house they had been at and gave the
sandwich bag of drugs to an individual named "G," whose wife
called 911. Hibbler, who testified she did not consider herself
to be good at measuring heights and weights, spoke to detectives
and described the offender in the black coat. She first told
detectives he was a black male 20 to 25 years of age between five
feet, seven inches and five feet, eight inches tall, weighing
between 160 and 170 pounds, with a medium complexion. She later
described him as 20 to 28 years old weighing between 150 and 170
pounds. Hibbler could not remember if he had facial hair.
According to Detective Claeson, who was investigating the murder,
Hibbler "appeared to be extremely distraught." Hibbler did not
tell the police about the drugs.
Coverson, who received multiple gunshot wounds to his head,
legs, and groin, died at the scene. Evidence technician Gerald
Reid recovered and inventoried numerous 9-millimeter and .45-
caliber cartridge cases and metal fragments from the murder
scene, as well as one fired bullet. Reid did not dust Coverson's
Jaguar for fingerprints.
On January 6, 2002, Detective Claeson spoke to an individual
claiming to have information about Coverson's death. Claeson
then located the defendant's photograph. After sending other
officers to locate Hibbler, Claeson went off-duty.
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At approximately 6 a.m. the following day, January 7, 2002,
Hibbler was taken to the station and, after retaining counsel,
informed the police about the drugs. She also viewed a
photographic array including a photograph of the defendant. She
told Detective Claeson that one picture looked like an old
picture of the man in the black coat. Claeson then showed her a
more current photo of the defendant. She identified the
defendant. Hibbler signed the first photograph, but not the
second. Hibbler also identified a "filler" photo as being the
individual in the orange coat.
Detective Claeson then went to the defendant's home,
arrested him, and recovered a High Point 9-millimeter
semiautomatic pistol loaded with eight rounds from between the
defendant's bed and the wall. Forensic testing revealed that, to
a reasonable degree of scientific certainty, the 9-millimeter
cartridge cases and bullet recovered from the scene of Coverson's
murder matched the 9-millimeter handgun recovered from the
defendant. Although the gun, its magazine and the eight rounds
were tested for fingerprints, no suitable latent impressions were
found.
At the police station, Claeson told the defendant that he
was going to take part in a lineup, but the defendant "repeatedly
stated he wasn't going to be in a line-up." After being informed
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he did not have a choice, the defendant stood in a lineup and was
identified by Hibbler.
On January 29, 2002, Hibbler viewed a photographic array and
tentatively identified the second offender. However, when she
viewed a lineup several days later, she could not identify anyone
because she "wasn't 100 percent sure."
The defendant presented testimony from Ruby Evans, his
grandmother; Christopher Flunder, his friend of 14 years; Iana
Moore, the wife of his cousin; and Rosie Shanklin, his mother.
Evans and Shanklin testified that the defendant, who was
between six feet, two inches and six feet, four inches tall, had
facial hair, including a beard, moustache, and sideburns, as of
December 30, 2001.
According to Flunder, the defendant purchased the 9-
millimeter pistol on December 25, 2001, after Coverson's murder,
from an individual named "Wild." Flunder saw the defendant fire
the gun on December 31, 2001, in celebration of the new year.
Moore, who lived on Green Street a few houses south of where
the murder occurred, testified that she heard gunshots in the
late evening of December 19 or the early morning of December 20,
2001. She looked out her bedroom window and saw a woman
screaming and two individuals running away. Of the two
individuals, she could only see the one wearing black, whom she
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described as short. She did not see the defendant. Moore did
not give this information to the police previously because she
lived in a "[h]orrible neighborhood" and was afraid.
The parties then made their closing arguments. After
receiving instructions from the court and deliberating, the jury
returned a verdict finding the defendant guilty of murder. The
court imposed a prison term of 35 years, tacking on an additional
20 years because a gun was fired.
DECISION
I. Motion to Suppress
The defendant first contends the trial court erred in
denying his motion to suppress the 9-millimeter handgun as a
fruit of his warrantless arrest because Ruby Evans did not give
the detectives consent to enter the home and because no exigent
circumstances existed.
When reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to
suppress, the court's factual findings are reviewed for manifest
error while the court's ultimate ruling is reviewed de novo.
People v. Pitman, 211 Ill. 2d 502, 512, 813 N.E.2d 93 (2004).
As a general rule, a warrant is required to support the
nonexigent, nonconsensual entry into a private residence for the
purpose of making a felony arrest. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.
573, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639, 100 S. Ct. 1371 (1980); People v. Abney,
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81 Ill. 2d 159, 166, 407 N.E.2d 543 (1980). That is, the police
need either a warrant or probable cause coupled with exigent
circumstances to lawfully enter a private residence and
effectuate an arrest. In re D.W., 341 Ill. App. 3d 517, 529, 793
N.E.2d 46 (2003).
Our supreme court has set forth the following factors as
relevant to a determination of whether an exigency exists: (1)
whether the crime was recently committed; (2) whether there was
any deliberate or unjustified delay on the part of law
enforcement during which a warrant may have been obtained; (3)
whether the crime was grave; (4) whether there was a reasonable
belief that the suspect was armed; (5) whether the police were
acting on a clear showing of probable cause; (6) whether there
was a likelihood that the suspect would avoid arrest if not
swiftly apprehended; (7) whether there was a strong reason to
believe that the suspect was in the premises; and (8) whether the
entry was made peaceably, albeit without consent. People v.
McNeal, 175 Ill. 2d 335, 345, 677 N.E.2d 841 (1997); People v.
Williams, 161 Ill. 2d 1, 26, 641 N.E.2d 296 (1994); People v.
White, 117 Ill. 2d 194, 216-17, 512 N.E.2d 677 (1987). Although
these factors are relevant to the court's determination, they are
meant only to serve as guidelines and each case must be decided
on its own facts after considering the totality of the
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circumstances. McNeal, 175 Ill. 2d at 345-46; Williams, 161 Ill.
2d at 26. The fundamental guiding principle is the
reasonableness of the officers' conduct. McNeal, 175 Ill. 2d at
345.
The trial court believed Ruby Evans--the entry into the
Evans' home was nonconsensual. The police did not have an arrest
or search warrant when they entered the house uninvited and
walked up the stairs to the defendant's bedroom. Those findings
by the trial court are not against the manifest weight of the
evidence. The remaining issue is whether exigent circumstances
justified the arrest and seizure.
The defendant's right to be free from governmental intrusion
into his own home is "at the very core of the fourth amendment."
Payton, 445 U.S. at 589-90. To justify a warrantless entry, the
circumstances must "militate against delay and justify the
officers' decision to proceed without a warrant." Abney, 81 Ill.
2d at 168-69. We do not see those circumstances in this record.
The murder occurred on December 20, 2001. Police officers
interviewed Candice Hibbler at about 9 a.m. on Monday, January 7,
2002. That interview apparently established probable cause to
arrest the defendant. Police officers arrived at the Evans' home
at 10:30 a.m. or 11 a.m. They made no attempt to obtain an
arrest or search warrant.
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Detective Claeson, the only police officer who testified at
the suppression hearing, did not attempt to explain the failure
to obtain a warrant. Certainly, several judges were available to
the officers on a Monday morning in Chicago. Nor did Claeson
testify he had any reason to believe the defendant posed a danger
to the arresting officers. There was no evidence the defendant
had been seen with a weapon during the seventeen days since the
shooting. The offense had not been recently committed. See
Abney, 81 Ill. 2d at 159. And there was no evidence the
defendant would escape if he were not swiftly apprehended. See
People v. Yates, 98 Ill. 2d 502, 515, 456 N.E.2d 1369 (1983).
That is, "the passage of time between the commission of the
offense and the arrest has a significant bearing on claims of
exigency." White, 117 Ill. 2d at 217.
In White, 117 Ill. 2d at 218, our supreme court held the
lapse of nearly two weeks between the commission of the crime and
the discovery of the suspect's whereabouts rendered it "extremely
unlikely that an additional several hours of delay to obtain a
warrant would have enabled the defendant to escape or permitted
him to commit another serious crime." In Abney, 81 Ill. 2d at
170, the court noted that the lapse of time between commission of
the crime and the discovery of the suspect's whereabouts would
make it much less likely that any additional "delay to obtain a
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warrant would have impeded a promising police investigation and
conceivably provided the added time ***needed to avoid capture
altogether."
We are dealing with a "basic principle of Fourth Amendment
law that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant
are presumptively unreasonable." Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551,
559, 157 L. Ed. 2d 1068, 124 S. Ct. 1284 (2004), quoting Payton,
445 U.S. at 586. To rebut that presumption we must find "the
exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so
compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment." Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385,
393-94, 57 L. Ed. 2d 290, 98 S. Ct. 2408 (1978). We see no such
exigencies in this record. The State fails to offer any good
reason why an arrest warrant was not obtained in this case. If
the facts of this case are enough to authorize a nonconsensual
entry and arrest in a private home, the "basic principle of
Fourth Amendment law" referred to by the Supreme Court has little
meaning. Not much would be left of the warrant requirement.
We find the trial court erred when it denied the defendant's
motion to suppress the gun.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
The defendant next contends that the evidence was
insufficient to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The
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defendant argues Hibbler's identification testimony was
completely unreliable in light of his unimpeached version of the
events because Hibbler had a poor opportunity to view the
offender's face, her description of the offender varied, the
photo array with which she was presented was suggestive and took
place more than two weeks after the crime, and she expressed
uncertainty when identifying him.
When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence,
the issue presented is whether, after viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond
a reasonable doubt. People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261, 478
N.E.2d 267 (1985); People v. Slayton, 363 Ill. App. 3d 27, 31,
842 N.E.2d 1168 (2006). The determination of the credibility of
witnesses and the weight to give their testimony are issues for
the fact-finder to decide and the fact-finder's conclusions are
entitled to great deference. People v. Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d
274, 279-80, 818 N.E.2d 304 (2004).
In Slayton, this court noted that "[t]he identification of
defendant by a single witness is sufficient to sustain a
conviction despite testimony to the contrary, provided the
witness is credible and observed defendant under circumstances
that would permit a positive identification to be made."
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Slayton, 363 Ill. App. 3d at 31. We also noted that
"[d]iscrepancies in features such as height are not dispositive
because few persons are capable of making accurate estimations of
such characteristics." Slayton, 363 Ill. App. 3d at 31.
In this case, Hibbler testified no less than three times
that she was able to see the face of the offender in the black
coat. She was in the offender's presence for the entire
incident, which she estimated to last between three and six
minutes, and identified the defendant as that offender at trial,
as well as in a photographic array and a lineup. Although she
told the police the offender was approximately six inches shorter
than the defendant's height, she testified at trial that the
offender was taller than Coverson, who was about five feet, eight
inches tall, as she was able to see his face while he grabbed
Coverson from behind. The jury was presented with detailed
testimony describing the photographic array Hibbler viewed, the
circumstances under which she identified the defendant, and her
possible credibility issues. It was for the jury to determine
whether Hibbler was believable.
When viewed in the light most favorable to the State,
Hibbler's testimony is sufficient to support a guilty verdict.
III. Prosecutorial Misconduct
The defendant next contends that several aspects of the
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prosecution's closing and rebuttal arguments amounted to
misconduct that denied him his right to a fair and impartial
trial. Since the evidence in the new trial will be different, we
see no purpose in examining the prosecutor's comments.
IV. Lineup Evidence
The defendant contends Claeson's testimony that he refused
to participate in a lineup and the State's use of this evidence
in its closing argument denied him his right to a fair trial.
The defendant acknowledges he failed to properly preserve this
issue for review, but contends we should review the issue under
the plain error doctrine. Because the evidence of his refusal to
participate in a lineup, if improperly admitted, may affect his
right to a fair trial, we will review the merits of the
defendant's contention. People v. McGee, 245 Ill. App. 3d 703,
705, 614 N.E.2d 1320 (1993); see also People v. Kennedy, 33 Ill.
App. 3d 857, 861, 338 N.E.2d 414 (1975).
As the defendant acknowledges, his participation in a lineup
does not implicate his fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination and he had no right to refuse to participate. See
McGee, 245 Ill. App. 3d at 710, citing United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149, 87 S. Ct. 1926 (1967). The
defendant, however, contends that evidence of his refusal to
participate in a lineup was inadmissible evidence of his
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consciousness of guilt. The defendant relies primarily on
Kennedy, 33 Ill. App. 3d 857, and People v. Warner, 121 Ill. App.
3d 322, 459 N.E.2d 1053 (1984), for support.
Neither Kennedy nor Warner involves a defendant's refusal to
participate in a lineup; rather, in both cases the defendants
refused to give a voice sample. In Kennedy, the court held that
because the defendant, who was accused of making bomb threats
over the telephone, was advised of his Miranda rights but was not
told his refusal to give a voice sample could be used against
him, his refusal could not be introduced at trial as an admission
of his guilt as it "may well have been an exercise of his right
to remain silent which the officers had conveyed to him without
qualification." Kennedy, 33 Ill. App. 3d at 862. Warner,
which involved a defendant's refusal to say "[h]ey you" during a
lineup, followed Kennedy and held the defendant's refusal to say
the words could not be introduced at trial where he had been
advised of his rights under Miranda but not told his refusal to
say the words was not protected. Warner, 121 Ill. App. 3d at
326-27.
Kennedy and Warner can be distinguished from this case. In
those cases, the defendants were specifically advised they had
the right to remain silent and that anything they said could be
used against them. It was reasonable for them, as lay persons,
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to believe they did not have to use their voices, and that their
refusal could not be introduced at trial. See Kennedy, 33 Ill.
App. 3d at 862. That reasoning does not apply in this case,
where the defendant was not asked to use his voice, but was told
to stand silently in a lineup. Further, in McGee, 245 Ill. App.
3d at 711, the court rejected the defendant's contention that the
admission of evidence demonstrating his refusal to participate in
a lineup constituted error. As in that case, we cannot say that
the probative value of the defendant's refusal in this case was
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See
McGee, 245 Ill. App. 3d at 711. His contention is rejected.
V. 20 Year Sentencing Add-On
Because we remand for a new trial, we see no need to discuss
defendant's sentencing issue.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the circuit
court of Cook County is reversed and this cause is remanded for a
new trial.
Reversed and remanded.
HALL, J., concurs.
GARCIA, J., dissents.
JUSTICE GARCIA, dissenting:
On the issue of "unnecessary delay," our supreme court has
spoken: "'[U]nnecessary delay' is to be measured not from the
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time when police officers learn the suspect's location but from
the time they obtain probable cause to arrest." (Emphasis
added.) People v. White, 117 Ill. 2d 194, 218, 512 N.E.2d 677
(1987). I have not found a single case where passage of time
between the crime and the development of probable cause has been
considered in deciding whether exigent circumstances are present
to justify a warrantless arrest. The absence of such case law
is, of course, understandable given that the reasonableness of
the officers' conduct is at issue. See Abney, 81 Ill. 2d 159,
173, 407 N.E.2d 543 (1980) ("The guiding principle is
reasonableness under constitutional provisions governing searches
and seizures"). In the absence of probable cause to arrest, the
officers could not have taken any action either to apprehend the
suspect or to seek a warrant. Cf. White, 117 Ill. 2d 194.
Accordingly, I am compelled to conclude that the mere passage of
time between the crime and the development of probable cause
cannot be considered "deliberate or unjustified delay by the
officers during which time a warrant could have been obtained."
Abney, 81 Ill. 2d at 170.
In White, our supreme court based its finding that the
defendant's warrantless arrest on August 23 was not justified by
exigent circumstances because the record, while not precise,
showed "the police seem[ed] to have received probable cause in
the form of statements by eyewitnesses shortly after the killings
on August 12." White, 117 Ill. 2d at 219. The supreme court
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noted that under more alarming facts, a contrary decision might
be warranted. "The considerations in favor of a finding of
exigency are those related to the gravity of the crime, the
possibility that the defendant was armed, and the further
possibility that he might attempt to escape. In the proper case,
we might find these considerations decisive." White, 117 Ill. 2d
at 219.
Certainly this case amply demonstrates the gravity of the
crimes that the defendant had committed; that the officers
reasonably believed that the defendant was armed cannot be
gainsaid; and, that he might attempt to escape apprehension seems
beyond contention. These considerations are decisive in this
case in favor of a finding of exigency.
I would think the majority would have found exigent
circumstances to justify the defendant's arrest at his home had
the identification of the defendant occurred within 12 hours of
the murder. Yet, the majority offers no reason to conclude that
the officers were any less reasonable in seeking to apprehend the
defendant immediately upon developing clear probable cause when
the crimes the defendant had committed were no less grave (they
were still murder and robbery) within the hour and a half of
developing probable cause; the record is barren of any basis to
conclude the defendant was not still armed (in fact, he was
doubly armed with the handgun he used in committing the murder
and a rifle with a high capacity magazine) during that hour and a
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half; and, had the defendant been tipped to the eyewitness having
been to the police station to view a photo display, he
undoubtedly would have sought to escape (this inference is
warranted based on his reaction at the time of his arrest-he
reached in the direction of the handgun). As the assistant
State's Attorney argued in the pretrial hearing, the arresting
officers knew the defendant could be armed, knew the weapon used
in the murder had not been recovered, and knew that the victim
had been shot numerous times during the course of the robbery.
The officers were also aware that the defendant knew of the
existence of an eyewitness as he and his accomplice attempted to
force her into the victim's car. "The desirability of
apprehending such an individual is obvious, and an officer's
reaction should not be unduly criticized unless we are to
encourage unreliable, time-consuming speculation as to whether
more violence will occur while a warrant is sought." Abney, 81
Ill. 2d at 171. The supreme court's conclusion in Abney is
equally apt here: "[T]he officers who entered defendant's home
were presented an unusual opportunity to quickly apprehend an
armed suspect and thereby prevent his escape, avoid exhaustion of
law-enforcement resources, and help ensure against further
endangerment to the community." 2 Abney, 81 Ill. 2d at 169.
2
In this vein it bears noting, although unbeknownst to the officers at the time of their
arrest of the defendant, the defendant had preyed on the same community in the previous year by
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committing like-violent crimes. The record establishes that both the charged murder in this case
and the prior year's crimes occurred within a four-block radius of his home.
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With this case, the majority has imposed a standard upon the
police that is too high when balanced against the threat posed by
a defendant remaining at large while a warrant is being sought.
Officers must be free to act upon the gravity of the crime, the
dangerousness of the individual, and the corresponding need to
apprehend the suspect quickly so long as they act reasonably
under the circumstances present (which includes acting nearly
immediately upon having probable cause to arrest). Given that
the defendant was arrested within an hour and a half of
developing probable cause, the officers could reasonably believe
that an immediate arrest of the defendant was warranted under the
circumstances. The officers' conduct was reasonable as "they did
not contemplate their course of conduct for an extended period of
time." Abney, 81 Ill. 2d 171. Here, as in People v. Yates, 98
Ill. 2d 502, 517, 456 N.E.2d 1369 (1983), "the trial court
correctly found no constitutional infirmity in defendant's
warrantless arrest."
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
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