The City of Chicago v. Beythel Outcast Church

FIFTH DIVISION
July 27, 2007
No. 1-06-1724
THE CITY OF CHICAGO, a municipal ) Appeal from the
corporation, ) Circuit Court of
) Cook County.
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
)
v. )
)
BEYTHEL OUTCAST CHURCH, n/k/a Beth-El )
All Nation Church of God in Christ; )
REVEREND EDGAR JACKSON; and UNKNOWN )
OWNERS and NONRECORD CLAIMANTS, )
1534-40 West 63rd Street, Chicago, )
IL 60629, ) Honorable
) Ann Houser,
Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE GALLAGHER delivered the opinion of the court:
Plaintiff, the City of Chicago (City), appeals from the
trial court's dismissal of the City's amended complaint against
defendants, Beythel Outcast Church and Reverend Edgar Jackson
(Church), for lack of jurisdiction over the City as a defendant.
On appeal, the City asserts the trial court erred in ruling that
the City needed to name itself as a defendant in its own
complaint. We reverse.
The Church has not filed a response brief; however, we may
proceed under the principles addressed in First Capitol Mortgage
Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133 (1976).
1-06-1724
In a previous opinion, we explained the manner in which the
City obtained title to the property located at 1534 West 63rd
Street in Chicago, Illinois (Property). City of Chicago v. Beth-
El All Nations Church of God in Christ, No. 1-04-0364 (July 31,
2005) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). The
Church was previously the registered owner of the Property;
however, state and county records indicated no taxes had been
paid on the Property from 1986 through 1995. Cook County
acquired the Property in 1997 and assigned its rights in the
Property to the City in 1998. The City also obtained a tax deed
to the Property in 1998.
Although the City held title to the Property, the Church
remained in possession. The Property operates as both a church
and a retail furniture store.
On August 27, 2004, the City filed a complaint against the
Church, alleging the Property, which the Church "owned,
maintained, operated, collected rents for, or had an interest
in," was in violation of the Chicago Municipal Code (Code). The
City alleged building code violations for (1) problems with
ornamental projections;(2) washed-out mortar on a parapet; (3)
pealing paint on exterior wood; and (4) loose or missing paint on
window panes. The City also alleged the building was dangerous.
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In addition, the City sought fines of $2,000 for each day that
violations existed, injunctive relief, appointment of a receiver
to bring the Property into compliance with the Code, and other
relief if necessary.
On October 22, 2004, the City filed an amended complaint,
adding several Code violations for (1) loose and bulging stone
work; (2) an improper flue pipe; (3) the close proximity between
the flue pipe and wall; (4) lack of light bulbs in exit signs;
(5) lack of carbon monoxide detectors; (6) peeling paint; and (5)
a loose sash and missing putty from window panes. The City also
requested fines of $5,500 per day and an additional $15,966.40
for costs incurred from the installation of protective canopies.
On December 3, 2004, the Church filed an answer, denying
ownership of the Property. The Church also claimed that the
violations had been corrected or were in the process of being
corrected. The Church raised a counterclaim that the City
illegally took title to the Property through a tax deed
proceeding, interfered with the Church's ability to borrow money
against the Property, and conducted unwarranted inspections to
interfere with the Church's quiet title.
On June 17, 2005, the trial commenced and Sam Clark, a City
building inspector, testified regarding the condition of the
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Property. He also testified that at his inspection of the
Property on December 2, 2004, young church members or students
were present. On September 19, 2005, the court ordered the
parties to submit briefs addressing whether the court had proper
jurisdiction over all necessary parties.
On October 19, 2005, the City filed a memorandum of law
arguing that the City, the Church and Reverend Edgar Jackson were
the only necessary parties and had all been joined to this
action. The City also asserted its interests were fully
represented by virtue of the City's presence in the case as a
plaintiff, and therefore, it was unnecessary to add itself to the
case as a defendant. The City further asserted that it was not
required to sue itself. The record does not indicate that the
Church submitted a brief.
On February 27, 2006, the court ruled that it did not have
jurisdiction over all necessary parties because the City had not
been joined as a defendant. The court also found that as a
property owner, the City had some responsibility to address
violations. The court struck the City's complaint and granted
the City 60 days to file an amended complaint.
On May 2, 2006, the City filed a "memorandum of law and
objection to February 27, 2006 Ruling and Order," asking the
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court to reconsider its order. The City again asserted that the
trial court had jurisdiction over all necessary parties and that
the City was not required to name itself as a defendant in its
own complaint.
On May 22, 2006, the trial court denied the City's motion to
reconsider its order and dismissed the action because the City
failed to file an amended complaint as directed by the court's
order.
On June 14, 2006, the City filed a notice of appeal from the
trial court's order dismissing the action.
On appeal, the City asserts that the trial court erred in
ruling that it lacked jurisdiction because the City failed to
name itself as a defendant in its own complaint. Further, the
City correctly concedes that it was necessary for the City to be
a party in this action, but asserts that bringing its claims as a
plaintiff satisfied that requirement. In addition, the City
contends that assuming it had some responsibility to correct Code
violations, the Church could have asserted joint liability with
the City in its counterclaim.
A necessary party must be joined in an action or an order
entered without jurisdiction over that party is void.
Yorulmazoglu v. Lake Forest Hospital, 359 Ill. App. 3d 554, 561
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(2005), citing Schnuck Markets, Inc. v. Soffer, 213 Ill. App. 3d
957, 982 (1991). A necessary party is one whose presence in an
action is required to (1) protect that party's interest in the
controversy which would be materially affected by a judgment
entered in her absence; (2) protect the interests of the parties
before the court; or (3) enable the court to completely determine
the controversy. Caparos v. Morton, 364 Ill. App. 3d 159, 175
(2006). However, an absent party is not required to be joined
when a party in the action effectively protects the absent
party's interests under the doctrine of representation.
Caparos, 364 Ill. App. 3d at 176. Although provisions of the
Code of Civil Procedure address the need to join parties to an
action, none require a plaintiff already in an action to be
joined in the action again as a defendant. See 735 ILCS 5/2-404
through 2-407 (West 2004). Furthermore, this court has held that
"a party may not be both plaintiff and defendant in an action."
Hume v. Town of Blackberry, 131 Ill. App. 3d 32, 34 (1985).
Here, the City's presence in this action as the plaintiff
was adequate. The City, as plaintiff, sufficiently protected its
own interest in this controversy. Naming itself as a defendant
would not enable the City to protect its interests anymore
effectively.
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We agree with the City that the Church's interests were also
protected because the Church was free to assert joint liability
with the City or raise other defenses against it. In addition,
we find no reason why the trial court was not able to completely
adjudicate the controversy with the City present in this action
as the plaintiff. Furthermore, the City could not be both the
plaintiff and defendant. Hume, 131 Ill. App. 3d at 35. Finally,
although the Code does state that the owner of the property
"shall be liable" for violations, the Code does not state that
the City is required to sue all parties with liability, including
itself as an owner. Chicago Municipal Code, §13-12-020 (2000).
As noted, the Church was free to raise the issue of the City's
liability in a counterclaim, which it filed.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the
trial court and remand for further proceedings.
O'BRIEN, P.J., and O'MARA FROSSARD, J., concur.
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